Published in the Spring of 1927, *Being and Time* was immediately recognized as an original and groundbreaking philosophical work. Reviewers compared it to an “electric shock” and a “lightning strike,” and there was praise for the “philosophical brilliance” and “genius” of its young author, Martin Heidegger (he was only thirty-seven years old). *Being and Time*, and Heidegger, quickly became the focus of debates and controversy, as well as an inspiration for new impulses in thinking. Indeed, the publication of *Being and Time* was an intellectual event of such consequence that it seems right to describe it with a comment Goethe made in another context: “from here and today a new epoch of world history sets forth.”

Prior to the publication of *Being and Time* Heidegger had achieved some fame on the basis of his lecture courses at the University of Marburg. The courses were challenging and stimulating, and it is no accident that many of his students during these years would become original thinkers in their own right. Hannah Arendt later spoke of “the rumor of a hidden king” circulating among university students in Germany. Hans-Georg Gadamer described Heidegger’s classes as “an elemental event” in which “the boldness and radicality of [Heidegger’s] questioning took one’s breath away.” Among students at least, it was clear that during his years at Marburg (1923–1928) Heidegger was laying the groundwork for a genuine philosophical revolution. But until the publication of *Being and Time*, that revolution remained only a rumor, since Heidegger had not published anything for a decade.

Despite his renown as a teacher, this absence of publications placed enormous pressures upon Heidegger to finally bring into print the ideas that he had been developing in his lecture courses. The reason for this is clear: in 1925 Heidegger was passed over by the Ministry
of Education for a promotion to Paul Natorp’s chair in philosophy at Marburg due to his lack of publications. Faced with this rejection, Heidegger worked intensely over the next year to finish the project of *Being and Time* until he was finally able to present “a virtually complete manuscript” to his teacher, Edmund Husserl, on Husserl’s sixty-seventh birthday (April 8, 1926). Later that same year, Heidegger was again nominated for Natorp’s chair, and this time he submitted the galley proofs of *Being and Time* in support of his nomination. The Ministry of Education’s response was to reject Heidegger’s nomination yet again, returning the proofs of *Being and Time* with the comment “insufficient.” After *Being and Time* was published a few months later, its reception made it abundantly clear that this genuinely new philosophical voice and viewpoint was destined to have a profound impact upon philosophy, and that Heidegger had indeed opened up a new path for thinking. In 1928 Husserl retired from teaching at the University of Freiburg and Heidegger was offered Husserl’s chair; although Heidegger eventually received an offer from Marburg, he accepted the chance to move to Freiburg as Husserl’s successor instead.

One consequence of this pressure to publish was that Heidegger decided to publish *Being and Time* in installments rather than wait until the entire text was finished as he had outlined it. The conception of the fundamental ontological project undertaken in *Being and Time* was, however, fully articulated from the outset: in §8 of the Introduction, Heidegger outlines the plan of *Being and Time* as divided into two parts, each with three divisions. The first installment of the text that Heidegger published in 1927 consisted only of the first two divisions of the first part; two-thirds of the planned text—the last division of the first part and the entire second part of the projected text—were still to be written. Initially, Heidegger planned on completing the project of *Being and Time* as he had originally outlined it, but by 1929 or 1930, he had abandoned that plan. The text that we now have, and that stands as the complete text of *Being and Time*, is thus the “incomplete” version that was published in the spring of 1927. Heidegger announces this in his “Author’s Preface to the Seventh German Edition” (1953) when he writes: “The designation ‘First Half,’ which previous editions bore, has been deleted. After a quarter century, the second half could no longer be added without the first being presented anew. Nonetheless, its path still remains a necessary one even today if the question of being is to move our Dasein” (H xxvii).

What this means for one who sets out to read *Being and Time* is that this book needs to be understood as a torso of its own intentions and the fragment of a larger project. This poses a special interpretive problem. Since *Being and Time* continually rewrites itself, that is, since it repeatedly revisits earlier analyses in the light of their
own conclusions, one needs to read it with this incompletion always in view: what was projected, even if never completed, was to have been the basis for a reexamination of the text that we do have. Although significant portions of its “missing” sections were eventually written and published elsewhere (the 1927 lecture course, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, is especially significant in this regard), Heidegger never attempted to “complete” *Being and Time*, and he made no clear effort to link the portions that were published elsewhere to the plan of *Being and Time*. When one bears in mind that *Being and Time* remains a fragment, that Heidegger never explicitly continued to work out the plan of that project, and that he never systematically incorporated the work he did there into his later work, one is left with a genuine question: is the project of fundamental ontology laid out in *Being and Time* able to be carried out to completion? Or is it the case that this project cannot be completed according to the conditions that it sets for itself? Heidegger would ask this same question—even if only tacitly—for many years.

