Introduction

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The connection between religion and politics is a hot and controversial topic in today’s political and intellectual discussion as it was in Hegel’s time—that is, during the first decades of the nineteen century and in the first reception of Hegel’s philosophy in the second half of that same century. Indeed, issues pertaining to this topic are daily at the center of inflamed policy and political debates in secular states around the world, and shape the life of millions of people in theocratic regimes. Globalization, population mobility, immigrations and diasporas of various kinds, the very nature of our multicultural societies are among the factors that make the intersection of politics and religion a crucial issue of our time. Today questions regarding religious diversity and toleration of diversity, concerning possible limits of acceptability of various religious practices within secular societies, not only pitch the Western democratic world against theocratic regimes but deeply divide the Western world itself.

Philosophically, the problematic constellation covered by this connection addresses additional general issues such as the relation between the church and the state, or alternatively, the sacred and the secular, the theological and the political, and leads to the discussion of the role and limits of religious life within the modern state and in modern politics. For Hegel, it also concerns more specific problems of modernity such as the conception of freedom and the conditions of its subjective as well as objec-
tive realization in the historical world; the autonomous status reclaimed by subjective consciousness and its rights; the limits of values such as toleration; the function of political institutions in fostering, promoting, and regulating those rights and values; and the role that religion, in connection with culture and education, plays in some of the great historical upheavals and transformations of the modern world—from the French Revolution to the industrial revolution and the emergence of capitalism. Finally, the problematic issue of understanding the relationship—historical and political at the same time—between the different world religions becomes a central topic of philosophical consideration. While Hegel here follows in the aftermath of the Enlightenment tradition, this is also an issue with which we are confronted almost daily: how can we judge the different world religions without biases and without superimposing doubtful ideologies and axiologies? Is such judgment possible at all, and can it be separated from a certain, more or less implicit philosophy of history?

Moreover, for its touching on this complex constellation, the connection between religion and politics offers an interesting entry point in the discussion of Hegel’s practical philosophy as it exposes some of its most controversial theses allowing one to reassess them in a new light: from the claim that the political state, although separated from the church, is in some sense itself a “consecrated” entity (and that “right” as such is “something sacred”), to the preeminence that Hegel assigns to Christianity (and Protestantism) over all other historical religions, up to the role that such preeminence plays in his alleged teleological view of the historical development (guided, in its latest phase, by the German state). Finally, the focus on the relation between politics and religion sets Hegel’s practical philosophy in conversation, on the one hand, with modern thinkers such as John Locke, Edmund Burke, and more generally the thinkers of the Enlightenment, and on the other hand, with successive philosophers such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Weber, and John Rawls, thereby leading us to evaluate alternatively the usefulness and the limits of Hegel’s theory for the understanding of some enduring questions of our own contemporary world.

While Hegel’s social and political philosophy has been one of the most studied parts of his system during the last few decades, and his philosophy of religion, in the aftermath of the recent critical edition of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, has also begun to attract the interest of many scholars, the more pointed topic of the relation between politics and religion despite its centrality both to Hegel’s practical
philosophy and to our contemporary debate still deserves merited attention. This volume begins to fill this gap. By bringing Hegel’s contribution on the topic to bear on some crucial questions of our time, the essays of this volume show, alternatively, the fruitfulness and the limits of the perspectives and ideas he has to offer us.

A first sense of the variety and richness of themes that can be found at the intersection of politics and religion in Hegel’s philosophy can be gained by briefly addressing the systematic connection to which these topics belong in the overall development of Hegel’s mature thought. To be sure, Hegel’s reflection on these issues dates back to his early philosophical works in the Frankfurt and Jena years leading up to the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. However, it is in the *Encyclopedia* (in its three successive editions of 1817, 1827, and 1830) and in the 1821 *Philosophy of Right* that Hegel reaches his mature systematic organization of the questions pertaining to the connection between politics and religion. And yet, significantly, the systematic structure meant to accommodate these issues is not a rigid one. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, which gather the material on which he used to regularly lecture from the 1820s up to his death, Hegel often revises and expands on the systematic structure of the *Encyclopedia*, thereby testifying of the liveliness and fluidity of the topic in the ongoing development of his thought. Religion and its philosophical thematization increasingly intersect with the history of art and philosophy as well as with a broader reflection on culture, social institution, and politics.

