ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP
INSIGHT FROM THE FOUR CAUSES

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1. Introduction

In teaching Aristotle’s Ethics it is almost impossible to keep the students from taking partial friendships as merely friendly relations and perfect friendship as the only one that really counts as friendship. It is easy to sympathize with them, since a host of scholars seem to share the same view, with various arguments that attempt to explain how this makes sense of what Aristotle says in the text. The difficulty is that it does not take seriously the emphasis Aristotle gives to friendship as necessary for human beings, even in cases such as the virtuous or the vicious where it does not seem necessary or possible. In resorting to analogies or examples to explain what Aristotle might mean, I chanced on analyzing his argument in terms of the four causes. My initial analogy was that a house built of wood is just as much a house as one built of stone, even if it is more prone to destruction by fire or water or the ordinary wear and tear of time and use. Similarly, partial friendships share the same essence as perfect friendships, even though they too are prone to break up. By looking more carefully at Aristotle’s definition of friendship as wishing the good of the other, especially as he expands this definition when he begins to speak of proper self-love, and also at his careful discussion of good will as the condition needed for beginning a friendship, I attempt to discern how the different aspects of friendship can be understood in terms of the four causes. In brief, good will is the moving cause, the activities
associated with wishing the good of the other constitute the formal cause or essence, the character of the individual is the material cause, and the other as good is the final cause. The character of the individual determines both the capacity to know the good and the degree of maturity needed to engage in the activities that constitute friendship. A virtuous character is the right material for forming a friendship; a vicious one falls short and is in fact counterproductive; and a character between these extremes serves as the material for friendships of different kinds, as the individual is more or less successful in following the model of the virtuous. One other assumption I make is that justice is related to friendship in the same way that the practical virtues are to contemplation in NE X, 6–8. This gives a context for understanding the good of friendship in terms of shared contemplative activities that seems missing in many accounts that look on friendship as if it were solely a moral virtue.

2. Wishing the Good (boulesthai tagatha)

Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship by claiming that it is both a necessary good and a virtue in some sense. In NE VIII, 1, he mentions the rich and powerful as well as the poor and unfortunate, as a way of indicating that friendship is necessary for everyone. The more crucial test, however, concerns the wicked, for whom friendship seems impossible (NE VIII, 1, 1155b11–12), and the virtuous, for whom it seems unnecessary (NE IX, 9, 1169b4–5). Aristotle’s discussion thus rests on the tension between the necessity of friendship for everyone and its relation to virtue. Most commentators take virtue as more fundamental and thus contrast perfect friendship with the two partial varieties. Aristotle’s argument, however, is more complicated and nuanced. Discussing friendship in terms of the extremes makes his distinctions precise, but sometimes makes the general application of his principles harder to discern. Aristotle reminds us throughout, however, that he has not jettisoned the idea that friendship is necessary for all human beings, even if some will fail in their efforts.

A careful reading of NE VIII, 2 indicates key factors in the definition of friendship and distinctions that are central for keeping friendship open to everyone. He deals with friends in the dual sense of objects that can be liked and of subjects capable of liking. Examining the object first, he separates the likeable from other kinds of objects. “It seems, however, that not everything is liked but only the likeable; and this is either good, or pleasant, or useful. One would think that the useful is that by which something
good or pleasant comes to be, so that the good and the pleasant would be likeable objects as ends” (*NE* VIII, 2, 1155b18–21.) Aristotle reduces them first to the good and pleasant and in the next few lines to the good alone. What drives this reduction to the good is a shift in his focus from the object as likeable to the subject that can like them. Since he regards the object as a final cause, this is natural, for the subject always chooses the good. Thus, in dealing with the subject the issue he must face is not the good, the pleasant or the useful, but the real or the apparent good. In other words, the difference between the virtuous and the rest of us, including the wicked, is precisely the choice of the apparent over the real good, and this choice rests on our character and not on choosing the useful or the pleasant instead of the good. In Aristotle's view everyone chooses the good, and “it makes no difference,” for the real good or the apparent good “will both appear likeable” (*NE* VIII, 2, 1155b26–27). This shift from looking at the object as good, useful, or pleasant to looking at the subject as always choosing the good is an initial indication of the complexity of the definition, which concerns not one individual but two and the specific activities these individuals share as friends. Failing to take this complexity into account is one of the sources for the tendency to reduce friendship to virtuous friendship alone. This distinction between subject and object will arise again in the later analysis of good will as the moving cause, but at this point Aristotle clarifies a few more details about friendship itself.

