Introduction

Reconstructing Democracy and Recontextualizing Deweyan Pragmatism

Jim Garrison

Dewey, the neo-Darwinian, thought we lived in an ever-evolving world that required the continuous reconstruction of ideas and ideals to survive and thrive. The idea of democracy (along with the associated ideals of freedom, equality, and social justice, as well as the institutions—civil, religious, economic and such—for realizing them) is no exception. Dewey was a philosopher of reconstruction. Those who claim to understand Dewey yet do not reconstruct him for their time, place, and purpose fail to appreciate what was perhaps his most profound message. The chapters in this book recover and reconstruct Dewey for today’s postmodern, post-9/11, fragmented, and globalized world.

According to Dewey, “The most pervasive fallacy of philosophic thinking goes back to neglect of context” (LW 6: 5). He distinguishes two kinds of context: “background” and “selective interests.” We will return to selective interests later. Background comes in two kinds, temporal and spatial.
“Temporal background” refers to entrenched traditions and culture customs along with each individual’s habits of conduct acquired through cultural participation. There is also a temporal background of intellectual traditions that “differentiate it from blind custom” (12). For Dewey, intelligence, especially reflective and creative intelligence, which both critiques actual conditions and imagines and constructs alternative conditions, is the key to freedom. We liberate and control ourselves by comprehending and controlling the world that conditions our conduct.

Each chapter in this book champions cooperative social inquiry as being critical to the preservation and growth of democracy. Two chapters, those by Larry A. Hickman and Hans Seigfried, are devoted largely to democratic social inquiry. “Spatial background” covers “all the contemporary setting within which a course of thinking emerges” (13). The chapters that appear in this book recontextualize Dewey in this way, although they also are very aware of the temporal background of their reconstructions. The intellectual tradition used to provide reconstructive reflection on Dewey’s original democratic constructions is his own pragmatic theory coupled on two occasions with the original insights of Köln (Cologne) Interactive Constructivism. Each contributor relies on some version of Dewey’s theory of inquiry, although there is disagreement about its adequacy, which leads some to suggest reconstruction (see Kersten Reich, Stefan Neubert, and Charlene Haddock Seigfried) while others (see Larry A. Hickman and Hans Seigfried) seek to illustrate its surprising breadth and depth. Hickman, Neubert, and Reich are especially interested in drawing educational consequences from Dewey’s theory of inquiry, whether reconstructed or not.

Let us pause and ask about our times, our present context. What is the state of democracy today? Modern liberal democracies such as those established by the American and French revolutions assume an isolated, atomistic individual born with innate free will, innate rationality, and innate natural rights. For Dewey, freedom, rights, rationality, and individuality are contingent social constrictions dependent on intelligent inquiry, and not innate endowments. For him, “Freedom or individuality, in short, is not an original possession or gift. It is something
to be achieved, to be wrought out” (LW 2: 61). Köln Interactive Constructivism, represented here in the chapters by Reich and Neubert, obviates these contingencies, as my chapter does, directly confronting the assumptions of liberalism regarding the constitution of personal identity. Although Dewey did not think human rights and the like were innate, he did think they were tremendous cultural achievements, part of our contemporary context, that should not only be preserved but expanded. Freedom, rights, and intelligence are cultural and individual achievements for Dewey, not natural endowments. One is fortunate if they happen to be born in a nation where such accomplishments are part of the cultural background, while others must struggle for them. Dewey had a “socialist” view of liberalism that Judith Green calls particular attention to in her chapter, while Neubert and Garrison mention it in passing. It is a natural consequence of Dewey’s social constructivist theory of mind and self that is discussed to some degree in all of the chapters in this book.

