Chapter 1

Introduction

Leadership is again in vogue. In part, and especially when viewed from the perspective of contemporary American politics, this phenomenon owes much to the facile equation of national leaders with their states, and states with moral purpose. Because powerful individuals can do evil things, it has seemed like a relatively short step to speak of an “axis of evil” comprised of states. This tendency is abetted by something that the “age of terror” shares with its ironic predecessor, the “new world order.” Both terms emphasize possibility rather than constraint. The former denotes the most dangerous consequences of freedom, while the latter holds out hope for the constructive application of human energy to build new institutions of peace. Either term might be appropriate in an era when the Cold War constraints of an older generation have fallen away. So leaders have again taken center stage, freed for the moment from assumptions that their performance is merely puppetry, and emboldened to believe that there might not even be a script.

In time, Americans no doubt will tire of crusading, as they always have. Yet history suggests that crusaders are never in short supply. In their moments of ascendency, including the present, social scientists tend to emphasize the possibilities of human agency. In their moments of disappointment, theories of structural constraint and the grand patterns of history return to prominence. Machiavelli’s The Prince was written in the years immediately following the collapse of the Florentine republic in 1512, as absolutist monarchies were resurgent throughout Europe, and only a decade before Martin Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the church door in Wittenberg. This was a moment of sweeping change, and it produced a treatise that remains the classic statement on the importance of skillful leadership in a permissive environment.

A more recent classic in the same genre, Sidney Hook’s 1943 book The Hero in History was written in the midst of a world war that
was also a crusade for most who took part in it. Hook had the misfortune to write only a few years before the bipolar competition between capitalism and communism would lock international relations into a condition of apparent stasis for nearly half a century. Perhaps this is one reason why leadership studies has been an academic backwater ever since. Even as the Cold War gave birth to social science, and departments of political science sprang up to replace departments of politics or government, the vibrant wartime interest in political leadership gave way to structural theories of bipolar constraint and market forces. Economics became the queen of the social sciences, and leadership became an object of study only for pundits and a few psychobiographers.

Today, two trends run counter to the preference for grand designs and structural analysis. The first is the emergent tendency of the United States to assert its power on a scale that was impossible in the late twentieth century. Accompanied by the crusading Manichaeism of which we have already taken note, this tendency is perhaps inevitably linked to a new unilateralism that rejects the multilateral designs of the previous decades as poorly suited to new, activist agendas. This is a fitting time for scholars to draw attention to leadership, regardless of whether its consequences are seen as benign or malign. A striking example of the new leadership studies is Richard Samuels’ book, *Machiavelli’s Children*. Samuels’ scope is not limited to the post-Cold War era, or to the United States. Instead, focusing on Italy and Japan, he begins with the state-building, wealth-building, and ultimately empire-building efforts of Camillo Benso di Cavour, Hirobumi Itō, and Aritomo Yamagata. He traces Italian and Japanese politics from the late nineteenth century to the present, giving a compelling account of how the sometimes similar and sometimes widely divergent choices of leaders in these two “catch-up imperialist” states have shaped their destinies. Samuel’s book is a sophisticated and meticulously researched tribute to historical contingency and the importance of leadership.

Like *Machiavelli’s Children*, this book is a study in historical contingency. Its primary focus is postwar Germany, which we have chosen because it is a relatively “hard case” for proponents of leadership studies. If leadership seemed to matter less during the years of the Cold War, it should have been particularly irrelevant in Germany, constrained as it was by powerful allies and rivals alike. We will show that German politicians had more room to maneuver than is widely assumed. In developing this argument, we follow the path taken by another exemplary work in the leadership studies genre, David Patton’s incisive study of *Cold War Politics in Postwar Germany*. Like Samuels,
Patton makes a strong case that leadership matters. German chancellors did not have the range of options available to American leaders, but they did have options. To help illustrate these alternatives, we contrast the German experience with that of another state occupying a similar international position: Japan. As in Germany, Japanese Prime Ministers often made skillful use of their limited freedom to play off the interests of their American occupiers against other forces, both international and domestic. They did not, however, always make the same choices as their German counterparts.

The argument of this book does not stop with the assertion that leadership mattered, however, or that even the leaders of second-tier states during the Cold War had real choices to make. Instead, it seeks to integrate its analysis of leadership with a theory of the available choices. Leadership studies, as a body of scholarship, has suffered not only because bipolar stability rewarded structural theory in the late twentieth century, but also because of its apparent indeterminacy. Its best practitioners, like Samuels or Patton, are sophisticated enough to avoid the trap of suggesting that anything goes. Clearly, it was not possible for Japanese, Italian, or German leaders to do anything they pleased. Nor, for that matter, has this ever been possible for American leaders. In general, however, those bent on demonstrating the relevance of leadership have not been equally intent to show the limits of the possible.