The following brief overview of the systematic structure that articulates the issues belonging to the connection between politics and religion in Hegel’s mature thought is meant to provide, at the same time, the general framework that unifies the multiplicity of questions and approaches to the topic offered by the ten essays collected in this volume and a perspective from which one may preliminarily evaluate the relevance of the questions at hand.

Within Hegel’s system politics belongs, from early on and quite uncontroversially, to the realm of “objective spirit” (*objektiver Geist*), that is, to spirit as it makes itself actual and concrete in the real, objective, and intersubjective world. Herein spirit manifests and brings to realization its freedom in and through the many social and political institutions that constitute the intersubjective, collective reality of *Sittlichkeit* or “ethical life”—the structure of the “family,” the sphere of economic
relations, which Hegel calls “civil society,” and the institutions of the modern political “state.” In this process, spirit gains the dimension of its historical existence and freedom becomes a historical reality. Within the structures of *Sittlichkeit*, the state is the sphere in which politics finds its more specific place. The state, however, as the highest form of ethical life is the result of the development of the preceding moments of spirit in its objectivity—“abstract right” and “morality,” which systematically precede “ethical life”—and encompasses them, in dialectical fashion, by reframing them as constitutive moments of the political life. On the other hand, the development of state politics opens up the realm of international relations from which “world history” (*Weltgeschichte*) obtains as the final conclusion of the sphere of objective spirit. Hegel’s modern state is the nation-state that confronts other nation-states on the conflictual scene of world history.

In the overall systematic of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, objective spirit occupies the middle, mediating position between “subjective” and “absolute” spirit. As everywhere else in Hegel’s philosophy, these systematic distinctions have the dialectical and developmental meaning whereby that which (logically and systematically) follows is the result of what precedes insofar as what precedes is *aufgehoben*—that is, negated but also maintained, transfigured in a new and higher figure—in what follows as it finds in it its truth and adequate existence. In this way, objective spirit, and with it the sphere of politics, must be contextualized both as the result of the overall development of “subjective spirit” and as producing the transition to the forms of “absolute spirit.” Now, the latter is the sphere in which religion finds its peculiar systematic place. In the objective and collective structures of ethical life, subjective spirit, which is both the intelligence of theoretical spirit and the subjective will acting in the world, finds its true freedom and realized existence. The individual in her thinking and acting is here connected to an intersubjective context—to the ethical whole in which she first acquires a higher, more universal meaning for her existence. This development, in turn, yields the higher and indeed truer expression of the absolute and infinite value of subjectivity proper to religion and religious representation. Religion, along with art and philosophy, belongs to the sphere of spirit in its “absoluteness.” This highest level of spirit’s realization is achieved with a “transition” that brings systematically out of world history, raising spirit above the manifold, unresolved conflicts of politics and, more generally, above the finitude of the objective, historical world and allows
consciousness to finally articulate and affirm a content that is truly and concretely universal and absolute. Religion, for Hegel, is concerned both with the representation of the divine or the absolute centered on the interiority of individual, subjective consciousness and with the collective forms of cult and ritual that constitute the life of the church and lend to religion a history and a historical differentiation in the many world religions. The dialectic relationship between the autonomy of the subject and the absolute value of the content offered by the tradition defines the crucial issue confronting religion in the modern world. Moreover, while politics is fundamentally national and hence its universality is always limited, religion even though grounded in the existence of a particular state, aims at a form of universality that is broader and more concrete. This is, in Hegel’s view, the meaning of spirit’s absoluteness. Religion, however, has itself a history and differentiates itself in the many world religions, which brings to light the inner dialectic of religion itself—of its universal claim and of the universal validity of its different historical forms.

What I just sketched out in a simplified way is the apparently straightforward systematic succession that can be obtained by a quick look at the table of contents of the *Encyclopedia* when the task is to assign to politics and religion their respective places in the system of philosophy. In fact, even on the basis of this presentation alone, it is immediately clear that things are far more complicated than they seem. And in this complication lies the interest, the actuality, and the vitality of our topic, namely, the connection of politics and religion.

