I

Emotions, Moods, and Feelings

I.1. Introduction

In this opening chapter, I begin by sketching a positive account of emotions, moods, and feelings. I then briefly discuss some (of the many) recent views advanced by philosophers (rather than psychologists) about these mental phenomena, arguing against accounts of these that I take to be mistaken and thus trying to show that my view has certain advantages over these current theories. Note that I cannot comprehensively discuss here all recent theories of emotions; nor do I claim to give an exhaustive theory of the emotions beyond a preliminary sketch, which should suffice for the purposes of a study focused primarily on musical expressiveness, after all.

More specifically, here is what I do in the different sections of this chapter. In section I.2, I sketch a cognitive-affective view of the emotions, as you will see shortly. Section I.3 distinguishes emotions from beliefs and also from moods; note that this latter distinction will in fact be used in section VI.2 against the musical formalism of Eduard Hanslick. The next three sections of this chapter critically discuss, respectively, Martha Nussbaum’s neo-Stoic cognitivist view, Paul Griffiths’s position, and Jesse Prinz’s somatic theory. The chapter concludes by conceding that it may be possible to reconcile a cognitive-affective view of the emotions with a somatic theory.

I.2. What are Emotions?

So, let us begin with the emotions and the question “What are emotions?”

In a nutshell, the cognitive-affective view of emotions that I favor claims that emotions, standardly, are dynamic complexes consisting of two components: (1) an affective element, consisting of affects or feelings; as well as (2) a cognitive element, consisting of (evaluative) beliefs, thoughts,
judgments, imaginings, seeings-as and the like. In virtue of the cognitive element, emotions have intentionality, i.e., they are directed upon or about things such as states of affairs, actions, events, people, physical objects, and so on. Furthermore, it is claimed that desires, which are distinct from emotions, may often accompany or even constitute emotions, though this need not be the case for all instances of every emotion. Also, underlying bodily processes are the neurophysiological bases or causes of emotions that allow emotions and may be necessary for emotions, but are not themselves parts of emotions. And as for behavior, while emotions often have (typical) behavioral expressions, these latter are neither necessary for emotions as some people may feel emotions (e.g., sadness) without expressing or manifesting them outwardly, nor is behavior sufficient to actually have an emotion as an occurrent state of one’s psychology as shown amply by the case of very good actors; here I borrow Hilary Putnam’s decisive super-Spartan and super-actor objections against Behaviorism. Moreover, against Agnes Moors, Phoebe Ellsworth et al. (2013a, 119–20), emotions need not have an action tendency or action readiness or some sort of motivational component associated with them; think of couch potatoes wallowing in boredom in front of the television. It is granted, however, that emotions are often shaped by social and cultural influences, though I will not dwell on the point as this concession is not itself a part of the cognitive-affective view of the emotions. Note in passing that the cognitive-affective view I favor combines earlier judgmentalist or cognitivist views of the emotions with feeling views of the emotions, a claim made by Paul Griffiths on behalf of perceptual theories of emotions (Griffiths 2013, 220). Note also that while the claim that emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties suggests that emotions may give evaluative knowledge, the cognitive-affective view can also grant that emotions may give us evaluative knowledge both about what is of value in the world as well as about what we value (compare de Sousa 2011).

At this stage, let us specify what the elements of the above account of the emotions amount to. It is difficult to give a very precise account of affects, but I will make a start here and claim that very roughly one may say that affects are the non-cognitive, non-intentional part of emotions. They involve (a) “raw feels,” or inner “psychological” affects, of pleasure or pain, and they may also involve (b) physical or bodily affects (compare Oakley 1992, 9–14).

It is easier to give an account of physical than psychological affects, though an adequate theory of the emotions must account for both—instead
of denying the latter, or else reducing them to the former. Physical affects involve bodily reactions like hearts pounding faster, pulse rates quickening, hair standing on ends, breathing getting faster, etc. Such affects may be found when we have feelings of excitement or fear, though one general worry may be that these “physical affects” are just external, behavioral manifestations of inner, psychological affects, not affects themselves. To dispose of this worry, consider the case of being extremely drowsy. Now, being drowsy need not involve any inner, psychological affects of pleasure or pain, even as accompaniments, but may only involve physical affects like yawning and a general lethargy. This drowsiness may be so strong that it may induce us to go to sleep before we realize that we are drowsy, or else it may take a little while before we realize that we are drowsy. Thus, this state of drowsiness is non-cognitive insofar as, at least for a little while, it does not involve a belief or a thought or a judgment, and it is also non-intentional insofar as it is not about, or directed toward, anything. Moreover, we have here a feeling or affect of drowsiness, but not an emotion. All of this goes to illustrate my claim above that feelings or affects are non-cognitive, non-intentional parts of emotions. And it also serves to illuminate the distinction between emotions and feelings or affects. Note also that one can have emotions that involve physical or bodily changes (in terms of neuron firings and other changes in one’s neurophysiology) without having physical affects or feelings, and without being aware of the underlying physical changes.

Psychological affects, on the other hand, are best seen in cases of intense emotions. Suppose X’s mother, who X is very attached to, dies, and X feels an emotion of intense grief. Such grief involves not only assent to beliefs about her mother’s death, but also an inner, psychological feeling or affect of pain (or distress) that may (or may not) be behaviorally or physically manifested through crying, dejection, and the like. Psychological affects of pleasure, as opposed to pain, can be seen in aesthetic experiences of great works of art, or of beauty in nature, as the inner psychological affect of intense pleasure (or joy) that I feel when I admire Michelangelo’s David, for instance, or when I admire the beauty of a stunning landscape in the Himalayas.