The second trend that has worked against grand structural theorizing offers a way to integrate leadership analysis with a theory of limits. The emergence of constructivist scholarship emphasizing human agency has been aided considerably by the decline of Cold War constraints. But the pioneering constructivist texts appeared before the breakup of the Soviet Union. They emphasized human agency and the possibilities for the construction of alternative political arrangements. Yet these scholars were not simply preparing for the latest historical swing in what psychologists call the person-situation debate. As a group, constructivists rebelled against the agent-structure dichotomy rather than taking sides. They were also motivated by frustration with the materialism and rationalism that typifies much social science research. They challenged the former by stressing differences in the ways people understand the material world, and they criticized the latter for its inability to understand the identity and goals of the people who make means-end calculations. By placing ideas and identities in a social context, however, constructivists also viewed agency as problematic. People are in a position to matter, according to constructivists, but they do not invent ideas or identities in a vacuum, without regard to the
social milieu in which they arise.10 It would thus be deeply misleading to view constructivism simply as another manifestation of the latest swing toward the position that leaders (or other agents) matter. It would also be a missed opportunity.

Constructivism is positioned, in principle, to do what leadership studies cannot: to develop integrated theories of choice within constraints. Scholarship on leaders and leadership speaks effectively to the problem of change, to dramatic initiatives and pivotal decisions. It does not contribute with equal ease to studies of persistent order and historical patterns. And yet this is a book about order as well as leadership. It is a book about patterns in the choices that German and Japanese leaders have made in their efforts to help build a postwar international order and to find their own place within it. To identify such patterns does not nullify the claim that their leadership mattered. Their choices were real. In fact, they made different choices. But as elites in both of these countries deliberated over the choices they faced, their debates took on a pattern that constructivism can help to make familiar.

This is a book, then, about leadership and order. It is not another volley in the interminable ping pong match between those who see power in human agency and those who see only impotence confronting the forces of history and destiny. Constructivism is an approach in social science that awkwardly, uncomfortably, and often unsuccessfully tries to position itself between agent and structure. In principle, constructivists embrace both, although most efforts to do so are trivial. Often, they tilt decisively in one direction or the other. When they achieve a balance, it is usually only by applying agency to one problem and structure to another. This book seeks a more integrated approach to the problem of international order.

ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

One of the rites of passage for students of international relations is mastering a scholarly vocabulary that treats anarchy as something closer to a synonym than an antonym for order. If anarchy is defined, as it usually is in this field, as the absence of legitimate authority to establish order, this in no way prevents the emergence of patterned behavior. These patterns are just another kind of order—one produced without an orderer.11 The student of international relations learns to look for these patterns, and to attribute them to underlying structures of the balance of power, to recurring strategic dilemmas, or perhaps to the enlightened self-interest of states that coordinate their actions to produce public goods. But there is no need, one is reassured, to look
for anyone or anything with the authority to create order. And if some entity does claim such authority, an intergovernmental organization perhaps, it is easily enough dismissed as the mouthpiece for the interests of whatever states dominate it.

In this standard portrait of international relations (standard particularly at American universities), order is a by-product rather than itself a subject of analysis. Orders do not constrain or inform; they simply emerge. Students of international relations may take a certain pleasure in discovering these patterns, but there is no need to do anything with them analytically. For many people around the world, of course, there is little pleasure or comfort to be found in recognizing this particular pattern: the preeminence of a liberal economic order over other redistributive alternatives (what was once called the “new international economic order”). The “new world order” likewise seems to many nothing more than a fig leaf for American self-interest. But again, whether one praises or criticizes a particular form of order, the order itself is all pattern and outcome. If it is to be changed, we look elsewhere for the necessary tools, and not to the idea of order itself as a tool.

This book puts order in the middle of its analysis rather than at the end. To understand why, it may be helpful to begin by considering another common use of the term. An order is not only a pattern, but also a command. It is a rule, issued by some, to tell others how to behave. No wonder the term is not often understood by international relations theorists in this way. What anarchy assumes about international relations is precisely that no one has the authority to issue orders of this sort to states. Or, even if such authority is gradually emerging in the fora of international organizations, it still seems to carry little weight when truly important matters are at stake.

The ease with which rule-giving is often dismissed in international relations stems in part from a misunderstanding of what rules are and of what they do. Some rules convey information about an agent’s desires. If the agent in question is endowed with a measure of authority, then expressions of desire may be interpreted as commands. Given sufficient authority, the commands may even be obeyed. To the degree that legitimate authority is lacking in international relations, on the other hand, so is the basis for legitimate commands. Yet placing emphasis on legitimacy, which is central to the definition of anarchy as the absence of legitimate authority, leads us away from an important point about rules. Illegitimate commands are nevertheless commands. The ability to issue commands depends not on power or legitimacy, but rather on the ability to convey meaning. The first question we should ask about rules, therefore, is not whether they are
obeyed or whether the agent issuing them has enough power to make them seem compelling, but instead whether they are understood.

When we succeed in using language to convey meaning, we also succeed in producing order. This is exactly what language does. It is an ordering system for distinguishing one thing from another and for identifying connections among these things. Statements intended to convey meaning about such distinctions are rules. Commands are a special case of rules, but all speech is an order-producing activity. To the extent that we can understand states as agents, capable of speaking, then we must understand their speech as order-producing.

