This chapter describes existing party models and shows how the numerous models can be clustered into five general party types. All models that we group in these five clusters basically describe the same type of political party.

ELITE AND CADRE PARTIES

One of the first scholars to describe a political party was Edmund Burke, who, writing in 1770, defined a party as a group of parliamentary representatives who agreed to cooperate upon certain principles. These first political parties emerged in proto-democratic systems, with suffrage limited to a small, privileged class of the more propertied male population. An extra-parliamentary party organization was practically nonexistent and the coordination between its members, a small elite from the middle and upper classes, was loosely structured. Wolinetz (2002, 140) describes this type of party as closed caucuses of prominent individuals. Distinguishing between internally and externally created parties, Duverger (1954) characterized these first parties by their origins in groups of parliamentary representatives (see also Kirchheimer 1954b). According to Duverger, a small cadre of individuals with high socioeconomic status, who have only weak links with their electorate, commonly leads these internally created elite parties. Clearly, the defining characteristic of elite parties on the electoral dimension is the high status of their members, who already had obtained politically powerful positions before the advent of an extra-parliamentary party organization.

The emergence of these “modern” extra-parliamentary parties, under the influence of the extension of the suffrage, was analyzed by Mosei Ostrogorski (1903). He compared these elite parties in Britain and the United States and, the latter having a more extended electorate, concluded that power became increasingly concentrated in local party “machines” that aimed at winning elections through an extensive system of patronage and clientelism.
At the organizational level, elite parties have basically two layers: in the constituencies and in parliament (Ostrogorski 1903, VIII–IX; Duverger 1954, XXIV; Katz and Mair 2002, 114). The extra-parliamentary party is weakly articulated or even absent and each constituency is able to provide its own resources, so that central authority and control are weak. Katz and Mair (2002, 115) argue that the elite party is basically an agglomeration of local parties consisting of “a small core of individuals with independent and personal access to resources able to place either one of their number or their surrogate in Parliament as their representative” (see also Ostrogorski 1903, i). Such a picture of the elite party organization is also sketched by Duverger (1954, 1–2, 62–67) who characterized the caucus party by its local and embryonic organizational structures, which were exclusively aimed at recruiting candidates and campaigning for them during the election period. For Duverger, the early cadre parties were merely “agencies of electoral coordination for groups of local notables with broadly similar views but a deep aversion to such vulgar notions as membership dues or party discipline” (see Knapp, 2002: 107). In a similar vein, Neumann (1956) identified the earliest political parties as parties of individual representation, which are characteristic of a society with a restricted political domain and only a limited degree of participation. They articulate the demands of specific social groups and at the organizational level their “membership activity is, for all practical purposes, limited to balloting, and the party organization (if existent at all) is dormant between election periods. Its main function is the selection of representatives, who, once chosen, are possessed of an absolute ‘free mandate’ and are in every respect responsible only to their own consciences” (Neumann 1956, 404).

The various authors do not say much on the ideological character of elite parties, but although the different groups of parliamentarians may have held “widely diverging views” of what the national interest was (Katz 1996, 116), competition between parties was relatively limited and centrist (Wildavski 1959, 313). Since all elite parties consisted of members of the higher echelons of society and only represented a limited section of the population, political conflict centered on the extent of unification and centralization of the state, the level of local autonomy, and the level of state intervention in the economic process (primarily taxes and tariffs). Mostly, such elite parties are associated with conservative and liberal outlooks in life.

**MASS PARTIES**

Whereas political power preceded the formation of the elite party, the mass party is the mirror image in that the formation of the extra-parliamentary organization preceded the acquisition of political power. Typically, mass
parties are externally created and mobilize specific segments of the electorate that have previously been excluded from the political process (Duverger 1954; Kirchheimer 1966). These parties have been typified by Neumann (1956) as parties of social integration, as they have sought to integrate these excluded social groups into the body politic. Since they aim at a radical redistribution of social, economic, and political power, mass parties demand a strong commitment from their members, encapsulating them into an extensive extra-parliamentary party organization that provides a wide range of services via a dense network of ancillary organizations. In the words of Neumann (1956, 404):

> Modern parties have steadily enlarged their scope and power within the political community and have consequently changed their own functions and character. In place of a party of individual representation, our contemporary society increasingly shows a party of social integration. . . . It demands not only permanent dues-paying membership (which may be found to a smaller extent within the loose party of representation too) but, above all, an increasing influence over all the spheres of the individual’s daily life.

