Introduction

Were the Indians the disappeared of 1897?
—David Viñas

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In Argentina, “state terror” conjures up the 10,000 to 30,000 disappeared during the so-called Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (Process of National Reorganization (1976–83), but full-scale violence was preceded by the assassination of some 2,000 dissidents by paramilitary death squads loosely organized by the Argentine government of Isabel Perón (1974–76).1 Whereas the genocide of First Peoples and the pillage of their lands began with the Spanish conquest and colonization and continued with the birth of the nation, the blueprint for state terrorism can be traced back to the development of the modern nation-state.

INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE ON NATIVE PEOPLES IN ARGENTINA

At the time of the Proceso, members of the Argentine Academy of History noted that war against Indigenous peoples began with the conquest (1516) and continued during the colonial period.2 Even so, in 1816, during the wars of independence, patriots and cousins Juan José Castelli (1764–1812) and Manuel Belgrano (1770–1820) advocated for a monarchic system ruled by a person of the Inca civilization. They hoped that this type of government would be more palatable in Europe, generate support from Indigenous populations, and serve as reparations for the actions taken against the Incas during conquest and colonization. The proposal was rebutted with the argument that although Indigenous peoples in Peru rebelled against forced labor (mita), the periodic incursions of Indigenous peoples in the River Plate area (malones) resulted in kidnappings
(cautivos) and the loss of livestock. As of 1740, malones were exacerbated by the expeditions organized by landowners to capture wild cattle, which unknowst to them affected the survival and mobility of First Peoples. According to dominant ideology, Argentina emerged from three centuries of epic war against Indigenous peoples (Fitte and Benencia, 13–14).

Conversely, liberal ideology underscores the existence of a fluid “contact zone,” with periods of negotiated peace and mutual violence (Alimonda and Ferguson, 1). In Mendoza, while preparing to cross the Andes to liberate Chile and Peru, General José de San Martín (1778–1850) met with the Pehuenche to request safe passage through their land, as well as material support, including livestock such as horses and cows (Martínez Sarasola, 2013, 233). Sometime later, when they returned the visit, San Martín defined himself, “yo también soy indio” (I’m an Indian, too), prompting them to hug him and promise to die for him (Martínez Sarasola, 2013, 238). Indeed, San Martín’s July 27, 1819, announcement famously referred to sacrifices expected from the soldiers, which included lack of clothing, “andaremos en pelota como nuestros paisanos los indios: seamos libres, y lo demás no importa” (we’ll go naked, as our neighbors the Indians: let’s be free, nothing else matters,” Martínez Sarasola, 2013, 239).

However, the malones and contramalones (reprisal raids), led by Indigenous peoples and landowners, respectively, continued. During the administration of Martín Rodríguez (1820–24), three expeditions to the “desert” (as the lands south of Buenos Aires were called) resulted in the doctrine of “final solution,” which posited a war of extermination (Fitte and Benencia, 14). Juan Manuel de Rosas led an Expedition to the Desert (April 3, 1833, to May 25, 1834), and freed some 700 captives. Tellingly, between 1853 and 1861 the legislative bodies of the state of Buenos Aires passed initiatives allowing for the economic incorporation of the southern territories through exploitation of the land or its colonization (Navarro Floria, 145). The early doctrine of the final solution, functional to the capitalist, liberal, and republican ideology that essayist and future president Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1811–1888) synthesized in the contrast between civilization and barbarism (underdevelopment), reappeared in the 1880s.

Although the conquest of the southern territories and the subjection of its peoples were deemed necessary for the construction of the nation-state, it was the landowners in Buenos Aires who drove the successive campaigns. The “desert” was emptied and presented as “available land, conquered by the
subjection and the replacement of the Indigenous and creole population” (Navarro Floria, 140–41). Consequently, the territorial control espoused by the doctrine of the final solution ensured the appropriation of land required for the “expansion of agricultural exports,” which in turn underscored the functionality of the army to the interests of the oligarchy (Alimonda and Ferguson, 1, 5). In 1879 General Julio A. Roca (1843–1914) set out toward the “desert” commanding one of five columns with 6,000 soldiers, headed toward Rio Negro (currently the province of Neuquén) in the Argentine Patagonia. In the name of science and development, the expedition included photographers, engineers, geologists, and mine prospectors.

Between 1878 and 1884, approximately 2,500 Indigenous people were killed in the regions of La Pampa and Patagonia (Martínez Sarasola, 2013, 400). Other historians contend that “it is possible to speak of between 10,000 to 14,000 dead and 14,000 prisoners who were force-marched” to the city of Buenos Aires, and shipped to Martín García Island, which became a concentration camp. From there, children, young women, and, as the ads said, babies were sent to the Hotel for Immigrants to be distributed to wealthy families as servants, maids, or cooks by the ladies of the Sociedad de Beneficencia (charity), who were married to the same men who propelled the campaign (Awka Liwen). Men who were able to work were shipped back from Martín García. Some were to serve for six years in the army or the navy; others were sent to the sugarcane fields of northern Argentina, where they were exploited by landowners. Older “Indians” were sent to work as servants or in odd jobs in Buenos Aires or to be peons in neighboring estancias (Bayer, 25).

