Barricades Are Back

An event can be turned around, repressed, co-opted, betrayed, but there still is something there that cannot be outdated. Only renegades would say: it’s outdated. But even if the event is ancient, it can never be outdated: it is an opening to the possible. It goes as much inside individuals as in the depths of society.

—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “May 68 did not take place”

June 19th 2001. We had finally reached Genoa. After getting the few things we brought with us to the Carlini Stadium, which had transformed into a busy and crowded sleeping and convergence space, we enter a joyful parade for open borders and freedom of movement. There is music and chants everywhere, masses of bodies, and riot police in full gear who remain at a certain distance. I briefly ponder whether it will be the same the day after. June 20th is the day scheduled for direct actions against the G8. Protest groups had announced a symbolic attack against the red zone that enclosed the G8 summit meeting. The next morning my whole body feels excited. Everywhere around me people prepare themselves for one of the marches by padding up their bodies with foam, old tires, and other creative materials. It takes a while before the march can start. We are many thousands and the hot sun heats up bodies under the protective gear. But even before reaching the yellow zone, the march stops. I hear something about police from the loudspeaker wagon; in the next moment tear gas enters my lungs: our march is attacked by police. After retreating as a first reaction, people regroup in order to try to continue the march. But the attack becomes harder. In the frontlines people are beaten up. More and more tear gas. People hurl the tear gas canisters back and start to throw stones at the police. I see crying faces and bleeding bodies around me. Many of us rush into the various side streets to our left (the right side is enclosed by a railway track). Police vans
continue chasing us. In one of the parallel streets we are entrapped: police before and behind us. I saw us beaten up and arrested already. Then we find a door to a bar. We knock and the door opens. Safe! Everyone in the bar is talking loudly. Just after I sat down, someone from the back calls for a camera. I only possess a very bad and old one, but rush to the window. I start to take photos without fully realizing what I’m photographing. At the square below us there is a police circle around an armored vehicle. After it moved, I see the body of a protester lying on the street. The police are not allowing anyone to come close to that protester. One of the police officers notices that pictures are being taken from our window. He rushes in our direction and threatens with his gun. I quickly retreat from the window. Half an hour later, we decide to sneak another look at what is going on close to the red zone. There are no police anymore in front of the café. But the smell of tear gas still fills the air. A few corners further we meet an Italian guy who looks rather appalled. When he comes closer, we realize that his body is shaking. We ask him what has happened. Using a mix of Spanish and Italian, we learn that his friend has just been shot by the police. I quiver. What I had taken pictures of was not an injured protestor. It was his murdered friend . . .

Choosing Sides

This book is not about Genoa. Nevertheless it takes an object as starting point that was amply present during that G8 protest: the barricade. Given its confrontational character, the persistence of the barricade in the history of contentious politics is indeed stunning. First noted by social historians in Paris in 1588, the use of the barricade as an element of contentious politics in Europe coincides with peaks of antisystemic activity: 1789, 1848, 1871, and 1968 mark moments in which people dug up the streets and erected massive constructions in order to assert their sovereignty (Bos 2005; Traugott 1995). The blockades and confrontations of global summit meetings after the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle demonstrate the timeless and global character of the barricade as an instrument for insurrection and testify to the resurgence of heightened antisystemic activity. It seems as though the barricade contains the unfulfilled promises of the past that are meant to be redeemed in the present struggles. Erecting barricades in their struggle against neoliberal governance institutions at the beginning of the new millennium, summit protesters plainly asked: which side are you on?

The most obvious trait of a barricade reveals at once its exceptional potential as political instrument: a barricade demarcates two sides. Barri-
Barricades separate social forces and help to convert politics into an antagonistic process, where people have to choose sides. To be sure, the barricades of Genoa involved more than just two actors. Next to the police and protesters, there were journalists, bystanders, NGO officials, members of parliament, researchers, and perhaps agents provocateurs. However, a barricade forces these various actors to choose sides. There is no unengaged viewpoint or “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971), no arbiter, and no consensus.

What I realized in Genoa is that I am not “theorizing from the margins,” as postmodern scholars like to put it. Theorizing from the margins means to escape from the antagonism and to extrapolate from a minoritarian position (Deleuze & Guattari 2004). Postmodern theories challenge dualist forms of thought as being predicated on the exclusion of difference and argue for the multiplicity of the situated experience of exclusion. In my view, however, thinking from antagonism does not mean to suppress differences, but to acknowledge the social world as conflictual. The state form of social organization transposes the conflictual character of the social world into contradictions that are resolved through mediation (Mandarini 2005). An antagonistic relationship is predicated on two irreconcilable positions concerning the foundation of the present social order, in this case between summit protesters and global hegemonic forces. Political resolution through mediation reveals the contradictory character of capitalism. Antagonism is not the result of dialectical thinking, but the result of resistance against capitalism suppressing differences (Holloway et al. 2009; Holloway 2002: 33). Capitalism is an antagonistic social relationship. Taking this antagonism into account, negative dialectics, as “ontology of the wrong state of things” (Adorno 1990: 11), is a movement of negation rather than of synthesis. The choice for one side implies the negation of the other side. Genoa was such a situation. Summit protests create a space within and against global hegemony. Transgressive summit protests create a moment for choosing sides and for understanding ourselves as antagonistic subjects. Being aware of this contradiction obstructs the possibility of escaping into the safeguard of academic objectification.

