Introduction

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Here at the onset of the second decade of the half millennium since initial encounters between tribal worlds, old and new, where the reemergence of Western hemispheric tribal nations defies predictions, repeated and historical, of their demise, we are prompted to consider the meanings, dimensions, and manifestations, and general project of indigenous nationhood. In part we provocatively seek the rehabilitation of the term “tribal” where we foreground the implicit political plurality and interdependence of tribes, which in an early anthropology and history had been regarded in evolutionary terms. Here we seek a synthesis in the form of tribal nationhood.

We understand and see all around us that Native nationhood matters but differently to variously situated actors. In Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations, his influential overview of tribal self-determination since the onset of termination, lawyer-historian Charles Wilkinson sees articulations of tribal sovereignty as among the most substantial developments effecting Native America over the past century. For Wilkinson, Tribal self-determination in the twentieth century emerged in the context of the federal Indian policy of termination, and the threat it posed to nationhood, reservation economies, tribal identity, and cultural vitality. Recent scholarship affirms this linkage. Dan Cobb and Paul Rosier, for example, associate resistance to termination with assertions of nationhood, and suggest that as Indians developed international perspectives on their conditions, they drew analogies between
colonialism at home and its expressions abroad. It is certainly no accident that the American Indian self-determination paradigm gained the traction that it did at the same time as so many African countries gained their independence, now more than half a century ago.

In this emerging world, Native intellectuals from D’Arcy McNickle to Clyde Warrior and Robert K. Thomas developed the language to communicate their concerns externally and internally, and raise consciousness by focusing on cultural, political, social, and economic sovereignty, and the educational strategies to articulate the nationhood they envisioned. If we consider as well Loretta Fowler’s assessment of tribal sovereignty in the context of modern American political and social life, we understand too that nationhood is concrete and imagined, constantly in motion, and contested in multiple ways and from numerous directions. It is accomplishment and aspiration, something described and lived, as well as a product of history.

That history attaches the ideas of “nation” to “indigenous,” “tribal,” “native,” and “Indian”—but not systematically. In treaties and treatises, constitutions and legislation, philosophers, theologians, and lawmakers have referenced existing—and perhaps historically specific—terms to describe indigenous political organization. Nation, Native, Indian, tribe and the like enjoy and suffer various definitions, and consequently different legal-political applications. On the one hand, they can be understood to presume the existence of variously autonomous and distinctive entities differently able to act collectively, to negotiate with the representatives of emerging nation-states. They can describe historical constructions or ethnic identity. Assertions of indigenous sovereignty flow through debates over the meaning of nationhood that make recognition of Indian nations under the U.S. Constitution, or in Canada where the Delgaamukw and Marshall decisions open the door to acknowledging the historical and cultural basis of First Nations sovereignty, and in Aotearoa/New Zealand, where the Treaty of Waitangi stands as a foundational document for Maori sovereignty and that state’s two peoples/one nation aspirations.

On the other hand, nomenclature can operate as an instrument of dispossession, the suffering part of our characterization above. In the United States, legislative and judicial enactments progressively restricted the dimensions of Native nationhood, moving from Chief Justice Marshall’s invention of domestic dependency in the 1830s, through the end of treaty-making a few decades later in 1871, and the enshrinement of plenary authority through the Lone Wolf decision in the very early twentieth century. Canada operated on a parallel course, constructing an Indian Act that presumed the extinction of First Nations through
a process of differential status and enfranchisement, and settler colonial societies from South Africa to Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand adopted similar practices aimed at erasing indigenous nationhood. While twenty-first-century indigenous groups contest colonial domination by reasserting nationhood, more recent expansions of legal/political definitions of tribal sovereignty remain vulnerable to political whim, and conflicting legal definition.5

In this context, the assertion and putative reassertion of nationhood, as a component of modern tribal worlds, signifies the revitalization and reimagining of Indigenous political, cultural and economic life. From casinos to smoke shops, through legal action on treaty rights, and including manifestations as varied as tribally controlled community colleges, the extension of taxation and regulatory authority over reservation domains, bold assertions of ownership of culture and history, as well as the development of relations of interdependency with other sovereign entities—so well articulated by Cattelino in her study of Seminole gaming—tribal nationhood in the context of globalized nation states is a new political phenomenon. Contemporary movements to restore indigenous nationhood through the operations of international organizations speak again to this merging of old and new definitions and understandings of tribalism. They also reference the internationalization of indigenous nationalism, where linkages are intellectual and cultural, historically based and forward looking, political and legal, and flow from shared experiences with colonialism.6