Tellingly, explorer “Perito” (Francisco) Moreno (1852–1919) “saved” three chiefs, Shayehueque, Inacayal, and Foyel, together with their families and other members of other tribes (Tehuelches, Pampas, and Araucanos) who had been deported as prisoners of war by “hosting” them at the Museum of Natural Science of La Plata (1884). Once there, they were photographed according to the conventions of the period, which evidenced the link between spectacle and ethnography. They provided the contemporary entertainment derived from exhibits of exotic beings (Quijada, n.p.). Later, Shayehueque and Foyel, who accepted Argentine citizenship, were allowed to return to their lands. Inacayal, who refused, died shortly in 1888.

The plight of Indigenous peoples in the northeast was no better. Portuguese explorer Alejo García traveled through the lands that later became Argentina
and Paraguay in search of the Incan empire in 1524. In the sixteenth century the Mocoví were semi-nomadic; work was gender-specific since men hunted and fished with *fijas* (harpoons made of canes) while women gathered fruit (Citro, “Historia,” 31–33). The introduction of horses allowed for increased mobility both in terms of migration and warfare (Citro, “Historia,” 43). During the seventeenth century, Abipones and Mocovís periodically attacked the northeastern cities of Santa Fe and Corrientes, claiming the entire region bordering the Paraná River. In fact, their presence was so pervasive from 1730 to 1740 that settlers were prevented from going to the river. They were so powerful that they would walk around the city, forcing the settlers to remain at home for fear of their lives (Furlong, 14–15). In 1734 the settlers signed a treaty that allowed for the peace and prosperity of the region, due in large part to the founding of nine Jesuit missions, among them two for the Mocoví, San Javier (1743) and San Pedro (1764), where Indigenous peoples were employed as peons (Citro, “Historia,” 61).

Father Florian Paucke (1719–68), a Jesuit living among the Mocoví from 1749 to 1767, describes them as arrogant and warlike in action, but like lambs in everyday life, soft-spoken, great orators, and faithful to their word. He added that they were easy-going unless they did not feel like doing something, in which case nothing would move them (Furlong, 78–79). According to Father Bustillo, they believed that the afterlife was similar to life on Earth; therefore, they would butcher the best horses so that the dead would be able to hunt (Furlong, 87). Father Paucke describes them as excellent horsemen, humble people who excelled in agriculture and construction (of buildings at the mission), who were willing to take part in Christian festivities and processions. By mid-nineteenth century, Franciscans had taken over the old Jesuit missions (Giordano, 6). Conversion had a lasting effect on the Mocoví, as attested by the festivities organized in honor of such saints as Santa Rosa, which included collective dancing in circles (Citro, “Historia,” 74).

With the arrival of the first Italian immigrants in Santa Fe in 1856 (Esperanza) and Chaco in 1878, the Mocoví were deprived of their lands. A few years later, between 1881 and 1884, General Benjamín Victorica (1831–1913) commanded the conquest of the Gran Chaco, which, like General Roca’s campaign to the desert, was aimed at land annexation (Viñas, 118–25). First Peoples of the Chaco region have constantly been referred to as either tame and civilized or savage and barbarian. The dichotomy (civilized versus savage)
remained well into the mid-nineteenth century, due to the references to their lack of interest in work and to the abuse they endured from settlers, the army, and civil authorities (Giordano, 15). The arrival of sawmills allowed for the Mocoví to join the workforce, although this was into a combination of huge estates and an industry based on the extraction of nonrenewable resources and the exploitation of the labor of Indigenous peoples and peasants (Citro, “Historia,” 81). Mocoví people also worked at sugar mills as of 1883, through the auspices of their chiefs, who acted as middlemen. In sum, the mixed subsistence economy of the Mocoví was set by the end of the nineteenth century, and they would engage in seasonal work, drifting from sawmills to harvests, combining concentrated rural labor with diminishing returns of hunting, fishing, and gathering. By working as peons for landlords and sawmill owners, the Mocoví were able to return to their ancestral lands and subsistence models (Citro, “Historia,” 81–82).