The ideological and organizational character of mass parties is influenced by their aim to represent and mobilize a particular and clearly defined social, religious, or ethnic segment of society, as well as their extra-parliamentary origin. In order to organize a politically excluded group, mass parties need a coherent vision of a better and different world and the ability to communicate it in a compelling manner. As Panebianco (1988, 264) pointed out, the stress is on ideology, and “believers” play a central role within the organization. Paradoxically, these “parties of the excluded” attempt to integrate their followers by insulating them from possible counterpressures (Katz 1996, 118). This insulation is achieved by a distinct ideology that is engrained in the minds of the members through propaganda, the party press, and party-organized activities in all spheres of life (Neumann 1956: 405). Ancillary organizations are created in the fields of education, labor, housing, sports, banking, insurance, and so on, so that all social, economic, and cultural activities of the party’s supporters are consistent with its ideology. The ideological vision of a better world becomes visible and materializes within this social niche. Needless to say, the ideologies of these mass parties differ from the already powerful groups, but they also differ from the various ideologies of other mass parties. The result is fierce and principled competition among parties. Thus, among mass parties themselves there is substantial variance in ideology and (consequently) in organization.
Highlighting these differences, Duverger (1954: 63–71) distinguishes between branch-based mass parties and cell-based devotee parties, the latter being more totalitarian in ideology and organization. This distinction is also found in Neumann, who separates the party of social integration from the party of total integration. A party of total integration is “all-inclusive” and “demands the citizen’s total surrender. It denies not only the relative freedom of choice among the voters and followers but also any possibility of coalition and compromise among parties. It can perceive nothing but total seizure and exercise of power, undisputed acceptance of the party line, and monolithic rule” (Neumann 1956: 405). Lenin (1902: 464–65) envisaged such parties as a small and cohesive group of professional and totally committed revolutionaries who lead huge masses of uncritical followers.

The mass party can also be found in a religious variant, the denominational mass party (Kirchheimer 1957a: 437; 1966), which Kirchheimer differentiated from the totalitarian party and the democratic mass party (Kirchheimer 1954b). Both the denominational and the democratic mass party try to appeal to a maximum of voters to take over the administration and carry into effect a definite program (Kirchheimer 1954b). They are, however, still limited in their appeal and only aim at mobilizing a specific social class or religious group. According to Gunther and Diamond (2003: 180–83), the mass party can also be found in nationalistic and fundamentalist variants, which are more proto-hegemonic in their ideology and tend toward a militia type of organization.

In terms of organization, all mass parties share the characteristic of extensive and centralized bureaucracy at the national level. The democratic variants of mass parties are characterized by an elected and representative collegial leadership, often combined with formal powers for a national congress with representatives from the membership (Wolinetz 2002, 146). Formally, mass parties are democratic organizations, but the ideological rigidity and the internal processes of training and recruiting members of the elite (through extensive socialization in the local branches and the internal educational system) make real competitive elections unlikely. Observing one of the first mass parties, Michels (1912) noted the bureaucratic rationalization within mass parties in which a small and unrepresentative elite gains control over the resources and means of communication. Michels thought that in any large organization power concentrated in the hands of an oligarchy is inevitable. “It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandaters over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy” (Michels 1962, 365). Inevitable or not, mass parties tend to be hierarchical in their structure, as all activities of the ancillary organizations and local party branches are coordinated by the extra-parliamentary leadership. In contrast

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to the elite parties, in which local caucuses voluntarily form a national organization, the central office of the mass party has a top-down approach. Local branches and cells are founded and coordinated from the center in order to increase the level of societal penetration of the party. Characteristic of mass party development is the establishment of an extra-parliamentary office that takes precedence over the party’s public office. As a consequence, the party in public office is controlled, disciplined, and supervised from the extra-parliamentary leadership. All representatives are considered to have received the same mandate (Katz 1996, 118). The party in public office is simply instrumental to the implementation of the party’s ideology (Katz and Mair 2002, 118). These strong vertical organizational ties (Panebianco 1988, 264) are needed to amass and pool resources at the central level of the extra-parliamentary party (Katz and Mair 2002, 117). The mass party derives its name from the mass of members that form the core of the organization. High membership levels and the extent of involvement and participation by members in inner-party activities and electoral campaigning are part of the defining characteristics of mass parties (Ware 1985; 1987; 1996). Beyond the voluntary work members do for the party, they are also the main source of income. Membership fees are used to finance the central bureaucracy and the campaigning activities of the mass party. Other sources of income for mass parties derive from the activities of the ancillary organizations and their own party press.

