ONE

Maimonides as Biblical Exegete

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One of the striking features of Maimonides’ oeuvre is that he did not write any purely philosophic work. In this he differed markedly from such predecessors as al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and his contemporary Averroës, who wrote a variety of commentaries on Aristotelian works, as well as philosophic encyclopedias and independent philosophic treatises. As reason for such lack of interest, Maimonides maintained that the existing philosophic literature in Arabic is adequate for anyone having an interest in pure philosophy. Maimonides writes in Guide II 2:

Know that my purpose in this Treatise of mine was not to compose something on natural science, or to make an epitome of notions pertaining to the divine science according to some doctrine or to demonstrate what has been demonstrated in them

and he continues

for the books composed concerning these matters [he has in mind works composed by Arabic philosophers] are adequate. If, however, they should turn out not to be adequate with regard to some subject, that which I shall say concerning that subject will not be superior to everything that has been said about it.¹

From this statement and the lack of any purely philosophic works by Maimonides, with the exception of a Treatise on the Art of Logic;² the question may be asked: If the Guide to the Perplexed is not a philosophic work, to what type of literature does it belong? In answer to this question I wish to propose that it is best understood as a commentary on the Bible—although it must be spelled out what kind of commentary it is—and that it is addressed to Jews. Beyond that I wish to argue that even Maimonides’ halakhic works, the Sefer


ha-Mitzvot and the Mishneh Torah are essentially based on the Bible rather than on the rabbinic literature. The question may then be asked why the Bible is so central to Maimonides’ thought. I wish to suggest that the answer to this question lies in Maimonides’ theory of prophecy and specifically in his description of the prophecy of Moses.

It may be affirmed generally that, for Maimonides, the Bible provides direct guidance for the practical, as well as intellectual, life of every Jew. That the Bible, rather than the rabbinic literature, is the major guide for Jewish life emerges, first of all, from his Sefer ha-Mitzvot (Book of Commandments), a work in which Maimonides enumerates the commandments of which Jewish tradition speaks. At the beginning of the work, setting down the principles that guide his enumeration of the commandments, he states emphatically that rabbinic ordinances are to be excluded from this enumeration. In enunciating this principle he takes issue with the author of the Halakhot G’dolot, a pre-Maimonidean code, who counts such rabbinic ordinances as the lighting of Hanukkah candles and the reading of the Megillah on Purim among the biblically ordained commandments. For Maimonides, rabbinic ordinances are still obligatory, but the biblical commandments are fundamental. In support of this opinion, Maimonides cites the biblical verse “torah tzivah lanu Mosheh, morashah K’hillat Yaakov” “Moses commanded us the Torah, an inheritance of the congregation of Jacob” (Deuteronomy 33:4). According to the rabbinic interpretation, the numerical value of the letters of the word torah equals 611. If to this number is added the numerical value 2, for the first two of the Ten Commandments, which the Jewish people heard directly from the mouth of God, the total number of the commandments in the Torah is 613. On the basis of the biblical verse, with its emphasis on Torah and the rabbinic interpretation of the verse, Maimonides concludes that the 613 commandments of which the tradition speaks must all be biblical. So he states in the Sefer ha-Mitzvot, as the first of the fourteen principles on which his enumeration is based, that “it is not fitting to count within this enumeration commandments that are rabbinic.”

A similar reliance on the Bible appears in Maimonides’ Code, the Mishneh Torah. For the work is organized on the same scheme that Maimonides had used in Sefer ha-Mitzvot. Hence, at the outset of the work, he once again lists the biblical commandments on which the work is based, and he begins his exposition of each group of laws with the biblical commandments on which the laws to be discussed are founded. In composing the Mishneh Torah, “in plain language and terse style so that the entire oral law might become systematically known to all,” he works from the biblical foundation to the rabbinic elaboration. He concludes:

I have entitled this work Mishneh Torah, so that a person who first reads the written law and then this compilation will know from it the whole oral law, without having occasion to consult any other book between them.
Turning now to the Guide to the Perplexed, we find that Maimonides states that the first purpose of this work is to explain the meaning of biblical terms and that its second purpose is to explain the meaning of obscure biblical parables. He writes in the introduction to the Guide: “The first purpose of this Treatise is to explain the meaning of certain terms occurring in the books of prophecy [the Bible].” A little later in the introduction he writes: “This Treatise [the Guide] has a second purpose: namely, the explanation of very obscure parables, occurring in the books of the prophets, but not explicitly identified there as such.”