Today’s neoliberals do not question any of the fundamental assumptions of liberalism, though they do tend to insist that all rationality is calculative and utilitarian instead of reflective, imaginative, and deliberative. Classic liberal economic theory was laissez-faire. Neoliberals recognize the role of Keynesian economics and the state in regulating the market, but following Milton Friedman and his mentor, Friedrich August von Hayek; they reject all other forms of socialism (e.g., social security, welfare, public schools, public health, etc.). The effect of neoliberalism is to limit the public commons to the marketplace and voting to market purchase. As Dewey said over seventy years ago, “Anthropologically speaking, we are living in a money culture. Its cult and rites dominate” (LW 5: 46). Public policy deliberation increasingly reduces to market calculation, which requires that everything have a quantitative price. Dewey’s theory of social deliberation and inquiry counters this kind of reductionism. He did not anticipate the specifics of neoliberalism, but even in his day, he was aware that “our institutions, democratic in form, tended to favor in substance a privileged plutocracy,” and he did not hesitate to place his hopes in “a socialized economy” (LW 11: 60, 63). On this and many other
matters, Dewey provides a mirror upon which to reflect upon our own times, as well as some of the tools and insights needed to ameliorate the situation.

Today, there is an influential neoconservative movement perhaps most readily recognizable in the writings of Allen Bloom and his student, Francis Fukuyama. Bloom’s mentor was Leo Strauss, who was influenced in turn by his teacher in Germany, Carl Schmitt (who was one of the architects of the Third Reich and author of the proposition granting the chancellor unlimited powers). Strauss himself believed in democracy, but only for those who were most fitted for it. According to the former student of Strauss, and later biographer, Anne Norton (2004), his work has spread through a tight network of highly influential students and disciples that currently number into the hundreds, all positioned at important spots in government, universities, corporations, and even military academies. She identifies such think tanks as the Olin, Scaife, Earhart, Lynde, and Harry Bradley foundations as bolstering and financing the movement with billions of dollars.

The neoconservatives, influenced by Plato’s idea of philosopher kings, believe only a small elite has the wisdom to rule, because only they can bear the burden of the truth. The vulgar, however, have become so powerful in even our limited modern democracies that it is only possible to control them by indirect means, using “the noble lie” conveyed by various media to shape the will of the people to the higher purposes of their leaders. Dewey wrote:

Every autocratic and authoritarian scheme of social action rests on a belief that the needed intelligence is confined to a superior few who because of inherent natural gifts are endowed with the ability and the right to control the conduct of others; laying down principles and rules and directing the ways in which they are carried out. (LW 11: 219)

Dewey fought such elitist attitudes that emphasized democracy for the people but not by the people. He addressed such attitudes in his famous *The Public and Its Problems* (LW 2), which is the focus of James Campbell’s lead chapter in this book. Dewey’s
hope was for a participatory democracy of the masses, which we will find articulated in every chapter that follows, although none mention the frightening specter of neoconservativism. For Dewey, the key to democracy is more liberating, creative, and critical learning, not miseducation for the multitude.

In many ways, neoconservatives recoil from the very idea of liberal modernity, and especially later modernity’s notions of socialism and mass democracy, which they fear leads to relativism. Deweyan pragmatism, with its constructivist, conceptualist theory of universals (concepts, categories, rules, laws), falls far short of the kind of absolutism and fixity they demand. Nothing less than a Platonic ideal of the philosopher king who has seen the eternal Forms will satisfy them. (Larry A. Hickman’s and Hans Seigfried’s chapters expound upon Dewey’s evolutionary theory of “scientific” concepts and its implications for moral concepts.) If anything is worse than modernism for neoconservatives, however, it is the rampant nominalism of postmodernism that denies the very possibility of unifying metanarratives while emphasizing endless diversity, difference, and fragmentation. Sometimes it also seems to flirt with nihilism. Deweyan pragmatism seeks dynamic and evolving unity in diversity, but it rejects the postmodern tendency to nominalism, fragmentation, and nihilism. Nonetheless, in their chapters, the two foremost representatives of Köln constructivism, Reich and Neubert, astutely show how postmodernism, properly employed, can help identify shortcomings in Dewey’s philosophy of otherness and difference as well as his failure to fully theorize power, especially oppressive power.

Dewey also was prescient about the role of religion, spirituality, and morality in modern society. He signed “A Humanist Manifesto” in the spring of 1933, along with thirty-four professors, clergyman, and writers. Part of the humanist movement in religion, it affirmed evolutionary naturalism while rejecting supernaturalism, deism, theism, and personal immortality. The manifesto emphasized the function of religion in addressing human needs, the release of human creativity, the pursuit of social justice (the kingdom of heaven on earth), and “a socialized and co-operative economic order” (cited in Rockefeller 1991, 450). It simultaneously rejected religious fundamentalism and materialistic,
atheistic, and secular humanism, such as one finds in classical Marxism, Freud, or the reductionism of logical empiricism. The chapters by Campbell, Green (with an emphasis on Dewey's metaphysics), and Hickman grapple directly with the contemporary legacy of Dewey's position, which was, perhaps, much more popular in his day than in ours. A creative tension among these chapters helps readers decide what they think about such matters for themselves.