**ELECTORAL CATCH-ALL PARTIES**

Mass parties in Europe have been successful in integrating their followers in the body politic and in replacing their ancillary organizations with full-blown welfare states at the national level. Coupled with high levels of economic growth, the maturation of welfare states has resulted in the emergence of a substantial new middle class made up of skilled manual workers, white-collar workers, and civil servants. Their interests have converged and become indistinguishable from those of the traditional middle classes. According to Kirchheimer (1966), such diminished social polarization went hand in hand with diminished political polarization as the doctrines of mass parties slowly became interchangeable. Ideologically, mass parties gradually transformed into programmatically bland catch-all parties and this process culminated into a waning of principled opposition and a reduction of politics to the mere management of the state (Krouwel 1999; 2003). Kirchheimer distinguished the catch-all party from the Weltanschauungs-party, and argued that the modern catch-all party was now forced to think more in terms of profit and loss than of electoral support and policy (Wolinetz 2002, 145–46). He asserted that political parties had been reduced “to a rationally conceived
vehicle of interest-representation” (Kirchheimer 1957b, 314–15). Although catch-all parties still functioned as intermediaries between elements of formerly united groups, the working class only continued to accept these parties because they promised to give priority to their material claims, not because of their social vision. Catch-all parties were reluctant to perform the role of opposition, as this would seriously diminish their success in realizing group claims. This transition from the ideologically oriented mass party to the interest group–oriented catch-all party is indicative of the erosion of principled opposition.

Kirchheimer's development of the catch-all thesis is a good example of how erratically theory-generating processes operate concerning party transformation. Kirchheimer formulated his catch-all thesis on the basis of only a limited number of observations, in particular the German Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands and Christlich-Demokratische Union, the British Labour Party, the Italian Democrazia Cristiana, and the French Union pour la Nouvelle République (Kirchheimer 1966). He hypothesized that the catch-all development witnessed in these cases was likely to be prevalent in many European countries and would lead to a more or less generalized transformation of party systems. Kirchheimer was also fairly categorical in identifying the properties of this new party—including its ideological, organizational, and electoral dimensions—which is why there still remains substantial confusion in the contemporary literature regarding precisely what a catch-all party is and precisely which parties can genuinely be regarded as catch-all (see Dittrich 1983; Wolinetz 1979; 1991; 2002; Schmidt 1985; 1989; Smith 1989; Krouwel 1999).

As early as 1954, in an analysis of the West German political system, Kirchheimer first introduced the concept of the catch-all party (Kirchheimer 1954a, 317–18). Over more than a decade the somewhat loosely specified notion of the catch-all party was continuously altered (Kirchheimer 1957a, 437; 1957b, 314; 1959a, 270 and 274; 1961b, 256; 1966a, 185). None of Kirchheimer's essays develops an exact definition of this new type of political party and at no time did he ever provide a clear and coherent set of indicators as to what precisely constituted a catch-all party. Confusingly, the catch-all party is sometimes referred to as the “catch-all people's party” (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190), other times as the “catch-all mass party” (Kirchheimer 1954a, 250; Kirchheimer 1966a, 191), the “conservative catch-all party” (Kirchheimer 1954a, 250), the “Christian type of catch-all people’s parties” (Kirchheimer 1959a, 270), and, in still another version, as the “personal loyalty variant of the catch-all party” (Kirchheimer, 1966a, 187). Indeed, twelve years after its first introduction, Kirchheimer had still only formulated a very cursory definition of the catch-all transformation, a process which he then conceived as involving five related elements:
a) drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage. . . .  
b) Further strengthening of top leadership groups, whose actions and 
omissions are now judged from the viewpoint of their contribution 
to the efficiency of the entire social system rather than identification 
with the goals of their particular organization.  
c) Downgrading of the role of the individual party member, a role considered a 
historical relic which may obscure the newly built-up catch-all 
party image.  
d) De-emphasis of the class-gardée, specific social-
class or denominational clientele, in favour of recruiting voters 
among the population at large.  
e) Securing access to a variety of 
interest groups for financial and electoral reasons. (Kirchheimer 
1966a, 190).