This conclusion demands of the reader two considerable leaps of inference. The first is that language consists of rules giving rise, in turn, to order. The preceding discussion sketches out this claim only in a very limited and perfunctory way. The next chapter will develop it more rigorously, drawing on the work of both linguists and international relations theorists, and placing special emphasis on the emergence of constructivist scholarship investigating the relationship between language and order. The remainder of this chapter will concern itself with the other inferential leap: that it is meaningful to think of states as corporate agents endowed with the capacity to “speak,” to enter into debates, and ultimately to take policy positions. It may seem far less of a stretch to say that states enact policies than it does to say that states speak. But it should not, for policies are merely statements (of intentions, with implicit reference to interests). An account of states as “speakers” is thus eminently practical as a way of making foreign policy a useful term.

The state we are primarily concerned with in this book is the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the Cold War era. This is a challenging case, as already noted, because even if Cold War Germany were endowed through anthropomorphic magic with the faculty of speech, one might suspect that it would have had little to say. It is easy to suppose that all of its lines were scripted in committee by officials of NATO, the European Community, and the occupation powers. The next section considers and rejects this claim. German policy makers engaged in lively debates about the options available to them. We will focus in particular on German Chancellors and their chief opposition party rivals. But the point of the debates was never merely what Adenauer or Kohl, for example, would agree to. Ultimately, it was what the FRG would agree to do—and what it would say—in “conversation” with other states in Europe. By keeping this point in mind, we hope to highlight the connections between leadership studies and international relations.
A GERMAN DEBATE

The bipolar Cold War system is widely supposed to have been the central feature of international politics in Europe during most of the twentieth century’s second half. As the United States and the Soviet Union squared off against each other, potential disagreements among Europeans in each bloc seemed, at worst, a noisy distraction from the real issues. The debate that sprang up in a defeated Germany about the proper basis for a more stable and peaceful European order turns out, however, to have had a longer life than the Cold War that supposedly made it moot.

In the late 1940s, sharp differences of opinion could already be heard in the Federal Republic of Germany about how the West German state should orient itself toward the rest of Europe. On one hand, some Germans felt that their country would have to earn its independence and, in the short run, settle for institutional ties that would severely curtail Germany’s freedom of action. The nature of these ties—of European, American, or even Soviet design—was secondary to their role of placing German agency in an institutional context. Given the mistakes of the recent past, the FRG could not insist on immediate equality, so the argument went, but should instead tolerate and even foster external (most likely American) leadership while seeking to regain international trust. Close integration of German policy making with international institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Defense Community (EDC) would lessen European fears of a revival of German power. Over time, it was thought, close cooperation with other countries would restore trust and, eventually, allow the FRG to regain equality and authority. Of course, East-West politics also mattered. Since closer relations with the East might hinder the political and economic integration of Western Europe, a “policy of strength” toward the East and close ties with the West became an essential part of the institutional strategy. Yet this strategy was derivative of the “institutional” position in the German debate over Germany’s international role. Sovereignty was the ultimate goal, institutional constraint was (paradoxically) the means, and policies toward the East and unification were tertiary, though clearly important nonetheless.13

On the other side of the debate were those who disagreed not with the goal of reestablishing German sovereignty, but rather with the proposed means. Since many Germans spoke out against the Nazis and fought National Socialism from the outset, some voices within the FRG insisted that postwar Germany under the leadership of the Nazis’
former opponents had already earned political equality or that, in any event, it was an inalienable attribute of the German people. Recognizing Germany’s equal status as an agent would therefore be the sine qua non for entering into new political relationships with the West. The West German government should accept or enter into institutional commitments, therefore, only when doing so would guarantee equality and respect for German authority. Conversely, it should reject membership in institutions like the ECSC and the EDC that sought to discriminate against the FRG or to place it in a subordinate position. Adherents to this stance also argued, soon after 1945, that priority should be given to German unification and to a settlement with the East. Once again, this position followed from particular means—securing respect for German agency—that they considered essential to protecting German sovereignty. By placing the focus on German agency, they more naturally raised the question of German unification. Convinced that a solution would require Four Power negotiations, and that it would be counterproductive to alienate the Soviet Union by accepting close institutional ties with the West, they sought to reach out to the Soviets, to reject an anti-Soviet Western bloc, and to pursue a vision of an international Europe that would include the USSR.

A debate over the FRG’s proper role in a stable European order, and over the necessary requirements for achieving this order, thus took root and flourished among Germany’s leading policy makers. A parallel debate also emerged in East Germany where the political elite was, if anything, even more strictly constrained than were leaders in the West. The debate divided those who saw close ties with Moscow as a precondition for stability from those who preferred a model of “socialism in one country.” This book focuses on the West German debate over European order, however, for two reasons. First, focusing on the West avoids the confounding effects of a revolutionary communist ideology on German normative pronouncements. Second, and more pragmatically, the documentary record of these debates remains much better for the West than for the East.

