

Introduction

A Rock and a Hard Place

Between a Party and the People

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I think it's tempting not to negotiate with hostage takers, unless the hostage gets harmed. Then people will question the wisdom of that strategy. In this case, the hostage was the American people and I was not willing to see them get harmed.

—President Barack Obama, Block and Raz,
“All Things Considered”

On December 7, 2010, President Barack Obama held a news conference to push back against the criticism leveled at him by congressional Democrats and liberal media commentators for compromising on tax legislation with congressional Republicans. Even though Obama offered an analogy placing Republicans in the role of “hostage takers,” he chided his fellow partisans, saying that Democrats were being “sanctimonious” for failing to see that their principles would result in economic policies that would harm the American people.¹ Obama’s admonishment to Democrats, which came less than nine months after his signature health care reform bill (the

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) passed with a single Republican vote, illustrates the fraught and contingent nature of presidential leadership in a polarized era.

After sweeping Republican victories in the 2010 midterm elections, including a net gain of sixty-three seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, Obama was faced with the task of working on expiring tax legislation with a “lame duck” Democratic Congress and an emboldened Republican minority leadership. An ailing economy and a restive public mood completed the dismal backdrop for the negotiations. Unwilling to cede his relevance in future policy debates, Obama intentionally sought to compromise with congressional Republicans so as to reposition himself as the nation’s leader, despite his party’s electoral “shellacking” as the president described it.² Still, his agreement to extend the Bush-era tax cuts in exchange for an extension of unemployment benefits prompted fierce resistance from congressional Democrats, including a call for an “old-fashioned” filibuster by liberal Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT).³ Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) accused the president of “caving.”⁴

The countervailing pressures on President Obama during the legislative debate and the public criticisms from across the partisan spectrum over his decision once he agreed to a compromise exemplify the leadership dilemma at the heart of the presidency, the tension between party priorities and national imperatives. As Sidney Milkis explains, “Obama’s political difficulties have stemmed from his efforts to reconcile two competing approaches to presidential leadership—a venerable method of executive leadership exalting nonpartisan administration of the welfare and national security states, and an emergent style of partisan presidential leadership featuring vigorous efforts to accomplish party objectives.”⁵ Yet this tension is not new. James MacGregor Burns observed similar pressures for midtwentieth-century presidents. “The President,” wrote Burns in 1965, “must be more than administrative chief or party leader. He must exert leadership in behalf of the whole nation.”⁶ As the only elective office chosen by the entire country, presidents, at least since Andrew Jackson began making his plebiscitary claims in the 1820s, are expected to represent the collective will of the people. Yet as Woodrow Wilson also noted in 1908, “The role of party leader is forced upon the President by the method of his selection . . . He cannot escape being the leader of his party . . . because he is at once the choice of the party and of the nation. He is the party nominee, and the only party nominee for whom the whole nation votes.”⁷ The express purpose of this volume is to explore this friction between national and partisan leadership: its sources and con-

sequences, and how presidents maneuver in response to these pressures. Thus, as the challenges that Obama faced during the tax cut extension debate demonstrate, institutional structures and leadership expectations bind presidents both to their political parties and to the American people.

Although more visibly pronounced in recent history, owing to the partisan polarization gripping the nation's capital, the tension between party and national leadership has its origins in the American Founding. Seen as a source of division, parties are absent from the United States Constitution and its formal institutional design. The Framers, fearful of "cabal, intrigue, and corruption," and the "dangerous vice of faction," established the Electoral College as the mechanism for selecting presidents, or at minimum, the nominees for the office should no candidate receive a majority of electoral votes.⁸ Even though the delegates at the Constitutional Convention possessed varying expectations for the presidency, in part because of their differing beliefs about the proper role of an executive within a republic, they substantially agreed on the notion that presidents would be thought "successful in the degree to which they subdued or transcended partisanship."⁹

