

Philosophy of Mind and the Problem of Personal Integration

Chapter One

I

It is not an exaggeration to say that since the writings of Descartes, mentality or consciousness has become the central area of philosophical attention and investigation. But it is not just mentality as mentality which has taken center stage; it is rather mentality as grasped and experienced self-reflectively. Indeed it is largely through the writings of Descartes that this has occurred, for it is he who explicitly and systemically directed the gaze of awareness inwardly and in so doing helped create a world, the world of self-reflective consciousness or self, within the larger non-self-reflective world.

Recently, say over the last thirty years or so, activity within this and related areas has expanded at an even greater rate than usual. The expansion has been so great that even the names given to the enterprise have undergone change. What was once called "philosophy of mind" and "philosophical psychology" is now called "philosophy of psychology" or "cognitive science," and, most recently, "neurophilosophy." These developments suggest that besides the great deal of work that is being done within the discipline, there is also a great deal of self-conscious work being done on the nature of this work. Not only has attention been directed at the content of the discipline; it has also been directed at the goals, presuppositions, tools, and methodology of the discipline.

This, of course, is a healthy and positive situation and the work that has been produced is both important and impressive. But while there is much good here, there have also been some unfortunate developments. As work has proceeded, the discipline has become more and more narrowly fo-

2 Consciousness

cused.¹ The focus has been on a cluster of questions which relate to the ontology or nature of the mental; and the primary concern has been to understand and explain the similarities and differences between the mental and physical or, better yet, to show there is an identity of the mental and physical, with the former reduced to the latter. Understandably, a good deal of this theorizing is directed at avoiding as much as possible the absurdities and embarrassments of dualism, especially substance dualism. But what is unfortunate is that as a result of such emphases what can be called “lived consciousness” or “lived sense of self” has been largely, perhaps entirely, ignored.

For example, when consciousness in its phenomenological presence is investigated, it is almost never in its own terms or in its character as a dimension of a life being lived; rather it is investigated as a phenomenon which is at least potentially embarrassing for some form or other of materialism. Similarly with self, for when it is treated, it is not from the standpoint of *being* a self or living a life — well or ill — as a self, but from the standpoint of personal identity, conceived in a general, abstract and impersonal fashion. As we have become more and more knowledgeable concerning the workings of the brain and both in imagination and actuality are able to separate out parts of the brain from each other and the brain from the rest of the body, questions about personal identity have become more complex and intriguing. But from this standpoint, the question of personal identity becomes, to a significant degree, a matter of physiological, or even sometimes logical, structure and is no longer entirely, or even primarily, a question of psychological structure or of psychological experience.

There is, of course, no doubt that questions concerning the nature of the mental and its relationship to the physical are both relevant and crucial. Indeed, it seems reasonably clear that, at the very least, the mental is physically based. The idea of freely flowing, unattached mentality is, I think, defective in a profound fashion. Even though many people talk about such a phenomenon and on the surface there does not appear to be anything incoherent about such talk, I think such talk is a symptom of deep seated distortions within consciousness. With consciousness properly experienced and understood, claims of this sort would be seen as unintelligible.² We would then not talk about a disembodied mentality or disembodied mental states or properties.

These remarks, however, do not commit me to a form of materialism within which it is not possible to discuss consciousness. Whatever ontology my views ultimately entail — some form or other of materialism or a dual

aspect theory or something else — I wish to discuss consciousness and sense of self, not as embarrassments we have to explain or explain away, but as fundamental constituents of the kind of life we lead — indeed, as the very phenomena which make human life what it is.