Here are some more differences between physical and psychological affects. Affects of pain can be both physical as well as psychological, but while physical pain is usually localized to some part of the body that is in pain, psychological pain is not so localized. For example, the physical pain of being pinched or hit is restricted to, and felt in, the concerned part of the body, whereas the psychological pain felt upon the death of one’s mother
is not localized to any particular part of the body (although one may have a heavy heart, metaphorically speaking), though it is not located outside the body either. Similarly, affects of pleasure can be both physical as well as psychological, but while physical pleasure is usually localized to some part of the body, the same need not be true of psychological pleasure. For example, the physical pleasure of being tickled is localized to the body part being tickled, whereas the psychological pleasure of aesthetic experience is not so localized; I do not feel the pleasure of seeing a beautiful Himalayan landscape (just) in my eyes, even if that sight is soothing to my eyes in some sense. Note that I said that unlike psychological affects or feelings, which are usually not localized, physical affects are usually only localized. But physical affects need not always be localized, as shown by the physical affect of being drowsy which is spread all over the body and not localized to, say, the eyes or the mouth.

Psychological affects of pleasure (or comfort) are, roughly, the “feel good” aspects common to all positive emotions (joy, elation, contentment, etc.), while psychological affects of pain (or discomfort) are, roughly, the “feel bad” aspects common to all negative emotions (anger, hatred, sorrow, despair, anguish, etc.). Perhaps there is a third genus of “neutral” psychological affects or feelings that involve neither pleasure nor pain. For example, there might be a neither pleasurable nor painful psychological affect associated with the physical affect or feeling of drowsiness. It is a further, open, question whether there are distinct psychological feelings involved in many emotions, psychological feelings that are unique to the emotion in question. For example, it might be thought that anger involves not just painful psychological feelings but “burning” ones; similarly, sorrow may involve a “sinking” feeling and not just painful psychological affects. If this is right, then the distinct psychological feelings involved in some emotions would all be species of one of the three genera of psychological feelings. At any rate, it needs to be clarified further what exactly psychological affects are and what they involve; what I have said so far is only a preliminary, rough sketch, one that suffices for my purposes.

Let us turn now to the cognitive element of emotions. As seen in the above example of intense grief felt by X upon her mother’s death, the cognitive element of emotions involves a belief that a certain judgment is true, or at least justified by the present evidence—X believes that it is true that her mother is dead. Sometimes, though, the cognitive element involved in emotions is weaker than strict beliefs and may involve thoughts or imaginings, as, for example, is the case when I fear small, 3-inch lizards,
knowing fully well that they are harmless. At any rate, the cognitive element is also often evaluative. In the case of the example above of X’s grief, X not only judges that it is true her mother has died but also believes that this is somehow bad, which in turn causes feelings of loss and sadness.

As indicated earlier, in virtue of their cognitive elements, emotions have intentionality, i.e., they are about something, or are directed or focused upon some object. Thus, X’s grief is about her mother’s death, and my fear above is directed upon lizards; it is a fear of something, vis-à-vis lizards in this case. Emotions acquire intentionality because their constitutive cognitive elements (whether beliefs, judgments, thoughts or imaginings) have intentionality—a thought, for instance, must be a thought about something; it must be directed upon an object, including not just physical objects, but also states of affairs, actions, events, persons, and the like.

It is sometimes held that emotions also involve a desiderative element consisting of desires for action, or strivings, in addition to the affective and cognitive elements specified above. I believe that such accounts of emotions are mistaken in making desires constitutive elements of all emotions, though desires may partly constitute some emotions such as love (which typically involves a desire or yearning to be with the objects of one’s love) or anger (which typically involves a desire for revenge).

To begin with, I think we must distinguish clearly between the concepts of emotions, desires, and beliefs. The idea of a unidirectional fit (or agreement, if you like) with the world, with different directions of fit, applies standardly to beliefs and desires, but need not apply in the same way (if it applies at all) to emotions, where the fit with the world is bidirectional. In contrast, when emotions involve the idea of a fit with the world, this is true in a bidirectional way.

To illustrate, my desire to listen to, say, Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony involves the striving that the world should change to match my desire so that somewhere in my vicinity there is a recorded or a live performance of this musical work; though this is not to say that we should always try to change the world to fit our desires, even if we want this typically, all else being equal. In contrast, we typically want our beliefs to be true, i.e., we want that our beliefs should match the world, not vice versa, and that we give up false beliefs, which do not match the world. So, for instance, when we realize that the belief that the earth is flat is false, we want to give it up and hold instead the true belief that the earth is round.