The Constitution, theoretically designed "to control and counteract parties," soon came to depend on them, especially to cohere the purposes of the legislature and executive and as vehicles for the expression of divergent opinions.¹⁰ In the early Congresses these divisions mainly concerned the role and scope of the new federal government regarding the states, the economy, and foreign relations with Britain and France. As these issues came to dominate the national political debate, the parties gave structure to the contest between rival viewpoints. The parties, therefore, became the avenues through which lawmakers in Congress bargained over legislation and coordinated voting activity; the channels that connected the separate, yet interdependent, legislative and executive institutions; and the basis for the nomination and selection of presidential and congressional candidates.¹¹

Although presidents have been grappling with partisan pressures since George Washington's first presidential term, the birth of the modern administrative state transformed the relationship between presidents and parties. At the turn of the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson noted, "It is . . . becoming more and more true, as the business of the government becomes more and more complex and extended, that the President is becoming more and more a political and less and less an executive officer."¹² Hence, the more duties delegated to the president by the Congress and the more prominent the president has become within the federal pano-

ply of elective representatives, the more trenchant the leadership dilemma and the more elusive governing success have become for the president.

Taking together these historical developments, this volume argues that much of the shape of presidential politics in this contemporary era beset with partisan polarization and expansive presidential claims arises from this need for presidents to serve as both defenders of the national interest and as the leaders of their political parties. Even though there are many challenges to effective presidential leadership, the most fundamental of these is to reconcile the demands of national and partisan leadership. The constitutional structures of governance implore presidents to transcend political divisions, but the politically developed structures of selection ensure the president's involvement with one of the major parties. These structural conditions compel presidents to both unite and divide, or more precisely, to forge coalitions between elements they have sought to divide in their attempts to win office. We call this tension between the president's service as a party's leader versus the nation's leader the *leadership dilemma*.

Although this tension persists through the history of presidential politics, it seems to push and pull with greater force in the contemporary era. We believe this is the case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the national demands on presidents are greater than ever—a result of path-breaking events, such as the Great Depression and World War II, which inflated expectations of presidential involvement in public affairs (e.g., Milkis 1985).¹³ Second, a renewed level of polarization between Democrats and Republicans at the national level has exacerbated the partisan pressures that presidents confront (e.g., Fiorina and Abrams 2008).¹⁴ This, in turn, makes it more difficult for presidents—as well as aspirants to the office—to reconcile the claims of their partisan base with their perceptions of the nation's needs. Thus, presidents currently bear intense demands in their dual roles as national and partisan leaders.

Analyzing the Presidential Leadership Dilemma

Leadership is the essence of the presidency. But effective presidential leadership must balance national demands against partisan pressures. Hence even though the Constitution tasks the president with the responsibility to implement federal laws and nominate high-level national officials, the institutions of presidential selection require aspirants and incumbents to build a partisan coalition of supporters. As presidents grapple with

this *leadership dilemma*, how can we assess their choices? The literature on the presidency suggests two broad approaches, which are embodied, respectively, in the following questions: What are the requirements of presidential leadership? What does it take for a president to succeed?

The first question deals with the structures within which presidents operate and in particular the nature of the expectations surrounding their exercise of power. Scholars addressing this question emphasize that comparisons of presidential leadership should consider both the opportunities and the constraints that presidents face. *Presidential Leadership: The Vortex of Power*, edited by Bert Rockman and Richard Waterman (2008), offers a recent investigation into this subject. In its discussion of scholarly surveys ranking the presidents in the introduction to this volume, Rockman and Waterman posit that conceptions of presidential leadership have changed over time as the expectations of the presidency changed. As a result, “the more activist presidents of the twentieth century” fared better than their more passive predecessors on the qualities assessed in modern surveys.¹⁵ Further, they argue, these changes in expectations combine a linear trend—an increase over time as the institution grew in stature—with a cyclical pattern. Following Skowronek (1997), they also assert that the cyclical pattern depends on a president’s political identity in relation to the established political regime. “Presidents,” Skowronek explained, “attempt to build all sorts of nuance and subtlety into this relationship, but stripped to its essentials, it comes in two forms: opposed and affiliated.”¹⁶ Both forms alter the expectations of a new president, but they depend on the perceived success of the prevailing political regime and his identity as an affiliate or opponent. Thus, according to Rockman and Waterman, “time”—linear and cyclical—affects expectations, and in turn, these leadership expectations affect the judgments of a president’s success in office.