However important the ontological question, it leaves quite untouched a more fundamental and, apparently, inescapable question. For whatever ontology I endorse, *I still must determine how to live*. This is unavoidable; and adopting any version of materialism or dualism does not, at least at this point in the development of consciousness, solve the problem of how to live. To be sure, if certain theories are adopted and, more so, turn out to be true, we may need to see how our everyday concepts can be understood and modified in light of what these theories teach us. And, I suppose, as an extreme outcome of the *deep acceptance* of certain theories, our experience of life may, over an extended period of time, come to be radically altered. Certainly, if consciousness is developmental and historical, as I think it is, it can change; and perhaps it can even change to the extent that the felt reality that one must determine how to live is no longer felt at all.

These last remarks, of course, are prompted by the recent wave of attacks on what has come to be called, with an unfortunate use of emotive language, “folk psychology” (FP). The suggestion that FP be eliminated and replaced by the insights and language of a mature neuroscience is radical to an extent that is almost impossible to state. Whether proponents of elimination are aware of it or not, it is not just a call to change how we think and talk about experience, but is a call to alter how we see and experience the world at its most fundamental levels — levels, it might be added, at which most, perhaps all, of us are not even aware.

To make such a proposal, one must have a conviction that what is called folk psychology is distorting, deceiving, and systematically wrong. And wrong not just in its presentational or representational content, but also, more radically, wrong in the modes by which it presents or represents. From this point of view, the basic categories of the mental, *i.e.*, belief, desire, and the like, are seen to be defective, virtual fantasies creating a totally mistaken sense of experience. To be convinced of this is to be convinced that all of us, as we walk about, are in systematic and complete error about the way the world is, and the way we and others are. And, again, this is not just error about this or that, but is systematic, structural error or illusion. Obviously, this is no small claim.

It is, however, quite interesting how both those who attack and those who defend FP do not see the depth of the suggestion for elimination. For

4 Consciousness

example, Horgan and Woodward, defenders of FP, claim that “the wholesale rejection of FP would . . . entail a drastic revision of our conceptual scheme.”³ This, however, is the least of the matter, for how could such a revision take place? There is here not only the suggestion that our “conceptual scheme” could undergo a “drastic revision,” but an implication that there is something outside the conceptual scheme in terms of which the revision would be accomplished. But what could this possibly be? What, other than elaborations, modifications and alterations of the conceptual scheme could alter the conceptual scheme? It appears Horgan and Woodward’s remarks are undergirded by an assumption that there is some neutral, non-conceptualized, perhaps abiding and unchanging, realm of mentality which, with the proper conceptual scheme, will be adequately conceptualized. Implicit in this kind of talk about drastic revision of our conceptual scheme is a split between content and form, or conceptual system and life, such that the one can be separated from the other without significant or fundamental alteration of either.

This, however, is a very problematic model. For there appears to be a mutual interconnection between mentality in its various manifestations and FP. There are not two separately existing realms which are somehow accidentally and contingently pasted together. Rather, FP is constitutive of mentality as mentality is constitutive of FP. The seeds of mentality not only have developed as they have, but have developed at all, because they have produced and, in turn, been permeated by FP. If, per impossible, FP is rejected in total, there would be nothing left over which could be called mentality. To attempt to eliminate FP is not just to remove an extraneous, replaceable feature of how we see and experience life in its various aspects; it is to remove our very seeing and experiencing of life.

These remarks, however, should not be taken to imply that FP cannot and ought not be modified, developed and altered. Not only is such change possible; in many instances it is needed. These, however, would be changes within FP; they would be developments and refinements of FP, not replacements of FP with something else. As I have suggested, such a wholesale replacement is impossible and unintelligible.

Yet, it is probably possible, *over an extended period of time*, to alter FP so radically that the way we now see and experience life would be only dimly recognizable. Such change, however, cannot occur by way of the discovery or creation of a new language for dealing with mentality. If FP is constitutive of how we see and experience life, in depth change will occur only as we come to identify and “work through,” concretely and personally, the ele-

ments which constitute our sense of the world and our lives. Any suggestion concerning what is ultimately real and how we ought to talk which derives from elements extraneous to how we see and experience life will simply roll down the back of the complex depths of how our folk psychological concepts constitute our experience of life.