Emotions which do involve the idea of a fit with the world typically involve the direction of fit going from the world to the emotion, and
also sometimes the other way around. Thus, the fit between emotions and
the world may be bidirectional. Many emotions involve the idea that the
world should come to fit the desire that is involved in, or constitutes, that
emotion. There is, however, a sense in which the direction of fit may go from
emotions to the world. The idea here is not that some emotions are true,
as beliefs that fit the world are, but that some emotions may be appropriate
given the way the world is, e.g., moderate fear of a deadly snake may be
an appropriate emotion that fits the world. Such fitting emotions would
involve assent to the true beliefs that constitute them. Thus, when emotions
fit the world in the same direction in which beliefs do, the senses of fit
involved are different. While true beliefs fit the world in a representationally
faithful sense—they “mirror” or “picture” the world, if you like—appropriate
emotions fit the world in the nonrepresentational sense of being befitting or
suitable. It is also possible that one and the same emotion can fit the world
bidirectionally, for so far what I have said is that some emotions may fit
the world, whereas the world may fit some other emotions. For example,
my moderate fear of the deadly snake may be appropriate, and moreover
that emotion may involve the desire to flee so that the world comes to fit
that desire when I do run away from the scene.

Now, emotions are often constituted by desires. For instance, the
emotion of love for someone is standardly constituted by, or involves, a
desire to be with the object of one’s love (be it a person, pet, place, book,
musical work, film, or something else), and in this sense involves the idea
that the world should come to fit this desire. Similarly, the emotion of being
angry with someone may involve a desire for revenge, and in this sense
may involve the idea that the world should fit this desire.

But there are other emotions where it is not clear that they are
constituted by desires. For instance, suppose a student gets an “A” grade on
a philosophy paper. The ensuing emotion of happiness is certainly caused by
the satisfaction of the desire to fare well, and certainly the emotion involves,
as its constituents, affects of pleasure as well as the student’s assent to the
true, evaluative belief that she has obtained an “A” and that is a good thing.
But it is not clear that this emotion itself is constituted by the satisfied desire
to fare well, nor is it clear that this emotion is constituted by, or necessarily
involves, a desire for action of the sort often found in anger or love. Of
course, she may have a desire, later in time, to continue to fare well, but it is
not clear that this later desire constitutes the very emotion of happiness that
she feels when she is happy at her grade upon first coming to know of it.
And she may also have a desire, later in time, to tell friends and loved ones
about her grade, but again it is not clear that this later desire constitutes the
very emotion of happiness that she feels when she is happy at her grade upon first coming to know of it. In this example, the first rushes of happiness, I contend, consist only of affects and belief, yet there is a full-fledged emotion of happiness. Moreover, I claim that even if the student is very modest and never has a desire to tell anyone about her grade, she can still have the emotion of happiness so long as there occur (a) the appropriate evaluative belief, and (b) the relevant pleasurable psychological affect.

Justin Oakley claims that one problem for accounts of emotions which do not include desires as constituents of emotions is that they may fail to distinguish between some emotions, like my fear (involving the desire to flee) felt upon seeing a snake, and interest (involving the desire to stay and examine) felt by a naturalist upon seeing the same snake (Oakley 1992, 22–28). Oakley thinks that only desires can distinguish fear from interest in this case. However, it seems that Oakley is mistaken here, for clearly there are different affects involved in this example given by Oakley, an affect of pain (or distress, more properly) in the case of fear, and an affect of pleasure (or excitement, more properly) in the case of interest; one may also question whether interest is an emotion or a mode of belief, though for argument’s sake let us grant Oakley that it is an emotion. Moreover, there are also different cognitions involved in the two cases: I cognize that the snake is deadly, while the naturalist cognizes that the same snake is harmless but rare. Alternatively, if the snake is indeed deadly, then the naturalist may indeed cognize that it is deadly but rare, and his affects may be both of pleasure (or excitement, more properly, given his interest in the snake) and pain (or distress, more properly, given his fear of the deadly snake). Even so, the cognitions and affects involved in the naturalist’s emotion, which is a mix of interest and fear, will be different from the cognitions and affects involved in my emotion of fear. These differences in affects as well as cognitions may serve to distinguish fear and interest, without having to bring in desires, contrary to what Oakley thinks. Oakley is, however, right to say that acting out of emotion involves being motivated by desires; and acting out of emotion is not requisite for having emotion. For example, acting out of compassion involves being motivated by the desire to help the needy. In such cases, desires explain the motivational power of emotions.

I.3. Emotions, Beliefs, and Moods

But enough of desires and their distinction from emotions. The distinction between emotions and affects or feelings should be clear from what has
gone before; affects are necessary but not sufficient for emotions since they lack the cognitiveness and intentionality involved in emotions. I believe it is important to briefly make clearer two further distinctions: (a) that between emotions and beliefs or judgments, and (b) that between emotions and moods.

We have already seen part of the distinction between emotions and beliefs in terms of the idea of a fit with the world. We want our beliefs to fit the world, but this idea of a fit with the world, when it does apply to emotions, can do so in both directions: typically, with the world fitting the emotions, and also sometimes with emotions fitting the world.