At the beginning of the twentieth century there were several political and religious movements among the Guaycurú peoples. According to the hegemonic version, the shaman would announce the defeat of the white people and the beginning of a new era of happiness for the Indigenous peoples. Most of these movements led to a confrontation with the police and/or the armed forces. The Mocoví movement took place at San Javier in 1904. The Toba and Mocoví rose up at Napalpí in 1924 and followed Toba Shaman Natoxochi at El Zapallar in 1933. There was another Toba insurrection at Pampa del Indio in 1934–35, which was followed by an uprising of the Pilagá and Toba from the province of Formosa, who followed Luciano around 1940 (Citro, “Historia, 83). As we shall see, most of these were millennial movements, which offered hope through healing and religious practices in a context of exploitation of labor and encroachment of ancestral lands, with obvious implications for cultural and material survival. Government institutions repeatedly resorted to the impact of the label of malón (insurrection) to justify genocidal policies. Most important, these massacres usually involved the implicit or explicit participation of civil society. The encroachment of German and French colonies deepened the stigma for Indigenous peoples, who were being shot at on sight. Consequently, they had to claim a criollo identity to survive as peons. In sum, to be considered civilized and European, the Generation of 1880 resorted to genocide to erase its questionable ancestors (Viñas, 54). These expeditions had a lasting impact on hegemonic ideology because Argentines are always ready to say that there
are no “Indians” in the country. However, according to the genetic map of Argentina, 56 percent of the population is of Indigenous descent (Heguy, 1).

IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION

Symbolic erasure of First Peoples begins by recording the birth of the nation in 1810 or 1816, since selective omission condemns them to nonexistence. The educational apparatus has played an integral role in the continuation of symbolic genocide. As early as 1856, the *Catecismo de Geografía* (*Geography Primer*), published in Buenos Aires, stated that the boundaries of the Argentine Confederation were Bolivia at the north; the Republics of Paraguay, Brazil, and the Oriental Republic (Uruguay) and the ocean on the east; Patagonia and the Atlantic Ocean on the south; and Chile on the west. In fact, Indigenous peoples controlled three quarters of the land in Buenos Aires, the southern section of Santa Fe, and about half of the territory of Córdoba, San Luis, and Mendoza. By 1874, the section on geography of the elementary school manuals established that the southern limit was the Atlantic Ocean and the Strait of Magellan, thereby wiping out the Indigenous confederations that had been fiercely fighting to defend their land and culture since 1850 and had only been recently forced out from most of the province of Buenos Aires. The ideology of the agricultural export economy was reproduced in the educational system between 1880 and 1920. While it interpellated gauchos and immigrants, First Peoples were elided from symbolic representation. School books associated Indigenous peoples with childhood or nature, but circumscribed them to the past, thus condemning them to the margins of hegemonic discourse. Consequently, the discursive construction of Native Peoples as Other deprived of physical and symbolic representation legitimized genocide in the name of progress (Villegas, 206–7).

CONVENTIONS OF PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION

In mid-nineteenth century, photography became the means to represent modernity and the nation. However, objectivity was undermined by the “pose, mise-en-scène, focus, lighting, framing and the duration of the shot” (Castillo Zapata, 154). While pictures of members of the urban elite aimed at providing “a precise definition of the uniqueness of the face—hence, the identity—of the
subject,” in the case of Indigenous people, photography became an “apparatus that registered and subjected individual uniqueness to undifferentiated racial or social generalization, at the service of science or another disciplining institution such as the police” (Castillo Zapata, 157, 166). According to the most common conventions, the individual faced the camera. The scientific aura arose from the added component of pictures in profile (right or left). Finally, the degrading picture of the backside reduced Indigenous people to specimens ready for the curiosity of institutionalized knowledge or power (Castillo Zapata, 166).

Therefore, whereas the photograph of General Roca and his staff followed nineteenth-century bourgeois conventions, accentuating their individuality, forty-nine out of the fifty pictures taken during the campaign to the desert were “panoramic takes in which subjects and objects were lost in a dizzying immensity” (Alimonda and Ferguson, 8). While 2,000 women marched south with the 6,000 soldiers, women only appear in two pictures, accompanied by their children. Three out of the four pictures of Indigenous people focused on “friendly Indians” wearing Western clothing, which thereby erased their Indigenous identity. The last one of these pictures focused on the young wives and children of those who fought to the bitter end. They are sitting side by side, hugging, trying to cover their faces, while three priests holding a book (presumably the Bible) walk around them. Officers and civilians appear in the background (Alimonda and Ferguson, 11–12, 19–20).

Politics affects the representation of Indigenous peoples. While pictures of the friendly chiefs and their families visiting Buenos Aires follow bourgeois conventions, in line with the scientific conventions of the time, photographs taken at the Museo de La Plata are usually (front and profile) mug shots, although some are full-body photographs (N. Sosa, 27, 61). As attested by 300 glass negatives, Carlos Baruch followed the same ethnographic conventions when he accompanied Robert Lehmann Nitsche in an arranged visit to the sugarcane plantation of La Esperanza, province of Jujuy, in 1906. With the exception of a woman wearing a poncho, most of the Indigenous women are nude down to the waist. The subjection of the models stemmed from power inequality, since their employer would send them as “specimens” to be examined by Lehmann Nitsche. The white background in the photographs produces a strong contrast, as it isolates and objectifies the body (Martínez and Tamagno, 2).

