CHAPTER 1

Introduction:
Nietzsche and Embodiment

PART I. OVERVIEW

We often find ourselves theorizing about why we feel a certain way. We try to guess about the sources of an ailment that we or someone close to us may have. In the case of a developing headache, we might ask, “Is the onset of this pain the result of dehydration perhaps? Or mental stress? Is it the result of environmental or psychological circumstances? Or maybe it’s from a blend of these?” We might test the first theory and drink a big glass of water, or we might explore the second by taking a long walk or resting to try to calm our mind. Just how we make sense of the origin of a headache or origins of other sorts of human experiences—not just ailments or feelings but concepts and beliefs too—is a topic that occupies the attention of Friedrich Nietzsche in many of his writings. Nietzsche, one could say, has a story to tell about origins and especially about those origins that might help him to make sense of the often confusing and complex relations we inhabit across felt and imagined human experiences, that is, across what have come to be called respectively bodily and mental experience.

Nietzsche’s medium for investigating origins of our felt and imagined experience is written language. According to psychologist Lisa Capps and linguist Elinor Ochs, “language is the greatest human resource for representing and structuring events in our lives. And no language practice has more impact in this direction than storytelling” (Capps & Ochs 1995, 13). It might seem strange that a text about the writings of Nietzsche and the idea of embodiment should begin by discussing language practice and storytelling. And yet, many commentators on Nietzsche’s writings have remarked that for Nietzsche, the activity of writing and storytelling not only creates literature but also enacts and creates a life—indeed, an embodied life.1

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Nietzsche’s writings indicate his relentless resistance to traditional and received categories of being. This resistance extends to the spheres of felt and imagined experience—traditionally distinguished in the West as “body” and “mind.” With respect to these spheres, language has generally been perceived as residing in the province of “mind.” If in fact, one questions the often-accepted borders of mind and body, as does Nietzsche, and entertains a variety of arrangements configuring new and often highly integrated relations between so-called “mind” and “body,” then attention to the concept of language in a book about embodiment seems appropriate. This is because such attention may simultaneously enact attention to the concept of body. In this context, one might think of the position of Maurice Merleau-Ponty for whom language in *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945/1962) is one of many behavioral processes integrated together and forming a whole. The whole constitutes an individual’s experience, which Merleau-Ponty calls “phenomenological body.”

A potent form of language is storytelling. Storytelling is said to be universal among all human cultures (Capps & Ochs 1995, 13). It is a potent means of making sense of, investigating, and creating human experiences and societal norms. Our stories, contend Capps and Ochs, are not diminished versions of “what actually happened,” but in an important way, indicate and shape who we are and are becoming. Our stories recruit our evolving images and recollections of an event. They make and present us as they make and present our individual and collective theories of reality. “It is not what ‘really happened’ but rather experiencers’ theories of what happened that provide continuity between past, present, future and imagined lives” (Capps & Ochs 1995, 21).

Stories bear different images or memories of an event. Some may be laden with worn images plucked again and again by the narrator(s). These repeated renditions of a story resemble and co-assemble what may come to be considered the “official story” of the event. Some stories, on the other hand, expose forgotten or obscured impressions not typically associated by a narrator or community with the event. Such stories—distinguished by their fresh configurations—unearth and pose what can be called with respect to the event, a “subjugated story.”

In the context of nineteenth-century Europe, Nietzsche’s story about origins of human felt and imagined experience could be said to be a subjugated story. It uncovers generally buried threads. As Nietzsche finds these threads, he usually does not weave them together into a neat pattern and leave them there intact. Instead he weaves a position and submits it to stress. Often the pattern and images come undone, leaving some threads available to be taken-up and repositioned by another of Nietzsche’s endeavors. The new pattern generally differs from the previous one, even if its very possibility requires for its construction the pliable elements and fertile context of the recently twisted and abandoned position.
Nietzsche’s story of origins dusts off and generates often-ignored images and overlooked combinations of images of origin-events and shows them as generative relations to one other.

Among the tales he tells, Nietzsche seems to offer none as his official story. He weaves his elaborations, entertaining one position for a while only soon to find for himself a new posture through which he might concentrate abrasive pressure on the very organizing figure or structure he had been carefully working together. Under the stress, the tale’s structure or figures may fray. Its nodes and pattern of images may partially disintegrate. Nietzsche’s tale telling about origins then, is also an exercise in investigative entertainment, disassembly, and creativity.