The systematic succession that both in the *Encyclopedia* and in the *Philosophy of Right* leads from the extension of politics to the international scene of “world history” up to the new sphere of “absolute spirit” raises noteworthy systematic difficulties. First and foremost, what is it that makes of religion, along with art and philosophy, a form of “absolute” spirit—an absoluteness that Hegel’s systematics suggests should place it above and beyond objective spirit, that is, above and beyond the conflicts of politics and the finitude of world history? For, evidently, religion is not above and beyond history but deeply rooted in it; religion is not untouched by politics but problematically intertwined with it. For one thing, religion is itself subject to history and substantially contributes to it; its content is both absolute and historical. This claim, a crucial tenet of the development of the concept of religion in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, seems particularly problematic in the systematics of the *Encyclopedia* where Hegel maintains a strong separation between the
spheres of objective and absolute spirit. Both to the ethical life of the state and to religion belong the two moments of subjective consciousness and collective, institutional objectivity. These two moments are integral to Hegel's conception of freedom. While religion addresses the need of subjective conscience, that is, the infinite value of its interiority and autonomy, it necessarily exists in collective practices and rituals within the reality of the state. Ultimately, it is in force of such objective existence that religious practices and contents have a historical existence and live on in different traditions but may also conflict with (or, alternatively, lend support to) state interests and political demands. But if religion is so inextricably bound to the forms of ethical life (of which politics is the highest one), what is it that constitutes the “absoluteness” of religion, that is, the basis for assigning it to another, higher and successive systematic sphere than the realm of the state, namely, “absolute spirit”?

In the long remark to §270 of the *Philosophy of Right*, in articulating the structures of the state—its universal aim and its relation to the particular interests of the citizens—Hegel famously takes up the crucial issue of “the relation between the state and religion” (but also between “political science” and religion), which had become so prominent in recent times. In opposing the often-proposed claim that religion should be the “basis” or foundation (*Grundlage*) of the state, Hegel recognizes that religion exists within the state fulfilling herein a peculiar ethical function. In other words, religion is not simply concerned with another, transcendent world, is not utterly detached from worldly interests. And yet, the ethical function and existence of religion does not exhaust the actual and substantial reality of religion, which, unlike the reality of the state, can indeed be characterized as “absolute.” In other words, its “interest” is not merely a worldly interest. One could then suggest that what constitutes the absoluteness of religion beyond or in addition to its ethical function and existence within objective spirit must be properly systematic, that is, must be, as Hegel concedes, a difference in the “principle” to which the activity of religion and the state respectively responds. However, at the end of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel significantly introduces world history together with the forms of absolute spirit—that is, not as successive systematic forms but as forms that simultaneously constitute the reality of the same free “universal spirit.” Herein the difference between art, religion, philosophy on the one hand and world history on the other is not presented as a hierarchical difference in the levels of spirit’s development but merely as a difference in the “element of existence” in which
the same “universal spirit” simultaneously displays its forms. Accordingly, in art “the element of existence of the universal spirit is intuition and image, in religion is feeling and representation, and in philosophy is pure, free thinking; in world history is the spiritual actuality in its entire sphere of interiority and exteriority.” 14 In sum, the question remains open: What is it that sets religion apart from the state and confers to it an absolute character even though religion exists within the state and exercises herein a specific ethical function? What is the ethical function of religion and what is its different, absolute value? How does religion relate to the institutions of ethical life—to the individual’s participation in the family, in the economic life of civil society, and in the education of the citizen? And conversely, what is, in Hegel’s view, the state’s and politics’ relationship to religion, to the right that the latter claims with regard to individual subjective consciousness and its autonomy; but also what is politics’ relationship to the collective practices that support and determine religion in its ethical and historical existence?

These questions, which I have heretofore introduced as arising from the very systematics of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit—namely, from Hegel’s presentation of religion as existing within the ethical and historical reality of the state but also, at the same time, as placed above the state and its political and historical conflicts, in the sphere of “absolute” spirit—are extensively developed and debated from different perspectives and pursuing different implications, criticisms, and suggestions in the ten essays selected for this volume. Generally, the essays are presented in an order that allows the reader to become familiar, first, with the more abstract principles of Hegel’s practical philosophy and philosophy of religion, in order to then start thinking of the possible “application” of such principles to some issues crucial both to Hegel’s own contemporary world and to our own time. I shall now turn to a brief overview of each of these contributions.