In addition to the “scientific” interest, Lehmann Nitsche had aesthetic concerns in mind, “para conseguir algo de variedad . . . hemos alternado . . .
fotografías de busto, con otras de medio o tres cuartos cuerpo” (to provide some variety . . . we have alternated . . . head shots with pictures of the torso, and of the torso up to the waist; 1907, 55 in Martínez et al., 3–4). The rationale for the visit stemmed from a sense of urgency, which implies an awareness of the genocidal policies of the state, “la gran rapidez con que se extingue la población indígena del continente sudamericano” (the rapid extinction of the Indigenous population of the South American continent; Lehmann Nitsche, 1907, 53–54, in Martínez et al., 6). Although there are a couple of front and back shots of nude men, a picture of a group of elementary school children stands out since the arrangement and the setting is mirrored in Alcides Greca’s El último malón (1916).

Photography also documented achievements. In the Argentine northeast, Franciscans promoted the Franciscan Mission Union by printing postcards. Most of their pictures show groups of children or adults involved in the mission’s social activities. Because clothing suggests assimilation, Indigenous children “pass” as poor settlers. A shot of a dance strives for local color by emphasizing the gaucho’s garb, including the horse (Giordano, 19). In short, with the exception of the politically relevant “friendly Indians,” who had access to individualized representation according to bourgeois norms, Indigenous peoples were either represented as exotic subjects, in accordance to the precepts of science, or as white settlers or peons, according to the assimilationist ideology of the Franciscan missions. Photography contributed to the erasure of first peoples.

AFFECT

The contemporary emphasis on affect and emotions in disciplines as varied as anthropology, economics, history, law, literature, performance arts, philosophy, politics psychology, and the media, has been attributed on one hand to backlash against the discursive nature of Continental theory, epitomized by Lyotardian postmodernism, Derridean deconstruction, and Foucauldian theories of power (Liljeström and Paasonen, 1), and on the other to the current shift toward biology and neurology, that is, toward life sciences and especially neuroscience (Solomon, viii). But what is emotion? How does it compare with affect and with feelings and moods?19 Although the broad array of approaches can be arranged along the tenacious split between universalism and social
constructivism, many theories integrate these extremes. Let us begin with universalism, which reigns supreme in the life sciences. In 1962, psychologist Sylvan Tomkins (1911–91) argued for the need to standardize affect despite the lack of consensus on the number and nature of primary affects and the variations regarding their proper names. He distinguished between low- or high-intensity positive, resetting (neutral?), and negative affect, which would be identified by facial responses. Positive affects included interest-excitement, manifested through behaviors such as lowered eyebrows; looking, tracking, and listening; and enjoyment-joy, inferred by a smile, and the widening up and out of the lips. Tomkins only identified one neutral affect: surprise or startle, which he called resetting. It involved raising the eyebrows and blinking. Negative effects, the most numerous, ranged between distress and anger. Distress-anguish was manifested through cries, arched eyebrows, lowering of the mouth, tears, and rhythmic sobbing. The experience of fear-terror was evident through frozen-open eyes, paleness, feeling cold, sweating, facial trembling, and hair standing on end. Shame-humiliation could be read from downcast eyes and head. Contempt-disgust would be manifested through sneers or the ascending motion of the upper lip. Finally, anger-rage would be evidenced through frowns, clenched jaws, and blushing (Tomkins, 1:337).

Robert Solomon distances himself from the idea that emotions are first and foremost neurological affect programs that happen to us (Tomkins) to postulate the cognitive nature of emotion. According to Solomon, emotions are something more than mere feelings or sensations; they are judgments (viii). As judgments, emotions are disinterested, purposive in that they aim at changing the world, and can be explained rationally (Solomon, 3). Instead of dismissing them as unanalyzable, Solomon’s cognitive theory of emotion embraces affect and feeling as critical to emotion because he considers that as judgments of the body, they are no different from cognition or judgment. In sum, Solomon contends that cognition is basically judgment, “both reflective and prereflective, both knowing how (as skills and practices) and knowing that (as propositional knowledge)” (192). These theories link universalism and social constructionism by noting that emotions involve “social narratives as well as physical responses [for] an analysis of emotions is an account of our way of being-in-the-world” (Solomon, viii). Similarly, British-Australian scholar Sara Ahmed reminds us that emotions are not only about movement, as the Latin term *emovere*, “to move, to move out,” suggests. Rather, she counters, emotions
also involve attachments or connections, because the process of determining whether something felt by the body is beneficial involves thought and evaluation. In other words, the process involves the subject and preceding histories (Amhed, 11). Yet as the above mentioned theorists, and insofar as contact with an object generates feeling, Ahmed believes in the interconnectedness between emotion and sensation.