In the next few lines, this general distinction between likeable objects and the subject’s choice of the good alone is applied to friendship. Aristotle separates the proper objects of friendship, other human beings, from other likeable objects, such as inanimate things and, at least implicitly, other animals. Inanimate things are ruled out because they cannot like us back, and we do not wish for their good, at least not for their sake but for our own, which perhaps includes animals, to judge from his next statement that “they say it is necessary to wish good things for a friend for the friend’s sake” (*NE* VIII, 2, 1155b31). Wishing good things for the other thus emerges as the essence of friendship, but only if it is reciprocated. The complexity of friendship as involving two people means that the proper likeable objects are at the same time the subjects who are choosing the other as good. Here we come to the heart of friendship, not merely liking or having good will toward someone, but that specific situation where two individuals have this good will for one another, are aware of it, and actually start becoming
friends. We can thus have good will (eunous) toward the whole range of likeable objects, but good will is related to friendship only when it can be reciprocated. Aristotle ends this section by putting these elements together and relating them once more to the three ends that make things likeable, the useful, the pleasant, and the good. Thus he concludes with the following definition of friendship: “It is necessary then to have good will and to wish good things for one another, with both [individuals] not unaware [of the good will] because of some one of the [ends] spoken about above” (NE VIII, 2, 1156a3–5).

Having defined friendship in general, Aristotle next speaks of its species. It is in this context that we need to pay careful attention to Aristotle’s causes in order to understand what he means. “These [ends] differ from one another in kind, and so also the affections and friendships. Thus, there are three kinds of friendship, corresponding in number to likeable objects. In each case they are not unaware of reciprocal affection, but having affection for one another they wish one another good things on the basis of that [likeable object] for which they have affection” (NE VIII, 3, 1156a6–10). This text is generally taken as describing the motive or intention of the subjects for initiating a friendship, indicating the particular end the individuals have in mind from the very beginning. This does not seem to describe what actually happens between people, since all of us would make a mad dash away if we suspected someone of being interested in us solely for the pleasant or useful. It also undermines Aristotle’s sense of the necessity of friendship in his initial description where the range of people who seek friendship is deliberately inclusive. I will argue that this text and subsequent sections of NE VIII 3 are examining friendship formally. That is, the three kinds of friendship are not what we intend but define formally what the possible kinds of friendship are, given that likeable objects can be useful, pleasant, or good. Support will come from an examination of three topics, Aristotle’s development of the notion of good will in NE IX 5, of proper self-love in NE IX 4, and of happiness and self-knowledge in NE IX 9.

3. Good Will (eunoia)

The context of NE IX is different from NE VIII, since Aristotle is concerned with issues other than the definition of friendship and its division into species. In NE IX, 5, good will is thus discussed as the beginning of friendship, its precondition. Aristotle compares the role of good will in friendship with that of beauty when falling in love.
It seems then that [good will] is the beginning of friendship, just as what is pleasing to the eye is the [beginning] of love, for no one falls in love who has not already been overcome by the vision [of the beloved]. Enjoying the look, however, is not yet being in love, but only when one misses the absent [beloved] and desires his presence. So also it is not possible to be friends without sharing good will, but having good will is not yet being friends, for they only wish good things for those for whom they have good will, but they do nothing to help them get it nor do they trouble themselves about them. (*NE* IX, 5, 1167a3–10)