Stories can be helpful, destructive, or neutral with respect to their relative ability to make sense of the experience of a narrator or of that of members of a narrator’s community. For some of us living in the twentieth or twenty-first centuries, Nietzsche’s story has helped or continues to help us “makes sense” of our experience of origins. One such person for whom this is the case is Michel Foucault. In Foucault’s essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality,” for instance, we can see Nietzsche’s story about origins helping Foucault to tell his story about origins. He leans on Nietzsche’s method of excavating overlooked images or assembling atypical associations of images—a method that has come to be known as Nietzsche’s “genealogical method.” Via this leaning, Foucault’s story with the help of Nietzsche’s is able to distinguish the concept of genealogical origins from a traditional concept of Origin. Whereas the traditional concept Origin normally includes in its definition an ultimate foundation or beginning, the genealogical concept origin does not.

For others such as Robert Jay Lifton, author of The Protean Self: Human Resilience in an Age of Fragmentation (1993), and twentieth-century Japanese Buddhist philosopher, Shin’ichi Hisamatsu, author of The Fullness of Nothingness (1984) Nietzsche’s story—although not directly inspiring their stories about the concept of self—lines up with them. Lifton, like Nietzsche, views the nature of human selves as fundamentally fluid and Proteus is the Greek sea god that symbolizes this. Proteus is a god of many forms—no single form suits or sustains him and it’s this way for the human self too, says Lifton. According to Lifton’s idea of humans as protean, we are multifaceted selves—always shifting and changing. Hisamatsu likewise sees the human concept of self exceeding any single form while expressing itself in countless specific forms. In a dialogue between Hisamatsu and Paul Tillich about the relation between finite form and ultimate reality (Hisamatsu prefers to call ultimate reality: “Formless Self”)—“Hisamatsu replies that in its self-concretization Formless Self can assume innumerable forms. In the same conversation, Tillich persists in thinking that the Formless Self is somehow separate from the specific forms in which it manifests itself. But
the point is that the Formless Self does not have any form apart from the specific forms in which it manifests itself. . . . A specific form does not stand for or represent the ultimate; the ultimate is expressed, literally pressed out or injected into, the specific form” (Stambaugh 1999, 65–66).

In light of fellow story-tellers such as Foucault, Lifton, and Hisamatsu, Nietzsche’s story of origins seems to be a little less in our day, the submerged story it may have been in his. Foucault, Lifton, and Hisamatsu are just three tale-tellers among many whose stories—spanning disciplines—also show the influences of or a theoretical kinship with Nietzsche’s story. In recent years many narrators across disciplinary divides have been revising received enlightenment stories about human origins. Many have become aware of certain “official storytellers” as “official storytellers”: Kant, Rousseau, and Hegel, for instance, and, have recognized certain versions of their tales passed along by interpreters as the “official versions” but, importantly, not the only versions.

Nietzsche’s story, if still a subjugated one, seems less so in the company of stories about selves and origins told by his more recent comrades; Nietzsche’s way of “making sense” makes sense to at least some of our contemporaries. Although Nietzsche’s story seems for some to increasingly make sense—certain lineages of philosophers, psychologists, Buddhist teachers, literary theorists, and anthropologists, for instance—“making sense” is not the same as “common-sense.” As anthropologist Clifford Geertz sees it, what passes for common sense are customs agreed upon by people with shared habits, histories, and geography. Such customs are generated by particular group circumstances. Geertz insists, although “common sense” exists, universal or objective common sense does not (Geertz 1983, 75). In other words, what passes for common sense is not something that people can objectively discern across cultures independent of societal practices.