Cultural anthropologist William Reddy, who is critical about the linguistic turn of poststructuralism, suggests speaking about emotions in terms of translation, because this term allows for connecting languages and individuals, as well as “sensory modalities, procedural habits, and linguistic structures” (80). Reddy notes that the traditional association of emotion with nonlinear thinking (free association, poetic, or symbolic thinking) and physiological arousal (blushing, adrenaline rush, changes in the heart rate) underscores the contrast with conscious, rational, voluntary action, typical of human intelligence. Yet he admits that the breakdown of the belief in the rationality and voluntary control of emotions has led to undercutting the distinction between thought and affect (Reddy, 31). Along these lines, Australian-American philosopher Teresa Brennan deconstructs the notion of a Cartesian subject by suggesting that the senses (smell, sight) and hormones ultimately allow for a greater connection with other beings and the environment. Brennan posits a process that is social in origin but biological and physical in effect; therefore, her theory about the transmission of affect links universalism with social construction (3). Similarly, Canadian social theorist Brian Massumi advances models involving multiple pathways, levels, and types of activation. In exploring the embodiment of affect, Massumi distinguishes between intensity and qualification, interrelated in terms of resonation or interference. He defines intensity as reactions manifested on the skin, the surface of the body, and qualification as deep reactions that tend to belong to form/content but involve functions such as heartbeat and breathing, which allow for affect to rise into consciousness. As intensity seems to suspend the linear progress of the present of the narrative from past to future, language doubles the flow of images, allowing for two dimensions of every expression and the resonation of their interaction. Whereas Massumi equates intensity with affect, he prefers to use emotion as a label for the subjective content and the expression of the quality of an experience, which therefore becomes personal. In sum, as qualified intensity, emotion turns the experience into language, narration, function, and meaning (Massumi, 25–28).
Among contemporary approaches, philosopher Solomon’s theory about the cognitive nature of emotion underscores its intertwined behavioral, physiological, phenomenological, cognitive, and (socially) contextual aspects (196). Canadian philosopher Ronald De Sousa is best known for the notion of paradigm scenarios, which typically involve a situation type and a set of “normal responses,” initially defined in terms of biology and soon after of culture. For instance, a baby’s smile is first and foremost a biological response, but with time it is deployed instrumentally to elicit a response. The social constructivist aspect arises from the need to identify the situational components of paradigm scenarios depending on the child’s developmental stage to teach it to experience a given emotion. In addition to daily life, paradigm scenarios are reinforced by stories, art, and similar experiences pertaining to the culture. Whereas De Sousa underscores the value of literature in supplementing and refining these paradigms, I would add the media in our age of global connectedness. Since the complexity of emotions increases, learning these scenarios continues indeﬁnitely. Nonetheless, prelinguistic responses such as flight or attack subsist in the so-called primitive emotions of fear and rage partly because of their dependence on relatively separate parts of the brain (De Sousa, 182–84).

Similarly, Jonathan Flatley argues that we develop our sense of the environment through our purposive activity in the world, which always includes a range of intentions, beliefs, desires, moods, and affective attachments. Hence, our spatial environments are inevitably imbued with the feelings we have about the places we are going, the things that happen to us along the way, and the people we meet; these emotional valences affect the way we create itineraries. Flatley concludes that affective mapping is important insofar as affect guides us through our spatial environment, allowing for the reproduction of ideology by incorporating associations ranging from race and class to capitalism, patriarchy, and gender. The process of accretion is linked to the subject’s historic context and social formations because it incorporates new information and parental influences (Flatley, 77–79).

Reddy’s theory, emotional expression as a type of speech act, constitutes the most recent and influential paradigm shift. In *The Navigation of Feeling* Reddy presents the overview of research on emotion in cognitive psychology and anthropology that led him to present his own proposal, which was obviously influenced by J. L. Austin’s speech act theory. Reddy realized that utterances about speaker’s emotions are neither constative (descriptive) nor performative.
They are reports. Reddy postulates that first-person present-tense emotion claims have a descriptive appearance, a relational intent, and a self-exploring or self-altering effect. Regardless of whether they refer to the first or third person, the accuracy of descriptive statements about emotion can only be verified in terms of their congruence with similar utterances, gestures, and acts, because no one can see or hear the respective referent. Reddy’s relational intent refers to the specific scenarios, relationships, or action orientations involved in or designated by statements about emotions in social life. For instance, regardless of the country, familial relations always already subject emotional expression to a set of normative expectations. Finally, by self-exploring or self-altering effect, Reddy refers to emotions that activate thought, such as cognition and judgment, which may range between being automatic, habitual, semiconscious, or imperfectly glimpsed, and may even manifest themselves through facial signals, laughter, blushing, tone of voice, gesture, and posture (100–102).