Main Argument

This book sets out to analyze how authorities attempt to render ineffective this renewed emergence of barricades and antisystemic activity. I look at the tactical innovations of protesters and tactical adaptation of authorities’ control repertoire as an interactive process responding to the tactical innovations of protesters. How do protesters try to disrupt the smooth flows of summit meetings? And how do authorities, on the other hand, try to
control these attempts? My argument is that global antisystemic dissent is managed by voiding politics from dissent and submitting it to a supposedly technical reason of political administration. Social control tries to maintain order by reducing the probability of an undesired event producing disorder. Instead of avoiding protest, the emerging practice of social control attempts to *eliminate visible dissent* as part of democratic politics. This is to say, it is not protest that is repressed, but it is dissent that is made invisible by channeling and managing protest.

Authorities constantly attempt to annihilate the two-sidedness of the barricade and therefore the antagonistic character of the political. Choosing sides is thus deemed unnecessary. And the politics of social conflict are reduced to the art of administration. Rather than manifesting a political conflict, clearing away a barricade can be presented as an essentially apolitical administrative act that reinstalls the public order by guaranteeing the normalized flows of the present order. Although being embedded in the struggle for hegemony of a political project, social control in European liberal democracies presents itself as apolitical, or to borrow a term of Žižek (2002: 11), as *politics without politics*.

This tendency of liberal representative democracies points to a more general and intrinsic limitation of Western democratic theory and practice. Whereas dissent is formally guaranteed in liberal-democratic constitutions, institutionalized forces constantly aim at the elimination of dissent as constituent practice. Albeit recognizing conflicting interests, liberalism is predicated on the idea and practice of reconciling them into a sociopolitical consensus. Ultimately, this means to eliminate visible dissent. Antagonism (in the sense of irreconcilable interests) is antithetical to the idea of political liberalism. The analysis presented in this book, then, presses for an *unthinking* of the liberal premises in political theories from the standpoint of disruption, conflict, dissent, and antagonism, and for a conceptualization of democracy outside of institutions. Therefore, I start with the barricade as challenging the idea of representation.

The barricade negates the elimination of dissent and antagonism. It reintroduces dissent through creating disruption in the streets. As such, barricades point to the potential of transgressive collective action in constituting a moment for political decision. Transgressive protest is a direct attack on political liberalism and its predication on representative forms of politics. Antisystemic dissent is the constitutive outside of political liberalism. Through asserting the ownership of conflict in an autonomous action, barricades transcend mediated forms of political representation. They are neither
a prolongation of institutional politics nor its premature articulation, but constitute a genuine form of political action by doing dissent in the streets. Negating the negation of dissent, summit protesters on barricades assert that the political is political, and that the current world order is contested.

Tactical Interaction

This book starts from an analysis of the tactical interactions between authorities and protesters during summit protests in Europe. I analyze the tactical adaptations of authorities in response to protesters’ tactical innovations. Tactical innovation and adaptation can be studied by looking at tactical repertoires. Tactical repertoires are sites of contestation (Taylor & van Dyke 2004: 268) in which bodies, space, communication, and the law are used by protesters and authorities to disrupt and control. The tactical interaction throughout summit protests in Europe is analyzed here as a process of tactical innovation and tactical adaptation (McAdam 1983).

Reconstructing the interactions during six summit protests of the past decade, I trace the process of tactical interaction during summit protests in Europe: the 2000 protests against the meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in Prague; the 2000 summit of the EU in Gothenburg; and the G8 summit protests in Genoa in 2001, in Evian in 2003, and in Gleneagles in 2005. I conducted observant participation in four of these events: Prague, Genoa, in Gleneagles in 2005, and in Heiligendamm in 2007. Gothenburg is included because it was the first summit where police shot at protesters with live ammunition. Moreover, the tactical adaptation of authorities from Prague to Genoa can be grasped better by taking into account the shifts that already took place in the context of Gothenburg. Evian is included because it was the first summit in Europe after the Genoa protests taking place in a remote venue outside of a major city. Moreover, the choice for these summits was guided by the availability of reports and evaluations in languages I can understand (German, Dutch, English, Spanish, French, and to some degree, Italian). Taken together, the six summit protests included in my research provide a sufficient base for tracing the processes of tactical interaction throughout the first decade of 2000.

The analysis of the interaction between summit protesters and authorities throughout six summit protests is organized around four contested sites of struggle: bodies, space, communication, and law. We can see protest events as an interactive process of bodies moving through space and communicating...
about *legality*. Each site of struggle provides a different entry point to understand the influence of protester and police tactics on each other. At the same time, together the four sites of struggle allow a comprehensive analysis of how the contestation of global hegemonic forces during summit protests has triggered a preemptive shift in social control through increased deployment of biopolitical forms of power.

*Summit Protests and Their Actors*

Taking summit protests as a starting point for a social analysis of the power relations between dissent and hegemonic forces, I want to understand summit protests as events that constitute possibilities. As Deleuze and Guattari (2006: 233) convincingly propose, an event can never be outdated. It is an opening to the possible. It goes as much inside individuals as in the depths of society. Summit protests are such a moment, such openings to the possible, to alternatives with promise. Zollberg (1972) calls this “moments of madness,” where new forms of contention become explosively visible. Drawing on Marcuse’s work, Katsiaficas (1987: 6–7) speaks about the “eros effect” to capture the stunning simultaneity and similarity of struggles erupting around 1968 throughout the world. Summit protests initiated a similar “eros effect” in the global circulation of struggles. As the struggles of the 1960s in the Western world followed the intense anti-colonial struggles in many parts of the Southern world, summit protests in Europe followed decades of intense opposition to neoliberal restructuring in the South (Starr 2005; Walton & Seddon 1994). I tried to extend the potential for future events by analyzing how these events are put together socially. In this book, I do not want to betray this eventfulness.