The second question—what does it take for a president to succeed?—has been addressed by scholars who focus on the president in office. The most renowned contributor in this tradition is Richard Neustadt, whose classic book *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* analyzed how presidents use, acquire, and maintain “power” or “effective personal influence.”¹⁷ For Neustadt, power derived from four sources: formal authority, professional reputation, prestige or public standing, and human qualities (that are “fashioned from experience and temperament”).¹⁸ Yet even with multiple sources, power remained fragile: “hard to consolidate, easy to dissipate, rarely assured.”¹⁹ For the purposes of this volume, Neustadt’s analysis suggests that presidents may vary in terms of how they use power and whether they do so effectively.

Erwin Hargrove (1966) focused similarly on the individual differences between presidents. But while Neustadt's approach was rooted in the "politics of perception,"²⁰ or how presidents are viewed by other politicians, voters, and professional political observers, Hargrove concentrated on a president's personality or character traits. Contrasting "Presidents of Action" with "Presidents of Restraint," Hargrove described how "the skills of leadership are rooted in political personality,"²¹ and as such, he identified "four variables" for assessing a president's personality: needs, mental traits, values, and the ego, or the unifying agent, which joins the first three factors into a recognizable personality.²² Hargrove stressed that "leaders seek to gratify their needs in the playing of political roles. They find some roles more congenial than others and shape roles to fit their predispositions of need, mentality, and ability."²³ This suggests that presidents do not choose between national leadership or party leadership solely on the basis of exogenous factors (institutional constraints or political circumstances). Instead, because the office is "in some senses . . . shapeless, and each President fills it out to suit himself," whether or not a president pursues partisan leadership or national leadership may depend on his view of the office and his beliefs about his leadership duties.²⁴ Thus, while we have mostly addressed this leadership tension as stemming from institutional structures, historical developments, and timing, it cannot be dismissed that this tension may also arise from the president himself.

The contributions to this volume, therefore, consider not only the influence of structure, but also that of agency in several ways. Most obviously, each piece inquires—implicitly or explicitly—about whether approaches to the *leadership dilemma* are driven by structure, development, and context (exogenous), or by the individual factors specific to each president (endogenous). Recurring structural factors, as briefly suggested, include time (historical, electoral, or Skowronekian political), party control of the elective branches of government (divided or unified), and the president's role as executive officer. Time not only presents presidents with opportunities and constraints, but, as Rockman and Waterman noted, it has altered the leadership expectations for them. In addition to secular time, both electoral time and political time determine the ability of the dominant regime or majority party to address national problems and maintain their coalition. Thus, through understanding a president's place in electoral and political time, we may learn about both his approach to his own party and his approach to leadership. During his first term in office, is the president focused on his national standing or on his party's electoral success in the Congress? More generally, do

presidents alternate between party leader and national leader as electoral cycles progress in ways that are similar to senators alternating between the representational roles of trustee and delegate? Further, once installed, is the president charged with the task of creating and defining a new political coalition, in the mold of reconstructive leaders such as Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, or is his expected project one of maintaining a fissiparous party coalition, as articulative and disjunctive leaders face? Finally, how do the “third-way” presidents of the preemptive form who inherit a complicated relationship with their own parties navigate and incorporate elements of the opposition into their own party, so as to undermine the dominant regime? Each of the contributions in this volume examines how presidents address these structural leadership dilemmas inherent to their own moments in time.

The incentives and constraints posed by party control of government are somewhat more straightforward. Placing interbranch relations at the center of the presidential leadership dilemma, comparing divided and unified government allows us to ask several theoretically important questions. First, do presidents have an advantage when negotiating with a Congress controlled by their own parties, or do they simply face different challenges? Second, does an opposition Congress inspire presidents to take a more moderate and bipartisan approach, or do they increasingly rely on unilateral resources to achieve policy ends?