This process has nurtured critical discussions, inside and around the academy. Scholars are busily investigating the history, definitions, and manifestations of indigenous nationhood, and undertaking them in light of movements to decolonize community, cultural, and personal life. Whether assertions of nationhood proceed, stimulate, follow, or act in concert with the other processes is less clear. In a provocative engagement with these issues Kevin Brunyeel proposes that we conceive of the postcolonial relations between indigenous nations and the United States as “third space of sovereignty.” Maori scholar and activist Linda T. Smith posits an inextricable link between the “decolonization” of interior lives and practices and exterior assertions of indigenous nationhood. Franz Fanon raised an analogous issue decades ago.7 This raises a host of questions because the processes of colonization, settler state-formation and indigenous political reconstitution are all of a single piece. Hence, what is it that is decolonized? How does decolonizing the mind inform the project of indigenous nationhood? How are we to understand the reality of tribal nationhood in light of complex histories? How is indigenous nationhood to be understood, defined, and observed? How
is it manifested? What are the relationships between past and present modes of political organization and ethnic identity? How have Indigenous nations interacted with colonizers (and with one another), and how have those interactions shaped, formed, or effectively created, the indigenous nations we observe today? How is nationhood both represented as a process, something defined and constructed, asserted and defended, a product of human action, through history, and as operating outside the actions of history, assertion, or perception, akin to Platonic forms of observed phenomena? With this orgiastic interrogative indulgence we invite the reader to read radically, going to the root of contemporary claims about both the present and the past in the papers collected here.

These questions, and undoubtedly many others, motivated the inaugural Tribal Worlds sessions, held in Eugene, Oregon at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Society for Ethnohistory. As a project sponsored by SUNY Press, “Tribal Worlds” intends to nurture critical studies in the history of indigenous nation-building. Our linked sessions encouraged scholars and audiences gathered to consider definitions and manifestations of Native nationhoods, in contemporary times and through history. This volume attempts to capture the essence of those conversations, but also with the added benefit of reflection, additional study, and further conversation. As such, it represents a probing into some of the fundamental concepts and concerns that guide our scholarship, and in cautious concert with the aspirations and achievement of indigenous communities and peoples. This book is conceived as sets of intertwined, if not fully integrated, conversations where “Tribal Worlds,” as a volume in this case and as an academic project in the larger sense, seeks to encourage debate, discussion, probing analysis, and creative intellectual endeavors on questions having to do with governmentality, peoplehood, in contemporary times and as shaped by historical forces and circumstances.

Definitions and Manifestations

Two linked issues surfaced during the Eugene discussions, and came to influence subsequent submissions from our contributors. We identify them as “definitions” and “manifestations,” and have organized this volume accordingly. But a few words of explanation. First, we did not ask essayists to respond directly to either manifestations or definitions, and so organization followed the editorial process. Second, the binary structure of this volume should not be taken to presume distinct sets of conversations, oriented exclusively around either issue. Rather,
essayists effectively speak to one another across and between sections, and through any number of analytical and interpretive threads. Our arrangement is designed to offer structure, suggest larger themes that inspire the work of our contributors, and highlight potentially fruitful avenues for future inquiry. Each section, as each paper, is multifaceted and amenable to additional conceptual, academic, and political questions that hold scholarly and political implications.

Definitions

The language we use carries intellectual, historical, and political implications. More than a century ago, Max Weber described “nation,” “ethnicity,” and “race,” concepts important to the emerging discipline of political science, as “vernacular terms” rather than precisely defined (or definable), with meanings dependent upon context and usage. These demarcations of peoplehood were, he suggested, both imprecise and culturally bound. Though devised in the context of emergent nation states in nineteenth-century Europe, and in the context of colonialism, Weber’s observations seem applicable to challenges associated with defining indigenous nationhood. After all, if nationhood was elusive to those who thought solely in terms of the European nation-state, how well do those terms describe indigenous forms of political organization, historically if not currently? If we describe Indigenous nationhood according to language upon context and culture (in this case nineteenth-century Europe), are we effectively replicating colonialism, as uniquely indigenous forms of political organization come to be defined against, and thus circumscribed by, colonialist forms and mentalities? What does this mean historically, or for the relationship of past indigenous peoples to modern Indian nations?8