Summit protests constitute a space where a broad diversity of struggles come together and are articulated into an antagonism with hegemonic global forces. Summit protests can be seen as a process to formulate a new theory of power. As opposed to Mao Zedong’s proposal of “bombarding the headquarters,” protesters map the nodes of a global network of hegemonic forces by confronting the spatial manifestation of global governance. Summit protests constitute events with global aspirations, precisely because protesters confront global hegemonic forces in their spaces, challenging their production of “benevolent” global governance.

The hegemonic forces of neoliberal globalization are diverse and operate at various levels of governance. Taking a Gramscian approach, this book sees hegemony as produced by a network of nationally based as well as inter- and transnational, public and private actors, and as inherently comprising

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both material and ideational (cultural) aspects of power (Cox & Sinclair 1996: 151). Although the US has a significant role in the production of neoliberal hegemony worldwide, it is hardly the only state pushing neoliberal ideologies and practices. Besides state institutions, many other types of forces have influence on the neoliberal project and agenda, such as universities (the “Chicago boys”), think tanks, corporations, and intergovernmental agencies (see Klein 2007). However, key for international governance are, among others, the WTO, WB, IMF, and G8 and most of their powerful member states. Therefore, summit meetings of these major institutions are crucial places for staging dissent with the neoliberal order. Zajko and Béland (2008: 724) point out that:

> [t]he practice of summit diplomacy differs significantly from more traditional forms of international meetings, which rely on networks of diplomatic staff who typically operate outside public view. Summit diplomacy, on the other hand, involves multilateral meetings between economic and political leaders in a way that is highly visible and symbolic.

The contestation of global hegemonic forces materializes as street conflicts between police and transgressive protesters. Avoiding the trap of sociological categorization proceeding through identification, I take transgressive summit protesters as being constituted through the act of resistance. As Negri points out, the moment of struggle is also the moment of the production of subjectivity: “A constituent power produces subjects, but these subjects must get together. The production of subjectivity is not an act of innovation, or a flash of genius, it is an accumulation, a sedimentation that is, however, always in movement; it is the construction of the common by constituting collectivities” (in Negri et al. 2008)

My approach is based on a material ontology that conceptualizes the social world as a product of doing (Smith 2005: 25). Instead of being a category of identitarian thinking, my use of the term “transgressive summit protesters” includes all actors engaging in transgressive summit protest (whatever ideological or organizational background they may have). Summit protesters are not conceptualized as sociological category (with all the impertinent questions about age, ethnicity, class, or ideological orientation implied in the construction of such a “population”), but as the antagonistic subject constituted through the act of confronting global hegemonic forces. The antagonistic subject is formed by power and is therefore the outcome of a constantly shifting strategic field.
Police, on the other hand, constitute themselves another form of strategic subjectivity in the attempt of fabricating order (Neocleous 2000). A tricky aspect of the constitution of global hegemonic forces thereby reveals itself. Police are not directly working for global institutions, but are the state’s personified monopoly on violence. Global hegemony unfolds through the sovereign power of the nation-state. Albeit being events with global aspirations, summit meetings are largely organized by state authorities, and are therefore controlled by state police forces. This is not to say that there are no intergovernmental agencies involved in controlling summit protests, especially on the level of the European Union (see Starr et al. 2011). Neither do I want to repeat the analytical mistake of earlier social movement scholars to reify the state as a homogeneous and static entity with a single interest (see Jasper 2012). Just as not all summit protesters prefer disruptive tactics, not all state officials or police want to repress protesters (and even if they do, not necessarily in the same way). According to Marston (2003: 230–231) the state should not be conceptualized “as an abstraction that exists outside of human agency, but as a manifestation and response to the practices of human agents.” Instead of highlighting opinions and intentions, my analysis foregrounds the actual doing of control. As such, the police doing control contradict transgressive summit protesters in doing dissent (see chapter 3).

**Biopolitical Control**

Unlike the more conventional terms “repression” and “policing,” social control is better suited for grasping the more subtle and pervasive forms of police action (see Starr et al. 2011). Both repression and protest policing often invoke overt and brutal police behavior. My study shows that subtle operations are at least as important and can be even more devastating for protesters’ tactics. Moreover, whereas the term “policing” is often normatively loaded in referring to “more or less democratic” forms of policing, repression, in its most accepted definition as “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective action” (Tilly 1978: 100), could equally be applied to the disruptive tactics of protesters. However, as we will see, there is a difference in the way authorities and protesters create obstacles for each other. The difference in the way authorities operate is better grasped by the term “social control.”