II

While it is somewhat surprising that defenders of FP fail to see the full character of the call for the elimination of FP, it is not surprising that opponents of FP do not fully appreciate the matter. Paul Churchland, certainly one of the staunchest critics of FP, chides functionalists for their alleged conservatism concerning FP.⁴ The implication, of course, is that Churchland and other eliminative materialists are not conservative, but are genuine radicals. But I doubt Churchland appreciates the full force of his radicalism. In *Matter and Consciousness*, he writes that the bottom up approach — *i.e.*, the focus on the material bases of behavior rather than on the mentalistic phenomena stressed by FP — will produce “. . . a new and more adequate set of concepts with which to understand our inner life.”⁵ This suggests there is some inner life separate from the concepts of FP, that removal of the concepts leaves an unconceptualized inner life which can then be more adequately understood with the new concepts developed by neuroscience.

However, it is again not clear what this inner life would be — unless, that is, it is something entirely different from the inner life which is experienced as consciousness. And, of course, that’s what Churchland has in mind. The inner life which can survive the elimination of FP is not the inner life which enables us to relate to the world in the manner we do. The outcome of Churchland’s proposal would be the elimination of what is universally experienced as our inner life and the provision of another inner life which cannot function — at least without considerable explanatory detail of how it could — as the inner life of a reflective creature must if the creature is to survive. That is, the inner life which enables us to act in the world as we do is FP; it is not the brain states which can be described separate from FP. We can, of course, recognize that brain states provide the physical basis of the inner life expressed by FP; but this is far indeed from replacing the inner life expressed by FP with a set of descriptions of brain states.

That Churchland accepts a distinction between an inner life that exists separate from FP and can be radically severed from FP can be seen still

6 Consciousness

more clearly if we look at one of his arguments against FP. In the context of a rejection of various folk theories concerning the physical world, Churchland writes about FP: “. . . it would be a *miracle* if we had got *that* one right the very first time. . . .”⁶ This is a very interesting and revealing remark, for it suggests that at that time, there existed something to be got right or wrong; that at the dawn of reflective consciousness there was already in existence a mental life which could have been adequately understood by a set of concepts and theories. But how could there have been such a mental life or set of concepts and theories by means of which that mental life could be adequately grasped? These are all elements of consciousness, and, as such, need to develop, and come to be over extended periods of time. They are not and cannot be present, “fully formed,” at the dawn of reflective consciousness. There was thus nothing to have gotten right or wrong; there was only the beginning in pre-reflective awareness of what has come to be our reflective mental life.⁷

Although just how one would prove this is uncertain, consciousness, and especially reflective consciousness, is developmental and historical. In part, the awareness which is consciousness develops in terms of a secondary awareness of the original, primordial awareness. This secondary awareness or understanding is, in part, creative and so also expansive and enlarging. And this enlargement of consciousness, of which FP is one inherent and central dimension, includes the sense we develop of ourselves and our lives. Thus, if we are to alter and improve our understanding of ourselves and our lives, we must work through FP. One can miss this, I think, only if one's attention is not on consciousness, but on something else, such as brain states. If consciousness is held to *be* brain states, then it is understandable how one might say that we could have got things right the first time, for presumably—though this too is questionable—the brain states that were mental states five or ten thousand years ago would be the non-numerically same brain states that would be mental states today.