These debates have in fact persisted beyond German unification, and their robustness belies claims that superpower bipolarity was the only significant feature of Europe’s international environment. This book argues that while the debates may have been animated by superpower relations and also by a variety of domestic concerns, they were nonetheless organized along lines that constructivist analysis is particularly helpful in clarifying. Bipolarity undeniably shaped the terrain on which the debate took place. So did the pragmatic concerns of everyday life in postwar Germany. Yet fundamental disagreements
over the proper relationship between national agency and European institutions informed this debate in ways that both a Cold War historiography emphasizing East-West conflict and a domestic analysis of party conflict are likely to miss.

For most people, and in most countries, the emergence of deep schisms and even the most vitriolic rhetorical exchanges among politicians are not cause for puzzlement. Rather, the willingness to enter into protracted debates would seem to be an important qualification for a career in politics. It is useful to keep in mind, therefore, that most observers have emphasized the extent of agreement rather than disagreements among postwar German policy makers. As David Patton points out, “the Federal Republic of Germany has long been known for its consensus politics.” The standard model of German politics—particularly after the Social Democrats dropped their demand for fundamental economic reform at a party congress in Bad Godesberg in 1959—emphasizes a corporatist entente among representatives of German society’s leading interest groups. In this view, debates are only for show, since government, business and labor leaders have already worked out a compromise on the next wage hike, plant closing, or interest rate policy behind closed doors. And it is precisely to these consensual arrangements that some observers attribute Germany’s postwar economic success.

As already noted, moreover, the constraints of Cold War bipolarity should reinforce the tendency toward consensus in West Germany. According to one of the preeminent scholars of postwar German foreign policy, Wolfram Hanrieder, “everyone was aware that powerful and most likely irresistible outside forces were reaching into the untested domestic political system, that the range of domestic and foreign policy options was narrow, and that the opportunities for genuine self-assertion were severely limited.” Thus, he continues, “the history of the domestic political contest over Bonn’s foreign policy is the history of a ‘great compromise’ between the Left and Right. . . . This compromise, slowly forged over the decades, was effectively imposed by the shifting political, military-strategic, and economic realities of the European and global state system.” Now, at the dawn of a new century, German politicians are so accustomed to this pattern that a politics of consultation and consensus is almost second nature, even after Cold War constraints have disappeared. Peter Katzenstein calls this a “culture of restraint” that has caused Germans to eliminate “the concept of ‘power’ from their political vocabulary.” Simon Bulmer calls Germany the “gentle giant.” And Jeffrey Anderson puzzles over “Germany’s reflexive support for an exaggerated multilateralism.” To find evidence
of a persistent cleavage among German leaders—a division precisely over how Germany should relate to other states—thus runs against the grain of the received wisdom about German foreign policies, both during the Cold War and after.

Even those who emphasize German consensus are not blind, of course, to the animosities and disagreements that occasionally disturbed the calm of the German political order. It is not their claim that Germans never disagreed, but rather that the disagreements never overturned the underlying corporatist consensus. And it is not our objective to place undue emphasis on the debates, but rather to point out that, when they occurred, they exhibited a pattern that does not reflect the party structure or other basic cleavages within German politics. In general, it is true that the Christian Democrats and the Catholic Church were more likely to support the structural-institutional position of policy linkage and careful coordination with the West, whereas members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the army, the diplomatic service, and the Protestant Church tended more often to emphasize respect for German agency and the desirability of openness to the East. By the time the SPD came to power, however, Germany had gone too far down the path to Brussels to rethink its basic postwar orientation. If the debate between institutionalists and proponents of sovereign German rights persisted—and it did—then it had to be about something else. In any case, neither vision of Germany’s role in Europe cleaved neatly to party lines.

On the contrary, numerous individuals across the political spectrum felt that Adenauer’s “all-or-nothing policy” of Western alignment was a mistake. A case in point was his chief antagonist in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Jakob Kaiser, who proposed that Germany should seek to mediate between East and West.24 Kaiser was not alone. Adenauer’s Interior Minister, Gustav Heinemann, resigned in October 1950 to protest the Chancellor’s policies on rearmament, which he felt would diminish chances for unification. Karl-Georg Pfeiderer and Thomas Dehler—both members of the CDU’s coalition partner Free Democratic Party (FDP)—were also skeptical of the Chancellor’s policies of integration with Western Europe.25 They were joined in their skepticism by German intellectuals such as Golo Mann, Karl Jaspers, and Rudolph Augstein.