An important concept to grasp the subtle and pervasive character of social control is biopolitics. In “Postscript on the Societies of Control” (1992), Deleuze argues that biopolitical forms of power, instead of repressing
a population, increasingly aim at the control of a “milieu.” Elaborating on Foucault’s proposal of disciplinary societies shifting to societies of control, this theoretical lens provides an understanding of how control centers on the regulation of flows as opposed to disciplining the formation of subjectivity. Foucault captures this shift through the notion of “governmentality” (1991). Governmentality denotes the intersection between the technologies of power and those of the self. By this, he means that authorities do not only legislate and rule; they are equally involved in shaping and guiding the conduct of people. Indeed, government constitutes people in such a way that they become governable. Biopolitical control thus focuses on the creation of a population. Contrary to the techniques of sovereign power centering on territory and law, or the techniques of disciplinary power centering on the subject, those of biopolitical power concern the population as collective. Whereas disciplinary power operates through the production of subjectivity, biopolitical control operates through the production of a certain form of life, in the case of summit protests: predictable flows of protesters that do not disrupt the flows necessary for the summit meeting to continue. Securing the daily flows of life, biopolitical control avoids the occurrence of an undesired event (Foucault & Senellart 2007: 66). In line with Foucault, we can call this the emergence of a security paradigm. Ironically, the motto of the 2009 G8 in Italy was “To produce security.” This book investigates how this security paradigm translates into the material organization of the social control of dissent.

Moving the focus from the individual body to the “collective” body of populations, biopolitical forms of power regulate life itself. Foucault (2004: 249) shows how power, having the regulation of life at the center of its biopolitical interventions, has to be reconceptualized as not only a capacity for repressive intervention but as a productive force. Instead of focusing on the internalization of social norms and values (as disciplinary power does), biopolitical power interventions focus on the normalization of a certain way of life. However, this emergence of biopolitical forms of power intersects with disciplinary forms of power. The coexistence of disciplinarity and biopolitics constitutes what Foucault has coined a “normalizing society” (Foucault 2004: 253).

In their adaptation of Foucault’s concept of biopolitical power for their analysis of Empire, Hardt and Negri (2000: 23) suggest that the normalizing apparatus of disciplinarity is intensified and generalized in societies of control. Disciplinarity thereby extends well beyond social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks of power in everyday life. Taking the normalizing apparatus of biopolitical power as a starting point means
moving away from a purely repressive account of how power works to an analysis that situates control within a broader attempt to produce society and subjectivity. This is to say, protesters have to be produced in such a way that they become a “population” that has internalized its own normalization.

Mapping Ruling Regimes

The aim is not to understand reality, but to understand (and by understanding to intensify) its contradictions as part of the struggle to change the world.


In the early morning of July 31, 2007, a dozen heavily armed policemen of an antiterrorist unit in Germany storm the flat of the sociologist Andrej Holm, where he lives with his partner and two children. They pull him out of bed, arrest him, put handcuffs on, and cover his head, while starting to search the whole house. A lot of his personal belongings are confiscated: laptop, computer, digital camera, books, magazines, archive materials, among others. Holm is brought by helicopter to the General State Prosecution in Karlsruhe and then—“preventively”—put in jail. There he spends more than three weeks imprisoned in isolation, until he is released on bail to await the trial against him.

Looking at the arguments for these unusual measures given by the state prosecutors, we appreciate how the story sounds even more like science fiction. Andrej Holm is suspected to be part of the so-called *Militante Gruppe* (militant group), that appeared to be behind several actions of property destruction targeting military logistics and politicians or institutions involved in the G8 preparations. This suspicion is grounded on the following evidence: (1) Holm knows two other persons who are also suspected to be part of the militant group; (2) Holm has met once with one of these two persons without taking his cell phone with him, which indicates, according to the prosecution, that it was a conspiracy meeting; (3) a general text analysis proved that Holm is using certain words in his academic publications that appear as well in the letters of the militant group; words such as “gentrification” and “imperialism”; and because (4) Holm holds a doctoral degree and works at the university, he therefore is supposed to have both
the intellectual capacities and the access to information allegedly necessary to write the letters of the militant group.5

Confrontation with ruling regimes provides a possibility to understand how they work. Holm’s encounter with high-ranking state authorities provides a reliable starting point for social analysis. It raises a set of questions: which state institutions have been involved in gathering information? What kind of information was gathered about Holm and others? How did state authorities gather the information? And how did they arrive at the alleged evidence? Based on constant observation of all aspects of his life, the dossier of Holm consists of tens of thousands of pages gathered by the Federal Criminal Police Office and the German Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution). Looking at these documents, activists could gather interesting insights about the way state authorities work. The intelligence services started observing Holm not because of supposed membership in the militant group, but because he was active in the mobilizations against the G8. Through observing him (and others) the authorities have a more or less full account of many activists that have been involved in the G8 mobilizations. They were able to map their mutual interrelations, the places where they live, their email addresses, and telephone numbers. Another thing that became clear is how the intelligence services actually operate when observing suspicious persons. One could trace which methods they use: cameras, tapping of landline and cell phones, Internet surveillance, car detectors, among others. It also became clear that, despite this huge amount of data, all the evidence related to criminal or terrorist acts is based on highly speculative chains of interrelating data of persons and events. Said in different words: through observing Holm (and other persons), the intelligence services got a rather detailed picture of the anti-G8 mobilization, while they found nearly no evidence about the Militante Gruppe. One may wonder whether this was their intention at all.6

Confrontation as Pedagogy of the Oppressed

The task of mapping “social movements” is a quarrelsome endeavor. A book based on rich empirical material and insider accounts about social movements can probably best be written by the intelligence services. They are not only gathering information in all ways possible on this movement, they also exchange this information increasingly across national borders. At the same time, intelligence services would be the first to be interested in an empirical study that maps the movement, in order to mobilize the results
for further counterstrategies. In fact, the empirical interest became painfully clear when in 2010, after having finished this study, several UK undercover police infiltrating the networks of summit protesters for many years were exposed (Monroy 2011).