If consciousness is developmental and historical, the sorts of entities which are conscious are developmental in a way in which entities which are not conscious, say rocks and trees, are not. Rocks and trees do, of course, undergo change; but such change is simply mechanical and physical, involving no elements of awareness at all. Even beings somewhere between rocks and trees, on the one hand, and human beings, on the other—dogs and cats for example—do not undergo change in the unique manner in which reflective creatures do. Dogs and cats—that is, pre-reflective creatures—do not undergo changes which involve representational or symbolic systems which can be directed onto the environment, the creature doing the

representing or the mode of representation itself. Though dogs, cats, and the like, do direct themselves onto the world in definite ways, *i.e.*, act or at least behave, they are severely limited by their inability to develop the awareness which issues in reflective self-awareness and the development of modifiable and expandable symbol systems. The emergence of such reflective awareness and its peculiar mode of operation thus constitutes a new stage in the development of consciousness, a stage which I call “reflective consciousness.” Since this development is expressed by and manifested in FP—indeed, comes about in part through the development of FP—the latter is constitutive of reflective consciousness, and is in fact an essential part of what enables us to experience life in the peculiar self-reflective fashion we do.

The language and concepts of FP seem to play an essential, constitutive role in our having the sort of inner life that we have. But if this is so, it tells dramatically against the eliminativist’s goal of having the language of FP replaced by a language of neuroscience. To talk about spiking frequencies and the like rather than about pain or belief or desire would, I think, accomplish either of two things. If, over some extended period of time, reflective creatures came to the point of talking exclusively in terms of spiking frequencies and the like, it is not clear how they would be able to act. It appears that action is tied not only to phenomena such as belief and desire, but also to various semantical features of language, such as meaning, reference and truth. In the absence of such phenomena, it is not clear how beings of the sort *reflective* creatures are could act. Their use of the language of spiking frequencies could not do the job FP does because the language of spiking frequencies does not include the mental states and linguistic phenomena which appear to be necessary for action. It thus appears that the literal and total rejection of FP would produce a creature incapable of action and so incapable of survival.

But perhaps this conclusion is too extreme; perhaps the language of spiking frequencies could provide the elements necessary for action. To be sure, the creature so speaking and acting would be scarcely recognizable to us; but lack of recognition is not equivalent to impossibility. However, while some sort of conceivability is present here, those who champion it must provide at least some of the explanatory details of what would be involved. And such explanatory detail must allow for the production of action, not just mechanical behavior or reaction. Personally, I am not confident that anything of the sort could be provided. Rather, I suspect that in order to tie the language of spiking frequencies sensibly to action, the former would have to incorporate, though perhaps in somewhat different forms, the very

mental states and semantics previously contained in FP. If, however, this were the case, the very same problems which led to the call for the elimination of FP would be present within the new language of neuroscience.

The eliminative materialist thus seems to be confronted by a dilemma: either there is a genuine elimination of the elements and language of FP; or those elements are incorporated within the new, emerging language of neuroscience. If the former occurs, we no longer have a recognizably reflective, somewhat self-directing creature, for the elimination of belief, desire, and the like, as well as the semantical properties of language, seem to eliminate the possibility of acting in the way that is characteristic of reflective creatures. If, however, the latter occurs and the elements of FP which enable action are absorbed into the language of neuroscience, the exact problems which suggested the elimination of FP would simply be reproduced in the new language.

My sense here is that the kind of elimination which is being suggested for FP is just not possible, that any alteration would itself be an elaboration of FP and, perhaps most importantly, constructive alteration would itself have to come from within FP. This last remark suggests a significant area of agreement between the views presently being put forth and those of the eliminative materialist. As the latter suggests, FP is indeed defective, perhaps even radically defective, and so needs to be modified. But whereas the eliminativist suggests elimination, my suggestion is that the changes must come from within FP and so must be modifications of FP and not a move to something entirely different.

But how, it may be asked, can change be accomplished from within FP? Although this is one of the main topics of these writings and will be treated in a number of contexts as we proceed, a few brief and general comments are now appropriate. One aspect of accomplishing desirable change would involve becoming aware, patiently, over time, of how we experience ourselves and the world by means of the categories and the assumptions of FP. If these are constitutive of consciousness and so of our experience of life, then, collectively and individually, we need to see just how and to what degree these elements provide both a structure for, and the content of, experience. That is, we must openly and at depth become aware of how we experience life and the world via these elements. As we become more and more aware of the various dimensions which are constitutively structured by FP, we will enlarge our understanding of how we see things and, hopefully, be in a position to create a more realistic and fulfilling way of experiencing ourselves and the world.