Members of the Social Democratic camp were likewise split over the desirability of neutrality, to say nothing of replacing Westpolitik with Ostpolitik.26 After the horrors of the Nazi period, “neutralist and antimilitarist sentiments . . . were widespread in immediate postwar Germany, not least within the SPD itself.”27 Thus, the SPD generally opposed
participation in a national defense program, although even the leftist element within the party did not categorically reject rearmament. More important, as Bundestag Deputy Paul Baade made clear, was that the SPD preferred rearmament to follow rather than precede German unification.28 Nevertheless, the Social Democratic mayors of Hamburg (Max Brauer), Bremen (Wilhelm Kaisen), and Berlin (Ernst Reuter) supported plans for a European Army and West German membership in the Council of Europe, arguing that it would be dangerous to alienate the Western powers. SPD Deputy Fritz Erler, apparently less worried about alienating the West than his colleagues, even labeled the FRG’s exclusion from NATO “blatant discrimination.” Erler stressed that “without access to the NATO Council the Germans would be nothing more than a ‘foreign legion’ at the disposal of the Western Alliance.”29

If both external constraints and political culture arguments lead us to expect consensus rather than debate in postwar Germany, and if domestic political divisions also fail to explain the character of the debate, then what does? At least two other possibilities remain. One of these is cynical: that the “debate” was merely an electoral tactic of German politicians. This explanation is not contradicted by the poor correspondence between party lines and opposing sides of the debate, since both are judged to be arbitrary. It is at least plausible that politicians chose positions on this issue merely as a way of distinguishing themselves from their opponents, or perhaps based on other short-term political calculations that diverged from party orthodoxy. This explanation runs counter to a long-standing tradition in the analysis of party politics, exemplified by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s classic studies of the relationship between parties and electoral cleavages. In brief, Lipset and Rokkan expect parties to reflect class, religious, or other basic divisions within society.30 And yet this does not ensure that all ideological divisions within society will be strictly and equally represented at the party level. As Karl Mannheim once observed, “parties do not represent totalitarian organizations of particular strata; party lines are not the only or the essential dividing lines through the entire life of the nation.”31 Thus, it is impossible to rule out the thesis that the debate over Germany’s relations with Europe represented more idiosyncratic divisions in German society, or purely pragmatic calculations on the part of politicians, that did not correspond to party platforms.

Although this explanation cannot be dismissed out of hand, we nevertheless find it unconvincing. If it were true that German politicians chose foreign policy positions merely on the basis of short-term electoral calculations, then one would not expect to find an extended
defense of these positions over time in their speeches and writing. For this reason, chapters 3, 4, and 5 each begin by exploring the personal background and basic positions of these politicians. The chapters show that, without exception, these individuals had well thought out and strongly held convictions about the problem of order and about how Germany should relate to other nations. In view of this evidence, including their statements on the issue even before entering public life, it is difficult to sustain the argument that their policy positions were based mainly on strategic calculation and electoral circumstance. It would have been extraordinary, in fact, had leading politicians not worked out their convictions on this issue early in their careers, because it was arguably the central foreign policy problem Germans faced. For the same reason, because it was so central, it is true that German parties often incorporated statements that seem to reflect either an institutionalist or rights-oriented position into their platforms. Again, it would have been surprising had they failed to do so. In the long run, however, neither the personal convictions of politicians nor party politics are good predictors of the persistence and structure of the debate itself. There were compelling reasons for both politicians and parties to take positions on the issue, but over time these positions varied across party lines. If there was a structure to the debate, it was not purely or even primarily electoral.

The explanation that remains is that the debate possessed its own structure. This book rejects the claim that either domestic or international politics offers a complete explanation of the German debate over order. This debate addressed a fundamental, normative problem faced by postwar Germany, and it was itself an important force shaping German foreign policies. At its core, the controversy over Germany’s proper role in Europe tended to pit those who believed that rights must precede obligation against those who expected the emergence of new institutional arrangements to generate new forms of agency, re-creating German authority within a broader European context. Although this debate weaves through both domestic and Cold War politics, it can be reduced to neither. This reflects a basic social problem for modern citizens who ask their government to provide ordering principles and a regulative structure that govern both internal relations (i.e., among citizens) and external relations (i.e., among states). It is also a basic ideological problem because the most prominent modern ideologies have emerged either in concert with (and in support of) this social contract, or else in opposition to it. If ideas and ideology have an extended impact on foreign policy, then ideas about order should be among the first subjects of study. That disputes over European order remain vibrant to
this day, animating contemporary disagreements over German proposals for more federal structures within the European Union, further attests to the importance of the issues at stake.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

Germany’s choice of foreign policy after its defeat in World War II—and the internal debate that occurred over these policies—ought to be an easy case for scholars who emphasize the importance of power politics and Weltmacht. The hard realities of the international distribution of power were never more in evidence than at the conclusion of this war, with most of the world’s major economies in ruins and with the United States having emerged as a preponderant force in world affairs. It is hard to imagine circumstances more likely to make West German policy the product of forces beyond Bonn’s control. Because Germany’s relationships with other European states were widely seen within Germany as crucial to the goal of establishing a lasting European peace, and to Germany’s eventual unification, this is also a case in which domestic politics should play a large role. There was no foreign policy issue that postwar Germans cared about more passionately than the problem of order, broadly construed. It is an intriguing puzzle, we argue, that neither the international distribution of power nor German domestic politics actually gives a good account of the evolution of the German debate over international order.