Yet earlier versions list different characteristics as the key features of catch-
all development (1964c; 1965d). In a draft version, Kirchheimer included 
a feature dealing with the extra-parliamentary party, and argued that the 
change toward catch-ellipsis involves: “Further development of a party 
bureaucratic apparatus committed to organisational success without regard 
to ideological consistency” (Kirchheimer 1964c, 16). In later versions, this 
element was formulated more generally, now referring to the relative power 
of the entire party leadership while dropping the idea that catch-all parties 
would develop more elaborate bureaucratic apparatuses (Kirchheimer 1966a, 
190). Over the years, substantive alterations were also made in Kirchheimer’s 
argumentation as to what factors influence the catch-all development in 
different European countries. At various stages, Kirchheimer added arguments 
about the particular social structures that determine the success of a catch-
all strategy, as well as an explanation as to why only major parties in the 
larger European countries could hope to appeal to wider electoral clienteles. 
Kirchheimer also reformulated his thesis with respect to the expressive 
and the aggregative function. First, he argued that the expressive function 
migrated from parties to other political institutions, while this claim was 
later reformulated to conclude that catch-all parties continue to function 
as expressive institutions but are limited by widely felt popular concerns. 
Another late addition to his theory was that the loose-fitting structure of 
the catch-all party and its disconnection from society will considerably 
limit its scope for political action. With this functional transformation, the 
organization of the catch-all party becomes more professional and capital 
intensive, much less oriented toward the extra-parliamentary membership 
organization and more toward the parliamentary party and the party in 
government (see Krouwel 2003). In sum, a catch-all party is characterized 
by an indistinct ideological profile, a wide electoral appeal aimed at vote 
maximization, a loose connection with the electorate, a power balance in
favor of the party top vis-à-vis the party members and a professional and
capital-intensive party organization (Krouwel 1999, 59).

In the United States, Eldersveld (1964; 1982) and Schlesinger (1965;
1985) have also pointed toward parties that became primarily oriented
toward the recruitment and selection of candidates for public office and
running election campaigns. The representation and mobilization of specific
social groups in the United States also became organized through professional
interest organizations that contributed, financially or otherwise, to the election
campaigns of individual politicians. Eldersveld (1964) sketched a picture of
local candidate organizations that function almost autonomously without
substantive coordination or support from a national party organization. He
called it the *stratarchy party model*: parties with limited levels of formal
organization and high autonomy. These parties have a “porous nature” and
easily absorb anyone willing to work for the organization, run as a candidate,
or support them with a donation or vote. The party is merely an alliance
of coalitions at the various levels (substructures) with little or no hierarchy.
Similarly, Schlesinger (1965; 1985) describes political parties as basically
local candidate organizations: a nucleus mainly devoted to capturing public
office. All party activities are specifically linked to an individual candidate
and the different nuclei of the same party can even be in competition
with each other for resources and votes. Nuclei have no members, only
contributors of all sorts, in financial terms, in time spent on campaigning,
or by voting for a candidate. While these American scholars stressed the
increasing autonomy of political actors, some observers in Europe have
suggested an opposite development toward more state-dependent parties.

**CARTEL PARTIES AND PARTISAN STATES**

The cartel model is theoretically linked to the catch-all party: analyzing
the functional transformation of parties, Kirchheimer (1954b; 1957b) had
already identified several types of political collusion in the 1950s. First,
Kirchheimer observed an interparty cartel of centrist catch-all parties that
try to maintain their grip on public office. As a result of the disappearance
of a goal-oriented opposition, combined with consensus on most important
policy issues, genuine political competition was almost completely eliminated.
This combination of vanishing political opposition with a shift of power
to the executive resulted in a firm interparty cartel, whereby political
competitors, particularly more radical parties, were increasingly excluded.
A second type of collusion was the formation of a state-party cartel, where
parties disconnected themselves from their social foundations and became
amalgamated with the state, reducing politics to mere “state management”
by professional politicians (Kirchheimer 1954b; 1957b). This extensive
PARTY MODELS

Collusion of political parties with the state as well as the severing of the societal links of party organizations evidences a power shift to the leadership of the major political parties. Kirchheimer alleged that the leadership of three faces of the party became tightly interwoven at the personal level, resulting in an ever-growing discipline within the parliamentary party. A third type of collusion has characterized the tripartite power cartel consisting of political parties, the state, and powerful interest groups. According to Kirchheimer, political parties try to “close the electoral market” by seeking the loyalty of large groups of voters not on the basis of their ideology, but through their interest organizations. Parties are increasingly subsidized by interest groups, which are also their main channels of communication with the electorate. At the same time, the party on the ground is neglected and parties display an increasing aloofness toward civil society. Finally, Kirchheimer predicted further collusion between the executive, the leadership of the major political parties, and the judicial powers, indicating an ongoing process of diffusion of state powers.