One problem with fundamentalism (which only began around 1910), for Dewey, was that it had lost the numinous and allegorical sense of religion by thinking finite beings could grasp the literal truth of the infinite divine mystery. Another was that it often had ceased to pursue the kingdom of heaven on earth through works, while emphasizing dogmatic faith rewarded only in the afterlife. Dewey thought that, some aspects of religiosity were subject to intelligent inquiry, but, as Hickman notes, he was willing to acknowledge the religious experience, like aesthetic experience to which it is closely allied, as an immediate, noncognitive, consummatory experience in itself. Such immediately profound experience may be the source of material for inquiry but was not in itself an object of knowledge. Like all religious humanists, Dewey's spirituality sought intimate relation with existence wherein our creative acts matter in the course of creating cosmos from chaos.

Ours is a globalized world, an important part of the “spatial context” wherein the present chapters appear. Globalism refers to a constellation of economic, technological, social, cultural, and political changes involving increasing international interdependence, interaction, and integration. Some see it as a form of cultural and corporate imperialism and homogenation of diversity, or even both as the same thing. On the other hand, globalism could lead to wider economic prosperity, international collaboration, and the creative use of differences. We believe the present volume represents a positive instance of global collaboration where pragmatism, a philosophy largely associated with the United States, interrelates with Köln Interactive Constructivism that relies on, critiques, and reconstructs Deweyan pragmatism to better fit its German and European context. The result is a work that expresses a critical-creative
dialogue, across national and intellectual differences, that expresses well what a global democratic conversation might look like.

Thus far I have said nothing about the context of uniquely individual selective interests. Dewey insists: “There is selectivity (and rejection) found in every operation of thought. There is care, concern, implicated in every act of thought. There is some one who has affection for some things over others” (LW 6: 13). It is a mistake to assume that one's surroundings is one's environment. One's environment is what enters one's biological and social functioning. To what one does not attend either consciously or unconsciously, one cannot respond; it cannot influence one's conduct. All perspectives are partial and incomplete, something Haddock Seigfried makes much of in her chapter. Dewey further notes: “Interest, as the subjective, is after all equivalent to individuality or uniqueness” (14). Uniquely individual, emotionally influenced selective interests help set the immediate context of individual action, although we must remember not only individual needs and desires but also the temporal and spatial background of the culture(s) within which the individual participates. The chapters by Seigfried and Garrison both explore the all-too-often ignored embodied, emotional, and uniquely individual aspects of selective interests and their role in constituting personal identity within a pluralistic community.

The chapters in this book reflect the immediate interests of the nationalities of their authors, who are all European or North American. It is primarily a first world, North Atlantic perspective. An important part of responsible scholarship is to acknowledge, as we have, the context within which we write. Nonetheless, all of the chapters here, in one way or another, are interested in issues of difference, diversity, and inclusion. As pluralistic democrats, they all remain permanently open to creative encounters with others, although they acknowledge the difficulties. The issues raised and explored are readily recognizable to scholars globally.

Dewey identified and understood in his day many of the social, political, and economic forces still found hard at work in our time. He provides a temporal mirror for contemporary
reflection, but we cannot effectively translate him into action until we understand and reconstruct him for our age. In this introduction, I have tried to describe some of the contemporary spatial and temporal contexts wherein the chapters gathered here will find their meaning in transaction with you, the reader, with your selective interests.