The volume is opened by two essays—Mark Tunick’s “Hegel and the Consecrated State” and Rachel Bayefsky’s “The State as a ‘Temple of Human Freedom’: Hegel on Religion and Politics”—that directly address the structural, dialectical relation between the state and religion, that is, the way in which the Hegelian state, although informed by religion, remains nonetheless a secular state. At issue is the extent to which the state recognizes religion as its subjective but not objective basis. The two essays ask distinctive questions. Tunick frames his discussion in terms of a confrontation between Hegel and the eighteenth-century conservative
thinker Edmund Burke. Burke’s characterization of the political state as “consecrated” or “sacred”—a characterization inspired, to be sure, more by pragmatic than theological motives—makes the starting point. Burke views the state as “divine emanation,” while religion secures, for him, the internal stability of the state (against, for example, the upheavals of revolutions such as the French). Tunick suggests that Hegel’s state can be considered as “consecrated” as well, although in a different sense than Burke’s. More properly, he characterizes Hegel’s state as a “secular consecrated state,” and sets out to show how this definition is not paradoxical. Religion plays a fundamental function, for Hegel, in the preservation of the ethical ties that keep the state together but does not create a homogeneous community in which everybody follows the same beliefs and religious practices. In addition, religion motivates citizens in the political participation in which their lives find meaning, freedom, and ethical fulfillment, but it also provides the connection to a spiritual totality that transcends individual particularity and its interests. On Tunick’s account, religion can be seen as the basis of the Hegelian state insofar as the state is grounded upon the principle of subjectivity that first emerges with Christianity and actualizes freedom whose principle is first embodied in the subjective will. Tunick’s aim is to outline the way in which the Hegelian state, in its practical functioning, proves its “consecrated” character, that is, its relation to religion as its basis. In so doing, he addresses issues concerning the role of religion in education, religious toleration, the toleration of atheism. Crucial differences between Burke and Hegel emerge in this connection. While Burke views religion as a stabilizing force within the state, Hegel is aware of the destabilizing risks inherent in the possibility that religion may slip into fanaticism. Burke’s consecrated state has no place for atheists, while Hegel allows for atheists to find alternative possible connections with the political whole—religion is not exclusive, philosophy is called in here to counterbalance the influence of religion.

The role that religion plays in Hegel’s “rational state” is at the center of Bayefsky’s contribution as well. While confirming the general interpretive claim that religion, for Hegel, supports the ethical structures and activities of the Hegelian state, she raises the decisive question concerning the specific kind of religion that Hegel views as indeed capable of fulfilling such a supporting role. The answer is offered by what Hegel calls “true religion,” that is, by the inward recognition of subjective freedom based on the reconciliation of the religious conscience with God. Bayefsky’s
argument regards the dialectical interaction—or even the reversal of the relation—between the state and religion that allows Hegel to reject the univocal, linear relation of foundation between the two. It is the rational state that helps shape true religion so that religious conscience can recognize the state as a spiritual realm in which human freedom can be actualized. Religion is not simply the foundation of the state, for “true religion” is itself, in turn, a product of the ethical education and formation promoted by the institutions of the state. At stake is a complex dialectical process in which the rational state and true religion reinforce each other. Throughout her essay, Bayefsky challenges clear-cut dichotomies that oppose the secular and the religious state, rationality and faith. While Hegel’s state is “rational” in the sense of not being based on faith or authority, his conception of religion is rational as well to the extent that religion and religiosity are expressed and instantiated in objective institutions that manifest the subject’s freedom; religion, however, being a form of “absolute” spirit cannot be reduced to its function within the state, and is not a mere tool in support of state authority. In this way, Hegel’s Sittlichkeit promotes a “reconciliation” of religion and reason. The issue, however, remains—and here Bayefsky’s and Tunick’s questions intersect—regarding the concrete, practical ways in which the Hegelian state carries out such a “reconciliation,” that is, the ways in which the rational state and the church should interact and the extent to which religion in general (and Christian religion in particular) should play a role in informing citizens’ lives without taking precedence over the state’s laws. To be sure, at stake in the reconciliation between the rational state and true religion is the larger problem of modernity, namely, the connection and mediation between the moment of consciousness’s interiority, which should be maintained free of coercion and external intervention and is upheld by religion, and the act of integrating individual consciousness in the collective and objective dimension of realized freedom—the moment guaranteed by the state.