Finally, the president’s unique constitutional responsibilities create cross-pressures to further party goals and to transcend partisanship. Again, as Woodrow Wilson presciently noted, “The makers of the Constitution constructed the federal government upon a theory of checks and balances . . . [but] leadership and control must be lodged somewhere; the whole art of statesmanship is the art of bringing the several parts of government into effective cooperation for the accomplishment of particular common objects,—and party objects at that.”²⁵ The expansive administrative functions involved in executing the law allow presidents to make decisions about personnel, structure, and ultimately the degree to which the administration will embrace a model of partisan responsiveness, or alternatively, of “neutral competence” and bipartisan expertise.²⁶ Similarly, the expansion of the presidential war powers obliges incumbents to represent the nation’s security interests, but presidents’ decisions in this policy area have become increasingly subject to the same partisan polarization as the president’s domestic agenda.²⁷

Amidst these structural constraints and opportunities are the complex and flawed individuals who occupy the office of the president, whose

unique characteristics can ultimately shape leadership styles.²⁸ In this volume, the contributors include investigations into temperament, skill, style, and policy ambitions in order to assess some of the different presidential approaches to the leadership dilemma. These analyses parallel many of the questions posed by classic lines of scholarship in presidential studies. How well did presidents make use of the resources available to them or the political experiences possessed by them? How did they create new opportunities and cultivate new resources? This emphasis on opportunity and obstacle is particularly important for our understanding of the leadership dilemma. Presidents do not bargain with no one. They inhabit an arena of shared and contested powers. They must also choose with whom they will bargain and whether or not their optimal strategies involve their fellow partisans. Hence, to the extent that parties constitute a resource for presidents to exploit effectively, they also, by using this resource, run the risk of appearing “too partisan.” Conversely, if a strong opposition party numbers among the obstacles faced by a president, we might expect there exists an opportunity to lead a bipartisan coalition and appear “above the fray.” Clearly, success in each of these scenarios depends not only on a careful balancing act, but also on a specific combination of political circumstance and presidential behavior.

The chapters in this volume progress roughly from campaigning to governing and explore one or more of the roles in which presidents contend with this leadership dilemma: coalition-builder, chief executive, and “bully pulpit” communicator. In each of these roles, presidents not only engage in characteristic tasks of the office and grapple with a leadership path, but they are also faced with varying constraints and opportunities to exercise agency. Hence, the choices that presidents make in pursuit of national or party leadership are conditioned by context and time. Circumstances, in turn, shape the way presidential choices are received in the political environment. Thus, the leadership dilemma remains inextricably linked to questions of structure as well as agency.

From Aspirant to President: Three Roles

President as Coalition Builder

“Does Barack Obama have a problem with the white working class?” asked the *New York Times* in the middle of the Democratic race.²⁹ This query reflected widespread—and at the time growing—doubts about

Obama's appeal among noncollege-educated white voters. But it also reflected a fundamental maxim of presidential campaigning: the need to build broad coalitions. This imperative lies at the center of aspirants' strategic thinking and practical choices. Yet it is also a basic requirement for presidents engaged in policy-making politics, as illustrated in Obama's struggles to enact legislation extending the Bush tax cuts. As a result, the challenge of uniting disparate groups with competing interests and values acquires much of its complexity because presidents—and aspiring presidents—build coalitions in markedly different arenas. And even though the dimensions of coalition building can appear sequential—party nomination followed by general election and then policy making—in practice they merge. As a result, campaigning aspirants look ahead to the election and future legislative battles. Incumbent presidents look across—at Congress, as well as behind—at the constituencies from which they garnered support in the past, and down the road, in anticipation of their reelection campaigns or the verdicts of history. For presidents, therefore, the best coalitions are those that allow them to thread the needle through each of these distinct demands.