But there is more to the distinction between emotions and beliefs. Beliefs, like emotions and desires, are cognitive and intentional. Beliefs may also sometimes be necessary for some emotions like grief, though some emotions may instead involve thoughts or imaginings, as seen earlier. Beliefs may, thus, at best be necessary components for some, but not all, emotions. The important point I wish to make here (contra cognitivists such as Nussbaum who I discuss later) is that beliefs alone cannot, in general, be sufficient for emotions, for beliefs themselves usually lack the affective component of emotions, a component which is so essential and distinctive to emotions. For example, my belief that “Schnee ist Weiss” is true if and only if snow is white does not involve an affective component, nor need it be accompanied by any affects, even if there is something it is like to have such a belief. Of course, it may be true that some beliefs may be accompanied by affects, or else may cause affects, or else may be necessary for affects, but none of these shows that beliefs are constituted by affects; just as the fact that some desires may cause some emotions, or may be necessary for some emotions, does not show that desires are constituents of even these emotions, leave alone all emotions, as argued before. For instance, my assent to the belief that the snake I see is harmful may cause, or be necessary for, or be accompanied by, an affect of distress that is part of the emotion of fear that I feel. But in no way is the belief, which is cognitive and intentional, constituted by the affect of distress, which is non-cognitive and non-intentional. Similarly, evaluative beliefs such as that women should be given equal pay as men may cause or be necessary for or be accompanied by affects, perhaps as part of an emotion, but it is not clear that such a belief itself includes affects as components. Note that I grant that there may be something it is like to have conscious beliefs, and that what it is like to have conscious evaluative beliefs may be different from what it is like to have conscious factual beliefs. But this phenomenological
aspect of beliefs is different from affects or feelings of pain or pleasure that are part of emotions.

Very briefly, let us now turn to the distinction between emotions and moods. We have seen already what emotions are. Now first, moods, unlike emotions, are non-intentional, i.e., they are not directed upon any particular object, though they may be set off or caused by particular events or things. For example, someone’s depression may be triggered or caused by her mother’s death; and thus she may be depressed “about” her mother’s death, in a non-intentional sense of aboutness, so to speak. But when she is depressed, her mind need not always be directed or focused upon her mother’s death (unlike say an emotion of grief about the same event); though, from time to time, her thoughts may wander back to her mother’s death, thus being directed upon that event. Nor is her depression directed or focused upon anything else in particular, unlike her emotions, beliefs, and desires. Second, moods are pervasive, affecting or coloring all other conscious mental events (like thoughts, desires, etc.) in their wake, whereas this need not be true of emotions. Thus, for example, our agent’s depression may “negatively” affect her thoughts, her disposition toward the world, her desires, and so on, while this need not be true of an emotion of grief, unless of course it turns into depression. We find thus that moods are non-intentional, and involve pervasive affects, and very roughly one may thus say that moods are objectless “emotions” (compare Sherman 1994, 9–11).

Note now that this distinction between emotions and moods is important, as is the one made earlier between emotions and feelings or affects. In fact, I will use it later in chapter VI.2 to argue against the formalism about music associated with Eduard Hanslick.

I.4. Other Views:
Martha Nussbaum’s Neo-Stoic Cognitivism

So much by way of clarifying the philosophical ground underlying the emotions. Having stated my positive view about the emotions, I now turn to assessing some other views about the emotions, though I cannot survey them all here. My own view of the emotions will, I hope, become clearer in relation to others’ views, and the survey that follows will situate my view. I hope it will emerge that my view has advantages over several theories of the emotions.
Consider first the neo-Stoic cognitivist view of the emotions held by Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2001). I first summarize Nussbaum's cognitivist view before offering my criticisms of it. Nussbaum holds that emotions are, centrally, cognitive (where by “cognitive” she merely means “concerned with receiving and processing information”) and evaluative appraisals or beliefs or judgments or thoughts. There are type-identities between emotions and judgments (or value-laden cognitive states, more broadly), on her view. These cognitive-evaluative beliefs or judgments need not, she claims, be linguistic or propositional or verbal and can be seeings-as. Thus, she claims that animals and very young children can have emotions, as the cognitions that form (and in her view are) emotions need not be inherently human or verbal. She also claims that emotions are intentional and beliefs are essential to their identity, and thus emotions cannot be mere thoughtless natural energies.

Nussbaum claims that objectless feelings of pain or pleasure are not absolutely necessary definitional elements of emotions, even though they may often accompany emotions. She claims that judgments of the right sort are both necessary and sufficient for emotions, and constitute emotions.

Now on to my criticisms. Nussbaum is right to say, I think, that very little children and perhaps some animals too can have emotions. If so, then I grant her that the cognitive component of emotions need not be strict propositional beliefs or judgments, but can be seeings-as or imaginings (or perhaps even visualizings), as I claimed above in my brief mention of the example of fear of lizards. Note this is not to say that beliefs can be non-propositional. However, once we have clearly distinguished, as above, between emotions and beliefs in terms of affects especially, we can see that her neo-Stoic identification of emotions with beliefs is mistaken, for thoughts cause emotions and are a part of them, but affects also form a part of emotions.

Nussbaum is right to think that beliefs or judgments cause emotions and constitute them, and that if we alter the underlying belief we can change the emotion, as the Stoics say. For instance, in the example (used also by Nussbaum) of the death of one’s mother, suppose instead of thinking that it is a bad thing or a loss that one’s mother is dead, one changes one’s underlying belief to the thought that perhaps it is for the best as she suffered for a long time and died peacefully (or that it is for the best that she is dead at last as she tormented her children for years). The emotion constituted by the belief will also change as the belief changes, from grief to a peaceful (even if sad) acceptance (or joy, in case one thinks it is a good thing she
is dead at last). Note in passing that while the claim that judgments or appraisals are both causes and constituents of emotions may seem to imply a problematic self-causation or auto-causation, one way out here, suggested by Agnes Moors, is to appeal to two senses of appraisal and claim that the appraisal process is the cause of the emotion while the appraisal output is a component of the emotion (Moors 2013b, 134–35), and claiming further that the appraisal output in turn causes other components of emotions such as feelings.