These remarks imply that it is quite legitimate to see philosophy of mind as including within its scope topics such as fragmentation, alienation, integration and the living of the good and fulfilled life. Typically, however, such topics are *not* treated within contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of mind. The reasons for such exclusions are complex and deep, but at one level they are related to the focus on the ontology of the mental, its relation to the physical, and the problem of personal identity. Such concerns are abstract and impersonal and so relate to particular instances only insofar as these instances exemplify the features of the abstract, impersonal case. There is, of course, a similar abstract/particular contrast involved in discussions of fragmentation, integration and the like. We do want to achieve adequate abstract and general characterizations of these phenomena, but such achievement, I will argue, is dependent on some degree at least of actual experiential understanding of these states by the inquiring individual. Explicating the ontology of the mental or the concept of personal identity does not involve this sort of experiential understanding, though of course such work does unfold against the background of one's awareness that one is a particular conscious being. Explicating fragmentation, integration, and the like, involves a grasp of the *particular ways* one is a particular conscious being; and this demands a level of experiential awareness and attention that is not needed in the other analyses.

Although the above approach has a very different foundation and points to very different outcomes than does eliminative materialism, there is yet an additional affinity between the two approaches. For both are suggesting that a clearer and more adequate understanding of our lives — and so a more fulfilling existence — will emerge if we properly understand the nature and workings of our minds. This stress on quality of life or how one lives is, I think, crucial and I see no reason why philosophy of mind cannot be understood so as to include such topics. Indeed, why study the mind at all, if it does not, at least at some points, become a study of the most propitious manner (or manners) in which the mind can operate within life experience. And if this is allowed as legitimate, so also is it legitimate to see how the particular mind we call “our own” can come to operate in this propitious manner.

III

If integration and fulfillment involve working through the elements which comprise FP and which structure our experience of life and the world, there must be some available manner by which these elements can be iden-

tified. If they cannot be identified, we cannot get at how we actually see and experience the world and so we will remain unaware within these perspectives.

If, for a moment, we focus on integration and fulfillment, there are three significant implications of the above remarks. I will briefly mention these now and treat them in greater detail later. First, integration and fulfillment are not simply given. They are not automatic properties of creatures who are reflectively conscious; rather, they are phenomena which, if existing at all, have been attained. Second, these phenomena consist of *being in certain mental states* which, in ways to be explained, cohere with the objective nature of the world, one's organism and one's distinctive mode of being. That is, on both a concrete, specific level, and a more general level, one experiences life, lives life, in certain ways. Although these topics can only be touched on at this point, one lives within the moment, spontaneously experiencing and reacting to the situation as it is; more generally, one lives within a realistic understanding and acceptance of one's larger life situation, taking responsibility for the focus and direction of one's energies. Such a life, uniquely possible for reflective creatures, involves absorption within the moment, but with the moment experienced as involving past "determination" and future unfolding. It is thus not a narrow preoccupation with various disconnected and arbitrary demands of the moment.

Third, following from the second point, and modifying the first point, these phenomena are not simply a matter of having correct beliefs or adequate theories. Integration and fulfillment are phenomena involving the internal distributional lay of the entire organism; they are not phenomena generated by one aspect of the organism—reason—adopting views which may not flow coherently from the totality of the organism and which are then externally imposed on the organism.