The literature has explored the range of tools available to aspirants and presidents as they seek to forge coalitions and the constraints that they face as they try to do so. Aspirants tailor their campaign messages to attract the attentions and approval of the media and key constituency groups.³⁰ Both aspirants and incumbents try to dominate interpretations of their context and emphasize issue areas where they are comparatively strong over their rivals.³¹ Presidency scholars also highlight presidents' capacities to use their political skills and resources to forge coalitions³² and the effects from “going public”—over the heads of law makers—to increase their leverage in bargains with congressional leaders.³³ Presidential vetoes can also be used for coalition-building purposes. For instance, as Edwards discusses, Clinton's vetoes in 1995 and 1996 not only led to the government shutdowns, but also undermined the coalition supporting congressional Republicans and reinforced the president's standing.³⁴ Despite their array, however, the use of these tools confers few guarantees: in election contests each aspirant faces rivals with nearly identical ambitions and sometimes formidable resources; absent a majority in Congress, coalition-building in the legislative arena is more likely than not to end in failure.³⁵

Four chapters in this volume examine closely the challenges of building coalitions in distinct political arenas. Nwokora looks at how aspirants construct coalitions in nomination politics. He asks how

important the candidates are in the construction of winning coalitions in nomination races. He argues that we can distinguish between candidate-dominated paths, in which candidates forge coalitions to support their candidacy, and alternative noncandidate-dominated paths, where media, political, or financial elites representing distinct constituencies coalesce on a candidate. He presents two case studies—the Democratic race of 1924 and the Republican race in 1980—to illustrate these paths in operation. Brown focuses her attention on the nexus of electoral and governance politics, in particular, the problem incumbents face as they aim to *rebuild* a winning electoral coalition. Brown interprets the reelection strategies of Clinton and Bush not only as attempts to build support sufficient to win reelection, but also as platforms for the pursuit of unique historic legacies. Thus, although both presidents were comfortably reelected, the different strategic paths that they pursued set the stage for profoundly different historical legacies: Clinton as a centrist and Bush as an ideologue.

The possibilities for coalition-building in legislative politics are explored in the chapters by Goren and by Copeland and Farrar-Myers. Goren's case study on the politics of closing military bases examines how attempts to purposefully strip partisan considerations from a policy-making problem impact presidential leadership challenges. She finds that politics seeps in through the cracks: presidents can and have involved themselves in the political side of base closures even as they emphasize their national leadership. Copeland and Farrar-Myers focus on the issue of gays in the military as they explore the coalition-building efforts of presidents Clinton and Obama. They examine the distinct ways that these presidents approached a political problem that has great potential for divisiveness, explaining why Obama succeeded at building a coalition for change while Clinton did not.

President as Chief Executive

In *Federalist 70*, Alexander Hamilton explained, “Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.” Hamilton's defense of a strong national executive rested on the

idea that “a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.”³⁶

Modern presidents have become involved in the policy-making process at several stages. In addition to the choices they make about how to implement laws, from signing statements to executive branch management, presidents have gone beyond the duties prescribed by Hamilton in the *Federalist* to actively promote preferred legislation. Two chapters in this volume examine how party control of Congress influences how presidents behave as chief executives, leading on policy issues. Ponder explores how the president’s place in the context of the political system affects legislative success. His concept of “presidential leverage” captures the president’s standing as compared with the public assessments of the government as a whole, and his analysis demonstrates that leverage helps to explain variation in the passage of presidential proposals. Kelley, Marshall, and Watts evaluate presidential choices at a later stage in the policy process through the study of rhetorical, as opposed to constitutional, signing statements as a form of political posturing and policy making under divided and unified government. Their findings illustrate that while presidents are not always able to persuade Congress, they have resources at their disposal to react to legislation and set the stage for future debates.