A tale-telling method—for instance, the way a narrator attempts to “make sense” of complex human experiences—may coincide with a community’s view of common sense but it need not. Making sense and common sense do not necessarily share an agreed-upon view of “reality.” Those of us living in industrialized communities may try to make sense of often complicated or confusing human experiences by telling certain kinds of stories. These stories often carry the mark of implied techno-societal assumptions. For instance, they may have logical structures that assume certain premises about individual responsibility and freedom, productivity, and scientific causal laws. Stories housing such assumptions generally reduce to an ultimate foundation or Origin. The ways that we in technological societies often try to comprehend our lives—that is, through appeals to idealism, Cartesian dualism and Newtonian cause-and-effect logic—can be said to overlap with what has come to be in industrialized communities, one form of common sense. This particular sort of common sense, and tales
drawn to its hue, harbors in it an implicit arbiter of “reality.” Saturated in dual-
ist assumptions of Plato-Cartesian ancestry, this perceived arbiter of reality is
generally associated with the European enlightenment and is sometimes called
“technological reason.” Nietzsche’s story, although at times using certain tech-
nological images and themes—generally deflects a deeply entrenched technolog-
ical view of common sense and reality coloring many of our experiences.
Because of this deflection, Nietzsche’s story remains promising territory for in-
vestigating ways human experience may disconfirm or exceed technological rea-
son. Nietzsche and Embodiment is in fact a meditation on the possibility of
discerning human experience as dynamically non-dual and Nietzsche’s pub-
lished writings provide focused resources for this investigation.

Just as Nietzsche has a story to tell about origins of certain embodied and
reflected worlds, I have a story to tell about Nietzsche’s writings. My story
started out like many stories—not quite sure where it would end up. Such a start
is in itself telling. My story of Nietzsche’s ends with a transition to the phe-
omenological writings of Merleau-Ponty. One of the points I emphasize in the
transition is that for Merleau-Ponty the act of speaking or writing is simultane-
ously the way of accomplishing the meaning of a thought. It is not a translation
of a meaning that one has “already thought of,” but rather, speaking or writing
itself is a process that accomplishes thought and its meaning. Thought and the
meaning of a thought do not happen apart from words, writes Merleau-Ponty,
just as music and the “musical meaning of a sonata is inseparable from the
sounds which are its vehicle (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 182). A person’s speech is a
person’s thought (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 180). And written or said words
(thought) are just one sort of behavioral process through which we express or ac-
complish a felt or imagined need. It is one of numerous human processes—each
of which overlaps and integrates with the others. In Merleau-Ponty’s eyes, then,
Nietzsche’s story, his story, and my story become meaningful in the telling of
them, not before.

My story of Nietzsche’s story about origins of felt and imagined experience
pays special attention to his text On the Genealogy of Morals (1887/1989). I expose
and interpret the ways Nietzsche makes sense of received categories of being, es-
specially traditional dichotomies of being like mind and body, self and other, idea
and matter, and psychology and biology. As has been widely recognized by com-
mentators, Nietzsche receives these categories skeptically. Nietzsche’s interpreters
in the last three decades have especially emphasized themes in his texts about a
loss of enlightenment concepts of reason, self, and identity. I offer a new inter-
pretation. I contend that in his writings, Nietzsche not only refuses to settle with
most traditional, often reductive or foundational, accounts of categories of being.
Nietzsche also does the following two things. First, he points to three intersecting
concepts at the non-foundational limit of his thought: dynamic non-dualism, relation, and metaphor. By dynamic non-dualism I mean a field of overlapping planes—especially the planes of the ideational, the psychosomatic, and the socio-physical. By relation I mean the being of relations without relata, that is, the being of relations without reified being. By metaphor I mean a sensation, image, or word that denotes an item as and in the place of another item. Second, through his nods to Heraclitus, Nietzsche begins to open his and our perceptual structures to modes of pre-literate human experience of which we are habitually unaware.

My view about Nietzsche then, shows him playfully advancing a non-official position characterized by three co-expanding and limiting concepts: dynamic non-dualism, relation, and metaphor, and cryptically suggesting that structures shaping perception since literacy are not the only ones pertinent or available to human speech and perception. It shows Nietzsche co-creating new bonds within and across traditionally perceived conceptual and cultural planes, all the while likewise co-creating his own felt and imagined life. As Nietzsche co-creates a story with reconfigured concepts about traditional categories, he lives his co-creation. He becomes, in an important and question-worthy way, his story. The following is an overview of the author’s story about his.