Campbell’s “The Political Philosophy of Pragmatism” provides a good start for this collection. He begins by exploring six themes associated with Dewey’s chief political work, The Public and Its Problems (LW 2). First, there is the appearance of this volume in a time of grave doubts in America about the possibilities of democracy, doubts that have now grown international and are expressed by others here. Anti-democrats, such as the so-called democratic realists in Dewey’s day and the neoconservatives in ours, propose putting political matters into the hands of experts rather than the masses of people, whom they deemed incompetent to govern. Dewey rejected the claim that popular democracy had failed and proposed instead that what America really needed was more, not less, democracy. Campbell, following Dewey, rejects the claim that popular democracy had failed and proposes instead that what America really needs is more, not less, democracy. Second, Dewey asserted the primacy of the community over the individual in questions of social policy. For Dewey, publics, and eventually government, emerge when the indirect consequences of actions extend beyond those immediately engaged in producing them, so that those suffering the consequences have a legitimate interest in regulating them. The third theme involves a “pragmatic” understanding of the state as the community and its government that attempts to address the problems of shared living. For Dewey, the definition of the state is never a fixed and final form but always subject to revision. Fourth, Dewey emphasized the importance of maintaining the evolutionary flexibility of the state. Consequences emerge that were not there before, whereas other consequences cease and no longer require regulation. Because government, for Dewey, is a function and not a fixed essence, its scope, size, and shape must shift with the changing context. This implies that government in modern America suffers because of the conditions of historical liberalism present when it first emerged, and that it
must evolve to respond to the present situation. Government should be an adaptive tool for solving the problems of our times. The fifth theme, consequent on the fourth, emphasizes the need for changes in the way that we think about and carry out our political practice. Every generation must learn to cautiously abandon their traditional stance and engage in deliberate intellectual and institutional reconstruction. They must learn to rethink democracy for their time and place. Finally, Dewey emphasized the fundamental necessity of faith in the possibility of cooperative inquiry to make democracy work. Campbell considers the contemporary situation in American society, where virtually all of Dewey’s themes are neglected, and where political practice is driven by absolutism, oversimplification, partisanship, and chauvinism, and the vital communal life of democracy has withered. Campbell concludes that we need to return to procedures that are more communal if democracy is to flourish, but he finds reason to be skeptical about the possibility.

In her contribution, “Dr. Dewey’s Deeply Democratic Metaphysical Therapeutic for the Post-9/11 American Democratic Disease: Toward Cultural Revitalization and Political Reinhabitation,” Green expands on her theory of “deep democracy” developed in an earlier work. Here she examines the health of her nation and recommends a metaphysical therapeutic to restructure background assumptions within its current patterns of communication on the local, national, and international levels. She finds signs of disease in America’s anxiety over the events of September 11, 2001, and the wars it has carried out in response. Green believes Americans still long for shared democratic hope, not only among themselves but also with citizens from around the world. Instead of pursuing the hope-fostering ways of democracy, however, widespread fears have led many Americans to place their trust in military might, totalitarian nationalism, torture, and demonizing all that seems different and strange. We are ailing, but we cannot seem to agree on what ails us or how to remedy it. Following Dewey, Green recommends pragmatist philosophical inquiry and reconstruction, which she believes will require employing a limited, context-specific democratic “metaphysic” to quite inquiry. She believes Dr. Dewey’s curing system can alleviate a fourfold
“democratic disease” now epidemic in America and the West: institutional subvertibility, ideological hollowness, individual nihilism, and cultural anomie. Green thinks Dewey’s “metaphysic” provides a good physic for our poor health. Unlike traditional Western metaphysics of substance, of fixed form, and final essences, Green shows that Dewey advocated a process metaphysic that allows us to create and then recreate an inquiry-guiding and imagination-stirring “big picture” or “background map” of the world of humanly “experienced and experienceable” general traits or conditions that appear at any moment common to human existence and the wider natural world within which we live. Seeing philosophy as a “liaison officer” among different disciplines, it integrates and unifies by facilitating communicative action across diverse context-specific discourses. It allows us to reach out far beyond the academy and the problems of philosophers to address the wider problems of local, national, and global “publics” that we, as philosophers should serve.