From this it is clear that Kirchheimer saw the development of cartel parties as a logical consequence of the formation of catch-all parties. This linkage between the models is useful when we look at later versions of the cartel thesis. The most widely cited is Katz and Mair’s (1995) cartel party thesis, in which the cartel is defined in terms of a state-party cartel: “colluding parties (that) become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state (the party state) to ensure their own collective survival” (Katz and Mair 1995, 5). Central to this party model is the relationship between state and society: in the development of the cartel, political parties and the state collude in a reciprocal process in which, on the one hand, parties increasingly extract state resources and “colonize” the institutions of the state and, on the other, the state increasingly regulates party political organizations and activities through law (Katz 1996; Krouwel 2004). Through this collusion and reliance on the state as a primary source of funding, cartel parties reverse the logic of party democracy: cartel parties no longer represent sections of society at the state level; instead, they represent the state to society. Cartel parties become increasingly dependent on the state, using state resources to professionalize their party organizations while disengaging from their former human and financial resources within civil society. Within this oligopolistic cartel, a vast portion of the state’s resources and institutional assets is accrued in the hands of the elites of the major parties. Politicians make increasing use of public institutions such as ministerial bureaucracies (to which they appoint spokesmen, media-, and policy advisors) and other state agencies and public utilities or quasi nongovernmental organizations (quangos) and the state-owned media for party political purposes and electoral campaigning. What seems to be occurring is a symbiosis between political parties and the
state, a weakening of the democratically crucial institutional differentiation of civil associations from formal state institutions. The state becomes “partisan” as political elites weld party organizations and state institutions together to such an extent that citizens can no longer distinguish between them (Krouwel 2004). Through increased formal regulation of party activities, established political parties seek to monopolize the route to executive office. In order to ensure these privileges, party elites, obviously, prefer to have them written down in law. Although political competition cannot be totally eliminated, cartel parties attempt to block competition from political “outsiders” by using legal means to their political advantage. Processes of both state-dependency and “self-regulation” increase and intensify the reciprocal linkages between political parties and institutions of the state, colluding into a “partisan state” (Krouwel 2004). While party organizations are formally considered part of civil society in most constitutions, in reality parties are “colonizing” the state through extensive processes of patronage and overlapping functional linkages. This is evidenced by the fact that politicians often simultaneously perform formal functions within political parties and formal roles in the state. This symbiosis of a supposedly “neutral” state bureaucracy and a professional political class is advanced, as in most European countries political recruitment has to a large extent been narrowed to the state-employed civil servants. As Puhle (2002) has pointed out, this structural proximity and overlapping of state institutions and party organizations leads to serious democratic problems. Political parties cease to be “intermediary” and “representative,” and it can also lead to higher levels of patronage, clientelism, and corruption.

Later specifications of the cartel thesis by Katz and Mair also include an argument concerning interparty collusion. Restating the cartel thesis, Katz and Mair (2009, 755) argue that the “cartel party is a type that is postulated to emerge in democratic polities that are characterized by the interpenetration of party and state and by a tendency towards inter-party collusion. With the development of the cartel party, the goals of politics become self-referential, professional, and technocratic, and what substantive interparty competition remains, becomes focused on the efficient and effective management of the polity.” Cartel parties are seen to limit and carefully manage the level of interparty competition through informal agreements and by sharing office. The cartel is largely implicit and entails the gradual inclusion of all significant parties in government. The range of acceptable coalitions is widened and the politics of opposition is abandoned (Katz 1996, 119–21; Mair 1997, 137–39; Katz and Mair 2002, 124). This common goal has transformed apparent incentives to compete into a positive motivation not to compete (Katz and Mair 1995, 19–20). Outside challengers are not formally excluded from electoral competition nor by the allocation
of disproportionate state resources to the incumbent parties; they are simply excluded from executive office as long as possible and can only enter the cartel through absorption and adaptation (Katz and Mair 1996, 531). Favorable conditions for the development of party cartels are a tradition of strong state-party relations, patronage, and a political culture of interparty cooperation. Interparty collusion creates its own opposition. Exclusion from executive power offers challengers ammunition to mobilize against the cartel parties (Katz and Mair 1995, 24).