The first two essays introduce those questions. Anthony F. C. Wallace and Gerald Reid write about two different expressions of Iroquois nationhood. In doing so, they deftly address history and belonging within an even larger political context and thus begin the process of definition we undertake herein. In a finely textured contemporary ethnographic portrait of a people who have cohered by virtue of their political system, Wallace describes a Nation defined by ties of matrilineal kinship organized into clans and articulated with the Grand Council of the League of the Haudenosaunee. He demonstrates how the Tuscaroras’ realm of governance has endured the jurisdiction of the State of New York as well as the interventions of the federal government. Drawing upon ethnographic work he did both quite recently and more than fifty
years ago, and complementing that with ethnohistorical materials ranging over the past three centuries, this essay by an eminent ethnohistorian introduces many of the themes within the topic of nation-building that will appear in the rest of the collection.

The early twentieth-century nationhood emergent in the three Rotinonhsionni communities Gerald Reid studies takes place in the context of competing governmental frameworks; one, a democratic system introduced by Canadian policymakers and promoted through the operations of the Indian Act; and the other a “traditional” Rotinonhsionni notion of hereditary governance, mediated by clan and lineage, and an authority rooted in history. Advocates of the latter see assertions of traditional self-governance as acts of resistance to colonialism; advocates of the former appeal to seemingly universal principles of democracy.

In both essays, Iroquois political action is understood through the framework of a history that locates the origin of Haudenosaunee/Rotinonsoni in a specific time and place, populated by particular individuals and understood through an ideology. Appeals to history are essential to the reassertion and survival of Iroquois nationhood, and historical continuity is understood. To the extent that Haudenosaunee principles are known to be historically based but also relevant to changing times (and indeed an antidote to dislocations associated with the operations of colonialism) they are, it may be said, guidelines for traditional futures.

But Wallace and Reid also introduce contest, oppositions, and ordering of distinctions to our conversation, themes that will reappear at different points in many of these essays. More directly, expressions of Haudenosaunee nationhood develop and are articulated within the context of contest, between opposing forces and principles, and result in the articulation of distinctions between those principles and individuals that represent and articulate them.

Contest lies at the heart of Reid’s conversation, but is not its entirety. Nor is it the sum total of what Wallace offers. Like Reid, Wallace understands Haudenosaunee nationhood as “nested phenomena,” where political domains of Nation, Community, and Confederacy operate as concentric circles, and explorations of these domains (and the ways they interact) reveal much about the particulars of Iroquois political life. They also reveal much about the process of Haudenosaunee survival and resurgence. Here again, contest between differing values operates in some domains but at a deeper level, principles and values, rooted in history and practice, offer shape, consistency, and continuity. Contest operates in at least two areas. First at the level of legitimacy, in competition between traditional governance and an imposed democracy, that for some severs governance from history and values. As several essays point
out, this contest over legitimacy is distinctly associated with resistance to colonialism, where assertions of distinctive definitions of Indigenous nationhoods themselves constitute acts of resistance.

This process also highlights internal distinctions. All nations, as a characteristic of their sovereignty, assert the right to determine membership. Peoplehood, nationhood, tribalism, and ethnic identity, all are products of drawing boundaries, articulating distinctions, extending and limiting membership. Boundary creation and maintenance can be understood as a response to colonialism. On the one hand, indigenous self-definition is understood as an act of resistance. Yet at the same time, the colonial impulse, its hegemonic character, seeks to impose boundaries upon indigenous groups. Boundaries that resemble either the hierarchical nation-state, or a diffuse and primitive tribalism that exists outside the world of nations, and the suite of international laws that govern relationships (and locate sovereignty). The irony lies in expressions of Indigenous nationalism that both respond to, and contest, European notions of the nation-state.