Being on the side of the movement that I was supposed to study, this posed a serious problem for my research methodology. It is a bit unsettling to know that a lot of significant material one might like to gather is stored in the massive archives of police and intelligence services. Rather quickly, it became clear to me that “the globalization movement” could not be “the object” of my investigation. Theorizing from the antagonism raises doubts about the very usefulness of such a category as “social movements.” Is this category not simply part of the strategy of control? Does a practice of defining such social phenomena not automatically restrict their potential and contribute to their containment? Once I had it clear that I did not want to write a book that would provide an interesting account for intelligence services and other repressive state authorities, but one that could enhance the self-reflexive capacities of antisystemic initiatives, I encrypted my hardware and reformulated my research question. Instead of gazing at a movement, I decided to investigate the power relations between protesters and the authorities with whom we are confronted.

The anecdote about Holm opens some doors for a critical approach to methodological questions related to social science scholarship. Methodology not only depends on the sort of questions that are asked and the “type of movement” one researches, but also on one’s chosen standpoint. Academic research designs often conflate approach with analysis and therefore make invisible how gathering data implies choosing a standpoint. Donatella della Porta, for example, nearly exclusively based her similar research on the policing of protest in Italy and Germany from the 1960s till the 1990s on the official accounts and records of the respective police departments. This is certainly a convenient way to get a lot of quantitative data. Her analysis, then, appears to be emerging “naturally” from the collected data. This is how “objective” and “neutral” science comes about. But does this really reveal how policing of protest works, or, simply on their sanitized representation of it? How can we develop research methodologies and knowledge that do not abide by the logic of control and containment, but rather function as a starting point for emancipatory practices? How can social analysis produce an account that does not establish an automatic nexus between sociology and policy-making?

In his quest for a “public sociology,” Michael Burawoy (2005) uncovers a division of labor between policy sociology, public sociology, professional
sociology, and critical sociology (2005). According to Burawoy, policy and professional sociology are found on instrumental knowledge, and critical and public sociology on reflexive knowledge. Professional sociology provides “true and tested” methods, the accumulated knowledge, and the conceptual frameworks. Policy sociology turns sociology in the service of a goal defined by a client. The aim is to find solutions for problems that are presented to the sociologist or to legitimate solutions that already exist. Public sociology, by contrast, is predicated on the idea of dialogue between the researcher and a public. Both policy and public sociology are sustained by professional sociology providing reliable methods and accumulated bodies of methods. The fourth type, critical sociology, serves to interrogate the explicit and implicit assumptions of the research programs of professional sociology, as well as the value premises of society. However, Burawoy fails to find a possible moment for the reconstruction of the sociological knowledge-building process. My question is: What kind of methodology brings us to a critical engagement with the social world?

This research is based on a methodological approach that takes political confrontation as a productive encounter that can be translated into an ethnographic resource. Confrontation provides access to see how ruling is organized and how an opponent works. As AK Thompson (2006) has pointed out, confrontation can function as “pedagogy of the oppressed”: one can start to map how the social world is put together, which then helps to transform it. This way, my own involvement in summit protests serves as a starting point for investigating how the interactions between police and protesters are socially coordinated. I chose the standpoint of summit protesters, “not as a given and finalized form of knowledge” but as “a ground in experience from which discoveries are to be made” (Smith 2005: 8). I understand the encounters between police and protesters as a problematic experience that raises questions about how the ruling of dissent is organized. Concrete sites of struggle are transformed into a problematic for investigation. As Dorothy Smith proposes, “(a) problematic is a territory to be discovered, not a question that is concluded in its answer” (Smith 2005: 41). This gives my research an exploratory makeup. Starting with summit protests as problematic encounters, my analysis goes beyond the immediate experience to trace the broader context of ruling and global dissent as it is articulated in the streets. John Holloway describes such a critical approach as a double movement: “Criticism acquires . . . an analytical movement and a genetic movement, a movement of going behind appearances and a movement of tracing the origin or genesis of the phenomenon criticised” (Holloway 2002: 109). In this book, I combine the analytical and genetic
movement by going beyond the immediate experiences of street interactions and tracing the origins of the tactical interactions that unfold during summit protests.

_Shifting Ontology and Epistemology_

The methodology of Dorothy Smith’s _Institutional Ethnography_ is based on Marxist and feminist traditions and aims for a sociology _for_ people instead of a sociology _about_ people (Smith 2005: 1). Instead of treating people as objects, institutional ethnography provides an account of how the relations of ruling operate from the standpoint of the people participating in them. Mapping ruling relations enables people to see the workings of institutions and their own position within them. The institutional ethnographer works from the social in people’s experience to discover its presence and organization in their lives and to map that organization beyond the locale of the everyday. The focus for studying the social on how people’s activities are coordinated (Smith 2005: 59); coordination is not isolated from people’s activities and it is not reified as “social structure.” Research then becomes a discovery rather than the testing of a hypothesis or the explication of a theory. The aim of a critical sociology for people is, ultimately, to demonstrate how extra-local power relations influence a local site of struggle. Not the people but the organization of ruling is the object of the study: the people are informants that have reflexive knowledge because they work within the ruling regime. Once completed, an institutional ethnography, rather than a resource for supposed experts, provides a resource that can be translated into people’s everyday knowledge. This way, it becomes a starting point for reorganizing social relationships.