Invoking a distinction between those who have also studied philosophy and ordinary people (including those who only study the legal portions of the Bible and rabbinic law), Maimonides distinguishes the modes of exegesis appropriate for each group. He says in the introduction to the Guide that the work is written not only for those who have philosophic training but also for “the vulgar, the beginners in speculation and those who have not engaged in any study other than the science of the law.” Such tyros have studied only the legal portions of the Law. Accordingly, Maimonides opens his work with an exposition of difficult biblical terms and parables, primarily those that describe God in anthropomorphic terms.

One of the major themes of Maimonides' philosophy is that anthropomorphic and anthropopathic terms predicated of God must be understood, even by ordinary people, non-anthropomorphically, that is, spiritually. In expressing this opinion Maimonides differed fundamentally from his contemporary Averroës who, in his Decisive Treatise Determining the Connection between Religion and Philosophy, urged that one should not expect ordinary people to think of God in incorporeal terms. Invoking the Qur'anic story in which Muhammad declared a slave woman to be a believer because she held that God is in heaven, although that implied a physical notion of God, Averroës argued that to require ordinary persons to hold a noncorporeal conception of God brought them to unbelief, since ordinary people can conceive only of corporeal beings as existent.

Maimonides' difference with Averroës here is not just theological but also psychological. Averroës believes that ordinary people cannot understand that incorporeal beings exist. To teach them that God does not have a body or corporeal attributes leads them to unbelief. Maimonides, by contrast, insists not only that ordinary people can understand that God does not possess a body or any corporeal attributes, but that to leave them in the belief that God has a body or any corporeal attributes is to leave them in unbelief. Thus, in all his writings, halakhic and philosophical, Maimonides makes it a fundamental principle that even ordinary persons must understand that God cannot properly be described by corporeal attributes. In Guide I 35, for example, he writes:

Just as it behooves [one] to bring up children in the belief, and to proclaim to the multitude, that God, may He be magnified and honored, is one and
none but He is to be worshipped, so it behooves [one to require] that they should be made to accept on traditional authority (תל דרכו ה-קברלז) the belief that God is not a body and that there is absolutely no likeness in any respect whatever between Him and the things created by Him.11

That corporeal attributes cannot be predicated of God and that He is unlike any of His creatures are fundamental principles of Maimonides’ thought.

How strongly Maimonides believed that even ordinary people must think of God in noncorporeal terms is also clear from his halakhic writings. For example, he lists as the third of the thirteen principles which every Jew is required to believe, that God is incorporeal. This principle, according to the Introduction to Perek Heleq, requires:

The denial of corporeality [to God], namely that we believe that the unitary being that we have mentioned [God] is neither a body nor a power in a body and that no corporeal accidents, such as motion, rest, and place belong to Him, either essentially or accidentally.12

Even more severely, he counts among heretics (מִינִים) one who believes in the existence of God, yet maintains that He has a body or a physical shape (משנה תורה הילוקות תשובה 3.15).13 For corporeal attributes would introduce multiplicity in God, and that would be a form of idolatry. Similarly he writes in Guide I 36:

I do not consider as an infidel one who cannot demonstrate that the corporeality of God should be negated. But I do consider as an infidel one who does not believe in its negation; and this particularly in view of the existence of the interpretation of Onqelos and of Jonathan ben Uziel [the traditional authors of authoritative Aramaic translations of the Torah] . . . who cause their readers to keep away as far as possible from the belief in the corporeality of God.14