Asserting distinctions also functions internally. Whether informed by ethnic identity, race, culture, law, and treaty, determining membership is inherently discriminatory. Some definitions are out while others are in. This process can be naturalized, but also involves contest, between and among social groups and frequently revolves around appeals to history, values, and (in some cases) instruments of colonialism such as laws and treaties. As Sturm’s study of Cherokee “blood politics” amply demonstrates, manifestations of indigenous nationhood turn on drawing distinctions, and involve appeals to history to define the dimensions of nationhood, settle disputes over membership, and sometimes to establish geographical boundaries of peoplehood.

They also involve conflict. Gerald Reid and Anthony Wallace discuss articulations of Iroquois nationhood as coinciding with conflict, that sharpen notions of legitimacy, contest externally imposed definitions, but also respond to the nation-state’s imperative to prescribe acceptable manifestations of nationhood. Contest involves modes of governance, limits to membership, assertions of broader national interests that extend beyond imposed physical boundaries, and appeals to law and history. These appeals to history can take the form of generalized associations between contemporary Nations and progenitors as recognized in oral histories, treaties, ethnographic accounts, and other documentary evidence, sometimes as understood through powerfully symbolic events, or what Fogelson termed “epitomizing events.”

National distinctions also operate in legal and political domains. When courts of law and legislative bodies adjudicate claims to resource
rights and geographical boundaries, or settle disputes over treaties and associated agreements, they are effectively rendering determinations on historical continuities between litigants in the here-and-now and predecessors named in treaties or other legal documents. Cases filed before the Indian Court of Claims often turned on the legal standing of contemporary polities to assume and assert the rights and prerogatives of historical actors and in that sense were determinations on appeals to history, and modes of understanding history.\textsuperscript{12}

Legal and constitutional questions open additional lines of inquiry. For instance, what are the consequences of conceiving of indigenous nations as “creatures of the law,” dependent upon treaties, constitutions, and international law, or legislation and executive orders promulgated by colonial powers and articulated through policy? Political scientist David Wilkins (Lumbee) engages this issue when he observes that Native sovereignty, while internally (culturally) driven and understood, nevertheless operates in the context of the colonial nation-state, and its prerogatives.\textsuperscript{13} Treaties, laws, constitutions, international protocols both constrain and enable indigenous nationhood. This reality certainly facilitates intelligibility between differing notions of nationhood but also limits the substance and reach of indigenous nationhood by linking its reality to alien and imposed laws and political structures. But does it also imply that indigenous nationhoods (as distinct from tribal worlds, perhaps) are made real through their articulation with (and acceptance by) colonialist regimes? This prompts us to consider the impulse of colonial regimes to define subordinate ethnicities by counting, categorizing, listing, measuring, acts that restrict the dimensions of Indigenous sovereignty. As James Scott observes, “seeing like a state” translates into categorization. Can it be that Native nationhoods are to some extent the colonial system replicating itself, through analogous forms of governance? Where the state replicates the state. Gerald Reid and Anthony F. C. Wallace suggest as much; so too will the essays that follow by Christina Hill, Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, and Sebastian Braun.\textsuperscript{14}

Christina Gish Hill and Heidi K. Stark assert and explore indigenous nationhood in the context of Northern Cheyenne and Anishinaabeg history, respectively. But nation, in these contexts, describes diffuse political organizations, less bounded geographically than through kinship relations, less fixed than fluid, less “state” than “people,” or so it would seem thus conforming to Ernest Gellner’s idea that members of the same nation share a culture and recognize that fact.\textsuperscript{15} This argument corresponds with several lines of inquiry common to American Indian ethnohistory, from Harmon’s discussion of Indians “in the making” in Puget Sound to Merrell’s influential unraveling of the Catawba’s “new
world.” Drawing as well upon the groundbreaking work of Frederik Barth, Harmon describes Native nationhood as a dynamic process of ethnic boundary creation and maintenance, effected by legal externals and the operations of colonialism, but shaped as well by kinship and indigenous definitions of peoplehood. Nations, in the making, are in motion, continuous with past forms but also created in real time. Likewise, Merrell traces the historical coalescing of disparate groups around Catawba nationhood, effectively the creation of an ethnopolitical identity out of many such identities.16