William Maker’s essay, “Religion and the Dialectic of Enlightenment,” contends that Hegel’s critical assessment of modernity, and in particular his opposition to the atomistic individualism of the Enlightenment, which he carries out in the early Phenomenology of Spirit, remains the crucial model to understand Hegel’s later insistence on the necessity to restrict the role that religion can be allowed to play in society and politics. More generally, Maker’s claim is that Hegel’s reservations concerning the rationality of religion (i.e., the capacity of religion to really
prove itself “rational”) and the acknowledgment of its destabilizing role in contemporary society all go back to that seminal critique offered in the 1807 work. This is the framework that explains Maker’s use of the expression “dialectic of Enlightenment” in the discussion of the role of religion in the secular world of politics. To be sure, Hegel’s view of Christian religion as a religion of freedom that promotes freedom’s realization in the religious community, grants it an important role in preparing the citizen for secular, properly political freedom. Indeed, when religion and the social-political sphere are rationally constituted, they support and serve one another. Religion channels the rights and needs of subjective conscience within the objective context of ethical life. Thus, insofar as religion cultivates and disposes citizens to participate in the life of the state as the secular instantiation of a divinely ordained freedom, Hegel recognizes its role in forming shared secular and political values even beyond its own sphere, furthering civic unity and mutual understanding. Maker’s crucial (and critical) point, however, is that in order to play this role religion must attain the rational self-understanding found in “consummate,” that is, Christian religion or in religion brought to its final form. In this way, religion in its rationality seems characterized by the need to self-transcendence. Religion leads outside of its own sphere. This is Maker’s take on the problem that emerges from the systematics of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit—the problem I briefly discussed at the outset of this introduction. In other words, religion has a legitimate place in the ethical world if it restricts itself to the claim of individual, subjective consciousness. But this is then also the basis of Hegel’s enduring critique of religion modeled on his critique to the subjectivity and atomism of the Enlightenment.

The fourth chapter, Timothy Brownlee’s “Hegel’s Defense of Toleration,” brings the issue of toleration, which is as crucial to the Enlightenment debate as it is to our current cultural debate, to the center. Brownlee’s central aim is to show that in the long remark to §270 of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel offers a strong defense of the principle of religious toleration, which he sees as the basis of religious pluralism within the state. For Hegel the notion that toleration of religious diversity is required within the state is based on the modern idea of subjective right. Unlike many of the thinkers of the modern liberal tradition, however, Hegel rejects the social contract. Brownlee’s task is to show that Hegel’s grounding of the idea of religious toleration on a different political model than the social contract reinforces instead of weakening the defense of the
value of toleration. To this aim, Brownlee places Hegel’s account within the liberal tradition, developing a confrontation between Hegel’s position and Locke’s and Rawls’s views, but also connecting Hegel to recent non-contractarian theories such as Martha Nussbaum’s. Locke famously maintains that the demand for toleration complements the individual liberty, established by “civil right,” to pursue one’s religious and moral interests free of external coercion. In his *Theory of Justice*, on the other hand, Rawls anchors the demand for toleration in the first principle of justice, which guarantees basic individual liberties such as the liberty of conscience. Both Locke and Rawls bring their account of toleration back to individual liberties with which the state cannot interfere. Similarly to Locke and Rawls, Hegel appeals to a set of subjective rights that protect individual conscience. The relation between subjective right and the state, however, is different for Hegel. His defense of toleration is closer to Rawls’s than to Locke’s, insofar as Hegel believes that toleration is required in many more radical cases in which individuals refuse to recognize direct duties against the state. Brownlee’s conclusion is that the overall rejection of the atomistic conception of individuality proper to the social contract tradition, which inspires Hegel’s conception of the state, does not entail a repudiation of liberal values such as toleration but is rather the basis of a strong defense of them. The suggestion is that Hegel’s non-contractarian social theory, which anchors the idea of political right in the necessity of social and institutional conditions for the realization of freedom, can still provide the platform for a robust account of liberal values such as religious toleration.