However, against Nussbaum, the fact that the emotion changes as the constitutive belief changes does not show that emotions are to be identified or equated with their cognitive elements, whether beliefs or judgments or seeings-as or imaginings, nor does it show that mere judgments of the right sort are sufficient for emotions, as she thinks. For emotions are also constituted by affects or feelings, as well as by desires in some cases. On Nussbaum's neo-Stoic view, grief, for example, is identical (at least for adult humans, if not for non-propositional infants and animals) with the acceptance of an evaluative, eudaimonistic proposition, to wit, that someone beloved is lost forever (Nussbaum 2001, 40–41). But while this proposition or rather acceptance of it may cause and partly constitute grief, surely grief also feels a certain way, a certain painful, perhaps "sinking" way. Or perhaps grief feels “like putting a nail into your stomach,” as Nussbaum says, which is just the non-intentional, non-cognitive feeling or affect of grief associated with and caused by the proposition that causes and partly constitutes grief. There is something it is like to have an emotion, and so how can feelings or affects be left out of any account of emotions, given that emotions feel a certain way, the feeling being an essential and central part of the emotion? What about other emotions such as love, anxiety, fear, jealousy, hope, despair, anger, and so on? Don’t these all feel certain ways? Doesn’t love, for example, (typically) involve a “yearning” feeling to be with the object of one’s love? Don’t anxiety and fear involve (typically) something like a “gripping” feeling? It really seems Nussbaum's account of the emotions is too narrow and one-dimensional if it leaves affects—whether pleasurable or painful or neutral (or some species of these)—out of these and other emotions. Thus I find I must reject her view as being at best partially right.

Note that it is possible that one may not be conscious of the feeling or affect one has when one has an emotion, and one may not even know that one is having a feeling. These qualifications block a possible reply that someone with a cognitivist position such as Nussbaum might make, to wit, that one can have grief but lack that particular feeling associated with grief.
or any feeling at all. For example, someone trying to defend Nussbaum might say that we may sometimes experience guilt *without* actually feeling any pangs of guilt. In response, it could be said that in such cases one could still be having the feelings, the *affect* of grief or the pangs of guilt, that is, without being conscious of them. Or else one may simply not know that one is having the affect of grief or the pangs of guilt. It might be interjected at this point, on Nussbaum's behalf, that an alien species could have the same emotions as us with slightly different feels or with no feels at all, and this shows that feelings are just accompaniments to emotions, not essential to them. In response to this, I grant that alien species might have the emotions we have, though the feelings involved may be different. But this does not yet show that feelings or affects are mere accompaniments to emotions, not essential to them. What is needed for that is to show that there indeed *is* another species (not just that there might be one such) with our emotions but without *any* feelings at all. This, I submit, is an empirical question. Until such time as it is proven that such a species exists, we have reason (even if not indefeasible reason) to think that affects are essential constituents of emotions.

Nussbaum herself makes two points in defense of her claim that feelings are not essential to emotions (Nussbaum 2001, 61). First, she says that there are non-conscious emotional states, such as non-conscious anger or non-conscious fear of death, and as these do not involve any necessary phenomenological feelings, feelings cannot be essential for emotion-types. Second, the feeling states people claim to experience in connection with emotion-types vary greatly, and thus Nussbaum claims she herself often feels anger without having the “boiling” feeling many report, which shows that this feeling is not essential to anger. As to the first point, while I grant Nussbaum that there can be non-conscious emotions, nevertheless when these emotions become and are *conscious* and one is conscious of having them, one must, I submit, *feel* the affective or phenomenological condition that is part of them. And conscious emotions might be said to be the *central* cases of emotions, ones which non-conscious emotions are derivative and different (and thus non-affective) forms of. Note that I am *not* committing myself to the idea that there is something it is like to have non-conscious emotions, that these have a phenomenological aspect, nor am I denying that non-conscious emotions are emotions. Regarding Nussbaum’s second point, one must first ask whether it is anger that she feels or some less intense state such as annoyance or irritation if the (“boiling”) affect of anger is absent. Even if it is anger that she feels, I suggest there can be variations of intensity
in the feelings one has, and these feelings might even be *non-conscious* and one need not be reflectively aware of them at all times. So it is *conceivable* that while angry, she feels *something like* the (“boiling” or “burning”) affect of anger, perhaps as a physical affect in the form of a tension at the back of her neck or a headache the next day, as she claims about herself, even if she is not aware that she has the affect (compare Stocker 1996, 21−23). One can allow for variations in the intensity of feelings or affects felt across and within subjects at different times and places, as Nussbaum wants, yet still claim, contra Nussbaum, that *some* sort of feeling (perhaps a “loose” or “broad” or a very weak feeling) or affect *must* be felt when we feel conscious emotions such as love or grief or anger.

A final point against Nussbaum. As Jerrold Levinson (Levinson 2004) has suggested, despite what Nussbaum seems to think, the choice when it comes to theories of emotions is not just between a purely cognitivist view of the emotions such as Nussbaum’s, on the one hand, and a view that sees emotions as merely thoughtless sensations or tingles or feelings, on the other hand. There is also a mixed position between these two (extreme) positions, to wit, a cognitive-affective view such as the position I have advanced above.