Reddy calls first-person, present-tense emotion claims utterances that include a descriptive appearance “relational intent” and a self-exploring or self-altering effect “emotives.” An emotive utterance is neither descriptive nor performative, nor is it self-referential. At first, an emotive statement seems to have a real exterior referent and thus to be descriptive (Austin’s constative). However, as emotives translate tasks that occupy our attention into words, the act of uttering an emotive leads to changes in its referent. Therefore, like performatives, emotives are influenced by and alter what they refer to. Emotives can change, hide, or intensify our emotions. First-person emotion claims include the present and past tense. Despite being in the past tense, emotives such as “I was angry at you” imply claims about the present state of the person. First-person long-term emotion claims can extend into the past or into the future. Emotives such as “I have always loved you” combine an interpretation of the past with an explicit claim about the present. Similarly, despite the reference to the future, emotives such as “I will always love you” constitute explicit promises as well as claims about the present. Nonverbal emotional signals like facial expressions, word choice, and intonation may derive from a present action and attention. If not, they need to be drawn into attention to become emotives. For instance, tears rolling down my cheek led me discover that I am sad. Though they cannot be observed, other claims such as “I am thinking it over” share the descriptive appearance, relational intent, and self-exploratory or self-altering effects of emotives. The same holds true in the case of the interlocutor’s emotions. Last,
while second- and third-person emotion claims such as “You appear angry” or “He is afraid” are not emotives for the person who utters them, they can affect the person spoken to or about. Insofar as the addressee rehearses the claim, they are emotives and may be referred to as presence effects (Reddy, 105–7).

Reddy’s emotives may allow for reconceptualizing the notion of freedom by reconfiguring the relation between the individual and the collective, despite the widespread use of the ethnographic present and the quandary stemming from understanding the manner and importance of the individual’s submission to society. Like De Sousa and Flatley, Reddy highlights the role of society in creating and observing emotional management styles organized around normative goals. Since emotives are self-exploring and self-altering, conflicts may occur between the individual and the social. These conflicts may arise in areas ranging from politics to the interpretation of a work of art. Indeed, affective flows lead to the constitution of the subject through broader social, political, and economic forces. In our postmodern world, the magnification of affect may swamp us, which explains why in politics alliances are not only logical but emotionally compelling (Shaviro, 4).

American sociologist Stjepan Meštrović, traces the origins of the postemotional society to the United States of 1960, noting that it is defined by skepticism, the end of passion, the disappearance of collective consciousness, the reconceptualization of death, and the end of innocence. Meštrović argues that the postemotional society has been reproduced by the media; hence, it can be currently detected in most Western societies. For instance, nowadays advertising sells feelings rather than focusing (as in the past) on objective markers. Thus, “Pepsi becomes the drink of a new generation” (Meštrović, 12). Meštrović argues that because of the ubiquitous presence of the camera, emotions seem staged, which leads to skepticism. The movement from the inner directedness of modernism to the outer directedness of globalization is accompanied by the feeling of powerlessness to exert change. To compensate, outer-directed individuals want to have the inside scoop, which leads to the proliferation of media venues, including the Internet, and the availability of news around the clock, all of which transforms the audience into voyeuristic consumers of secondhand emotions (Meštrović, 58). Another factor that involves staging emotions stems from the production of discourse by full-time professional newsmakers, since it is immediately transmitted by opinion makers, only to have its impact promptly gauged by opinion polls and recycled back to the audience (Meštrović, 13). Meštrović points out that
rather than disappearing, emotions have become “intellectualized, mechanical, [and] mass-produced” (26). For example, the multiple media venues broadcast information about so many reasons to feel compassion that the audience feels compassion fatigue. The traditional *caritas* that brings people together is superseded by a displaced compassion that is more like pity and thus allows some to look down on the victims. The implicit social divide is paradoxically elided insofar as the middle and lower classes mimic the habits of the leisure class, which in turn underscores an aesthetic approach to life (Meštrović, 26).

While the breakdown of the sacred began with the worship of reason during the French Revolution, contemporary societies worship money, celebrities, dates, battles, places, and such. Postmodernist nostalgia is evident in postemotionalism, since it strives to regain the emotional life associated with modernism. Collective social life is superseded by many fractured groups, which is intrinsically divisive. While compassion might be felt for fellow countrymen, compassion fatigue sets in as social and geographical distance increases (Meštrović, 107, 110). Finally, the attitude toward death has also changed. On one hand, watching the death of strangers in the news elicits indifference. School massacres involving the death of small children are met with mostly private, postemotional feelings of rage and horror. The death of loved ones is increasingly met with the same lack of depth, despite going through the motions of expressing the appropriate emotions, which are hastily forgotten in the postemotional pattern of everyday life. On the other hand, conventional remembrances of the dead, as in the Mexican celebration of Día de los Muertos, become fun occasions, such as Halloween in the United States. Finally, there is also an increasing fascination with dead celebrities such as John F. Kennedy, Elvis, Marilyn Monroe, and Selena (Meštrović, 118, 127–28).