The following two contributions—Kevin Thompson’s “Hegel, the Political, and the Theological: The Question of Islam” and Will Dudley’s “The Active Fanaticism of Political and Religious Life: Hegel on Terror and Islam”—tackle, from different angles, the question of Hegel’s relation to Islam. Crucial and controversial issues, many of them close to our own historical actuality, are raised in this connection: from the alleged theological and political opposition, even rivalry, between Christianity and Islam, to the problem of fanaticism and its relation to “terror,” to Hegel’s sparse reference to Islam and his privileging of Christianity over all other world religions. Thompson’s larger question is the relationship between the political and the theological. He addresses this issue asking what are the problems that the emergence of Islam as a “rival” to Christianity poses to Hegel’s thought—and asking how should such “rivalry” be construed in the first place. For Hegel, the opposition between Islam and Christianity
is not a purely theological opposition. It is a rivalry that concerns the ultimate foundation of political authority (hence, the ultimate ground of normativity)—it is a theological-political opposition. The focus is on two points: on the one hand, on the general relationship between the state and religion, Christianity (and Protestantism) in particular; on the other, on the specific teleology that frames Hegel’s account of the historical development of both religion and right. For, the historical realization of freedom at the level of world history is the terrain on which the opposition between Christianity and Islam manifests itself at the most fundamental level. With regard to the former point, Thompson argues that the connection between the political and the theological remains an unsettled and unresolved issue in Hegel’s thought during his late, Berlin years. Ultimately, he suggests that the key to Hegel’s view of the relationship between the theological and the political lies in the “political theology” that he reads in the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit. In connection with the second point, Thompson asks whether the historical teleology within which the two rival religions are inserted is “a pluralist typology” or “a hegemonic narrative of totalization.” In this connection, he offers a discussion of what it means, for Hegel, that Christianity is the “consummate religion” (hence, systematically, the highest and unsurpassed form of religiosity). Here he raises the intriguing question of whether there can be, for Hegel, a genuinely new form of religion after Christianity (i.e., after religion has reached its final “consummation”). This, Thompson suggests, is precisely the question that Islam poses as a new form of religion.

Both Thompson and Dudley notice the curious scarcity of explicit references to Islam in Hegel’s vast philosophical production, otherwise concerned, in the philosophy of religion, with Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism besides Judaism, Greek and Roman religions, and obviously Christianity. Dudley directly addresses the possible conceptual and systematic reasons for the apparent limited role that Islam seems to play in Hegel’s philosophy and in this connection brings into focus Hegel’s considered judgment on it. His entry point into the problem are two textual claims: on the one hand, a passage in which Hegel mentions Islam in the course of this treatment of Judaism; on the other hand, the intriguing claim to be found in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, where Hegel establishes an analogy between Islam and the French Revolution on the basis of the abstract formalism, the fanaticism, and the terror characterizing both. “‘Religion and terror’ was the principle [of
Islam], [just] as ‘Liberty and terror’ was [the principle of] Robespierre,”¹⁵ says Hegel. Why does Hegel connect Islam with Judaism and with the French Revolution? With regard to the first general issue of the limited presence of Islam in Hegel’s thought, through an analysis of the concept of religion and its relation to the historically determined world religions, Dudley concludes that Hegel allots to Islam a very limited role in his system because he does not regard it as a conceptually distinctive religious type. Islam is rather considered as a formal variation of Judaism: Islam universalizes the religion of sublimity. Now, Hegel holds that the religion of sublimity, in its universalization is essentially fanatical (and here lies the difference between the limitation of Judaism to the Jewish people and the universalism of Islam). And this leads Dudley to the second point, namely, to the claim that Islam is, specifically, a religion of fanaticism. “Fanaticism,” for Hegel, is the enthusiasm for an abstract thought or position that yields a negative and destructive attitude toward the established social and political order. Fanaticism is the flawed position that takes the negative moment of freedom, that is, the capacity to make abstraction from particularity, for freedom itself. In this way, the type of actualization pursued by fanatic activity—both political and religious—can only be the merely abstract and negative “fury of destruction.”¹⁶ For Hegel, the paradigmatic historical example of such “fury” is the Terror of the French Revolution. Now, Islam is the example of active fanaticism in the realm of religious life. The Islamic believer is entirely submitted to the worship of God but is not, as in Hinduism, simply absorbed into the One. The believer is indeed active in the world but with the negative purpose of destroying all possible conflict with God’s will, of not tolerating any particularity over and above the abstract universality that it embraces. Against fanaticism (both political and religious), Hegel offers his conception of freedom as an objective, historical process of actualization.