### I.5. Paul Griffiths’s Theory

Next I discuss the position advanced by Paul Griffiths (1997), whose view might seem radically different from my own stance, though I can take his claims on board, as I hope emerges below. Griffiths claims that the folk psychological category of “emotions” is a mistake, and that philosophers who write about the emotions should focus on recent findings in biology, neurology, and brain science. There is need, he claims, for an empirical investigation into the emotions. The emotion category of folk psychology does nothing to illuminate what is going on in people, suggests Griffiths. He is not, however, claiming that there is nothing going on in people who claim to feel emotions.

Griffiths allows for two different categories of emotions: “affect programs” triggered by separable low-level processes, and “higher cognitive” emotions that are shaped and “constructed” by culture. Work on affect programs is inspired by Darwin, and the theory is associated with Paul Ekman. Affect programs deal with, roughly, the occurrent instances of the English terms “surprise,” “fear,” “anger,” “disgust,” “contempt,” “sadness,” and “joy”; what might be called “basic emotions.” These are seen by the
affect program theory as short-term, stereotypical responses that involve cross-cultural facial expressions, autonomic nervous system arousal, and other elements. Cross-cultural facial expressions, claims Griffiths, require evolutionary explanations but do not imply that the emotional responses are innate. As for higher cognitive emotions, these are produced in agreement with cultural norms, and may involve subconscious conformity to cultural models. Traditional work on the emotions, Griffiths claims, also needs to take into account the social construction of emotions. Griffiths also claims that Ekman’s “basic emotions” are homologs, i.e., they have shared evolutionary origins across mammals; fear, for example, can be felt by many mammalian species and has a shared evolutionary origin in their common ancestors.

I begin my criticisms of Griffiths by focusing on what he says about affect programs (p. 77): “The central idea of the affect program theory is that emotional responses are complex . . . because they involve several elements . . . (a) expressive facial changes, (b) musculoskeletal responses such as flinching and orienting, (c) expressive vocal changes, (d) endocrine system changes and consequent changes in the levels of hormones, and (e) autonomic nervous system changes. . . .” Contra Griffiths, I would suggest that (a) through (c) are neither necessary nor sufficient for emotions, as one can have an emotion as an occurrent, inner, mental state and not express it facially or musculoskeletally or vocally, and one can pretend to manifest facial or vocal or musculoskeletal behavior typically associated with emotions without having emotions themselves. As for (d) and (e), these only give us the chemical and neurophysiological bases of emotions, but do not tell us what emotions themselves are, as I briefly elaborate below.

While I agree with Griffiths that traditional work on the emotions needs to make room for empirical, scientific investigations into these mental phenomena as well as the social construction of emotions, I would register the following reservations for his position. Work in the neurosciences can and does tell us a lot about the underlying neurophysiological and chemical bases (or causes) of emotions that allow us to feel these, and it explains how emotions are realized. However, it is not clear that it suffices to tell us what emotions themselves are, how they feel and are manifested, what they are constituted by, what the affects that constitute them are, which other mental phenomena (such as beliefs, desires, affects, moods, etc.) cause and relate otherwise to them and how they do so, and so on, as more traditional work on the category of emotion tries to do. Likewise, it is not clear that the notions of affect programs as well as higher cognitive emotions, and
work on these, *suffice* in themselves to tell us more about what emotions are, how they feel, and so on. About moods, Griffiths claims similarly (pp. 254–55) that these are neurochemical states of the central nervous system that modify its activity by affecting the probability that neural state transitions will take place. But here too, while we are told what *realizes* moods and explains their neurophysical and chemical bases, Griffiths does not tell us what moods are, how they feel, and so on, and in particular he ignores the *affective* side of moods, which seems so important for many moods such as elation, depression, and so on.

Against Griffiths, I submit that the category “emotion” characterizes usefully what people feel, and also helps distinguish emotions from and relate them to other mental phenomena such as feelings, moods, beliefs, desires, and the like, as I tried to do above. Griffiths is right to claim that conceptual analysis alone cannot determine the real nature of fear, for example. Nevertheless a cognitive-affective theory, such as mine, *can* and should make room for empirical research to tell us more about the neurophysiological and chemical and social constructionist causes and bases of fear, while *simultaneously* analyzing fear in terms of a cognitive element such as an evaluative judgment or belief or imagining or seeing-as, plus affect (plus desires). In any case, the onus is on Griffiths to come up with a genuine counter-example to a cognitive-affective theory that makes room for such empirical research. If Griffiths comes up with even one such case, which as far as I am aware he has not yet done, I am inclined to think that a cognitive-affective theory that respects and accommodates such research can deal with it. Until such time, I remain optimistic about the prospects of a theory that *combines* the kind of empirical work Griffiths wants with a more traditional approach to the emotions.

Indeed, in a recent essay (Griffiths 2013), Griffiths suggests that we need to integrate the approach to emotions of those philosophers who draw on the biological and psychological sciences with a more traditional approach, which sees philosophical work on the emotions as self-sufficient. Even though my view leans more toward the latter approach, I fully agree with Griffiths that integration is desirable, for while empirical science and data matter, so do philosophical and conceptual clarity, especially if philosophy can reveal truths about the mind of a different kind from those uncovered by science. I am inclined to claim that, similarly, work on musical expressiveness and in philosophical aesthetics in general must be *both* open to being informed by neuroscience, psychology, etc., without being mere armchair speculation, on the one hand, and at the same time
also seek philosophical and conceptual clarity, on the other hand, without getting bogged down in empirical and psychological data. In this vein, I was amazed to discover some years back at a talk given at my institution by the McGill music researcher Robert Zatorre that a lot of psychological work about music has been about musical arousal (compare Matravers 2011, 221), and until recently empirical research into music did not acknowledge the distinction between arousal and expression, a basic distinction long-acknowledged within musical aesthetics which will be discussed in section II.5. But more about such things later.