The comparison shows that good will is a necessary condition for friendship, but it is not sufficient. Good will thus capture one aspect of wishing the good of the other. In terms of Aristotle’s principle of potency and act, it is merely a first potentiality, indicating that these two individuals can in fact become friends. As the condition of possibility and starting point of friendship, good will thus is the moving cause that changes two individuals from being potential to actual friends. “Therefore one might say in an extended sense that [good will] is inactive friendship, but that if it continues over time and reaches a habitual state it becomes friendship, not one on account of utility or pleasure, for good will does not arise for these ends” (*NE* IX, 5, 1167a10–14). In its extended or metaphorical sense, therefore, good will can be understand as friendship, but only potentially, needing time and habit to become actual friendship. Friendship itself, therefore, needs to do more than just wish good things for the other. One has to be committed to helping one’s friend acquire these goods and this commitment, Aristotle avers, is both a matter of concern and of effort. Thus, wishing the other good as it operates in friendship oscillates between second potentiality (first actuality), friendship as a characteristic or habit the two friends possess, and second actuality, when they engage in the activities of friendship.

Some take the final lines of the above text, as well as the rest of the chapter, as overwhelming evidence against my thesis. Let me begin to show how they actually support it. Aristotle examines utility and pleasure under two different formalities. In *NE* VIII, 1–3, they are considered relative to the object as an end, whereas in *NE* IX, 5 they are considered as possible causes of good will in the subject. In *NE* VIII, 1–3, utility and pleasure are characteristics of the object and, relative to the definition of friendship, formally divide it into three species, perfect friendship and its two partial kinds. In *NE* IX, 5, by contrast, the subject may take the other as good erroneously, as an apparent good, but Aristotle is clear that
the other cannot be taken as merely useful or pleasant for the purposes of developing a friendship. In this context, therefore, utility and pleasure are related not to the definition of friendship but to good will as its moving cause. Aristotle argues in this context that utility and pleasure cannot be causes of the kind of good will that is necessary to move individuals to actual friendship. With this in mind, Aristotle’s comments in *NE* VIII, 3 and 13, on friendships of utility and pleasure take on a different function. First, Aristotle describes the elderly and ambitious young people as prone to friendships of utility, while the young in general, as especially subject to passions, are prone to friendships of pleasure. He is not talking about their intentions but about aspects of their character that carry certain tendencies with them. It is, in other words, an extrinsic analysis, and not about how anyone in these groups goes about forming a friendship. Second, Aristotle observes that friendships of utility often break up in terms of conflict and complaint and those of pleasure do so more from change of circumstance or situation. These distinctions between the two types of friendship are more retrospective than intentional. They thus illuminate our actual experience. Only when our friendships are over are we in a position to evaluate what kind they may have been; while we are in them we regard them as friendships pure and simple.

His further comments on utility in *NE* IX, 5 describe an individual who has received a good deed and whose good will is seen as the just return for the deed done. In this case, good will, in wishing the benefactor well, expresses one’s hope for further favors and does not look to the good of the benefactor as such. One wants the relationship to be friendly, but there is no interest in becoming friends. This situation describes a vast number of our interactions with others, where we are quite content with creating this friendly atmosphere in which to carry out the various pursuits that the routines of life entail. Aristotle’s concluding words, moreover, give us a clear indication of what he thinks does serve as a motive for friendship. He states that “generally, good will comes to be on account of some virtue and decency, when someone appears to another good or brave or some such thing, as we said of competitors” (*NE* IX, 5, 1167a18–21). The individual whom one wants to befriend stands out in some way as good and not merely as useful or pleasant. Thus our motive for friendship is that we like someone in such a way that we see in him some good that we want to get to know in the intimate way that friendship offers. While we may be mistaken, the motive conforms to his earlier reduction of the useful and the pleasant to the good and also serves to confirm the discussion of proper self-love in *NE* IX, 4. To conclude so far, while good will
can lead to friendship, under certain conditions where the other is seen as good and where each party has good will for the other for the other's sake, there are other situations, where utility or pleasure are the moving causes, that do not lead to friendship, but other relationships beneficial to both parties, but each for one's own sake. The confusion of many commentators can be traced to not recognizing this distinction.