The critique of modernity, which Maker addresses with regard to Hegel’s relation to the Enlightenment, is approached by Robert R. Williams in the perspective of Hegel’s view of Christianity. In “The Inseparability of Love and Anguish: Hegel’s Theological Critique of Modernity,” Williams discusses the far-reaching consequences of what he suggests is Hegel’s “tragic” view of Christian theology. Rectifying a misunderstanding often repeated in the literature, and further deepening the work on the notion of “reconciliation,” which interpreters mistakenly restrict to the social context, Williams argues that the idea of “reconciliation” at play in the Christian religion is not that of a harmony free of negativity and
conflict but is rather a fundamentally tragic predicament in which loss and suffering play a pivotal role. On Hegel’s account, the Christological theme of the “death of God” implies a critique of divine immutability and impassibility: God is not only related to the world but suffers tragically in that relation. Williams maintains that the union of infinite love poured out in infinite anguish and death constitutes the basic speculative intuition of Hegel’s philosophy of religion. While God suffers, He remains God in relation. This is the ontological foundation of divine-human reconciliation. Hegel’s idea of reconciliation is permeated by this conception of the suffering God in relation to the human world. In this way, reconciliation is presented as the “inseparability of love and anguish.” Now, the claim of such inseparability is not limited to a theological interpretation. It has important political consequences, which emerge in Hegel’s critique of modernity. The reconciliation at work in the sphere of objective spirit is fundamentally connected to the reconciliation at work at the level of absolute spirit. The separation of love and anguish, unified in the Christian religion, lead to the abstract and utilitarian philosophy of the Enlightenment in which love is transformed into enjoyment and pleasure, while anguish becomes the fury of nihilism and despair. We have reached, from the perspective of Christian reconciliation, the same Hegelian judgment on the cultural matrix that has lead to the Terror of the French Revolution, which Dudley addresses in relation to Islam. In the sphere of objective spirit, the social and economic effects of the separation of love and anguish emerge in Hegel’s diagnosis of some of the crucial, unresolved problems of modern civil society. Williams argues that the separation of love from anguish corresponds, in this sphere, to the attitude of the wealthy who live a life of enjoyment and respond to human misery with moralizing pronouncements that the poor deserve to be poor, while the separation of anguish from love corresponds to the attitude of the poor who are marginalized and left free to fail.

Chapter 8 addresses the problems posed by the differences of nationality and religion within Hegel’s conception of the state and the ethical world. In Nicholas Mowad’s “The Place of Nationality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Politics and Religion,” the focus of the discussion is systematically extended as the author tackles the relationship between objective spirit and the Anthropology of subjective spirit in which the idea of nationality finds its first systematic root. In taking his departure from a systematic analysis of Hegel’s idea of nationality that spans from “subjective” to “absolute” spirit, Mowad offers a new perspective on the
often-raised objection that considers Hegel’s views racist and Eurocentric. Nationality is rooted, for Hegel, in the Anthropology of subjective spirit, where he addresses the condition in which spirit is still immersed in nature, influenced by natural factors such as climate and geography. Now, the geography of a nation’s territory reflects on its national religion; while the nation-state is, in turn, a positive expression of this national religion. National characters become dramatically relevant at the level of “world history,” in the conclusion of the sphere of objective spirit. Herein, as nation-states display their irreconcilable conflicts and often precipitate in the condition of war, an “absolute” or non-national religion emerges, which is Christianity. Drawing an important distinction between the “nation-state” (which is still affected and shaped by natural differences) and the “state proper” (which has instead processed and overcome such differences), Mowad suggests that the function of the “absolute religion” is to produce the mediation or conciliation among the national agents of world history in the universal dimension of the “state proper.” From this interpretation it follows that “Christianity,” for Hegel, is not a particular national religion but a religion tied to the universality of the state proper. Hegel, however, famously argues that Christianity historically emerges with the “Germans.” Mowad’s thought-provoking claim, at this point, is that because of the link that connects the “Germans” to the “absolute religion” and its world-historical function, with this designation Hegel does not indicate a specific nation or race in the traditional sense. The “Germans,” in the sense proposed, are beyond race and nationality—they are not the citizens of the German nation-state; they are the carriers of the values of the “state proper.” Mowad’s conclusion is a rejection of the charge of racism and Eurocentrism. These apply to the limitations of nation-states and their dependence on natural character. The “German” and “Christian” spirit, by contrast, is for Hegel the modern spirit, which is necessarily transracial and transnational.