Integration and fulfillment involve psychic and emotional movement of the sort which require identification of the mental states we undergo at various times, as well as knowledge of why we are undergoing them at that time, what are their causes at various levels, and with what other mental states they are connected. Such probings deepen our understanding of ourselves, for from them there emerges a *felt awareness* that is sharper and wider than previously existed. But such probings also deepen our understanding of the world, for in becoming more aware of ourselves, we become more aware of the beliefs, desires, wishes, fears etc. which we bring with us to experience. Being aware of these, we can then begin to separate out our own reactions to situations from those situations themselves. This, in turn, pro-

vides one with an awareness of alternatives to one's dominant perceptions of oneself, others and the world. Finally, such awareness is a step toward positive alteration or modification of how one sees and experiences life and the world. From this perspective, integration and fulfillment involve a transformation of one's fundamental ways of being in the world.

But if this is so, we are again back — though this time with greater urgency — to the problem of identifying our actual mental states. Although beset with numerous difficulties, the method which I think we must employ is identification through phenomenology. The reason why phenomenology is central to the enterprise is relatively clear: since integration and fulfillment are actual states of the individual, they involve experiencing certain mental states. These states must supplant⁸ the pre-integrative states of the individual and for this to occur the latter must be identified. Given that the pre-integrative states are the experience of the moment, focusing on the experience, *feeling* it in its full range and at various levels of depth, will reveal the elements which constitute the experience.

The method of phenomenological identification, however, is beset with at least three major difficulties. First, there is the obvious point that at least sometimes we do not know what mental state or states we are experiencing. Assuming the mental state in question has a phenomenology, we can cover over this phenomenology either by failing or refusing to assign it its proper name. Innocently, we may be genuinely confused, uncertain of just what we are feeling; more ominously, we may not want to know what we are feeling. In the latter case, we may believe or think or convince ourselves that we are experiencing *x*, while in actuality we are experiencing *y*. For example, one may be angry, but simply deny it and insist one is indifferent. Here, a present phenomenology and so its mental state, anger, is simply misnamed; but, in a more complex fashion, the actual phenomenology may to various degrees be concealed by a manufactured, but not actually functioning, phenomenology of a different, also non-functioning, mental state, in this case, indifference.⁹ Thus, actual, though unacknowledged phenomenologies and their interconnected mental states can in various ways be distorted, misnamed and hidden. As a result, phenomenological identification cannot simply function as a magical entrance into our actual mental states.

But however powerful this objection is, it is not an objection against the method of phenomenological identification; rather it is an objection against an overly simple use of that method. What the objection reveals is that the mechanisms of consciousness are such that phenomenologies and their intrinsic mental states can, in a variety of ways, be masked, covered

over, or hidden by other activities and aspects of consciousness. The way out of this difficulty is not a rejection of phenomenological identification, but an awareness of the pitfalls of the method and so a more careful and judicious use of it. Briefly, this would involve the cultivation of the ability to trustingly relax into one's experiences so that their various dimensions will reveal or manifest themselves to explicit awareness. Such manifestations will be a complex of felt aspects of the experience—and these aspects will either have a distinctive phenomenology or will be internally connected to an aspect (or aspects) of the experience which does have a phenomenology.

These identifications and associations enable us to move more deeply into our inner lives and, since we are parts or aspects of the larger world process, into the way the world is as well. As suggested previously, it is through such movement that integration and fulfillment become possible. The method of phenomenological identification is as crucial as it is, for it enables us to be in touch with the felt quality of our lives. If integration and fulfillment are, to a significant degree, matters of the felt quality of our lives, we must work through the felt quality of our lives to attain them.

A second objection to the identification of mental states by phenomenology involves the claim that a large number of mental states do not have a phenomenology. Propositional attitudes, and especially beliefs and desires, often are said not to have any phenomenology at all. This, of course, is a large topic and I will have something to say about it when I discuss desire and belief (in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively). For now, although I think this is a significant problem, I do not think it is an overwhelming one. In many cases, perhaps all, what is crucial is how these phenomena are treated. If they are treated either as pure abstractions, isolable from any and all mental complexes, or as logical abstractions from particular mental states, or both, the temptation is indeed to say they have no phenomenology. If, however, they are treated as modifications of consciousness, inherently interconnected with a larger network of mental states, it is more likely that we will see (and experience) them as having a phenomenology or at least as directly tied to elements of the mental complex which do have a phenomenology. My inclination is to treat them in the latter fashion. But these are complex matters and I will return to them later.