There are two important conceptual moves in the methodology of Dorothy Smith: the ontological and epistemological shifts. The _ontological shift_ implies a move from the ideological practice of creating speculative accounts to the empirical study of how a politico-administrative regime actually works. Activists and scientists alike often attribute agency to concepts such as “homophobia” or “neoliberalism” or to institutional glosses such as the “red tape,” instead of critiquing the ideological practice of these politico-administrative regimes as methods of determining how things happen.9 The social as the focus for study is to be located in how people’s activities or practices are coordinated. This way, coordination is neither isolated from people’s activities nor reified as “social structure.”10 The conceptual basis of the research is reflexively organized within a materialist understanding of a world that is put together in people’s practices and activities.11
The epistemological shift implies a rejection of objective accounts. Criticizing the ideological character of the idea of objectivity, Dorothy Smith stresses that knowledge of the everyday world is reflexively, rather than objectively, organized. Thus, the shift is not one from an objective to a subjective epistemology, but from an objective to a reflexive epistemology. It means, first of all, explicating informants’ knowledge as socially organized, and therefore as constituted reflexively. Second, it means beginning reflexively from one’s own actual location in the world rather than from the objective standpoint of standard sociology. Smith (2005: 54) points out how “Objectivity appears as the stylistics of a discourse rather than as generated by a research methodology.” “Objectivity” is just one form of the social organization of knowledge that produces a form of knowledge mobilized to rule society. The point of “a sociology for people” is to juxtapose the objective knowledge of politico-administrative regimes against the locally organized, reflexive knowledge of individuals in the everyday world. Therefore, institutional ethnography resists the dominance of theory and the constraints of a priori conceptual frameworks.

The practice of using a rigid conceptual framework freezes the activities of actual people who live in a world of emerging and changing social relationships. Looking at a frozen social world through the lenses of a rigid conceptual framework easily can make us believe that things really are like this (for example, that a social movement is a “thing” that exists). This form of doing social analysis enacts the social each time one thinks about it this way (Law & Urry 2004). By looking at contentious collective action through the conceptual lenses of “social movements,” social scientists enact social movements. Such accounts mystify the social world and, by doing so, contribute to its reproduction. Therefore, John Holloway proposes that a critical approach should dissolve the categories of thought: “To think scientifically is to dissolve the categories of thought, to understand all social phenomena as precisely that, as forms of social relations” (Holloway 2002: 92). In my view, this means to reveal the processes and mechanisms that operate behind (scientific) categories. Unthinking social sciences is itself a political process that raises questions about society as constituted by changing conflictual social relations.

The unthinking of sociological categories as object or singularity can move our understanding of the working of power forward. Unthinking the category of “social movements” makes this point fully apparent. From the moment one takes the social existence of such an abstract category for granted, a whole series of new questions arises: who participates in this movement and why? Where does it start? And where does it end? When did
it emerge? Where was its peak? Who are the leaders? among others. This set of questions has been addressed by the various methodological approaches of social movement scholarship, which treats diverse and dispersed processes of contentious articulations as “social movements.”¹³ Here are reservations about using such a concept. First, as the ongoing struggle about its definition demonstrates, the concept of “social movements” is mostly about defining and classifying social phenomena. Neither does the concept of “social movements” seem to be an adequate description for the potential of the social phenomenon at hand, even less in the case of “the anti-globalization movement”: this is not a clearly identifiable social phenomenon with strict boundaries, but a series of conflicts where global hegemonic power relations are challenged. Therefore, I prefer to speak about contested sites of struggle instead of social movements. It means opening the category of “social movements” to see the processes and mechanisms of contention and conflict. Ultimately, it means to take the term “movement” seriously: movements move, and should not be reified in their moments of struggle. This, too, voids the political from the political struggle.

Beyond Identification?

Looking at tactical interaction, innovation, diffusion, and adaptation, the approach of this book tries to avoid two frequent traps of recent social science scholarship: methodological nationalism and individualism. The first is a product of seeing societies as (naturally) being bound to nation-states, and politics therefore a question of national governments or international cooperation. Cross-border interaction and transnational organizing cannot fully be grasped this way (see also Linebaugh & Rediker 2000). The latter places individuals—and their opinions, interests, and actions—at the center of political analysis. Nevertheless, collective action is more than the sum of the individual participants, certainly when one looks at tactical repertoires. We therefore need to look for ways to move beyond these methodological presuppositions.

Frequently, “the nation-state” serves as analytical category of social movement scholarship. As John Holloway suggests, the existence of the state implies a constant process of separating off certain aspects of social relations and defining them as “political” and hence as separate from “the economic” or “the social.” The antagonism on which society is based is thus fragmented: struggles are channeled into political, economic, social, or cultural forms, none of which leaves room for raising questions about how they feed into the coordination of social relationships.
The state is considered to be a (central) locus of the political. Agnew (1994) calls this the “territorial trap” of seeing states as containers of society; Beck (2006: 12) calls it the “national prison theory of human existence.” As Giddens (1990: 13) points out, methodological nationalism reduces “societies” to “nation-states” without theorizing the latter concept. Patel (2009: 5) adds that the notion of a nation-state reproduces a Eurocentric form of sociology. Poulantzas (1973) proposes, instead, to see the state as a social relationship. According to Holloway (2002: 94), this relationship is predicated on an ongoing process that tries to impose the statification of social conflicts (and therefore renders non-institutional action unnecessary).