In his contribution “Democracy and Education after Dewey—Pragmatist Implications for Constructivist Pedagogy,” Reich calls on the resources of Köln Interactive Constructivism to supplement and reconstruct the two determining criteria of a desirable community, as originally formulated by Dewey in his 1916 *Democracy and Education* (MW 9), and discussed by Campbell and Neubert elsewhere in the present volume. He begins by carefully examining these criteria as “metaperspectives” and concludes that there are some important omissions in Dewey’s discussion of both criteria. For instance, Dewey did not adequately comprehend such differences as culture, class, race, and gender. Perhaps for that reason, he fails to fully appreciate the play of power structures in creating and preserving difference in ways that often are oppressive and alienating. Further, Reich realizes, our postmodern situation, characterized by Zygmunt Bauman, for instance, is more ambivalent about notions of social progress than was Dewey. In addition, the problem of enabling democratic assent and dissent without violence and conflict has proven much more intractable than Dewey anticipated, something Campbell and Green seem willing to concede. Although they require considerable rethinking
and updating, Reich believes Dewey’s metaperspectival criteria remain valuable norms for the democratic practice of education. He focuses on two main lines of reconstruction. First, from the constructivist perspective, Reich proposes an expansion toward an “observer’s theory.” Distinguishing among the perspectives of “observer,” “participant,” and “agent” is crucial to the development of Interactive Constructivism. After considering their independent characteristics, and equally importantly their interdependence, he shows that we need an “observer theory” to fully clarify how “facts” are always constructs within the cultural context of observers. Comparing Dewey’s and Pierre Bourdieu’s construction of the role of scholarly experts in the determination of knowledge indicates, according to Reich, that Dewey’s view was too simplistic and optimistic and requires further refinement. Reich’s second line of reconstruction suggests that we should emphasize “learning” as a third criterion for democracy. Although Dewey had already attributed a crucial position to learning in the relationship between democracy and education, Reich thinks the time has come for an explicit affirmation of this as a determining criterion for the status of all democratic communities. Interactive Constructivism emphasizes that democratic learning must never confine itself to one interpretive community. Instead, it must expose itself to many interacting communities of interpretation, imagination, communication, observation, and such. He then examines how this three-tiered system could fulfill the original goals of Dewey’s criteria while rendering them more useful for dealing with issues of diversity, difference, and power. Reich concludes with a critical observation of the German school system, which does not adequately further democracy.

Continuing the use of Köln Interactive Constructivism to recontextualize and reconstruct Dewey, Neubert’s chapter, “Dewey’s Pluralism Reconsidered—Pragmatist and Constructivist Perspectives on Diversity and Difference,” focuses on questions of diversity and difference. Finding a great deal of value in Dewey’s pluralism, Neubert nonetheless asks: What use can we, today, make of Dewey’s philosophical pluralism in light of the cultural and philosophical changes that distinguish our
own situation from his? He suggests three especially promising lines of critical and creative reconstruction that can help contemporary Deweyans alleviate their own problems in a productive way. These lines concern three central and closely related issues. First, what is the meaning of social progress, and are scientific methods sufficient to secure it? Dewey’s social meliorism is not a typical twentieth-century narrative of progress; still, from the perspective of Köln Interactive Constructivism, it is perhaps better to reinterpret Deweyan reconstruction as a never-ending cycle of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction carried out among many diverse methods interacting with one another (e.g., artistic methods, therapeutic methods, educational methods, and so on). Second, what forms of social control are appropriate for the regulation of social interactions? Sometimes Dewey seems to have excessive confidence in “social engineering” and mechanistic methods that cannot stand up to the challenges of today’s globalized, postmodern, postindustrial situation. Köln constructivism recommends an approach expressed in terms of three metaperspectives. The first distinguishes three different relations to a given context, that of the “observer,” “participant,” and “agent.” These relations can be distinguished but interact so intimately that they cannot exist separately. The second distinguishes interaction of “self-observers” with “distant-observers,” while the last concerns the interactions of different levels of discourse. The third issue involves the role of difference in democratic conversation. Neubert believes Dewey requires reconstruction because he did not fully recognize the role power relations play in the development of democratic communications. While Dewey’s pluralism recognizes difference as being critical to communicative democracy, Neubert contends that he did not adequately understand the role of oppressive power in social relations, including race relations and gender relations. He draws on some of the work done in postcolonial studies to illustrate what is missing. For Neubert, a critical and creative reconstruction must distinguish between those aspects of Dewey’s philosophical approach that can best help us rethink the challenges and implications of pluralism for our own time and other aspects of his thought that were char-
acteristic of his time but no longer seem entirely convincing or helpful today.