It is not plausible to argue, conversely, that this is an especially hard case for a “constructivist” analysis emphasizing the independent role ideas, ideologies, and social conventions play in shaping policy. If a constructivist, normative analysis should apply to anything, it should apply to a debate over the ordering principles of international society. It is a hard case for constructivists only in the sense that, as many of those cited above would argue, a debate about values and order independent of existing partisan cleavages should not have emerged in the first place in postwar Germany. Since such a debate did emerge, constructivists ought to be able to explain it. The real challenge for constructivists has not, in fact, been finding suitable cases. Rather, it has been the difficulty of generating any empirically testable propositions at all. Postwar Germany is an eminently suitable testing ground for constructivist propositions about order if only such arguments can be devised. To explain why this has been so difficult, we should first say more about what constructivism denotes.

Constructivism is a notoriously wooly, but nevertheless highly visible, trend in many fields of scholarship, ranging from law to
psychology to international relations. No doubt, it owes some of its present cachet to a fashionable late-modern sensitivity to the ambiguities inherent in human knowledge and to declining faith in purely rational accounts of the scientific enterprise. At the same time, ironically, constructivism is optimistic in its emphasis on human agency and on the prospect that people make (and can re-make) the world in which they live. In *World of Our Making*, Nicholas Onuf introduced the term to the field of international relations and challenged both modern and postmodern conceptions of social science. Because knowledge is mediated by language (the mechanism whereby knowledge is produced and stored), and because language is impregnated with values (as suggested above in our brief discussion of rules), knowledge cannot be divorced from values. Onuf thus criticizes modern positivism on ontological grounds: knowledge of the world cannot occupy a domain separate from that of values. Instead, it occupies the intrinsically value-laden domain of language. At the same time, all knowledge-producers (speakers) are of the world and constrained by it. The limits of physics, chemistry, biology, and so on may not dictate unique scientific constructions, but it hardly follows that they are irrelevant. Onuf thus carved out for constructivism what Emanuel Adler later called a “middle ground” in debates over the prospect of advancement in social science.

The same year that *World of Our Making* appeared, Friedrich Kratochwil’s *Rules, Norms, and Decisions* also rejected an objective domain of social life in favor of the position that reason, normativity, and language are inevitably bound up together. These two works set the stage for a trickle, at first, and then a flood of other self-described constructivist studies of international relations. Of these, perhaps the most influential has been Alexander Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics*. Like Onuf, Wendt has emphasized the plasticity of social constructions, as in his much discussed claim that “anarchy is what states make of it.” *Social Theory of International Politics* extends this argument but, at the same time, defends the demands of “scientific realism” that truth claims be subject to testing. Together, these books constitute one response to a crisis in the philosophy of social science. Each accepts the impossibility of viewing science as a value-free domain, and yet each rejects the skeptical postmodern position that the accumulation of knowledge is pure illusion or rhetorical artifice.

Their considerable merit notwithstanding, the contributions of Onuf, Kratochwil, and Wendt to carving out a sophisticated, late-modern position in the philosophy of social science are probably not the main reason for the growth of constructivism’s popularity in
international relations. Ultimately, as with any body of research, scholars have demanded that constructivism contribute something to an explanation of the subjects about which they care. In other words, they have demanded a contribution of theory rather than of meta-theory. Constructivism has gradually met this demand in two ways, both of which emphasize what Wendt has called an “idealistic or social ontology” that seeks “to reclaim power and interest from materialism by showing how their content and meaning are constituted by ideas and culture.”

First, constructivism has fostered new investigations of normative constraint in international politics. Some of these works specifically take on “hard cases” when national security is at stake. Martha Finnemore has shown, for example, that humanitarian norms cultivated by the International Committee of the Red Cross and embodied in the Geneva Convention constrain both the method and the likelihood of military intervention. Nina Tannenwald shows how norms against the use of nuclear weapons have shaped leaders’ willingness to use them, or even to threaten their use. Richard Price likewise argues for an emergent taboo against the use of chemical weapons. Other constructivists have shown that international norms act not only as constraints, but also as incentives. Audie Klotz’s exploration of the impact of global norms of racial equality on the apartheid regime in South Africa is a case in point. And John Ruggie’s nuanced analysis of multilateralism reveals an institution that simultaneously constrains, informs, and motivates state policies. Such concern for norms of international conduct is not without precedent. Its pedigree stretches back at least as far as Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Emmerich de Vattel, and perhaps even to their medieval predecessors such as Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez. But in an era that, until recently, has been so preoccupied with Spartan accounts of power distribution and microeconomic theories of choice, this body of constructivist scholarship comes as a welcome reminder that social and legal norms matter even to states.