PART II. OPENING NIETZSCHE’S GENEALOGY TO “FEMININE” BODY

Nietzsche’s story in On the Genealogy of Morals (1887/1989) suggests that human beings produce a concept of what it means to be a human being at any given time in Western history according to a mutual shaping that occurs among the concept of the self and the developing constitutions of conscience and corporeal punishment. I choose these three constitutions—self, conscience, and corporeal punishment—for a couple of reasons. They are themes in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals and they constitute both the extremes and center of a relational continuum I call Nietzsche’s “dynamic non-dualism.” In chapter 2, I provisionally categorize selfhood as ideational (the immaterial extreme), conscience as psychosomatic (the center), and corporeal punishment as socio-physical (the material extreme). My conception of Nietzsche’s dynamic non-dualism displays the playfulness and co-creativity that Nietzsche shows in his refusal to accept perceived “official” enlightenment stories about the boundaries of these categories. Thus, the borders of these categories—selfhood, conscience, and corporeal punishment—are not strict, but characteristic of a continuum, overlap.

In the formation of human beings’ concept of self, a reciprocal shaping, suggests Nietzsche, occurs among the three constitutions: self (ideational), conscience (psychosomatic), and corporeal punishment (socio-physical). The way a culture establishes an interpretation and custom of corporeal punishment...
influences—and is influenced by—the constitutions of conscience and selfhood. Only after Western people perform a long labor of physical cruelty upon themselves, Nietzsche theorizes, does conscience develop a memory, making possible the idea of God, the “Platonic” fixed idea, and the idea of “eternal” guilt. This ongoing reciprocal movement within and across the planes of corporeal punishment, conscience, and human being’s idea of self points to social influences participating in the formation of meaning and its physical manifestation in people’s bodies. It points to a relationship between idea and body, and indicates that only provisional borders separate them. It points to an idea-body integration.

Because Nietzsche heightens the stature of body in the formation of the concept of self as implied above, he has been said to open Western philosophy to the other, the body. Even so, it has been said (Oliver 1955, 17–25), that although Nietzsche opens Western philosophy to the body, he does so to primarily a male body. In chapter 2, in addition to describing Nietzsche’s conception of self formation as co-participant in a dynamic non-dualism, I create a framework—using a strategy that is itself Nietzschean—through which the possibility and questionability of a symbolically feminine body begins to emerge. I do this by using the metaphor of Indian curry. The metaphor works on two levels: as a symbolically feminine body; and as Nietzsche’s conception of self-formation as a dynamic non-dualism.

The curry metaphor for Nietzsche’s non-dualism reflects the illusory target that has been mistaken for a coherent “unified” self. Nietzsche’s writing explicitly undoes the Enlightenment concept of the supposed unified self. In so doing it implicitly fractures the concept of the apparent natural woman that presupposes a unified self. I argue that with respect to the concept of natural woman, Nietzsche’s words say more than Nietzsche means. They stretch towards a feminist reappropriation.

The Indian curry metaphor symbolizes the incoherence of the supposed unified self as well as the feminine body. It ties together Nietzsche’s non-dualism with the symbolically feminine body. The logic of Nietzsche’s words, if not their symbolism, prompts one to build a bridge from his writing to a symbolically feminine body.

Additionally, many recent accounts of body by feminist philosophers aim to avoid a notion of body as biology while sustaining a non-Cartesian dualist conception of mind and body. An example of this is Moira Gatens’s concept of body in *Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality* (1996). By “body” she does not mean biology but symbolic body. Although body as biology only is problematic for a nonreductive non-dualist (for whom what it means to be a human being can be reduced neither to the mental nor the biological), body as symbolic only also remains problematic. It reduces all to the mental.
My Nietzschean account of symbolic body attempts to avoid this reductivism. I categorize the images and metaphors that configure a symbolic body as ideational. And my concept of Nietzsche’s dynamic non-dualism reveals that the ideational, by definition, is not purely idea. It overlaps planes with the psychosomatic and socio-physical. Thus, my concept of Nietzsche’s dynamic non-dualism shows Nietzsche attempting to overcome the contradiction inherent in a supposedly nonreductive nondualist conception of body that nonetheless excludes the physiological. It shows why physiology need not be excluded from a conception of feminine body. This approach makes symbolically feminine body a more convincing nonreductive non-dualism, and also could be extended to a symbolism of masculine body. Thus, it avoids suggesting that a woman—or by extension a man—is her or his biology only. It suggests that biology is not static, that women and men are not thereby limited to traditional Western roles.