4. Self-Love and Another Self (*philein heauton kai allos autos*)

Aristotle claims at the beginning of *NE* IX, 4 that we are to our friends as we are to ourselves. This involves two complementary assumptions, that our self is somehow double (*NE* IX, 4, 1166a34–b2) and that our friend is another self (*NE* IX, 4, 1166a31–32; 9, 1170b6–7). A contemporary articulation of this assumption can be found in the writings of John Macmurray, where he explores how the self is constituted in relation to the other.10 While Aristotle does not use Macmurray's precise language, he is getting at the same kind of thing. In part, this expresses the fact that we cannot have direct self knowledge and therefore that we need to achieve self knowledge in relation to others, especially a friend, examined in the next section concerning *NE* IX, 9. Initially, however, these assumptions allow Aristotle to articulate more fully the definition of friendship that he gave rather succinctly at *NE* VIII, 2, 1156a3–5.

Some hold that a friend wishes and works for good things or things appearing so for his friend; or who wishes the friend to be and to be alive for the friend's benefit, as mothers feel for their children and even as in the case of friends who have quarreled. But others [hold] that a friend goes through things with and desires the same things as [his friend]; or that one shares the sorrows and joys of his friend, and this also happens especially among mothers. Thus they define friendship by one or another of these [characteristics]. A mature individual, moreover, has each of these [characteristics] toward himself (but for the rest, insofar as they undertake to be [mature], since virtue or the excellent man seems to be the measure in every case, as has been said). (*NE* IX, 4, 1166a2–13)11

Wishing good things for one's friend is fundamental to the definition that Aristotle proposed in *NE* VIII, 2, 1156a3–5, adding here a list that
articulates what some of those goods are and how friends express the wish for them both in their concern for one another and in the effort they exert in acquiring these goods for one another, the two elements of friendship noted at *NE* IX, 5, 1167a9–10. This concern is expressed strikingly in the example of the concern of mothers for the welfare of their children and in their ability to identify with their children’s sorrows and joys.

The introduction of character in the next passage allows for the examination of the material cause of friendship, since the character of an individual signals the kind of friendship one is capable of establishing, whether with oneself or another. There are two aspects that emerge in this context, the role of the moral virtues in developing friendship and then the role of friendship itself in contributing to the self knowledge and happiness of the friends. Both aspects prefigure and complement the discussion of happiness in *NE* X, where moral virtue also functions as a necessary precondition for happiness, which is constituted by contemplation. Aristotle begins by describing the self-love of someone of good character.

He also wishes and works for real and apparent goods (for it belongs to the good man to cultivate the good) and he does this for his own sake (for it is for the benefit of the thinking part, which is what each one seems to be). He also wishes for himself to live and to stay alive, especially for the part by which he is wise. For to be is good for the virtuous, since everyone wishes good things for himself and no one would choose to have everything but become someone else. (*NE* IX, 4, 1166a14–21)

It is worth noting that Aristotle mentions both real and apparent goods in the case of the virtuous, not claiming for them a knowledge that goes beyond the limits of human nature. He thus leaves open the possibility that someone of good character may have not only friendships based on virtue, but also those based on pleasure and utility. In addition, these efforts of the virtuous have their finality in the thinking part, the center of the self and the focus for the integration of all one’s activities.\(^{12}\) While one would not choose to become someone else, Aristotle notes at the end of this section that the virtuous man has these characteristics not only toward himself but towards his friend as well, “for a friend is another self.” (*NE* IX, 4, 1166a31–32)