Largely distinct from this body of work emphasizing norms and social institutions, constructivists have also taken up a second ideational problem: the way agents ascribe social identities, both to themselves and to other agents. Wendt has been especially influential in urging more attention to state identity. For Wendt, identities correspond closely to social roles, and state identities thus to the roles it is possible for states to play in the international system. This is very different from the way the term national identity is typically used by specialists in comparative politics—as a measure of a nation-state’s
internal cohesion—and other constructivists in international relations have generally followed Wendt’s lead, taking the cohesive state as a given and asking what sort of state it is.47 An impressive example is Ted Hopf’s compelling account of Soviet/Russian identity. Hopf weaves together documentary and literary evidence to show how Russians carved out for themselves a distinctive modern identity—or rather a series of related identities incorporating considerations of class, great power status, and ethno-regional difference. Tying these elements together is a “master narrative” portraying Russia as a modern, progressive state.48 Iver Neumann explores another account of identity and modernity, arguing that the East was pivotal in framing national and regional accounts of European identity.49 And Erik Ringmar argues, to take a third example, that Sweden entered the Thirty Years War neither primarily for conquest nor wealth (though these were undoubtedly among its objectives) but above all to demonstrate that it was a major power and member of the family of European nations.50 Participation in the war, in other words, was a symbol of Sweden’s status in Europe.

As with the normative research discussed above, constructivist investigations of identity politics have certain precedents. Or perhaps more accurately, they typically ignore certain precedents that nevertheless seem relevant. In 1956, Kenneth Boulding proposed a new field of study—the study of images and identities, spanning the social sciences—that he dubbed eiconics. Its central idea will seem familiar to constructivists who treat identities as “social meanings” conferred upon agents. “Knowledge,” Boulding writes, “has an implication of validity, of truth. What I am talking about is what I believe to be true; my subjective knowledge. It is this Image that largely governs my behavior.”51 In a chapter on “the political process,” Boulding clarifies the relationship between political images, identities, and roles:

Political images include not only detailed images of role expectations. They also include what might be called symbolic or personalized images of institutions themselves. A symbolic image is a kind of rough summation or index of a vast complexity of images of roles and structures. These symbolic images are of great importance in political life, and especially in international relations. We think of the United States, for instance, as Uncle Sam; of England as John Bull; or of Russia as a performing bear.52

Shortly before Boulding wrote, Henry Kissinger offered an analysis of Cold War foreign policy based on the distinction between “status quo”
and “revolutionary” states. This is a more general form of the state images that Boulding had in mind, and a sufficiently compelling one that Richard Cottam took it as the point of departure for his own study of “foreign policy images.” Cottam’s argument was that a more nuanced account of national images is necessary to explain foreign policy choices. One of Cottam’s image categories—the enemy image—received particular attention during the Cold War. Yet as foreign policy image theorists are still at pains to point out, many different kinds of images are ascribed to states. States may be seen not only as enemies, of course, but also as allies, imperialists, pseudo-colonies, rogues, and so on.

Some will object that these “images” are not the same thing as identities (national or otherwise), but the distinction is hard for constructivists, in particular, to defend. If identity is a social construction, then what makes an identity real is simply that people find it meaningful. Having rejected essentialist accounts of identity, constructivists see no difference in kind between identity and image. The foreign policy images discussed by Cottam are state identities, as understood by those states’ observers. Some identities may be more institutionalized, more visible, or more widely accepted than others. But this makes them no more “real” or “true” than other, contested identities.

The real problem is not sorting out the difference between “true” and apparent identities. Rather, it is building mid-level theories that bridge the gap between the abstract work of language- or rule-oriented theorists and the pragmatic accounts of normative constraint and national identity. Constructivism has been a success story both as a workable ontological compromise and as an inspiration for accounts of international relations that treat ideational concerns as important in their own right, not as mere epiphenomena to be explained by underlying material constraints. A rapidly growing body of descriptive scholarship shows how the social norms that define and constrain agents matter greatly in the conduct of international relations. In general, however, this body of work has not generated broad theoretical statements. And when constructivists do issue broad theoretical statements, they have tended to emphasize philosophy of science rather than empirical research.

This book is an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and description in constructivist scholarship by developing propositions specifically linking philosophical accounts of language and normativity to observable patterns of normative constraint in postwar German foreign policy. Put more simply, it seeks to apply empirically the somewhat abstract language-oriented theories of Žanin and Kratochwil to a
case in which policy hinged on fundamentally normative problems. At its core, the fundamental dilemma Germany faced after the Second World War was how it ought to be construed, as an agent, by the major international powers and how arrangements among European states ought to be structured to promote international order. The objectives of German policy—sovereignty and peace—were more or less widely accepted by German policy makers. The debate over how to achieve them was a debate over both the propriety and effectiveness of different ways of achieving these objectives.

If language-oriented constructivism offers theories of anything, it offers theories of how language works to produce normative effects, to bind agents to orders. In the narrow sense, this means that what is (speech or text in constructivist ontology) gives rise to ought (normative constraint) in certain linguistically patterned ways. In a broader sense, it means that what it is possible to do with language shapes the sort of order it is possible to create in societies. This is no less true in societies of states. For constructivists who wish to advance generalizable arguments, it makes sense to start with the problem of how states advance normative claims.