However, by reifying the role of the state, social scientists enact the state as the legitimate actor or arena of politics. This excludes other activities from being labeled “political.” Massimo de Angelis (2001: 112) refers to precisely this problem when he says that—when being asked about alternative visions—people expect formulated alternatives on the level of the state.

Wallerstein (1991: 77) excellently summarizes the danger of conceiving of global processes through a nation-state-centered framework: “it is futile to analyze the processes of the societal development of our multiple (national) ‘societies’ as if they were autonomous, internally evolving structures, when they are and have been in fact primarily structures created by, and taking form in response to, world-scale processes.” The ideological function of social science scholarship in reproducing the state as a social form is a form of methodological nationalism. By teleologically reorganizing contingent historical outcomes as necessary developments, the status quo is transposed into the “ought to be.” The nation-state becomes taken-for-granted. In a tautological manner, this normative transposition reproduces the necessity of the state as a social category.

Taking the individual as a central category for social analysis is another problematic tendency in social movement scholarship, especially the influence of rational choice theories. These theories reduce the problem of collective action to a comparison of individual costs and benefits. Among various objections to the presupposed idea of “individual rationality” are the emotional incentives for contentious politics (Jasper 1998; Goodwin et al. 2001). However, I want to demystify the very idea of the individual as a useful research category. Methodological individualism relies on the idea that, for example, a “social movement” is a sum of its individual participants. When analyzing how doing is socially coordinated, agency is ascribed solely to individual actors. Indeed, as John Holloway proposes, “The separation of people from the social tapestry of doing constitutes them as free individuals . . .” (Holloway 2002: 70). Reification of social relationships, therefore,
not only implies the rule of the object but also the creation of a peculiarly dislocated subject, denoted as “free individual,” a conception that prevents us from seeing a socially coordinated “us.”

Through these methodologies, social science scholars contribute to the practice of ruling by identifying people. According to Holloway, identification implies a third-person discourse. To write scientifically means to write about things in the third person, as “it” or “they”: “Study or theory is therefore study of something or about something, as in: social theory is the study of society . . .” (Holloway 2002: 61). Knowledge proceeds through definition, meaning that something is known when it can be defined. The interconnection between identitarian thought and the constitution of a subject as “free individual” makes clear that a critique of “methodological individualism” can only be accomplished on the basis of the negation of identitarian thinking.

Adorno’s proposition for a “negative dialectics” takes the totality of contradiction as the negation of total identification (Adorno 1966: 16). Bivalent logic based on the non-identity between what a thing is and what it is not always produces paradoxes. When the non-contradictory character of (scientific) terminology is demystified as delusional, conceptual thinking is directed toward non-identity (Adorno 1966: 22).

My analysis of police–protesters interaction during summit protests goes beyond methodological nationalism and individualism in two ways. First, by not taking a “social movement” or its participants as the research unit but tactical repertoires, instead of focusing on identities, I can focus on the process of tactical interaction. Second, by emphasizing tactical innovation and adaptation in this transnational process, my analysis moves away from approaches that see nation-states as natural containers of societies.

Resisting to Be Socialized as a Movement Scholar

At the beginning of this chapter, the example of Andrej Holm clarifies how being confronted with ruling regimes offers concrete possibilities to investigate how ruling works and how the social world is constituted through power relations. Taking a concrete site of a struggle to analyze how ruling is socially coordinated, I investigate the contestation of global hegemony by starting with the actual moment of confrontation. This is what led me to the choice of summit protests as multiple sites of struggles wherefrom I can investigate the interplay of global dissent and social control by looking at the interactions over time between police and protesters.

I am not only siding with summit protesters on the barricades. My standpoint also resists being socialized methodologically as a “social move-
ment scholar.” In this respect, my book aims to make a twofold intervention. On the one hand, I hope it to be useful for antisystemic initiatives in thinking about the innovation of transgressive street tactics. On the other hand, I wish to challenge academic research methodologies and epistemologies that are complicit with the practice of ruling. Linking my research strategy to the transgressive approach of summit protesters, I confront the conceptual dilemmas inherent to a scientific style predicated as it is on identitarian thought with the goal to establish an “objective” account of the social world. Such a style mimics the state form by reducing methodological questions to an administrative problem and results in the bureaucratization of social analysis. By providing “a sociology for transgressive summit protesters,” I hope to assert the possibility of a form of knowledge that can emancipate despite attempts to control.