The dual or multiple nature of human beings is at the root both of friendship to one’s self as well as of the importance of the friend as another self, but Aristotle first turns his attention to the many and to the vicious before exploring some of the implications of this insight.
It seems the things mentioned belong to the many, even to those who are immature. Now then, do they share in these things in this way, insofar as they accept themselves and undertake to be mature? [Yes], since not one of those utterly immature and engaged in evil possesses these things, nor even appears to. For they don’t even have [their act together]: they are at odds with themselves, desiring some things but wishing for others, just like the morally weak, even choosing pleasant but harmful things instead of what actually seems to them to be good. (NE IX, 4, 1166b2–10)³³

The differences among the good, the many and the vicious are not described in terms of their intentions, but rather of how their character facilitates or hinders their choices and thus the possibility of proper self-love as well as friendship with others. The many are not excluded from self love and friendship, but share in these characteristics insofar as they take the virtuous and mature as their models. Those who are bent on evil, however, are described in terms reminiscent of Socrates’ description of the tyrant in Republic IX. They still want friends but all their efforts are counterproductive, since they are basically at war with themselves and Aristotle concludes that they are “not likeable at all” (to mēden echēin phileton: NE XI, 4, 1166b26).

5. Virtue and Activity

While NE IX, 8 gives a full defense of self-love, establishing its foundation in the moral virtues and the dominant part of the soul, NE IX, 9 shifts to the role of friendship in happiness as an activity and the particular benefits of friendship for self knowledge, grounding the earlier comments on the multiple self and the friend as another self. The context of happiness alerts us that friendship cannot be reduced to the moral virtues, which have been more central in his analysis of the kind of character needed for friendship to develop. Aristotle is anticipating NE X 7,1178a2, where happiness is the activity of contemplation that integrates all the activities in the life of the sage. Since this aspect of friendship goes beyond the moral virtues, Aristotle can also explain why friends have no need of justice. Justice is concerned with those relations that precede friendship, as pointed out in NE IX, 5, as well as those conflicts that arise in friendships that turn out to be based on utility, discussed in NE VIII, 9. Nonetheless, the particular role of friendship in happiness, like contemplation and the virtue of wisdom in NE X,
7–8, presuming the moral virtues that establish the kind of character that is capable of developing friendship as well as contemplation.

Two small sections of this chapter will suffice for examining self-knowledge and the life friends share together. The first passage occurs when Aristotle reflects that happiness is an activity and not some kind of thing that one can possess. The assumption, mentioned earlier, that human beings are double or complex is very much in play, since Aristotle holds that knowledge of someone else is more direct and immediate than self-knowledge.

But if happiness is in living and being active, and the activity of the good man is excellent and pleasant in itself, as we said at the beginning, and what is one's own is also among these pleasures, [and given that] we are able to contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and the actions of those who are excellent friends are pleasant for good men (for both are pleasant by nature), then one supremely happy will need friends of this sort, since he chooses to contemplate actions both noble and proper to him, and such actions are those of a good man who is a friend. (NE IX, 9, 1169b30–1170a4)¹⁴

There is as sense in which we come to know ourselves and see the depths of our own nature in that peculiar mirroring that the other provides for us, especially in friendship. In the present context, moreover, Aristotle reminds us that the sage’s happiness includes and makes possible the best kind of friendship, where the contemplation of each other’s activities manifests and enhances the activity of happiness in each friend.¹⁵

The second passage meditates on life itself as pleasant and desirable. Aristotle points out the intricate relation between awareness or, as we would say, self-consciousness and the pleasure one takes in being alive. In this case, too, the friend is essential, precisely as another self who facilitates this awareness and with whom we share our lives and our thoughts.