The first step in Maimonides’ battle against anthropomorphism comes in his biblical exegesis. He seeks to show that even in the Bible anthropomorphic terms can have a nonanthropomorphic meaning, and he generalizes the point, taking it as legitimate to interpret all biblical anthropomorphisms in a nonanthropomorphic way. The resulting understanding is accessible even to those with no philosophic training. In chapter 11 of his Treatise on the Art of Logic Maimonides discusses the varieties of equivocal terms.15 He distinguishes six cases: completely equivocal terms, univocal terms, amphibolous terms, terms used in general and particular, metaphorical terms, and extended terms. Terms, like ‘animal’ apply univocally to man, horse, scorpion, and fish. For all these belong to the animal kind. These are inapplicable to God, since their univocal application requires some common genus, species, or common difference, whereas God and His creatures have no common genus, species, or differentia. Similarly, terms used in general and particular, like the Arabic
kawkab and the Hebrew kokhav, which in their general sense refer to any star and in a particular sense refer to Mercury, cannot be applied to God, since they refer to a genus and a member of one of its species, whereas God and His creatures cannot have this relation. Finally, extended terms, like the Arabic ṣalāt and the Hebrew ṭfillah, which at first refer to any request and later to prayer, a specific request, are inapplicable to God since these terms are related as a species to certain of its members. But God and His creatures cannot have this relation.

This brings us to the three kinds of equivocal terms that can be predicated of both God and creatures. These are terms that do not refer to an essential attribute but involve a mere nominal likeness or some accidental attribute. An example of the first such kind is ‘ayin, which in both Hebrew and Arabic signifies the eye that sees as well as to the spring of water. Such completely equivocal terms have only a name in common, not any property. These are the most likely candidates for application to God and creatures. Amphibolous terms like ‘man,’ applied to Zayd (Reuben in the Hebrew), a certain man, to his corpse, and to his picture, do relate to the notion of a human being. But their connection is accidental and not of the essence. Third come metaphorical terms, like the Arabic al-‘asad and the Hebrew aryeh, whose first meaning refers to a lion but which have a derived sense applicable to a courageous human being. As with amphibolous terms, the common factor is not of the essence.

While his exegetical method permits Maimonides to interpret anthropomorphic terms predicated of God and creatures in a non–anthropomorphic sense and thereby to resolve the anthropomorphism, it does not solve the problem of the likeness between God and creatures. For terms predicated amphibolously and metaphorically still imply some point of comparison between God and creatures. To address this problem Maimonides must turn to the philosophic interpretation of such terms. His solution is to hold that accidental attributes predicated of God must be understood as attributes of action, while essential attributes predicated of God must be understood as negations, or, more correctly, as negations of privations. But Maimonides does not require this kind of precision of ordinary people.

Maimonides shows similar leniency toward predicates expressive of passions or emotions, such as ‘merciful’ or ‘angry.’ From a strictly philosophical perspective such attributes cannot be predicated positively of God, since passions or emotions imply a change in the person of whom they are predicated. From a philosophic perspective they must be understood as attributes of action. While a philosophically trained person must be aware of this, Maimonides does not stress it as necessary for the ordinary person. In Guide I 35 he says that the addressee of the work, who has philosophic training, must understand that God is not subject to emotions or passions, but concedes that this truth need not be taught to an ordinary person. Similarly, he does not make God’s lack of emotions or passions one of his thirteen principles. Finally
he states in *Guide* III 28 that it is permissible, at least for ordinary persons, to think of God as having anger, a passion, in order that people, particularly ordinary people, will obey the Torah.