The third objection to identification of mental states by phenomenology has affinities to the first objection, but also has a significantly different source and focus. This objection is especially powerful for those whose primary concern is not with integration and fulfillment, but is with the ontological status of mental states, especially when these are conceived of func-

tionally and/or physically. If, as many materialists suggest, mental states are brain states and/or functional states, the phenomenology of a mental state, assuming it is even acknowledged, is not essential to the typing of that state. What is essential would be the brain and/or functional state which the mental state is alleged to *be*. On this view, we determine what type of mental state some particular mental state is not by its feel or phenomenology, but by discovering what brain state it is and/or by discovering how it functions within the larger mental/behavioral economy of the subject.

This is, of course, an interesting and important claim. But as suggested previously, it cannot by itself eliminate the lived dimension of mental states. Whatever the ontology of such states, there is still the need to determine how to live and so the inescapable need to focus on consciousness and its various phenomenologies.

There is, however, a consequence of this objection which does need attention at this point, for it is undeniable that mental states can be produced, not only through interaction with environmental situations, but also by direct stimulation of the physiological features of the organism which are the physical foundation of that type of mental state. But if this is so, it would seem that phenomenology — at least sometimes — is not relevant to the determination of the individual's life situation and so cannot be assigned the status of being universally relevant to the attaining of integration. This is, I think, correct, for while in one sense attention to an induced phenomenology reveals what an individual is experiencing — after all, that is what is being experienced — in another sense, this is not what is revealed at all. That is, the induced phenomenology does not flow from the individual's self-directed, continuous, organic involvement in experience; it is not connected to what, in the broader sense, the individual is *living through*. Since phenomenologies and their intrinsic mental states can only be indicative of the deeper and more general psychological mode of being of the individual when they arise from continuous, organic involvement in experience, artificially induced mental states and their phenomenologies could not be indicative of such modes. Having been artificially induced, they are isolated and discrete, not organically and coherently tied to the individual's more general mode of, or relationship to, existence.¹⁰ In such cases, phenomenology cannot be taken as revelatory either of the mental state one is *living through* or of one's more general and deeper psychological way of being.

The conclusions reached in response to the first and third objections are somewhat similar. In both cases, it was acknowledged that identification of mental states by phenomenology is not only fallible, but that since

phenomenologies can be manipulated or induced in a variety of ways, such identifications are not transparent, unproblematic entrances into one's genuine psychic life. With respect to the first objection, it was possible to claim that a more careful and judicious use of the method would tend to yield knowledge both of particular mental states and one's more general psychological way of being. This, however, is not possible to do in response to the third objection, for on that claim the source of error identification is found not in unawareness or self-deception, but in the different kind of thing a mental state is. And this, in turn, creates the problem of inducement of mental states through physiological stimulation.

The third objection, then, presents a difficult complication for the method of identification of mental states by phenomenology. Since mental states can be induced by stimulating appropriate physiological factors, it not only follows, once again, that phenomenology is not always indicative of what is actually being experienced or lived through; it also follows, uniquely, that reliance on phenomenology limits the class of mental states which are relevant to an exploration of the inner life and so the attainment of integration and fulfillment. Consequently, it becomes necessary to provide a non-arbitrary distinction between those mental states whose phenomenologies are relevant to grasping the inner life and those which are not. The obvious candidate here is a distinction between those mental states which are produced artificially and those which are not. The difficulty is in providing a reasonable content for the terms of the distinction. Clearly, mental states which are produced by the direct application of instrumentation or chemicals to the appropriate physiological areas can be said to be artificial. But a problem arises when we seek to limit artificially induced mental states to such cases, for there are a variety of additional ways in which mental states can be induced artificially, *e.g.*, mind altering drugs, various chemicals in food and the environment, and, most generally, interacting with an environment which is artificial in the sense of not being original.