As the virtuous man has [the same feeling] toward himself and toward his friend (for the friend is another self), then just as one’s own being is desirable for each one, so also is that of his friend, or nearly so. But one’s being was [shown to be] desirable through his perception of being good, and such perception is pleasant in itself, so it is necessary to be conscious also of the friend that he is, and this can come about in living together and sharing in discourse and thoughts. (NE IX, 9, 1170b5–12)
Self awareness is the way in which we exist and take pleasure in our existence. Such existence, however, is not restricted or reduced to our perceptions and thoughts as if they are private; as human, our perceptions and thoughts are intrinsically the substance of what we share with one another, especially with our friends. Aristotle is claiming in both these passages that the knowledge and awareness excellent friends make possible is not an accidental extra but a deeply constitutive part of the self knowledge and self awareness of each; it thus helps to place the description of contemplation in *NE X*, 7–9 in context. While contemplation is the kind of thing that is most self-sufficient in its formal structure, the role of others in contemplation and happiness is clearly essential in terms of the social character of human nature and the indirect character of human self knowledge. Finally, his earlier comments on the many, I would also venture to argue, do not exclude this kind of self knowledge and awareness, although it may be less complete and less frequent, as subject more to the vicissitudes of human imperfection.

6. Conclusion

I have used two strategies in this account of friendship in Aristotle, attention to how the various factors in his analysis function in terms of his theory of causes and care in translating certain terms more neutrally. The role of the causes bears the weight of the argument, while the translation gives supporting corroboration. Central is Aristotle’s definition of friendship in terms of wishing the good of the other, with the precise conditions under which this constitutes friendship. In this way friendship is defined as a virtue, a habitual state which has certain activities associated with it, in the concerns and efforts exerted for the friend. Among these concerns Aristotle includes wishing and working for the friend to be and be alive, undergoing and desiring the same things, sharing sorrows and joys. The range of people capable of these attitudes and actions is interestingly extensive, starting with mothers (mentioned twice within a few lines), specified most fully in terms of the mature (who have these toward themselves as well as others), and finally including the rest of us (who take the mature as our model).

The assumption behind this definition is that we all choose the good, but the problem is that the good can be real or apparent. Real goods are known and sought most especially by those who are good, with both moral and intellectual virtues, from Aristotle’s point of view, but all of us, including the virtuous, also wish and work for apparent goods of all kinds. In
terms of friendship, this distinction between real and apparent goods is the key for differentiating the kinds of friendship and the kinds of character capable of having them. Friendship thus has three kinds, complete or virtuous, with two partial kinds, pleasant or useful. As friendships, the partial kinds, moreover, include wishing all these goods and exerting effort and concern in helping a friend achieve them, but are qualified since the friend (or both friends) may not have the character and self-knowledge necessary to sustain the friendship when difficulties or quarrels arise and even when there are changes in the friends or their circumstances. There are similarly three kinds of character, the virtuous, the many and the vicious. The differences here relate to the different degrees in which people possess virtues, and a more restrained translation of Aristotle’s terms allows for a less rigid identification of friendship with the virtuous alone. Aristotle is actually careful to indicate that the many, especially as they have a more adequate self appraisal and seek to follow the example of the virtuous, are capable of friendships of various kinds, while only the vicious are excluded from achieving friendship, despite their efforts.

When Aristotle examines good will as the origin of friendship, he emphasizes that one sees the good in the other, under some aspect, and states explicitly that good will leading to friendship cannot arise from utility or pleasure. He is distinguishing here the difference between the point of view of the subject, who always chooses what appears good, and the objective nature of things, where the likeable may only be pleasant or useful, an apparent good, or where the subject has limitations that prevent knowing whether a good is real or apparent. Thus, one always, as it were, intends the good in becoming a friend, but one cannot always deliver on that intention. This is much more cogent than an interpretation that eviscerates the partial kinds of friendship by making pleasure or utility the intention for entering the friendship. Aristotle makes clear that such intentions cannot and do not lead to friendship at all, but to other relationships that may be called friendly but are different from friendship since they do not wish the good of the other precisely for the other’s sake. His earlier comments on wishing the good of the other, when more discretely translated, indicate that, as the essence of friendship, this is not restricted to the virtuous, even if they are the ones most capable of friendship, but includes the many as well, especially insofar as they are morally strong and seek to be virtuous. The wicked, while incapable of friendship, still testify to its necessity for all human beings. They continue to seek friendship, even if their efforts can only be counterproductive.