Let us examine two examples that show how Maimonides applied the philological distinctions presented in his *Treatise on the Art of Logic* to his biblical exegesis. The first is taken from *Guide* I 2, where Maimonides interprets the story of the Garden of Eden. According to Genesis, God forbade Adam and Eve to eat fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Having been tempted by the serpent, they eat from the tree and come to know good and evil, a knowledge that they did not previously possess. Maimonides addresses an interpretation that, in receiving the knowledge of good and evil and thereby becoming like *elohim*, Adam and Eve seem to have been rewarded, not punished, for their transgression. Maimonides undertakes to show that, in fact, Adam and Eve were punished not rewarded. He begins his exegesis by citing Onqelos’ interpretation of the passage, according to which the meaning of *elohim* is *ravrevaya*, that is, ruler. Maimonides reasons, following Onqelos, that the term *elohim* is a wholly equivocal term that can mean both God and ruler. The clever serpent draws upon this equivocation in the term *elohim*. The serpent suggests to Eve that, after eating from the tree, she and Adam will become like *elohim*, intending them to take this to mean “like God.” The serpent, however, is aware that the term, *elohim*, is equivocal and knows that they will become like *elohim*, in the sense of rulers, an inferior state. In becoming like rulers, Adam and Eve acquire practical knowledge, knowledge of good and evil, losing the privileged status they had prior to eating from the tree. They no longer live according to theoretical knowledge alone. On Maimonides’ interpretation, becoming like *elohim*, rulers, is a punishment rather than a reward.

An example of an amphibolous use of a term is provided in *Guide* I 3, where Maimonides criticizes persons who suppose that, in biblical usage, *t’manah* is to be understood only as figure, or physical shape. Against this opinion, Maimonides argues that *t’manah* is an amphibolous term with different meanings in different biblical passages. In one sense *t’manah* does refer to the figure or physical shape of an object, as when Deuteronomy 4:25 prohibits the making of a graven image or figure of anything (*pesel t’manat kol*). In another sense, however, *t’manah* refers to an imaginary form. For example, in Job 4:13, Eliphaz speaks of a night vision that appeared to him, a phantasm. He states that he could not discern the appearance of its figure (*mar’eh t’manah*). This passage opens the way to a second meaning of *t’manah*, as an imaginary form. Finally, the term *t’manah* refers to the nonphysical essence or nature of something, as is apparent in Numbers 12 and its declaration that the prophecy of Moses is essentially different from that of other prophets. To other prophets, God appeared in a vision (*mar’eh*) or in a dream (*halom*), both physical appearances, whereas Moses beholds the *t’manah* of God. Maimonides interprets this to mean that Moses understood the truth about God.
by way of the intellect, not the senses or the imagination. In the light of this interpretation, Maimonides interprets all biblical passages in which the term t’munah is applied to God as referring to an intellectual, nonanthropomorphic, truth about God rather than to a physical appearance.

This brings us to the section of the Guide addressed to people who have studied philosophy. We can now ask how Maimonides uses his philosophical interpretation of the Bible to resolve the perplexities, or better, the indecisions, of such people. Any interpreter must bring a set of principles to this task. For Maimonides, in the Guide, these principles stem from philosophical ideas and modes of argument. In its introduction he describes its addressee as having two characteristics: He is “a religious man for whom our Law has become established in his soul and has become actual in his belief, who is perfect in his religion and character.” Nevertheless, having “studied the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify,” he has become perplexed about the meaning of equivocal, metaphorical, and amphibolous terms appearing in scripture and, beyond that, about the concepts suggested there. Maimonides wants to help such a person see that there is no necessary conflict between biblical and philosophic ideas. Thus, in both his philosophic and halakhic writings, Maimonides identifies the biblical account of creation, Ma’aseh Breshit, with philosophical physics. He identifies the biblical description of the divine throne, Ma’aseh Merkavah, with philosophical metaphysics. The Guide, Maimonides promises, will reveal “the science of the Law in its true sense,” helping to resolve, for this student of philosophy, what he had set out to resolve for the ordinary believer by linguistic means.

Maimonides' method proceeds in two steps. He first counters fallacious philosophic arguments, showing that the arguments for the existence of God, His unity and incorporeality proposed by Kalâm thinkers are fallacious. However, in such cases as these, correct demonstrative arguments can be found. In another case, Maimonides shows that Kalâm arguments for the creation of the world are not simply fallacious. No demonstrative arguments for the creation or eternity of the world are possible. The second step of Maimonides' method is to establish a correct interpretation of the biblical text by means of correct philosophic arguments.