Hickman’s chapter, “Evolutionary Naturalism, Logic, and Lifelong Learning: Three Keys to Dewey’s Philosophy of Education,” examines the sad state of public discourse in the United States, where its citizenry, its government, and even its academy evidence a serious backlash against what is best termed a scientific or naturalistic worldview. With more confidence in scientific methods than that expressed by Neubert, Hickman examines such antinaturalist positions and utilizes them as foils for a discussion of what he takes to be acceptable forms of naturalism, which are linked by Dewey’s well-crafted theory of inquiry to a robust educational philosophy that includes a commitment to programs of lifelong learning. Hickman argues that Dewey’s approach is cosmological (and therefore opposed to supernaturalism as accepting the existence of a transcendent deity or deities), yet it is methodologically pluralistic (and therefore opposed to reductive naturalism and materialism). In addition, it is scientific in the sense that it exhibits closure with respect to the space-time causal system that is studied by science. Dewey’s naturalism is also ethical in the sense that it views norms as arising out of inquiry, which is itself characterized as a natural process, into the means of ameliorating social processes and conditions. Dewey offers a religiously humanistic, but not a secularly humanistic, idea of spirituality. His theory of inquiry is naturalistic in the sense that it arises out of a biological and cultural matrix and returns to those matrices as a part of the orderly process of its work. When inquiry fails to complete this cycle, there is a tendency to vapid abstractions and other forms of irrelevance to human life. Successful inquiry is capable of bridging the putative split between facts and values that has flourished for centuries as philosophical dogma, since it views facts as selected from value-rich contexts and values as open to evaluation by augmented access to facts of a case. At its best, inquiry is a process of lifelong learning. It employs what Dewey calls “genuine” logical concepts, that is, concepts that are constructed as part of a learning process, that exhibit determining principles, and that control their own instances. Such concepts go beyond inductive and nominal abstractions to experimental
ones: they are plastic but not arbitrary. Scientific concept formation requires the identification of instances relevant to a problem at hand, the supplementation of those with instances of the same kind, and the location of identified and supplemented instances within a wider conceptual system. As such, genuine scientific concepts afford a naturalistic bulwark against non-naturalistic (including supernaturalistic) alternatives to science and provide platforms for programs of lifelong learning.

Haddock Seigfried’s chapter, “Thinking Desire: Taking Perspectives Seriously,” focuses on the perspectival character of experience and its consequences for philosophical reflection. She draws on the work not only of Dewey but also of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and Jane Addams. She meticulously examines the way that feelings, emotions, and desires influence our apprehensions of reality, that is, the context set by selective interests. Haddock Seigfried believes emotions both help and hinder communication and understanding, and that any adequate explanation of objectivity or values must properly consider them. Unless we respect the noncognitive experience of being, having, and desiring, we will never understand the broader context of knowing. Inquiry is never pure, passionless cognition, because as embodied human beings, we are “thinking desire.” Whenever we think, we think about what we need and desire, even if we desire to prove an abstract logical theorem with clarity and coherence. She argues that the flourishing of feminist, black, and multicultural perspective-based philosophies confirms the original pragmatic insights into the importance of personal and collective desire and selective interest. We are perhaps more our emotions than we are ever our thoughts. She gives Deweyan pluralism an embodied and emotional component often ignored in the discussions about difference and diversity. Since the unfairness of partial perspectives is undesirable, many attempt to eliminate them. Haddock Seigfried argues, however, that we cannot eliminate partial perspectives, so it is better to explore various ways of either learning how to combine a plurality of perspectives into a useful unity or mitigate potentially negative effects. Relying on the feminist perspectives of Jane Addams, she expands and reconstructs Dewey’s “anti-essentialist,” nonreductive, evolving, and feminist-friendly
theories of communication and inquiry. She illustrates the force for both positive and negative outcomes of emotionally pervaded perspectives by looking at the response of the U.S. government to terrorism.