Kathleen Woodward coincides in positing communities of feeling, and even new structures of feeling, arising from socially specific responses to art. Affective mapping has focused on the impact of cinema. Indeed, over the past decade cinema and media studies scholars have elaborated on synesthetic sensations, embodied experiences, and forceful impressions involved in screen-based media (Liljeström and Paasonen, 1). Stephen Shaviro notes that rather than representing social processes, new media and digitized film not only participate actively in these processes but also help constitute them. By producing affect, films and music videos generate subjectivity while they extract value from this affect and play a role in valorizing capital (Shaviro, 2–3). To date,
Laura Podalsky has pioneered the research on affect in contemporary Latin cinema. Indeed, Podalsky rereads the new Latin American cinema of the late 1960s and early 1970s in terms of neorealist sentimentality, complemented by an affective appeal to join the revolution in (agitational) experimental movies such as Octavio Getino and Fernando Solanas’s *The Hour of the Furnaces* (1968). Among contemporary films focusing on violence such as Alejandro González Iñárritu’s *Love’s a Bitch* (2000), Podalsky links affect to a changing sociohistorical background, characterized by fear at the impending demise of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional in Mexico after seventy years of government, the onslaught of neoliberalism, and the withdrawal of the welfare state. In other words, Podalsky shows that certain works encourage their spectators to feel in ways that acknowledge alternative ways of knowing about traumatic events of the past, such as those of the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America, and others engage spectators with the emergent subjectivities of the globalized present. Thus, this project involves the self-estrangement of aesthetics, which allows for exploring the historicity of the affective environment and focusing on the social-political anchors or landmarks in that environment (Flatley, 80).

Films produce affect and generate subjectivity (Shaviro), which in turn impacts (the audience’s) affective mapping (Flatley). Focusing on affect allows for monitoring the history of exclusion of Indigenous peoples as reflected in some of the most representative Argentine movies released between 1917 and 2015. Indeed, this approach allows for comparing the emotional utterances made by the protagonists, noting the shift from representatives of hegemonic society up to the late 1960s, to Indigenous peoples thereafter. Given that this study covers a period of about 100 years, the sustained focus on emotional utterances allows for comparing the (degree of) discrimination Indigenous peoples were subject to in different periods as well as monitoring their accounts across space and time.

Emotional utterances about the struggle against the dispossession of the land are recurrent, beginning with Alcides Greca’s re-creation of the the Mocoví millennialist movement in *El último malón*, which arose from the realization that the white settlers had taken over the lands of the San Javier reservation, plunging Indigenous peoples into abject poverty. The movie opens with utterances of hegemonic discrimination, “una tribu de indios mocovíes . . . arrastra su vida miserable” (A tribe of Mocovi . . . survive in miserable conditions). From the Mocoví standpoint, emotives point at exploitation of labor, hunger, dispossession of the land, rape, and abduction. Hegemonic fears are intimated by
emotives attributed to the Mocoví, such as those regarding reversal of the social order and miscegenation, “Mujere [sic] gringo será nojotro, casa lo gringo será nojotro [sic] . . . la hija lo gringo siendo sirvienta mujer lo cacique” (“Gringo’s” women and homes will be ours. . . . The “gringo” daughters will be servants of the chieftain’s wife). Like Greca’s *El último malón*, Valeria Mapelman’s *Octubre Pilagá* focuses on hegemonic (Border Patrol’s and Federal Ministers’) fear of a millennialist movement, presumably nurtured by unfair socioeconomic conditions. Given that in 1947 the Pilagá were massacred, and those who did not perish were tracked down as they escaped through the forest, it is unsurprising that emotives point at the savage repression and the concealment of a crime perpetrated by the state.

In Nelo Cosimi’s *La quena de la muerte*, the question of the land is primordial insofar as Raúl is emboldened to seduce Cardo Azul precisely because of her perilous situation, “están viviendo en mis tierras” (you are living on my land). Discrimination is blatant in the erasure of the original Indigenous peoples from the plot (and from the Argentine imaginary). Hegemonic emotives are deeply racist, as shown by Raúl’s rationale to take advantage of Cardo Azul because she is “una indiecita” (an Indian girl), and Azucena’s comments regarding Don Braulio’s dwelling, “¿Cómo pueden vivir ahí adentro?” (How can they live in there?). Similarly, in *Damiana Kryygi*, Alejandro Fernández Mouján traces the emotives of turn-of-the-century scientists, who conceived of Indigenous peoples as specimens, and the hegemonic emotives of the intolerance of other cultures and customs, which led to Damiana’s commitment in the Melchor Romero Hospital.