POLITICS INCORPORATED: POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS AND BUSINESS FIRM PARTIES

As the major traditional parties collude with the state and form a bastion of power, challengers are left no other option than to organize outside the state-party cartel and use different resources to accrue electoral support. Thus the party cartel leads to the emergence of a fifth species, the business firm party, which may be a recent phenomenon in Europe but not on the American continent (see Carty 2001). Basically, there are two types of business firm parties: one is based on an already existing commercial company, whose structures are used for a political project, while the other type is a new and separate organization especially constructed for a political endeavor on the basis of business principles. Hopkin and Paolucci (1999, 307) suggest that business firm parties emerge when a new party system is created. They describe Berlusconi's Forza Italia as an example of the first type: “In Forza Italia the distinctions between analogy and reality are blurred: the ‘political entrepreneur’ in question is in fact a businessman, and the organisation of the party is largely conditioned by the prior existence of a business firm” (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 320). Fortuyn's party in the Netherlands can be seen as an example of the second type of business firm party, with an entire organization built up in a very short period of time utilizing corporate donations (Voerman and Lucardie, 2003).

In terms of organization, the business firm party generates its resources from the private sector, which differentiates it from the cartel parties that use state resources for their activities. Although business firm parties may have (financial) support from interest groups, such groups are not their main source of income or electoral support, or their main channel of communication. This means that the extra-parliamentary party is practically useless and will not be developed on any meaningful scale. What might be developed is a mechanism for mobilizing sympathizers to appear at party conferences to cheer on the party leadership. In the words of Hopkin and Paolucci (1999, 315), business firm parties will have only “a lightweight organisation with the sole basic function of mobilising short-term support
at election time.” The party on the ground will be limited to a minimum so that it does not hamper the leadership in its attempt to break the mold of the party cartel. As the dues-paying membership will be small and most of the resources will be needed for campaigning purposes, most of the party’s activities will not be assigned to party bureaucrats. “Party bureaucracies are kept to a bare minimum, with technical tasks often ‘contracted out’ to external experts with no ties to the party” (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 333). This seems to be the essence of the business firm party: all party activities and tasks are brought under formal (commercial) contract in terms of labor, services, and goods to be delivered to the “party.” This means that the only individuals who have a permanent stake in the party are those who represent the party in public office. “Grassroots membership is also limited, with a high proportion of party members being officeholders who see the party as a vehicle for acquiring political positions, rather than an end in itself” (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 333). As the party and its ideology are no longer goals in themselves, the business firm party “instead of being a voluntary organisation with essentially social objectives, becomes a kind of ‘business firm,’ in which the public goods produced are incidental to the real objectives of those leading it; in Olson’s terminology, policy is a ‘byproduct’” (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 311).

Business firm parties have a flexible ideological orientation and an eagerness to attract superficial support from broad sectors of society (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 315), but, unlike the catch-all party, they are not oriented toward interest groups for their policy ideas. Policy positions will be developed as products are within firms, in response to demands oriented by “market research,” with focus groups, survey research, and local trials to test their feasibility and popularity. These “policy products” need to be wrapped in the most attractive package and will be aggressively put into the electoral market. This explains why what seems to characterize business firm parties more than their predecessors is their almost total orientation toward the creation of “free publicity” or even direct control of the media. The best wrapping for these popular policies is an attractive candidate (or even a single leader) so that the marketing of the policies can be reduced to the promotion of an individual. Not surprisingly, those best trained for this mediatized political arena are individuals working in the entertainment sector, which explains why an increasing number of people from this sector are now finding employment in politics. As Hopkin and Paolucci (1999, 322–23) argue: “characteristic of the leadership of the business firm party: personal popularity, organisational advantages, and crucially, access to unlimited professional expertise in mass communication.” Needless to say, this extreme emphasis on the individual personality both leads to
vulnerability of business firm parties, as well as a high degree of centralization of power around the party leader (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 323).

This chapter has shown how the large number of party models can be best clustered into five generic types, as many of these models actually describe the same type of political party. Additionally, this chapter also shows that the numerous models may be sequentially linked, as the authors cited have described transitional phases within political parties or the emergence of parties in reaction to the transformation of existing political parties. From this review of the literature on party models on the basis of four dimensions of party transformation—origin, ideology, organization, and electoral appeal—we can now develop empirical indicators of party change using the five party models in sequence.