Hill and Stark invite us to think about indigenous nationhood outside the confines of bounded geography. This proposition respects the diversity of historical experience (as well as historical recountsings) and cultural values, and speaks to the extensive ethnohistorical literature on the variously defined and constructed phenomenon of ethnogenesis.17 But nationalism absent bounded geography is not necessarily peoplehood outside specific place. Indigenous cultural identities are intricately tied to place, or location, to the extent, as numerous studies have argued, that the existence of the one presumes that of the other.18 But what do we say about nationhoods that are rooted in place but not presumptively and primarily circumscribed by geographical or political boundaries? Stark and Hill speak of supra-national identities, rooted in place, but non-hierarchical, decentralized, and somewhat structurally similar to some of the African political formations described by British social anthropologists in the mid-twentieth century. And here we are thinking of the importance of kinship in the political organization of the Tallenzi, Logoli, and Nuer.19

Divergent definitions of nationhood certainly influenced international and intercultural encounters. As Euro-American and Euro-Canadian treaty negotiators and intermediaries both regarded and designated indigenous polities as “nations,” and circumscribed (effectively if not deliberately) the reach of Indian nationhood, Native people likewise manipulated inchoate and contradictory definitions to their advantage. In a sort of jujitsu of Native nationhood, indigenous peoples relied upon both the diffuse reality of their political organizations and the paradoxically rigid and emergent conception of Euro-American nationhood to confound efforts to define, fix, and encircle their political reality. Fluidity combined with a sense of peoplehood shaped and maintained by and through kinship not only defined Native nationhood, but also preserved it. Here we are attentive to both the constraints and the opportunities afforded by dialogue between representatives of structurally dissimilar political formations and recall Duane Champagne provocative study of the structural and historical conditions that underlay the Cherokee
and Choctaw strategy of state-formation in contrast to the Iroquois and Delaware strategy of revitalization as modes of engagement with colonialism.20

But there is more to this question of definition. Even Weber’s “vernacular terms” hold considerable historical, social, cultural, legal, and personal authority. They can be deployed for strategic and political ends, and in this sense definitions of Native nationhood are active, in motion, and productive of some end. National definition can be seen as an act of nation-building, and can signal political, ethical, and academic persuasions or agendas that, in turn, exert pressure on definitions—and vice versa. This speaks to historical uses of “nation,” or as contrasted with “tribe,” to draw distinctions between modern, rational, legal-constitutional political organization and their—presumed—pre-modern, less integrated, less completely articulated, progenitors. The political, in effect, intertwines with the historical. And this comes through very strongly in Heidi Stark’s recursive use of the term nation in analyzing the relationships between separate Anishinaabe communities and the collective communities with Euro-Americans. It is also explicitly and extensively addressed herein by Christina Gish Hill in her attention to both epistemological issues and historiography in the representation of the Cheyenne, and by implication, other indigenous groups.

Politics and history are crucial to Sebastian Braun. For if European definitions of nationhood obscured and misrepresented the functional reality of indigenous tribal worlds, what is the relationship between historical political organizations and their contemporary descendants? Phrased differently, how are we to consider the origins of contemporary Native nations? Political scientists of the “constructionist” persuasion see nationhood, national identities, as historically contingent, as developed through events and understandings of those events, guided by cultural values and perspectives on the past.21 In this sense, they remind us of Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities,” no less than the “invented traditions” of Hobsbawm and Ranger. All postulate contingent relationships between history, memory, and cultural production in the development and rationalization of ethnic nationhoods.22

Braun draws upon this intellectual tradition, but is mindful as well of its perils. If ethno-national identities are constructed, imagined, and invented, then does this not, provocatively and destructively, undermine historical relationships between native polities in the here and now and their historical ancestors? And does this proposition injure the defense of tribal nationhood today? If Indigenous nationhood is imaginary, or invented, then what are the implications for sovereignty? Absent a reality independent of exterior definition, is Native nationhood diminished?
Braun hopes to address this question by distinguishing between claims of historical and cultural alterity, and assertions of indigenous sovereignty. He wants us to consider historical contingency, not simply as a means of diminishing the reality of nationhood, but as a counterweight to the perils of alterity, where indigenous nationhood can be diminished in the service of cultural distinctiveness. This argument parallels Paige Raibmon’s critique of an externally developed authenticity that cements indigenous peoples in pre-modern stasis and denies the historical reality of adaptation to colonialism. As variously demonstrated by Colleen O’Neill, Philip Deloria, and most recently Jessica Cattelino and Daniel Usner, notions of authenticity marginalize Native peoples by diminishing their accomplishments, and by establishing a false dichotomy between tradition and modernity. In effect, a straitjacket of authenticity circumscribes indigenous self-representation by privileging alterity. As with O’Neill, Cattelino, Usner, and Deloria, Braun wants us to question dichotomies while also appreciating the human and institutional consequences of colonialism, and advocating for extensions of tribal sovereignty (as a product of treaties and agreements, rather than a consequence of exoticism) in the here and now. 23