That philosophic arguments in the Guide are a form of biblical interpretation becomes very clear in Maimonides' discussion of creation. He states in Guide II 25 that, were it possible to demonstrate the eternity of the world, he would have readily interpreted biblical verses accordingly, just as he assigned non–anthropomorphic meanings to the Bible's anthropomorphic terms. The difference is that in the case of anthropomorphic verses there were demonstrative arguments that God does not possess a body, while for the world's eternity no such arguments exist. Maimonides devotes thirteen chapters (Guide II 13–25) to proving this point. In Guide II 19, he shows that Aristotle himself did not think he had demonstrative arguments for the eternity of the world. Even Aristotle recognized, according to Maimonides, that
arguments for the eternity of the world were only dialectical. Nevertheless, Aristotle found the arguments for the eternity of the world that he offered more persuasive than arguments for creation. Against Aristotle's eternalism, Maimonides presents arguments based on astronomical observations designed to show that irregularities in astronomical phenomena show that the world in fact was created. It is unlikely that Maimonides would devote thirteen rather sophisticated chapters in his Guide to showing that the world was created if he really believed in the eternity of the world and, further, that his arguments for creation were simply a concession to the imagination of ordinary believers.

It would seem to follow that Maimonides uses a variety of philosophic syllogisms as means of biblical interpretation. One does well to turn to the Treatise on the Art of Logic for an analysis of such syllogisms and to the Guide for examples of this kind of interpretation. Maimonides, like other medieval logicians, divided syllogisms into different kinds. There are, first of all, demonstrative syllogisms, described in the Treatise as syllogisms the premises of which are certain. These are the surest syllogisms and are accepted by all rational beings. There are also dialectical syllogisms, based on conventions. Conventional premises are known among one people but not among another. The acceptability of a premise that is known among many people is stronger than one that is known among few. However Maimonides seems to hold that dialectical syllogisms are cognitively significant, presenting a truth, even though these syllogisms are less certain than those produced by demonstration. There are also rhetorical syllogisms, the premises of which belong to tradition. Less certain than apodictic or even dialectical syllogisms, rhetorical syllogisms are still cognitively significant. Maimonides' major point seems to be that all three forms of syllogism are cognitively significant, although they differ in degree of certainty. Thus, all three forms are useful for interpreting biblical concepts for those who have philosophic training.

In light of the distinctions of the three kinds of syllogisms, we find that few concepts are demonstrated apodictically in the Guide. It seems that Maimonides' literary device for indicating that an argument is apodictic is that he presents the argument anonymously. The only arguments of this kind in the Guide seem to be those that he presents for the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God in Guide II I. He does not present philosophic arguments in support of the premises on which these demonstrations are based. He gives the conclusions of the arguments, referring the reader once again to the general philosophic literature existing in Arabic for their proof. Listing twenty five propositions on which philosophical proofs for the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God are based, he writes in the Introduction to Guide II, "Aristotle and the Peripatetics after him have come forward with a demonstration for every one of [the propositions he lists]."

We have already noted that the argument for creation is dialectical, but it appears that arguments for prophecy, providence, and similar topics are
dialectical as well. Once again, there is a literary device that Maimonides uses to indicate that an argument is dialectical: For the concept under discussion, he presents a variety of opinions that have been held, with arguments for each opinion. He then presents his own opinion, showing that the arguments supporting his view are more likely or more persuasive than the arguments for the views with which he disagrees. On divine providence, for instance, he begins by presenting the position of Epicurus, who denied providence altogether, whether general or particular, and held that everything happens by chance. Next, he presents the opinion of Aristotle, according to whom the species are determined by the laws of nature while individuals are left to chance. Then he discusses the opinion of the Ash'arites, who held that everything is determined directly by the will of God. Finally he mentions the Mu'tazilites, who present human beings as having free choice and believe that divine providence extends not only to human beings but also to animals and inanimate creatures.