I.6. Jesse Prinz’s Somatic View

I turn now to the neo-Jamesian view put forth by Jesse Prinz (Prinz 2004) in his book Gut Reactions (also, incidentally, the title of a few books on gastric disorders by several different authors). Prinz tries to reconcile earlier bodily or somatic views of emotions with cognitive approaches to emotions and claims that emotions are embodied appraisals. He also suggests that emotions are perceptions, perceptions not just of aroused states or changes in the body as it registers things in our environments but also perceptions through the body of themes such as danger, loss, etc., that relate to our well-being. Fear of a snake, for example, involves pounding hearts, strained breathing, etc., and in perceiving these bodily changes we become aware of danger; fear thus tracks danger via heart palpitations (Prinz 2004, 68–69), as the heart beats with significance. Emotions, Prinz suggests, register bodily changes and thereby represent or track core relational themes (a phrase Prinz borrows from the psychologist Richard Lazarus) such as danger that pertain to our well-being.

In making a case for his view, Prinz rejects cognitive approaches to emotions, claiming that emotions are not cognitive if cognitions are taken as necessarily concept-laden and disembodied (Prinz 2004, 41). This leads to questions about how we should understand cognition, and Prinz suggests that cognitive states and processes exploit representations that are under the control of organisms, not the environment. Prinz grants that we can cause emotions by acts of will, e.g., imagining being angry, where the emotion is a concept based on memory, but he claims that our daily emotions are not cognitive but more like percepts under exogeneous control (Prinz 2004, 50).
Emotions, Prinz claims, are appraisals in that they represent organism-environment relations with regard to well-being by registering bodily changes. He claims there is no principled reason for claiming that appraisals must be disembodied. While the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (Damasio 1994, 139) claims that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes coupled with evaluations, suggesting that emotions can play a role in reasoning only if they involve a cognitive element, Prinz thinks cognitive evaluations are not required here (Prinz 2004, 60).

In suggesting that emotions are perceptions, Prinz claims that they are ways of using our bodily radar detectors to literally perceive our relationship to the world. He defends his view from apparent contrasts between emotion and perception (with regard to such things as unobservables, endurance, action, indirectness, modularity, and warrant), contrasts that might suggest either that emotions are not perceptual states or that they are not perceptions of core relational themes.

Prinz’s novel and ingenious approach has many plausible aspects, but I have several qualms about it. To begin with, it is not clear how mere bodily changes such as racing heartbeats, faster breathing, etc., and perceptions of these can appraise or evaluate things, creatures, situations, and the like. As the Concise Oxford English Dictionary tells us, to appraise something is to estimate the value or quality or price of that thing. It would seem then (at the risk of sounding like an ordinary language philosopher) that the very concept of appraisal calls for something like cognitions or judgments or concepts in order to evaluate. The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio seems to grasp this larger, philosophical point, and perhaps that is why he incorporates evaluations in his view of the emotions, as mentioned briefly above, claiming that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes coupled with evaluations. In contrast, it is not clear how Prinz solves this philosophical problem; indeed he even goes so far as to claim that “embodied appraisals are thoughts . . .” (Prinz 2004, 244). Of course, Prinz might claim here that what he means by appraisal is representing organism-environment relations with regard to well-being (Prinz 2004, 52); or as Magda Arnold who popularized the term “appraisal” in emotion research puts it, to appraise a thing is to see it as affecting oneself in a way that matters (Arnold 1960, 171), another notion that incidentally seems to call for evaluation and something like cognitions or judgments or concepts in order to evaluate. But notice now that when cognitive views of emotions (and cognitive-affective views of emotions such as the one I incline toward) talk about appraisal,
they have cognitive evaluations in mind, involving something like concepts or judgments or cognitions, as is the case, for example, with the view of the psychologist Richard Lazarus who sees appraisals as evaluations of organism-environment relations and their significance for one's well-being. If this is right, then it looks like Prinz is talking about something quite different from cognitive theorists of emotions when he mentions appraisals. As such, one can doubt his claim that his view reconciles or “bridges the gap” between cognitive and non-cognitive, bodily theories of emotions (Prinz 2004, viii). It would seem more plausible to claim instead that Prinz is only offering us an updated version of a bodily or somatic theory of emotions, a theory that is non-cognitive rather than a reconciliation of cognitive and non-cognitive approaches to emotions. Relatedly, one might also wonder contra Prinz how mere physical states such as pounding heartbeats can be focused on or directed toward the environment, as his notion of appraisal seems to require, given that intentionality has traditionally been thought to be a mark of the mental (compare Carroll 2006, 219). To be sure, Prinz appeals to teleosemantics, suggesting that the content of a representation is the state of affairs which it is that representation’s function to detect; for example, although anger is a perception of the body on Prinz’s view, its function is to detect when one has been demeaned or offended against, the nominal content of anger being the aroused body and its real content being the proposition that I or mine have been demeaned or offended against. But it is still not clear contra Prinz how mere physical states can detect things or have intentionality without something cognitive or mental to lean on. Note also in passing that cognitive views of emotions need not be committed to cognitions being “necessarily concept-laden, disembodied states” as Prinz portrays them (Prinz 2004, 41, 50–51, 74–76), for cognitions may involve something like not very highly sophisticated proto-concepts in the case of emotions in infants and non-human animals, and in any case cognitive theorists grant cognitions are neurophysiologically based and so cannot be disembodied (à la Cartesian mental states, for example).