Placed alongside Stark and Gish Hill, Braun highlights the tenuous relationship between definitions and manifestations, or perhaps more accurately the political and ethical conundrums that follow definition. For instance, if we are to follow Anderson and Hobsbawm/Ranger and argue that nations, peoples, tribal worlds perhaps, are aspirational and inspirational, and enlivened by interpretations of history, are we advocating a construction of nationhood that undermines the concrete reality of tribal nations? The implications are profound, and manifested in contests over treaty rights, federal acknowledgement and extensions of tribal sovereignty. This is treacherous ground, as Clifford recognized in his classic study of Mashpee recognition, and as Canada encountered through the Delgamuukw (1991) and Marshall (1999) decisions.24

The Mashpee, Delgamuukw, and Marshall decisions, not to mention legal considerations over Maori sovereignty as revealed through the Waitangi Tribunal,25 introduce courts’ discomfort with indigenous reckonings of history, and recall the practical implications of definitional conundrums. Anderson’s “imagined communities” and the “invented traditions” of Hobsbawm and Ranger move us in the direction of seeing national identities as first intellectual projects then realized in conjunction with political power but always in a plural context. That is to say, in coordinated opposition to a homologous locus. In all, and generally, all identities are simultaneously dialogical, authentic, and constructed. So, therefore the same may be said of ethnic and tribal identities, and
though Anderson’s discussion was limited to the role of print culture and capitalism in communicating supra-ethnic collective identities, similar processes obtain in these other political registers.

Even so, if nation-building can be understood as first an intellectual project, shaped by dialogue around and through cultural values, shared and competing principles, or appeals to history, then should it follow that these intersections of ideas and values (as communicated by people) are manifested through actions that are themselves reflections and constitutive of definition? Nations define themselves through intellectual activity, conditioned by cultural, ethnic, and racial aspirations in opposition to analogous processes in their hinterlands. If we conceive of Native nationhood as self-directed, as drawing upon indigenous conceptions of peoplehood, history, values, and identity, then are they less primordial and permanent than constructed, by individual and collective action, forces external and internal? This corresponds with Barth’s observations on ethnic boundaries (supported by Harmon and Andrew Fisher among many) and contests a naturalized nationhood, where boundaries and parameters and meanings of nationhood are mostly fixed. At the same time, the notion of a largely constructed nationhood privileges western interpretations of history, or judgments of historical fact and evidence, and is hegemonic, deeply colonialist, in implication if not intent.26

Manifestations

In the real world, relationships between how communities are defined—or imagined—and manifestations of nationhood are products of human and collective action. In other words, regardless of historical and cultural depth and continuities, nationhood acquires meaning by and through the actions of human beings, which can be seen as products of complex dialectics between definition and manifestation. Nation-imagining and nation-building act in tandem, just as structure and agency engage in what Pat Albers aptly described as an elaborate dance, with each moving across a floor without stepping on one another’s toes.27 Simply put, nation-definition and nation-building are partners, and nationhood is made manifest through contest and distinction; assertions and argument; the framing of oppositions; hegemony and resistance; performance and strategy, each given shape and substance by appeals to history, cultural values, and the operations of law, politics, and colonialism.

Josh Reid speaks to dialects of nation definition and nation-building through explorations of Makah whaling. Whaling, he argues, represents a tangible assertion of Makah nationhood, one that speaks to
appeals to history and enduring (if also adaptable) cultural values, by connecting cultural health with action that recalls and enlivens history. To say that Makah nationhood is a product of whaling is partly the case. But even more, whaling represents both a manifestation and a rebirth of nationhood because Makahs understand it to be, and because it encapsulates history, culture, and values. Whaling is an assertion of nationhood in the here-and-now, and an appeal to history.