Lucas Demare’s *El último perro* is founded on the premise that the stations dotting the immensity of the pampas allowed for the gradual takeover of the land in the struggle against savage Indigenous peoples. Therefore, hegemonic emotives refer to Posta del Lobatón as “guacha en mitad de la pampa” (orphaned in midst of the pampa), vulnerable to the hordes of “Indians” who were ready for pillage and, most important, were prone to kidnapping white women. Similarly, in Belisario Díaz Villar’s *Frontera Sur*, the struggle for the land is at the crux of Cacique Santiago’s initial warning, “Bienvenido, Mayor (Saravia). Pero estas tierras son de la tribu” (Welcome, major, but these are tribal lands). Significantly, Grana’s behavior and her emotional utterances become clear as we recall that her parents gave up their lives defending their right to the land. Saravia’s hegemonic ideology prevents him from acknowledging Grana’s
emotives regarding her pride in her Indigenous father and her willingness to die for the land. Along these lines, Jorge Prelorán includes Hermógenes Cayo’s recollections about the historic Malón de la paz (Peace Insurrection, 1946), which led to land distribution two years later. Emotives refer to the harsh conditions of the desert habitat of the Puna (Andean Plateau)—cold, wind, lack of water, and bare vegetation. Lautaro Murúa’s *Shunko* explores transculturation in an inhospitable area inhabited by peasants living in abject poverty. While the rural teacher’s emotives point at his gradual understanding of an animistic belief system, the students become assimilated as they move from being monolingual Quichua speakers to mastering Spanish.

Set in Patagonia and framed immediately after the campaign to the desert (1879), Edgardo Cozarinsky’s *Guerreros y cautivas* hones in on the subsequent wave of dispossession, as soldiers who fought for the land were duped into selling it for pennies to representatives of the oligarchy. Significantly, for the very first time in Argentine cinema, Cozarinsky portrays the plight of women taken into captivity, and Cautiva becomes the target of Coronel Garay’s racist and discriminatory invectives, “esa gente ya no es nada . . . A nadie obligan a ser esclavo” (Those people are nothing now . . . No one is forced to be a slave), which ultimately blame the victim. Coinciding in the location, Raúl Tosso’s *Gerónima* intimates the structural reasons a Mapuche mother of four lives in abject poverty despite owning land and suggests that her family’s forceful commitment into a distant hospital came from a ploy to deprive her of that land. Obviously, while Gerónima’s emotives point at her desperate need to escape from institutional imprisonment, the hospital staff refer to her in the most humiliating terms, “Son como animales” (They are like animals). Similarly, moving from the Patagonian plateau to the Andean valleys, Mathieu Orcel’s *Para los pobres piedras* coincides in exploring the struggle for land, given that the traditional summer grazing grounds have been fenced off by absent landowners. Whereas emotives underscore the gravity of the situation in the context of Mapuche relationship with the Earth, sacred songs bind the family together despite their summer separation.

From a historical standpoint, Ulises de la Orden’s *Tierra adentro* maps the areas controlled by Indigenous peoples and shows how the continued campaigns funded by civil society in its alliance with the military from Buenos Aires were aimed at moving the border southward. Witnesses emotionally refer to the state’s violent and forceful takeover of Indigenous lands which became
(Patagonian) national parks in the early 1930s. Emotives are focused on the pillage of the land, so they point at massacres, persecutions (which included being branded and raped), forced marches, enslavement, hunger, dismemberment of families, and the loss of personal and cultural identity. Therefore, the documentary includes cases of taking back ancestral lands and ends with an examination of the legal possibility of (national) land restitution.

In the northeast, the communities of Tierra Roja and Flor del Monte depicted in Philip Cox and Valeria Mapelman’s *Mbyá: Tierra en rojo* are involved in a protracted legal struggle with the Universidad de la Plata for ownership of their ancestral lands; their emotives refer to the continued encroachment, its effect on the culture; the difficulties involved in mere subsistence following the traditional practices of slash-and-burn farming, hunting, and gathering; the “soft” genocide of malnourishment; and the ultimate threat of extinction. Set slightly further west, Inés de Oliveira Cézar’s feature film *Cassandra* focuses on the results of turning native habitats into mega-industrial soy plantations: deforestation, contamination of the water, abject poverty, malnutrition, cultural extermination, displacement, and discrimination of Toba and Wichí communities. While the emotives uttered by Indigenous peoples refer to socioeconomic problems, Cassandra’s story arc involves emotives focused on becoming one with the land. Similarly, in Sebastián Lingiardi’s dystopia *Las pistas—Lanhoyij—Nmitaxanaxac* the subversion of Western power is based on the collaboration between white, Toba/Qom, and Wichí students, intent on discovering the key to interpreting a constellation that subtends Toba/Qom astronomical predictions. Utterances are purposely bereft of feeling to underscore the binding force of Indigenous languages and cultures.

As is evident, zeroing in on emotives allows for comparing affect, and therefore attitudes, across time and place in terms of hegemonic society and Indigenous peoples. Moreover, as emotives referring to living conditions are passed from generation to generation, they lend themselves to diachronic comparisons across regions. As an integral part of the film, emotives interpellate the audience. The question of whether they are tied to an increase in empathy depends on each person’s affective mapping. Similarly, the link between affect and (sociopolitical) action is marred by the compassion fatigue of postemotionalism (Meštrović) and its similar iteration, depression as a public feeling, resulting from racism, capitalism, and colonialism, among other factors (Cvetkovich).