Friendship has also its own end or good, which Aristotle is able to articulate most clearly in the case of the virtuous. The comments on
self-knowledge and happiness make abundantly clear that friendship goes beyond justice in the same way that the life of contemplation goes beyond the life of the moral virtues, by integrating them into a more complete and active human life. The primary good one has toward oneself or one’s friend is, as he says, toward one’s thinking part, that which each of us is. But this part functions within a living human being, who does not have direct self knowledge and for whom the friend is another self, whose actions both noble and proper can be seen or contemplated and with whom one can live and share one’s conversation and thoughts. These comments on friendship, further, give the context in which the analysis of happiness and contemplation of the sage in *NE* X, 7–8 have their first articulation and proper context, showing a much richer understanding of the human condition as rooted in our relation to one another.

Notes

1. Stern-Gillet 2013 (in this anthology), focuses on certain character types, the great-souled and the small-souled, and their relation to friendship. This helps expand a restrictive reading of *NE* VIII–IX, where the virtuous and the wicked become the only alternatives.

2. Gurtler 2003, 801–834, argues that the practical virtues and contemplation are not so much in competition as exclusive choices, but rather that practical virtues have their end in contemplation as that end that is complete and final. Similarly, justice only sets up the conditions in which friendship can develop and flourish.

3. Cooper 1980, discusses the “forms of friendship” in the first part of his essay (301–17). He describes moral character, pleasure and advantage as causes of friendship and what binds or cements the friends together. “Cause” seems taken in the modern sense of prior condition, here the intention or motive for entering and maintaining a friendship. This has two deficiencies: it does not exploit Aristotle’s diverse senses of cause, and as a result takes pleasure, advantage, or virtue as the motive or intention of the one befriending rather than as descriptions of the friendship. Aristotle examines the intention, however, in terms of good will as the origin and moving cause. Using Aristotle’s more complex notion of cause brings consistency to his presentation, is based on his own philosophy, and does not relegate the partial friendships to merely friendly relations.

4. All translations are my own, using the Greek text of Bywater, 1920.

5. Translating *tauta* as motives, causes, or reasons seems to be the source for seeing the virtuous, pleasant, or useful as moving causes, the reason why one as subject starts a friendship, rather than as ends related to the friend as likeable object, whether a real or apparent good.

6. Cooper 1980, 310–11, discusses the three ends in analyzing *dia*, which I have translated as “on the basis of,” specifying the end as the likeable object. For
the partial friendships, *dia* has been interpreted prospectively, so that one wishes good to the friend in order to secure one's own pleasure or advantage. For perfect friendship, however, Cooper argues that *dia* more likely means in recognition of the friend's good character. In this sense it is a consequence of the friend's character rather than some purpose in the one befriending him. He argues that all three cases should be the same, so that *eunoia* applies to all three types of friendship. His further discussion turns on the distinction between the *haplōs* character of perfect friendship and the *kata symbebēkos* of partial friendships. Here, however, by making the three ends the motive or intention of the one befriending, Cooper continues to take the partial friendships as not friendships at all (using the example of the businessman with certain of his clients). His distinction about *dia* confirms the presence of *eunoia* in all three types, but I make the further distinction that Aristotle is talking here about the definition of friendship formally considered, with the character of the friends as the material cause that qualifies the friendship. Thus partial friendships are fragile not because the two friends intend to use or find pleasure in one another, but because their character limitations or immaturity interfere with their intention to be friends.