Making the problem of order central to the analysis of international relations does not imply, of course, that it is easy to produce a desirable order or that any order whatsoever can be produced if only people try hard enough. Indeed, it does not compel constructivists to take a position about whether any given order is desirable. Claims to the contrary are caricatures of the constructivist position. This book will have nearly as much to say about limits on the sort of international order Germany could embrace as it will about the possibilities at the heart of German debates. It is a story of constraints as well as alternatives. Yet however limited the options were—by the international distribution of power, by alliance requirements, or by domestic politics—Germany was never so constrained that the prospects for constructing a new European order were reduced to only a single, decisive path. Ultimately, German policies were constrained not only by the pressing, day-to-day contingencies of Cold War politics, but also by an underlying philosophical choice.

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

This book will show that the same debate over Germany’s role in a broader European order has played itself out again and again among German leaders. This pattern emerged despite the constancy of the international system (which suggests that no important debate should have emerged) and despite domestic political changes and realign-
ments (which suggest that the debate should have been less coherent). The debate and the ideas behind it had a life of their own, and they live on today.

Despite its continuity, however, it is helpful to divide the debate into several distinct phases. After the war, as German politicians and occupation authorities struggled to rebuild and reform Germany’s shattered political institutions, the FRG’s economic and strategic dependence on the West served as the foundation for these efforts. This is not to say that alternative foundations were completely lacking or inconceivable. Yet the problems of order in Europe and order within Germany were intimately linked. As Konrad Adenauer and the CDU squared off against Kurt Schumacher’s SPD, domestic and international aspects of the debate over Westpolitik merged together. Chapter 3 will nevertheless show that Adenauer and Schumacher’s contrasting positions were not dictated by international or domestic constraints, but instead were informed by their own principled convictions about the necessary conditions for political order. Their convictions and their leadership shaped German policy.

As Cold War tensions eased in the 1960s, space opened for German politicians to reach out to the East. This period was undoubtedly an important transition, but not because it changed the terms of the debate over order with West Germany and Western Europe. German leadership shifted from the CDU and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger to the SPD and Willy Brandt, and foreign policy shifted along with it from Westpolitik to Ostpolitik. But party politics did not make this shift inevitable. Chapter 4 demonstrates, instead, that the shift was again the consequence of principled stances by Germany’s leading politicians. Although German policy changed, the terms of the debate remained almost exactly the same.

Finally, as Germany drew near to unification, the debate entered a third phase. Sensing the opportunity presented by Gorbachev’s reforms, Helmut Kohl embraced policies designed to bring East and West Germany together far more rapidly than the CDU had ever envisioned in the past. At the same time, the SPD that had long championed tighter links with the East grew more cautious. Party leader Oskar Lafontaine, in particular, advocated a slower pace of change. In this phase as well, and despite the enormous domestic and international stakes, the debate again reflected an established pattern of normative concerns. Chapter 5 shows that Kohl and Lafontaine engaged in essentially the same contest as their predecessors, pitting institutional and rights-based notions of order against one another.

David Patton has associated each of these eras—of Westpolitik, Ostpolitik, and Deutschlandpolitik—with distinctive political alliances
within the FRG. Each era, Patton shows, “cast asunder traditional policy alliances and created an opening to new interest coalitions.” While we accept both his periodization and a great deal of his insightful analysis of German coalition politics, we believe there is another, macrohistorical story to be told here. The broad consistency of German policy debates over European order is paradoxical on two levels. Taken together, chapters 3, 4, and 5 show that the debate persists even when Cold War constraints suggest it should not. And although this debate is frequently invoked in partisan rhetoric, the institutional and sovereign rights positions cut across party lines.

If we are correct that conditions after the Second World War placed debates over regional order at the forefront of German political discourse, then the same phenomenon should also have occurred in Japan. Chapter 6 argues that, indeed, this debate is reflected in the divergent positions of Japan’s most prominent early postwar Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, and his successor Ichirō Hatoyama. Although Yoshida and Hatoyama’s disagreements were conveyed in highly partisan terms, they were not party disputes fueled by opposing domestic coalitions. In fact, Hatoyama presided over the unification of his own Japan Democratic Party with Yoshida’s Liberal Party, forming the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that has subsequently dominated Japanese politics. Nevertheless, in Japan as in Germany, the debate over regional order has persisted. Chapter 7 explores this continuity. Not only has the discursive opposition between institutional and rights-based normative stances itself proven remarkably durable, but Germany and Japan have each exhibited pronounced tendencies within the terms of the debate. In Germany, the institutional position has so far prevailed, whereas a concern for national rights has been more prominent in Japan. Chapter 7 returns the focus to Germany to ask whether the institutional position will continue to dominate. This final chapter also considers the prospect that a third, directive and power-based position may finally re-emerge in German foreign policy.

Before examining any of these claims about the normative basis of political order, however, a fuller account of the relationship between language, obligation, and social order is urgently needed. Constructivists often invoke such terms, but the relationships between the constitutive and regulative functions of speech, between patterns of order and the normative force of language, remain imperfectly understood. Clarifying these relationships is the task to which chapter 2 now turns. The payoff is a theory of how norms sustain distinct social orders and a clearer understanding of why language itself matters so much.