My second concern about Prinz’s view pertains to his claim that emotions literally are perceptions or perceptual states. While Prinz ingeniously and quite successfully defends his view from many apparent contrasts (mentioned above) between emotion and perception in the last chapter of his book, I would register the following reservation that pertains to control and change. We can often control and change our emotions over time in ways that it is not clear apply to our perceptual experiences. To
use the kind of example familiar to and used by the Greeks, especially the Stoics, and Nussbaum, someone can control and change the sadness felt upon the death of her mother to acceptance if she changes the underlying evaluative judgment from one that suggests that it is somehow a bad thing that her mother died to an evaluative judgment that suggests instead that perhaps it is not so bad after all that her mother died, for she lived a long, happy, and fulfilled life, died in her sleep, without much pain, and she had to die sooner or later anyway, and so on. Indeed, one might even change the emotion of sadness to happiness in such a case if the underlying evaluative judgment is changed to one that suggests instead that it is in fact a good thing that one’s mother died, for she was wicked, abusive, and so on, assuming all this is true! Many ethical theories (such as virtue ethics as well as the ethics of love and care) and claims in fact build on this idea that we can often control and change our emotions to some degree. In sharp contrast, it is not clear how I can control and change my perceptual experience or state of, say, seeing a sunset as yellow or orange or red to one that involves seeing the sunset instead as blue or green or black (short of wearing tinted glasses or closing my eyes, both of which seem to involve a kind of cheating). This contrast with regard to control and change casts some doubt on Prinz’s claim that emotions are perceptual states. Moreover, contra Prinz (Prinz 2004, 222–24), it is not clear that emotions inhabit one of the senses (such as vision, audition, and olfaction), as he claims perceptual states must do, nor is it clear that emotions are implicated in perceptual input systems, as Prinz suggests. Of course, Prinz is right that emotions reveal how we fare in the world and how situations relate to our well-being, drawing our attention to certain things in the world and compelling us to act in response. But these insights can easily be taken on board by cognitive and cognitive-affective theorists without making the yet to be established claim that emotions literally are perceptual states; perhaps talk of emotions being perceptions should be taken not literally, as Prinz seems to do, but only figuratively.

Third, one might wonder against Prinz if bodily changes such as pounding heartbeats are just part of the neurophysiological bases of emotions that allow us to have emotions rather than being constitutive of emotions themselves. Prinz suggests (Prinz 2004, 244) that most emotion researchers try to pack too much into emotions by assuming that bodily changes, propositional attitudes, action dispositions, and feelings are parts of emotions, whereas he thinks these are mere causes and effects of emotions.
that should not be mistaken for emotions themselves. But in the same vein, it might be objected against Prinz that bodily changes (part of the set just mentioned above) should not be identified with emotions for they are only neurophysiological causes and effects of emotions. Note in this connection that Prinz suggests (Prinz 2004, 11) that Aristotle may have identified some role for the body in his theory of the emotions, when he speculated in the *De Anima* that anger is “realized” by blood boiling in the heart. But against Prinz, it is possible that “realization” may involve the body only being the neurophysiological, subvenient base or cause (even a standard rather than an essential cause, for Prinz grants, along with Damasio, that bodily changes are not necessary for emotions as emotions may bypass the body) of the emotion rather than being constitutive of the emotion itself. Neither subvenience nor causation need amount to constitution.

My fourth and final reservation about Prinz’s view pertains to his claims about moods (Prinz 2004, 182–88). Prinz suggests that moods are just a special case of emotions, and are embodied appraisals, but while emotions tell us how localized, specific events are significant for our well-being, moods tell us how our lives are faring globally and more generally. I have no quarrel with the claim that moods may inform us how we are faring overall, but doubt Prinz’s reasoning for suggesting that moods are intentional; and in any case, seeing moods as non-intentional does not prevent one from granting that moods have the kind of global, informative role Prinz identifies. Prinz claims that any mental state that has the function of being reliably caused by something represents that thing; if they have such a function, then Prinz thinks moods can be said to represent just what their corresponding emotions represent and so are intentional states (Prinz 2004, 184). But against Prinz, one must wonder if there is a double conflation going on here, one between causation and representation, and the other between representation and intentionality. Causation and representation seem to be different concepts, e.g., someone may be multiply stabbed in the back and, unknown to them, this may be the reliable cause of their intense pain, but it is not clear that the pain, the mental state here, must involve representations of a knife or stabbings, etc. Even so, it seems that conceptually, representation is not the same thing as intentionality or object-directedness or about-ness in the sense that Brentano posited, e.g., realistic portraits represent their subjects, but it is not clear that they thereby have intentionality, which has traditionally been thought to be a mark of the mental rather than of such non-mental things as portraits.