PART III. NIETZSCHE’S ASCETIC IDEALS AND A PROCESS OF THE PRODUCTION EMBODIED MEANING

Nietzsche’s story examines the plausibility of traditionally perceived identities—an identity of a concept, of a moral value, of a self, or of a semantic referent. It implies that the ancestry of his felt and imagined experiences—including felt and imagined reified identities—includes, conceivably, the absence of the human experience of such identities. I explain my interpretation of his story in part by my concept of dynamic non-dualism. Such a non-dualism depicts idea and matter, mind and body, self and other, and other traditional dichotomies as reciprocally related and engaged in a motion of exchange. Such dynamism underscores in Nietzsche’s story a concept of self much like that which Lifton and Hisamatsu describe. It spills beyond the borders of any permanent traditionally hypostatized identity. Its inside and outside are not easily distinguished, in part, because the self is permeable to inner and outer influences. Moreover, just as Nietzsche’s story of the concept of self is a story reminiscent of the Greek god of many forms, Proteus, so too is his story of body and other constitutions a story about mutual integration, fluidity, and change.

My view of Nietzsche’s story about the concept of self-formation reveals a general pattern of exchange within and across the planes of ideational, psychosomatic, and socio-physical constitutions. In chapter 3 I extend my view to explore Nietzsche’s story about the concept of “ascetic ideals” that Nietzsche talks about in his “Third Essay” (1887/1989). For Nietzsche, ascetic ideals (generally an ideational constitution) names a particular lineage and style of ideals emphasizing self-denial that Nietzsche inherits as a European—and especially as a European of Protestant descent. Nietzsche investigates the lineage of the concept of
ascetic ideals. In his investigation he points to a paradox between multiple meanings for ascetic ideals co-created by humans and their environs, and an absolute meaning for them insisted upon by certain dominating “ascetic priests.”

In chapter 2, in addition to the concept of dynamic non-dualism, I introduce the concept of relation. Through the concept of relation and, in particular, an etymological argument about the concept, I reveal in Nietzsche’s writing a pattern of reciprocal relations and apparent absence of reified things. It may come as little surprise then that amid much of Nietzsche’s ascetic-ideal discourse, the concept of ascetic ideals shows itself likewise indeterminate in meaning. It too exhibits a nonreified identity. In this context, ascetic ideals is a signifier signifying and interpreted in terms of many meanings, not a single univocal one. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche reveals the importation of ascetic ideals into human existence as an attempt to fill a hole perceived to exist given the absence of absolute meaning for suffering. It distinguishes, in other words, an attempt to import into human experience proper meaning.

By proper meaning I mean both the identity of the meaning of a concept and the identity of the meaning of the being of beings per se. My criterion for proper meaning is that some form of permanent being exists and is an absolute measure and arbiter of truth. For instance, one criterion for proper meaning is that there would either be an aspect of permanence accorded phenomena or accorded their origin. Wittgenstein, in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961), distinguished between objects and propositions about objects. Objects do not in themselves involve the property of truth. Truth, if it exists at all, suggests Wittgenstein, presupposes the existence of objects. Truth, if it exists says Wittgenstein, pertains to assertions humans make about objects and states of affairs among objects. But, as Heraclitus intimates, truth presupposes in addition to objects and propositions about objects that there exists a condition of permanence either in the objects and states of affairs or in their origin (i.e., God, ideal forms, etc.). The classical Greek debate famously manifest in the contrasting views of Heraclitus and Parmenides illustrates the necessity of the existence of permanent being in order for their to be unconditional propositional truth. If indeed all being is constantly in flux, as some of Heraclitus’s fragments suggest, then there seems to be no way to stay a proposition—to attribute it “truth.” This is because the moment a proposition is stated, presumably the object and the perspective of the viewer in relation to the object will have changed. And so, if the possibility of “truth” is in question, so too is proper meaning—that is, so too is the identity of meaning of concepts and of the being of beings per se.

It may be the case that a realm of permanence does in fact exist and lend stability to our assertions about objects we experience. The existence of permanent being may be the case even if a person is not aware of it, let alone able to know or prove it. And many may assume or have faith that such a realm of permanence
exists, despite not being able to ascertain such a realm. Many forms of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and philosophy assume the permanence of being. Indeed, it remains an open question whether such permanent being or God exists. An aspect of Nietzsche’s story tries to bring to visibility the habit of making such fragile assumptions as we go about our religious and/or technological practices.