But this is no simple reclaiming of an exotic past, or appeal to authenticity in stasis. As Reid explains, not only is Makah history intertwined with whaling as understood through oral history and cultural tradition, but also as a site of adaptation to colonialism. Individuals like Clapanhoo responded to colonial mandates by participating in the developing commercial economy. Commercial whaling became an instrument of Makah national identity, then and now. That Clapanhoo effectively (it seems) transformed clan and crest prerogatives into national patrimony, or the possessions of Makah nationhood, speaks as well to human agency, and nation-definition as nation-building. Yet exactly how clan and crest prerogatives became national patrimony remains curious, and perhaps an avenue for even deeper research.

Regardless, whaling as an expression of Makah “traditional future” speaks eloquently to dialectical relationships between traditionalism and modernity, authenticity creative adaptation, and the way appeals to history influence the construction, articulation, and communication of Indigenous nationhood. Appeals to history, linked as they are to concrete expressions of nationhood, also offer a bridge between definitions and manifestations. For Josh Reid, the notion of “traditional future” encapsulates this dialectic between past and present/future, but other contributors to this volume also address the central role of appeals to history.

Of course, indigenous nations respond to structural power differences, and Native nations come into being through the ingenuity and sacrifice of Native political actors, who deflect the power of the state to preserve/advance/restore Indigenous nationhood. In an articulation of Scott’s “weapons of the weak,” Native nations become nations by using the law, constitutions, treaties, and even classificatory schemes to resist colonialism and reassert sovereignty. While many of our contributors demonstrate that opposition to external forms of governance, or classification, constitute assertions of nationhood, indigenous nationhoods also draw upon law, treaties, and definitions of what “a nation” is, and is not. Tribal sovereignty can be, and often is, manifested through this dialectical relationship between colonialist legal/constitutional frameworks and indigenous reactions to, and claims over, those very same
documents and principles. It is a simultaneous process of recognition and misrecognition. That this process is fraught, interwoven and complicated by competing, and sometimes irreconcilable, standards of evidence is undeniable. The fact that courts of law remain generally unreceptive to non-written evidence demonstrates the persistence of colonialist definitions of nationhood that impact manifestations, certainly, but historic and contemporary expressions of nationhood still rely upon those very same legal and constitutional frameworks, albeit interpreted differently, or with distinctive emphases.28

Courts of law expose competing manifestations of indigenous nationhood to public scrutiny, and discussion, and thus are in effect public demonstrations of nationhood. Tribes, through their legal counsel and representatives, understand legal challenges as public events, as opportunities to assert nationhood. In similar fashion, Native nationhood is expressed in other public forums, as Native peoples seek to direct discourse towards sovereignty, even when immediate subject is located elsewhere, as in beadwork and basketry, subsistence practices, economic activities, and personal and tribal histories. Here, various scholars have documented the ways in which “working the land,” exploiting natural resources, developing arts and crafts for commercial purposes, and participating in local and regional wage labor markets, influences the development of self-government, the extension of sovereignty, and articulations of tribal nationhood. Individual group action articulates, shapes, describes, communicates, asserts and enacts various expressions of Native nationhood. Tribal nationhood in this sense can be seen as assertions, as argument, as project and strategy, as performance, but also as deeply intertwined with legal structures and the operations of colonialism. The works of William J. Bauer, Colleen O’Neill, Erika Bsumek, Jeffery Shepherd, and John Heaton, among many others, expose intersections between labor and nationhood. Economic affairs are simultaneously conditioned by structural inequalities rooted in colonialism and antidotes to subordination.29