Heidegger’s most extensive, significant, and explicit self-assessment of *Being and Time* is perhaps found in his *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*. There, as elsewhere, Heidegger’s view was that the project of fundamental ontology as it was outlined in *Being and Time* could not, in the end, be completed. Indeed, it is striking that much of the vocabulary and structures that he so painstakingly developed in *Being and Time* would disappear from his work over the next decade. Despite this, Heidegger was both emphatic and unwavering in his insistence that working through the project of *Being and Time*, while coming to understand its insights and its limits, was a decisive and ineluctable step on the path that thinking needs to take in our times. Thus, while Heidegger never resumed this project, he never repudiated it either. On the contrary, he frequently returned to it as he reexamined and rethought his own path of thinking. Despite—or even perhaps because of—the aborted character of his aims in *Being and Time*, this book was a constant touchstone for Heidegger’s own path of thinking and it would become a landmark in the history of philosophy that continues to challenge us today.

*Being and Time* begins by referring to a doubled forgetfulness characterizing our historical present: we have not only forgotten the question of being [Sein] and how to ask it, but this forgetting itself is no longer noticed, it too has been forgotten. This forgetting is not an “error” or a “mistake” that we can simply correct: one does not forget the question of being the way one forgets one’s keys, nor is the question of being a question that one can ask in the form that most questions take. Rather, the sources of such a question, as well as the way it is forgotten, are, as Heidegger’s analysis shows, rooted in our way of
being. Factual life is necessarily bound up in a movement that conceals as well as reveals. The same structures that disclose factual life shroud it in obscurity. As Heidegger put it elsewhere, “Das Leben ist diesig, es nebelt sich immer wieder ein” [“Life is immanent and hazy, it always and again encloses itself in a fog”]. Although our way of being always involves us in the fog of forgetfulness which, for the most part, we do not even notice, our way of being equally involves us in opening up and clearing the question of being. Asking the question of what it means “to be”—and “not to be”—defines and distinguishes each of us and determines the way we live our lives. Our way of being in the world is shaped fundamentally, and in every respect, by the fact that each of us is always preoccupied with this question, even if it is not thematized as such and even when it is forgotten. Yet, precisely because we have forgotten how to ask this question and because we have become numb to what moves us to pose the question of being, the first and largest task of Being and Time is to recover and renew it. In order to do this, Heidegger undertakes a phenomenological analysis of that being [Seiende] who asks such a question, the being who is concerned about its own being [Sein], namely, Dasein. To this end, the published portion of the original plan of Being and Time contains the “fundamental preparatory analysis of Dasein” (Part One) and the repetition of this analysis in the light of temporality which the existential analytic had disclosed as the primordial meaning of Dasein’s way of being (Part Two). The move from this analysis of the being of the questioner to the question of being itself was ultimately never carried out.

No brief summary of either this analysis or its repetition can ever be adequate to the range and subtlety of Being and Time. The sweep of Heidegger’s analysis here is stunning: truth, death, anxiety, praxis, others, tools, language, mood, guilt, history, existence, and time are just some of the many topics addressed here. Likewise, the innovative way in which such topics are unfolded and discussed becomes apparent in the language with which Heidegger carries out this analysis. Starting with the word “Dasein”—which is not another name for “consciousness,” “subject,” or “human being”—Heidegger introduces a vocabulary that challenges the reader. We find neologisms alongside commonplace words that are used in quite uncommon senses. We read, for instance, of “being-in-the-world,” “being-with,” “worldliness,” “thrownness,” “attunement,” “temporality,” “conscience,” “facticity,” “everydayness,” “equipment,” “anxiety,” “authenticity,” “care,” “objective presence,” “equiprimordiality,” and “taking care”—to name just a few of the words that need to be listened to carefully. The language of this text frequently needs to be heard in a different register than the one to which one might be accustomed: meanings are stretched, roots of
words are highlighted, small and seemingly insignificant words—"in," for instance—are shown to be complex and in need of careful reflection. Heidegger argued that "it is the business of philosophy to preserve the power of the most elemental words" (H 220). Reading Being and Time, one experiences this elemental power of language.