7. Cooper 1980, 310, says that *NE IX 5* seems to deny “that *eunoia* exists in pleasure- and advantage-friendships at all,” and is followed by Susanne Foster, 2003, 82. This reading misses the context of this passage and the nature of good will in the development of any kind of friendship. Despite Cooper’s nuanced counter-argument (see n. 9), both he and Foster seem in fact to understand partial friendships as only friendly relations, as in the case of a businessman. Aristotle here, however, distinguishes the three types of friendship from such friendly relations in that friends wish good for the sake of the friend, whereas these friendly relations are for one’s own sake. See n. 13 for Smith Pangle’s, 2003, rejoinder to Foster’s view.

8. Smith Pangle 2003, 92, discusses the three types of friendship based on virtue, utility and pleasure, but adds that good will does not arise from utility and pleasure. She notes that the essence of friendship is the shared activities, which applies to all three types. The only things missing in her account is the different contexts of VIII 1–3 and IX 5, and that good will is not only the root of friendship but is so precisely as the moving cause.

9. At this point, my translation does not inflate the case; where I have “some virtue and decency,” for example, Ostwald 1962, 256, translates it as “some sort of excellence and moral goodness.” The context of competitors for whom a spectator might spontaneously develop good will indicates not the perfect case of the virtuous, but the common experience of finding something good in another, when someone appears good, as Aristotle says here with precision.

10. Macmurray 1961 are the two volumes of his Gifford Lectures on *The Form of the Personal*. Macmurray argues that the person, as opposed to the subject, is constituted in relation to the other. Thus the person is never merely self-constituted, but the other is necessarily involved. Attention to his argument gives a context in which Aristotle’s position need not be reduced to the abstract “subject” of modern
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thought. Cooper 1980, 317–34, examines the relation of friendship to the good. For Cooper, it is necessary to establish why the virtuous individual needs or wants friends in the first place. This continues his restriction of friendship only to the virtuous, but includes the assumption that such an individual is self-constituted, so Aristotle’s position that friends are indeed necessary for virtuous individuals needs to be supported by several convoluted arguments, that are neither convincing nor illuminative of Aristotle’s different assumption about human nature.

11. Here again my translation attempts to be more neutral, so that tō epieikei is rendered as mature (earlier at 1167a18–21, as decent) rather than good or virtuous. Moreover, I have rendered hupolambanousin as “undertake” rather than regard, think, or suppose, highlighting Aristotle’s emphasis on friendship as an activity. Aristotle, in addition, does not seem to be taking the many as self deluded, but as having a self appraisal that leads them to follow the example of the mature; see 1166b2–10 below.

12. Hoper hekastos einai dokei seems to prefigure NE X, 7, 1178a2, einai hekastos touto. See Gurtler, 2003, 826–830, which examines the thinking part in terms of contemplation and its integrative function in NE X 7–8 and also, 2008, which examines Aristotle’s teleology based on the need of the body, the need of the soul, and their integration for us in the thinking part. See also Stern-Gillet, 2013, 8, who also sees the centrality of the thinking part for the virtue of the megalopsychos. This integrative role of the thinking part reveals how Aristotle actually connects the different parts of his ethical synthesis.

13. The many as immature (phauloi) are clearly distinct from those utterly immature (komide phaulon), for the many have some self-knowledge and desire to follow the good. I deliberately translate the term in a more neutral fashion.

14. Macmurray 1962, vol. 1, emphasizes the self as doer, with thinking as secondary. Cooper, 1980, 323–24, translates theōrein as “study,” to emphasize its active character rather than a mere sense of awareness. I prefer “contemplation” because it emphasizes the activity of seeing the other as whole or complete. This is not mere awareness, but the product of sharing a life together and is related to the sense of contemplation in NE X 7–8, which is active not in the sense of studying someone or something, but in regarding it as a whole.

15. Stern-Gillet 2013, 9–14, places friendship in the context of Aristotle’s understanding of human nature as social and that one’s self sufficiency has its locus in community with others, to whom and with whom one can exercise those activities that are peculiarly human. Her paper also brings out the relationship of theses virtues to self-knowledge, central to Aristotle’s concern in the present context.

Bibliography