Chantal Norrgard’s essay on Anishinaabe histories as recorded through the Federal Writers Project extends this conversation. Seen through the prism of public assertions of treaty-protected resource rights, interviews recorded through this New Deal initiative demonstrate a keen awareness of both the dimensions of treaties and the complex public discourses that shape and indeed limit real world expressions of those rights. Like Josh Reid, Stark, Gerald Reid, and Wallace, Norrgard’s essay speaks to the power of history, or more properly appeals to history, to assertions of tribal nationhood.
But Anishinaabe appeals to history, through the Federal Writers Project, move beyond important, and indeed provocative, explorations of the dimensions of on- and off-reservation resource rights. While these are essential (and raise important questions of the role of public discourse to assertions of nationhood) legal/constitutional/economic issues comprise only one aspect of Norrgard’s discussion. As with Josh Reid, anticipating essays by Tone-Pah-Hote and Greci Green, and in a way referencing Braun’s critique, Norrgard introduces expressions of cultural alterity to the conversation. Here, authenticity moves in two directions. On the one hand, Anishinaabe consultants use this media to counter conventionalized portrayals of savage Native peoples. This can be understood as a project, as assertions of identity, as agency, and in the service of protecting treaty rights. At the same time, is it possible to argue that Native alterity is deployed for strategic purposes? For instance, as state-administered conservation programs threatened to limit, and potentially erase, some treaty rights (and with that the economic security that those rights provided), did Anishinaabe consultants enact the “ecological Indian” as reassurance to nervous sportsmen and vacationers, and in the process protect and extend those very rights under threat? Intentional or not, and perhaps beyond what Norrgard wants to argue, this possibility supports Raibmon’s ideas on the politics of authenticity, and opens avenues for additional inquiry.30

This multiplicity of understandings of authenticity draws the final two essays into focus. Greci Green’s paper on the WPA Indian Handicraft Project can be seen as a sort of companion to Norrgard, in that subsistence-gathering rights, as defined through treaty, are manifested and demonstrated in the production of hand crafted items, birch bark makuks for storing maple sugar, black ash baskets, snow shoes, canoes, lacrosse sticks, and even furniture and more. What had much earlier been quotidian utilitarian objects were now signs of cultural distinctiveness. Here a federal program serves as the vehicle for the reproduction of an aspect of a traditional way of life: control over the organization of production, the very material from which conceptions of nation are realized. This basketry then becomes symbolic of an indigenous nationhood as well as an assertion of nationhood in the public sphere.

These expressions of nationhood are also gendered with the Wisconsin Ojibwe men and the Michigan Ojibwe women effectively bearing the load of cultural distinctiveness in a division of cultural labor. And this fact links this essay, this last third of essays to Tone-Pah-Hote’s discussion of Kiowa crafts. Here, Kiowa crafts and performance are expressions of nationhood in her estimation as a descendent of Kiowa people who
articulated their peoplehood in the register of artistic expression. Here song, dance, story, beading, migrate from clan and family prerogatives, as in the Makah case discussed by Josh Reid, to expressions of Kiowa-ness especially in the context of Indian fairs, sites that facilitated the production and reproduction of collective identities. Tone-Pah-Hote reminds us of Ellis who writes about dance, and Deloria on performance and appropriation, and Troutman’s work on musicianship and cultural survival, all of which speak directly to the performance of nationhood, as well as complex transformations where the personal and clan becomes the national through assertion and expression, and demonstration. All three of these essays reveal the ways in which expressive culture is also political action that shapes, articulates and preserves notions and practices of belonging productive of tribal nationhood.31

The essays in this collection represent the efforts of the authors to document and interpret the significance of cultural practices as signs of, measures of, and statements about the changing realities of collective belonging for at least several groups of indigenous people on the North American continent. We think they each successfully attend to processes of collective identity production. As such, there is much to glean about particularities from each. There is also much to argue with especially in the face of those particularities. We see this project as an invitation to readers to participate in a multi-register conversation about the endurance of indigenous peoples in the face of forces that sought to homogenize the aboriginally rather heterogeneous collectivities.

Notes

4. Rogers Brubaker, in “Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism” America Review of Sociology, 35 (2009), 21–42, offers a useful overview of the ways political scientists engage the question of nationhood. Along these same lines, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, ed., Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) was helpful. See as well, David E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and The U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina
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5. See Annie Coombes, Rethinking Settler Colonialism: History and Memory in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa (Manchester UK: Manchester University Press, 2006), Andrew Armitage, Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation; Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995).


19. See Meyer Fortes and Edward Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems* (General Books, 2010), where the editors acknowledge the work of Rob-
ert Lowie, ethnographer of American Indian peoples, in their own theoretical introduction to the collection of essays thus completing the circle of associations herein suggested.


Culture and Commerce at Fort Hall, 1870–1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Erika Bsumek, *Indian Made: Navajo Culture in the Marketplace, 1868–1940* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008); William J. Bauer, “We were all like Migrant Workers Here”: Work, Community and Memory on California’s Round Valley Reservation, 1850–1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