These last remarks lead to a much larger problem concerning the relationship of the notions of artificial and non-artificial to civilization or the world of the reflective creature. If "non-artificial" means "original" or "not made by human beings," then of course civilization, not being original, is artificial. Indeed, as we shall see in the coming chapters, it is the lot of reflective creatures to create a significantly new form of existence in the light of their need to direct their behavior in a relatively self-aware fashion. Within this situation, mental states arise through complex interactions with an environment which is not entirely original or natural, but has, in part,

been produced by the efforts of reflective creatures. Whether one can precisely draw the distinction between what is and what is not artificial in such a context is, for a number of reasons, not clear. But lack of clarity at this level does not mitigate against providing, at another level, content for the needed distinction. From the fact that there is a sense in which much of civilization is artificial, i.e., not original, it does not follow that we can't, within that situation, make a qualitative distinction between types of artificiality. And that is what I wish to do, omitting from consideration those mental states which are produced by the direct application of instrumentation or chemicals. If it is integration and fulfillment we are concerned with and we see phenomenological identification of mental states as necessary to the attainment of such modes of being, the fact that phenomenologies can be artificially produced and so not be expressions of one's actual mode of being is simply irrelevant to the matter at hand.

Again, my concern is with integration and fulfillment, not with providing a comprehensive theory of the nature and ontology of the mental. If one's concern is with the former, it is those mental states which arise in the flow of the life situation which make up the subject matter of the investigation.

When we talk about mental states in what is to come, we will be talking only about mental states generated in interaction with the environment. No doubt such states are not only products of a long evolutionary development, a development to which reflective creatures have contributed, but they also have physiological causes or correlates. However, they will not be artificially produced, but will be seen as occurring within the ebb and flow of non-artificial, concrete, lived experience. The fact that such states are in part the outcome of a process of development does not detract from their role in the lived experience of the individual; nor does the fact that they are tied to a definite physiology detract from their psychological dimension. In short, the fact that mental states occur in interaction with an environment which is in part created, and also have a physiological base does not deprive them of their central place in the kind and quality of life being led by the creature who experiences them.

There is, however, one version of the problem generated by this third objection which would detract from the relevance of mental states *qua* mental states to the attainment of integration and fulfillment. This would be a finding that mental states were never caused directly by interaction within the environment, but were rather always caused directly by physical/chemical processes in the brain. This view would allow that environmental situations could trigger the physical/chemical processes, but it would not allow

a separate causal role to the manner in which the individual psychologically experiences and reacts to the environmental situation.

Periodically, this sort of claim is made for certain kinds of mental states, especially "abnormal" ones such as depression. It is said that depression is not an outcome of how an individual is relating and responding to various life situations, but is the outcome of some sort of internal chemical imbalance. If such is the case, alleviation of depression would be a matter of providing the individual with the proper chemical balance, not a matter of identifying, through their phenomenologies, the various elements of depression so they might be adequately experienced and explored.

While this may be appropriate with some instances of depression, it does not follow that it is appropriate with all instances of depression. And further even in those cases in which there is a chemical imbalance, it does not follow that the imbalance was original and caused the depression. At the relevant level, it is possible that the depression in its psychological mode was original and caused the chemical imbalance. No doubt such a possibility wreaks havoc with certain notions of causality; but it cannot simply for that reason be dismissed.

Finally, while the chemical causes of mental states thesis has been held for various abnormal states, it has not, so far as I know, been held in that specific fashion for the whole range of mental states. The range of mental states which have an existence as psychological states is immense and so long as this is so, it is those states which constitute our sense of ourselves, others and the world. As such, they are our levers in the attempt to accomplish constructive, meaningful and fulfilling change — *i.e.*, to establish creative alignment and connection to and within the process of which we are a part.