President as “Bully Pulpit” Communicator

In a comparison between Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, journalists Lou and Carl Cannon noted a consequential distinction between different kinds of advice received by the two presidents about this “uniter-divider dilemma.” Reagan’s chief of staff, James Baker, admonished, “You can’t always govern by appealing to the base, sometimes you have to govern by reaching to the center—by reaching a consensus.” By contrast, a common understanding in the Bush administration was that policy choices were made in terms of “playing to the base,” a strategy frequently attributed to senior advisor Karl Rove.³⁷

The process of “appealing” to either the center or the base involves not only choices on policy trade-offs, but also choices on how to assert, frame, and define political problems and potential solutions. Communications scholar David Zarefsky contends that presidential rhetoric “defines political reality.” Expanding on this function, Zarefsky notes, “Naming a situation provides the basis for understanding it and determining the appropriate response. Because of his prominent political position and his access to the means of communication, the president, by defining a

situation, might be able to shape the context in which events and proposals are viewed by the public.”³⁸ By shaping political reality, presidential rhetoric can frame political issues and emergent events in ways that inspire unity and invoke widely held national values, or it can evoke ideas that will be received very differently by partisan supporters than by political opponents. Political context, as well as rhetorical choices, play a role in how these messages are received and translated into “political reality.” How do these attempts at persuasion and definition affect the leadership dilemma?

When presidents attempt to define political reality, they can draw on national symbols in an effort to unify the audience and transcend partisan divisions. Their effectiveness at this task may be contingent, at least in part, on structure and timing. Skowronek finds that presidents who are able to effectively “reconstruct” the political order are not only successful party builders and managerial organizers, but they are also able to frame new policy directions in terms of basic national values; presidents in the mold of Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt “retrieve from a far distant, even mythic, past fundamental values that they claimed had been lost in the indulgences of the received order.”³⁹ Carolyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson identify unifying the audience as a key feature of Inaugural Addresses, and, like Skowronek, suggest that reaffirmation of past heroes and commitments allows presidents to “rehearse national values.”⁴⁰

Jeffrey Tulis similarly argues that the expansion of the president’s rhetorical role has allowed presidents to have unique influence over the scope and stake of political conflict, although rhetorical choices can prove divisive. The ways in which presidents define issues can both influence policy and undermine deliberation with Congress, as Tulis explains in the example of Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, in which policies were designed within the executive branch around the “war” rhetoric and presented in an address to Congress “designed to arouse a general disposition of support” rather than invite a dialogue with Congress on the merits of the proposed policies.⁴¹ Although Tulis’ point does not deal directly with party divisions, the key insight is that presidential efforts to frame policy within a specific and highly public metaphor ultimately impair one of the key processes by which presidents can engage in bipartisan collaboration: deliberation. As a result, presidential rhetoric can play an intrinsically divisive role. Presidential rhetoric can also invoke party and partisanship in a more straightforward way. In a systematic study of presidential rhetoric during the first terms of Dwight Eisenhower, Jimmy Carter, Ronald

Reagan, and George W. Bush, John Coleman and Paul Manna find that modern presidents “link themselves rhetorically” to the party system with relative frequency, and that while divided government does not seem to influence the decision to use party rhetoric, audience and proximity to an election have a significant influence on the use of references to the “virtues of partisanship.”⁴² In sum, a substantial body of scholarship on presidential rhetoric connects the president’s choice of words, particularly on key occasions, to efforts at unifying the nation; at the same time, ample evidence exists for the divisive potential of presidential rhetoric.

Two chapters in this volume assess presidential decisions about rhetorical style as well as the ways in which structural factors, particularly electoral pressures and divided government, affect these choices. Kassop and Goldzwig look at counterterrorism policy in the Obama administration and analyze how Obama’s campaign rhetoric has shaped and constrained his policy options and choices in office. The administration, the authors show, has struggled to reconcile the dilemmas that derive from the president’s dual roles as partisan and national leader. The chapter tracks the consequences of the presidential dilemma in this context: how the president has compromised his stances and reversed campaign pledges; the conflict between advisers with opposing motives; and the disappointment of his party members.

Azari explores the ways that presidents use election victories to support their legislative agendas and invoke electoral mandates to justify their policy choices. This chapter begins with the broader theoretical question of why some elections are framed by presidents as primarily partisan mandates, while others are framed in less partisan terms. By examining the election interpretation rhetoric of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, Azari examines how newly elected presidents with unified party control of government manage the leadership dilemma and use mandate rhetoric to frame and promote their policy agendas.