The two final essays, Todd Gooch’s “Philosophy, Religion, and the Politics of Bildung in Hegel and Feuerbach” and Andrew Buchwalter’s “Religion, Civil Society, and the System of an Ethical World: Hegel on the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” connect Hegel’s treatment of the relation between religion and politics to later philosophical developments, namely, Ludwig Feuerbach and Max Weber. Gooch adds an important term to the relation of religion and politics, namely, Bildung—that is, broadly, culture and education. His claim is that Feuerbach shares Hegel’s idea of the need for a Second Reformation that would extend
into modern political life the spiritual freedom secured by the Protestant movement inaugurated by Luther. Unlike Hegel, however, Feuerbach holds that this Second Reformation would lead to the dissolution of Protestant Christianity in a united Germany organized by a secular, democratic republic. Drawing to the center the issue of the relation between the forms of absolute spirit—religion and philosophy in particular—and the structures of objective spirit that I discussed at the beginning of this introduction, Gooch examines the implications of Hegel's and Feuerbach's respective understandings of the relationship between religion and philosophy for their thinking about politics and Bildung. In bringing Feuerbach close to Hegel on these issues, Gooch counters the often repeated claim of Feuerbach's anti-Protestant conception of Christian history (notably, Dickey's interpretation); but he also shows the continuity of the tradition that going from Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller to Hegel constitutes the background of Feuerbach's own concept of Bildung.

The idea of Protestantism and its post-Hegelian ramifications occupies the last essay of the volume. The focus of Buchwalter’s contribution is Hegel’s dialectical conception of the relationship between the church and the state—a relationship that entails, at the same time, the claim of their necessary separation but also a commitment to the interaction and conjunction of religion and politics. In this conjunction, which Hegel associates with the idea of Protestantism, lies his peculiar philosophical view of secular modernity. Hegel claims that the “Protestant principle,” rooted in the idea of freedom as self-realization in otherness, must be comprehensively reworked so that it can achieve the “worldly” expression brought to light by the concept of freedom. In particular, Protestantism must take the form of the “system of an ethical world.” This is precisely, Buchwalter argues, the program of the 1821 Philosophy of Right. Herein Hegel offers the outline of a view of ethical life construed both as the social, economic, and political concretization of Protestant freedom and as a reconstruction or “reformation” of existing social-political conditions. On this basis, Buchwalter proceeds to an analysis of the sphere of “civil society,” dwelling in particular on Hegel’s account of the “corporation” and on the way in which such account should be brought back to the broader Hegelian view of the principle of Protestantism and the demands of its realization. Buchwalter’s claim is both that religion itself requires attention to the conditions for satisfaction that Hegel places in the sphere of civil society and that this sphere, in turn, depends for its very possibility on a religiously conceived conception of ethical life. In other words, we encounter here the same complex dialectical interaction or interdependency
relation that is at the center of Bayefsky’s essay and is crucial to the understanding of the relationship between religion and ethical life (and politics) in Hegel’s thought. Buchwalter finally discusses the distinctive character of Hegel’s position through a comparison with Max Weber’s account of the relationship between the “Protestant ethic” and the “spirit of capitalism.”

Notes

1. See Rph, §30.
4. See, however, the recent Lewis, 2011.
5. See Jaeschke, 1986, for a general account, and Heede/Ritter, 1973, for the editorial criteria of the publication of these Lectures.
7. See Rph §341 and Enc. §§550–552.
8. See Enc. §552.
9. See Hegel’s clear statement in Enc. §549 R at the end: absolute spirit is not “above history (über der Geschichte)” (sort of suspended like “above the waters”); spirit lives in history and it alone is “das Bewegende”—the moving principle—of history. See Nuzzo, 2012, for this discussion.
10. See Rph §270 R; in the Encyclopedia, this discussion is in §552 R, in the conclusion of the moment of “world history.”
11. Rph §270 R (TW 7, 415f.).
13. Hegel does the same, although less explicitly, in Enc. §549 R and thematically in §552 R.
15. TW 12, 431/358.

Works Cited