Although ethnographic methods have been successfully employed for the study of contentious politics and globalization (Shepard 2011; Gautney 2010; Graeber 2009; Maeckelbergh 2009; Juris 2008), it has been rarely done for police–protester interaction. Using a series of previous summit protests in Europe in order to analyze how the tactical interaction between protesters and police has unfolded through a series of protest events, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork during the 2007 G8 protests in Germany, including a two-year period of preparation and a year of evaluation. I also conducted observant participation at three other summit protests (2000 Prague, 2001 Genoa, and 2005 Gleneagles), and a number of other protest events that are not included in the final research makeup (2000 Climate Conference protests in The Hague, 2001 EU protests in Brussels, 2009 NATO protests in Strasbourg, and 2009 G8 protests in Italy). In addition, I held 18 narrative interviews with protesters and protest organizers, and conducted document and film analysis. The material being analyzed ranges from field notes to photographic and audiovisual material, from activist mailings, agitprop material, and discussion papers to maps, websites, legal dossiers, policy documents, and media coverage.

Overview

This book is structured around the four sites of struggle guiding my analysis of police–protester interaction. Each of the empirical chapters covers the interaction within one site of struggle: bodies, space, communication, and the law.

Before that, chapter 2 offers a historical and chapter 3 a conceptual discussion on how to understand repertoires of contention and of control
in a context of street interaction. Chapter 2 reconstructs tactical trajectories of global dissent in a historical perspective. In chapter 3, I first analyze how the creation of (global) conflicts is accomplished in the streets, and what the role of tactical repertoires is in circulating and transforming those conflicts. Secondly, starting with a critique of dominant and normative understandings of police interventions, I develop a framework for analyzing repertoires of social control predicated on the antagonistic relationship between “public order” and “disruption” (through transgressive tactical repertoires).

Chapter 4 presents bodies as the first contested site of struggle. How do summit protesters use their bodies during street conflicts? And how have bodies become the target of police interventions aiming at the creation of docile bodies? Starting with the analysis of the street as context for biopolitical disciplinarity, I look at how summit protesters make the body a central tool for challenging global hegemonic forces. I discuss the epistemology of four innovative street tactics and show how they feed into certain repertoires of action predicated on a logic beyond representation. The disobedient bodies of transgressive summit protesters are not only controlled through disciplining their bodies, but also through regulation in order to produce a certain (obedient) form of life.

Chapter 5 tries to understand police–protester interactions as struggles about space. How do summit protesters intervene spatially in the flows of summit meetings in order to contest them? And how do authorities attempt through spatial operations to make undesired events unlikely? Street interactions thereby reflect the necessity of hegemonic global elites to manifest themselves spatially by producing a territory for legitimate global governance. Starting with summit protesters’ challenge of spatial control via repertoires relying on “diversity of tactics” and “decentralized swarming,” I will map how police tactics aim to regain spatial control before and during summit protests by separation and containment. The initial capacity of protesters to incapacitate summit meetings by intervening in their spatial flows is countered by police by spatially incapacitating protesters’ tactics.

Chapter 6 looks at communication as a contested site of struggle. How are summit protesters’ innovative repertoires for communicating dissent organized both within and without their networks? And how is the circulation of dissent tackled by the authorities? Making disruption a way of communicating (and circulating) dissent, protesters constitute communication as a political side of conflict. Protesters achieve this through communication in decentralized networks making use of a combination of new technologies and real-life meetings. Protesters’ repertoires for the circulation
of dissent are therefore understood as an attempt to change the condition of the production of (hegemonic) truth. Authorities, on the other hand, regulate the circulation of dissent by making it a question of communication management. The tactical repertoire of authorities marks a shift from disciplinary to biopolitical forms of power focusing on the flows of communication. Communication during summit protests appears to be an important tool of global hegemonic legitimation strategies through psychological operations that preempt and manage dissent even before it occurs. Authorities did not only develop the capacity to influence mainstream media tactically, but also copy communication tactics used by protesters. Using marketing tactics, the police intimidate, demonize, criminalize, co-opt, disunite, and vilify summit protesters.

Taking law as a contested site of struggle during summit protests, chapter 7 is an attempt to understand transgressive protest behaviors in the context of sovereign power predicated on the monopoly of violence. How can law enforcement, civil legislation, and criminal prosecution be deciphered as concrete manifestation of the state monopoly on violence contested by transgressive repertoires of protesters? And how does the shifting legal practice around summit meetings institute a permanent state of exception? I argue that police–protester interaction enacts a state of emergency (the “temporary” suspension of the rule of law), which reveals the ontological status of summit protests as constituent moments for global power relations. Without abdicating reactive law enforcement tactics, police rely increasingly on preemptive law enforcement tactics in order to defend the sovereignty of global hegemonic forces. Revealing such an enactment of sovereign power, summit protests create a state of exception, which constitutes a moment to choose sides.

In the conclusion, I elaborate on the findings of the analysis of these four sites of conflicts. Coming back to the main argument of this book, I demonstrate how the transgressive summit repertoire is increasingly neutralized by the tactical adaptations of authorities. Dissent is met by more and more effective social control. The event staged as opening to the possible is commandeered, instead, as a non-disruptive moment in history. Through the preemption of the disruptive capacities of transgressive summit protesters, dissent is eliminated from view and the antagonism constitutive of global power relations is channeled into a resolvable contradiction (between “order” and “disorder”). Turning political questions into a problem of administration, authorities eliminate visible dissent. Social control “orders” dissent, by reducing the likeliness of disruption. The conclusion also details
Four contributions this book offers beyond the scope of this research. The analysis developed in the next chapters hopefully will trigger an unthinking of social movement studies, of social control in times of biopolitics, of democratic theory, and of the practices of antisystemic initiatives. The reactions to recent crisis management and austerity measures demonstrate that global dissent is far from over.