Overall, the contributions in this edited collection explore a recurring *leadership dilemma* for presidents. Presidents serve as both defenders of the national interest and as the leaders of their political parties; as will be shown, these roles are often incompatible. Through the numerous contributions in this volume, the authors examine how the competing institutional demands between governance structures and selection methods shape the strategic choices that presidents make and the contexts in which they make them. Bridging the gap in the existing literature by focusing on the leadership trade-offs for presidents, it offers a new perspective on presidential leadership by including, rather than omitting, party. Although

this theme fuses together the volume, each chapter makes its own distinctive contribution as the authors use a variety of methods and cases to look closely at how the parts of this leadership dilemma play out in different situations with different presidents. Finally, this volume addresses not only the exogenous pressures constraining presidents, but also the endogenous factors unique to each president, which may drive their choices. Thus, our intention is to provide both a holistic and an intersectional view of the presidential leadership dilemma.

Notes

1. Altman, "Can Obama Sell the Tax-Cut Deal to His Own Party?"
2. Madison, "Obama's 2010 'Shellacking' Is like Bush's 2006 'Thumping.'"
3. Breutler, "Unhappy Dems Mull Obama-GOP Tax Cut Deal."
4. Malcolm, "Cave In or Compromise, Obama's Tax Cut Deal with Republicans Could Win Him Much, Cost Him Little."
5. Milkis, "What Happened to Post-Partisanship? Barack Obama and the New American Party System."
6. Burns, *Presidential Government: The Crucible of Leadership*, 121.
7. Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States*, 60, 67.
8. Hamilton, *Federalist* 68.
9. Ketcham, *Presidents above Party*, 4.
10. Hofstadter, *Idea of a Party System*.
11. Aldrich, *Why Parties?*; Brown, *Jockeying for the American Presidency*; Landy and Milkis, *Presidential Greatness*; Elkins and McKittrick, *Age of Federalism*.
12. Wilson, *Constitutional Government*, 67.
13. Milkis, "FDR and the Transcendence of Partisan Politics."
14. Fiorina and Abrams, "Political Polarization in the American Public."
15. Rockman and Waterman, *Presidential Leadership*.
16. Skowronek, *Politics Presidents Make*, 34–35.
17. Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, ix.
18. Bowles, *Nixon's Business*, 17.
19. Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, ix.
20. Bowles, *Nixon's Business*, 29.
21. Hargrove, *Presidential Leadership*, 1.
22. *Ibid.*, 3.
23. *Ibid.*, 4.
24. *Ibid.*, 5.
25. Wilson, *Constitutional Government*, 54.
26. Moe, "The Politicized Presidency"; Rudalevige, *Managing the President's Program*; Burke, *Institutional Presidency*; Skinner, "George W. Bush and the Partisan Presidency"; Cameron, "Studying the Polarized Presidency."

27. Pfiffner, *Torture as Public Policy*; Goldstein, "Cheney, Vice Presidential Power, and the War on Terror."
28. Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 4.
29. Mellman, Mark, "Class Dismissed."
30. Flowers, Haynes, and Crespin, "The Media, the Campaign, and the Message."
31. Riker, *Strategy of Rhetoric*; Spitzer, *Presidency and Public Policy*.
32. Neustadt, *Presidential Power*.
33. Kernell, *Going Public*; Tulis, *Rhetorical Presidency*.
34. Edwards III, "Building Coalitions."
35. Edwards III, *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress*.
36. Hamilton, *Federalist* 70.
37. Cannon and Cannon, *Reagan's Disciple*, 84.
38. Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," 611.
39. Skowronek, *Politics Presidents Make*, 37.
40. Campbell and Jamieson, *Presidents Creating the Presidency*, 36–37.
41. Tulis, *Rhetorical Presidency*, 164–67.
42. Coleman and Manna, "Above the Fray? The Use of Party System References in Presidential Rhetoric," 417.