Having listed these four views, Maimonides argues that the opinion of Epicurus has been disproved philosophically. But he allows that there is some truth in the opinions of Aristotle, the Ash'arites, and the Mu'tazilites. Nevertheless, these opinions are inferior to the one he proposes. Aristotle based his opinion on the nature of what exists, the Ash'arites developed their view so as not to have to ascribe to God any kind of ignorance or lack of power, and the Mu'tazilites derive their view from the assumption that God is just, for it is unjust to punish someone whose actions are compelled. However, the Mu'tazilites go too far in extending God's providence to animals and inanimate things. In this case Aristotle is right in ascribing what happens to animals and inanimate things to chance. Maimonides' own opinion is that divine providence exists, but it extends only to human beings. The effect of divine providence, even in humans, is greater or lesser, according to the degree of an individual's intellectual development.

Maimonides goes on to show that this is known by human reason, as well as by the Law of Moses. Describing his own opinion that divine providence extends only to human individuals, and not to animals or inanimate subjects, Maimonides writes in Guide III 17:

In this belief . . . I am not relying upon the conclusion to which demonstration has led me, but upon what has clearly appeared as the intention of the book of God and the books of our prophets. This opinion, which I believe, is less disgraceful than the preceding opinions [the three mentioned] and nearer than they to intellectual reasoning.

Maimonides then presents arguments in support of his opinion. Again pointing to the inadequacy of the three opinions he rejects, Maimonides describes his opinion as one that "corresponds to the intelligible and to the text of the law." While Maimonides does not describe the nature of the argument as dialectical, it is clear that it is in agreement with his description of dialectical arguments in the Treatise on the Art of Logic.
As a final point, I wish to argue that the congruence of philosophy and the Law of Moses, the *Torah*, emerges from Maimonides’ description of the prophecy of Moses. According to this description, which occurs in his *Commentary on the Mishnah* and in his *Mishneh Torah* and to which he alludes in *Guide* II 39, the prophecy of Moses is distinguished from the prophecy of other prophets in four respects. The most significant of these differences is that “the prophets other than Moses received prophecy in an allegory or riddle, while Moses received his prophecy clearly and lucidly.”

From this description it follows, as Maimonides states, that Moses’ prophecy was rooted in the intellect alone, while the prophecy of the other prophets depended on the human imagination and the senses. Describing the prophecy of Moses in the seventh of his thirteen principles, Maimonides wrote: “There remained no veil he did not rend and penetrate, nothing physical to hold him back, no deficiency, great or small, to confuse him. All his powers of sense and imagination were suppressed, and pure reason alone remained.”

Thus, the Law of Moses, the *Torah*, is as close to reason, that is philosophy, as any law can be. This closeness leads Maimonides to emphasize, in his legal writings, that *halakhah* is based primarily on the *Torah*, rather than on rabbinic deductions. For the same reason, he relies on the philological considerations laid out in the *Treatise on the Art of Logic* for his interpretation of the Bible for the masses; it is in this way that he can bring their understanding of the biblical text, and particularly their understanding of the nature of God, closer to philosophic truth. Finally, syllogisms listed in the *Treatise on the Art of Logic*—again philosophic arguments—make it possible for him to show the religious person who has studied philosophy that no contradiction exists between biblical teachings, correctly interpreted, and philosophic truths.

NOTES


2. The Maimonidean authorship of *The Treatise* has been challenged recently by Herbert Davidson, *Moses Maimonides*, 313–322. For a reply to Davidson, see Ahmad Asnawi, “Réflexions sur la terminologie logique de Maimonide et son contexte farabien,” esp. 69–78.


4. *Sefer ha-Mitzvot*, 5; English, 2.368.


13. MT, ed. Frankel, 199; ed. Hyamson, 84b.


27. For a fuller and more nuanced discussion of Moses and the Law of Moses, see Kalman P. Bland, “Moses and the Law according to Maimonides.”

28. Introduction to Perek Ḥeleq, Haqdamot ha-Rambam la-Mishnah, 371–372 (Arabic), 142–244 (Hebrew); A Maimonides Reader, 419–420.

29. MT Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 8, ed. Frankel, 60–61; ed. Hyamson, 43a.

30. Introduction to Perek Ḥeleq, Haqdamot ha-Rambam la-Mishnah, 371 (Arabic), 142 (Hebrew); A Maimonides Reader, 409. Translated here after Weiss, as anthologized in Twersky.