Moving in the same direction as Haddock Seigfried, Garrison’s, “A Pragmatist Approach to Emotional Expression, Gender, and Identity” examines dominant sociocultural interpretations of emotional expression for clues to the construction of social identity, particularly gender identity. While each chapter in this book discusses the role of habits in Dewey’s philosophy, Garrison explicitly explores how cultural norms inscribe themselves as embodied habits that condition an individual’s social performance. He supplements Shannon Sullivan’s reconstruction of Dewey’s theory of habits and Judith Butler’s notion of how cultural norms establish scripts of gender “performativity” with some of his own work on Dewey’s theory of emotions and emotional interpretation. Garrison concentrates on what is right, and wrong, with Paul Ekman’s cross-cultural studies of automatic “affect program” responses and socioculturally mediated “display rules” that override or mask affect response programs. He examines a failed instance of cross-gender communication in a school setting in the United States that involves what Sue Campbell calls “being dismissed” emotionally and what this means for female gender construction. He also mentions an example of social class norms leading to the dismissal of an emotional response to racism. In both instances, he considers the capacity of social power to police social norms. Garrison concludes with a discussion of Dewey’s idea that creative, imaginative intelligence, not free will, is the key to freedom. Until we become reflectively aware of our feelings and habits of response and inquire into their sources and destinations, they control us instead of us controlling them. He locates an omission in Dewey’s notion of freedom, which sometimes fails to recognize the importance of material conditions in the exercise of intelligence. Garrison calls attention to the affective aspect of communicative democracy by illustrating what can go wrong in dialogues across differences.

In “Moral Norms and Social Inquiry,” Hans Seigfried discusses Dewey’s efforts to carry over the essential elements of
experimental knowing to everyday social experience. The chapter begins with a discussion of Dewey’s general pattern of inquiry where, by intelligent action, we arrive at “warranted assertions” that allow us to transform unsettled existential situations to successfully resolve the conflict. Seigfried calls attention to the operational nature not only of ideas but of facts as well, though he, like Hickman, concentrates on the former. The focus is on experimental-operational rules, axioms, and “stable and productive” formal leading principles in Dewey’s instrumental theory of inquiry. He especially seeks to emphasize the role of the “pragmatic a priori” in an effort to justify acts of what he calls “logical legislation,” by which he mean rules, axioms, and such used as normative guides to further inquiry. Such legislation is practical and not metaphysical or epistemological. The adequacy of an a priori principle (i.e., a logical form) to guide future inquiry is only derived from its past successes and, hence, is always subject to falsification and reconstruction. The second part of Seigfried’s chapter reviews the use of leading principles in the domain of social inquiry, which serves to expand the scope of application and provide additional tests of the validity of putative guiding principles. Dewey felt that social inquiries lagged behind physical and biological inquiry, not only because of their greater complexity, but even more so because they have not developed their own principles of “logical legislation.” Seigfried argues that the idea of operationally a priori principles is a more solid basis for social hope than the popular belief that the acceptance of fixed or transcendent universal moral norms in all areas, especially in advanced research and technology, will help us solve our most serious social, moral, and political conflicts. Such assumptions lead to the mistake of thinking social problems are already definitely understood in terms of the customary morality of the society, rather than realizing that they are problems, like other problems, that we may subject to critical reflection and experimental inquiry. Dewey thought that we should refrain from automatically casting social problems as moral problems. Nonetheless, he did not think there were facts independent of our values, moral or otherwise. We should seek to logically legislate the intelligent use of pragmatically a priori principles in all domains.
of human action. Each chapter here refers to Dewey’s theory of inquiry. By doing for the role of moral concepts in inquiry what Hickman’s chapter does for scientific concepts, Seigfried’s contribution brings this book to a well-rounded conclusion.

The chapters here show a smooth progression from the exposition of well-known and popular themes in Dewey’s work, such as pluralistic democracy and scientific inquiry, through a reconstruction of these themes, to the emphases on themes such as the inclusion of emotions clearly present in Dewey, though infrequently critically explored. All along the way, Dewey is challenged, revised, recontextualized, and updated in ways that should intrigue readers interested in the status of Dewey scholarship today.

Notes


   - EW *The Early Works* (1882–1898)
   - MW *The Middle Works* (1899–1924)
   - LW *The Later Works* (1925–1953)

   The volume number and page number follow the initials of the series.

2. Chapter 3 of Dewey’s *Individualism, Old and New* (LW 5) is titled: “The United States, Incorporated.” Today, “Corporate America” is a global idea associated with companies such as IBM, Exxon, and R. J. Reynolds. Much of what defines globalism is a culture of greed; often it is the continuation of nationalist colonialism by other means.

Works Cited