Of course, all of this makes the task of one who translates Heidegger especially difficult. Piled atop the usual struggles of translation, there are special difficulties facing the translator of Being and Time: Heidegger's suspicion about the inherited language of philosophizing and his neologisms, which are intended to force the reader to think from a fresh perspective, make the burden of the translator especially challenging. Joan Stambaugh faced these challenges with the insight born of her long connection to Heidegger's work. Thanks to Stambaugh, we have a translation in which one hears something of Heidegger's own voice. Nonetheless, all translation operates in a realm defined by nuance, options, multiple legitimate possibilities, apparent impossibilities, and resonances that complicate every otherwise fine choice. Translation is interpretation. It is also a sort of treason no matter how deep its fidelity. While I have taken advantage of the last fifteen years of commentary on this translation to make modifications to Stambaugh's original translation, there should be no doubt: this is still the Stambaugh translation of Being and Time. It is not possible to give an indication of all of the changes made in this revised edition; however, some general remarks might be helpful.

One difference in this new edition is that the German word being translated is frequently identified by being inserted in square brackets. Doing this solves a number of problems such as those arising from the difficulty in distinguishing "being" ["Sein"] from "beings" ["Seiende"]. Whenever there was any chance of confusion about the translation of these words, the German words were inserted. Likewise, it is not uncommon for Heidegger to make connections between ideas by having words echo one another. Typically, these echoes cannot be maintained in an English translation. Thus repetitions in German words like "environment" or "surrounding world" ["Umwelt"], "dealings" or "association" ["Umgang"], "circumspection" ["Umsicht"]; "considerateness" ["Rücksicht"], "tolerance" ["Nachsicht"], "sight" ["Sicht"]; "nullity" ["Nichtigkeit"], "nothingness" ["Nichts"], "the not" ["Nichtheit"] cannot be repeated in English, but the links that unite these, and many other words, can at least be made visible even to the reader who does not read German.

Greek characters are now used for the Greek words. The "Lexicon of Greek Expressions" is available at the end of the book for those who might find a transliteration and translation of many of those words helpful. Heidegger's notes, which were previously published as end-
notes, are now footnotes. The marginal comments from Heidegger’s own readings of *Being and Time* are included at the bottom of the page (indicated by symbols) along with the footnotes (indicated by numbers). The numbers in the margins indicate the page number that has been used in the German text since the seventh edition.

Most of Stambaugh’s translations of key words remain as before. There is, however, one change that needs to be explained and defended, namely, the decision that Dasein would no longer be written as Da-sein. The reason this change needs some comment is simple: as Professor Stambaugh writes in her Translator’s Preface “it was Heidegger’s express wish that in future translations the word *Da-sein* should be hyphenated throughout *Being and Time*.” Among the many considerations that have led me to no longer write Dasein with a hyphen I will note only the following. First, Heidegger expressed his wish in this matter prior to the publication of the final version of *Sein und Zeit* in his Gesamtausgabe, so he could have made the same change in the German edition. He did not make a change, but continued to write Dasein without a hyphen. This is a translation of *Sein und Zeit*, not the place for corrections to be made that would move the translation away from the German original. Second, there are a number of places in *Being and Time* where Heidegger does write Da-sein with a hyphen. To write Dasein with a hyphen in every case covers over a distinction that Heidegger himself makes and finds significant. Third, in later texts, most notably his *Beiträge*, Heidegger will write Da-sein with a hyphen, reverting to the non-hyphenated form mostly only to speak about *Being and Time*. There again Heidegger is, in some real sense, distinguishing Da-sein from Dasein. Finally, since many scholars writing in English use the German text when writing about Heidegger, English language scholarship has, by and large, not adopted the decision to translate Dasein as Da-sein. Professor Stambaugh discussed her translation of *Being and Time* with Heidegger many times and rightly followed his wish. But it has become clear over the years that the reasons not to do this are overwhelming. Too many differences are obscured when we do not stay with the practice that Heidegger himself retained in the final edition of *Sein und Zeit*. For the most part, however, the changes in this revised translation consist of modifications of sentences and other changes that, hopefully, will bring Stambaugh’s translation even more in line with Heidegger’s original text. Of course, if I have introduced new problems in doing this, I am responsible for those. My intention in making revisions was not to produce a different translation, but to present what I hope will prove to be a somewhat better version of the Stambaugh translation of *Being and Time*.

Heidegger himself thanked Joan Stambaugh for her translation of *Being and Time* by presenting her with a copy of the poem that is repro-
duced on the cover of this book. Joan Stambaugh must be thanked yet again: first, for her translation and the contribution that translation has made to Heidegger studies; second, for giving me permission to make the revisions in this new edition. Translators struggle over every word and the result is hard won. A translator who allows her work to be modified by another is truly generous.

Thanks are also due to Dr. Hermann Heidegger for his support of this translation from the beginning, as well as for this revised edition. Finally, I have benefited greatly from comments and suggestions offered by colleagues and friends—more than I can name here—as I have worked through this revised translation of Being and Time.

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