Many of these assumptions about the existence of permanent being that would ground proper meaning have been absorbed into secular variants in the West of common sense. Henri Bergson (1908/1991) addresses one manner of secular assumptions about permanence and proper meaning: “But the separation between a thing and its environment cannot be absolutely definite and clear cut . . . the close solidarity which binds all the objects of the material universe, the perpetuality of their reciprocal actions and reactions, is sufficient to prove that they have not the precise limits which we attribute to them” (209). Bergson’s questioning the discreteness of an object with respect to its environment simulates one of several ways that Nietzsche’s essay about ascetic ideals brings into view the apparent absence of invariance and proper meaning. We often assume that solidity and permanent meaning exist regarding particular objects in the world. One object for us is the concept of human being. Ascetic ideals especially concern ideals ascribing ultimate or proper meaning to human existence. Nietzsche focuses on showing the seeming absence of permanent limits to the concept of ascetic ideals—a concept which itself concerns the question of ultimate or proper meaning of being. Thus, the chapter’s interrogatory title—“What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?”—might also be worded “What is the Meaning of Meaning?”

The question of the meaning of ascetic ideals is especially abstract. It not only asks about the meaning of an abstract constitution (i.e., ascetic ideals or meaning), but, one could argue, it asks the meaning of a particularly abstract constitution: the meaning of meaning itself. Because of the especially abstract nature of the latter, I begin with an apparently less difficult topic to illustrate: a kind of reciprocation characteristic of a process of the production of meaning in Nietzsche’s concept of ascetic ideals. This first model will address the question framed by the phrase: “What is the meaning of (pre)menses?” I choose this phrase of the same structure as “What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals” because the structure of such genitive phrases harbors in itself a story that complements Nietzsche’s story. I am working with genitive phrases in which the preposition “of” is immediately preceded and succeeded by a noun. This is the case for the following three genitive phrases: “the meaning of ascetic ideals”; “the meaning of meaning”; “the meaning of (pre)menses.” By first exploring the genitive phrase “What is the meaning of (pre)menses,” I provide a grammar that obscures conventional designations of subject and object. This is because each
term preceding and succeeding the “of” acts as both subject and object. I compare this basic vision to a more developed co-constituting process among moral and definitive valuations of embodied experiences of (pre)menses. I show that as co-constituting, these factors—moral valuation, definitive valuation, and the (pre)menses constitution—are relations without relata.

As a “disease,” premenstrual syndrome has received much attention in recent decades and some include it among a category of illnesses called “socially-constructed disease.”Anthropologists, physicians, and even some philosophers are debating the status of its reality and its symptoms in relation to its primary cultural breeding ground: industrialized communities. My aim is not to take sides in this debate but to use the (pre)menses example to illustrate a process of the production of meaning implied in Nietzsche’s concept of ascetic ideals.

Using data from clinical studies of women’s experience of (pre)menses, I show that the way a culture establishes an interpretation of (pre)menses affects the way a woman physically experiences (pre)menstruation. In the West a predominantly negative valuation of menses inscribes itself both psychologically and physically in a woman’s body. This bodily inscription is reflected back to the community and confirms and further fuels the earlier pejorative valuation. The formation of that which some call a socially-constructed “disease”—premenstrual syndrome—begins to emerge. This process models the reciprocal movement in On the Genealogy of Morals that I discuss in chapter 4. It registers a culture’s valuation of a constitution and the individual’s received and reciprocating conceptualization and embodiment of that value. This general pattern that I have developed based on Nietzsche’s “Second Essay” reveals, perhaps more simply when viewed through the (pre)menses example, one of the reciprocal movements characteristic of what I have been calling Nietzsche’s dynamic non-dualism. One can begin to see in this reciprocal movement and dynamic non-dualism how Nietzsche’s story exposes an alternative to the legacy of Cartesian dualism and Enlightenment ideas of self, made possible by presupposing the being of proper concepts.

And so, by using the example of (pre)menses, I lend support for Nietzsche’s way of saying if not explaining the often-confusing relationships and experiences we feel and imagine. Nietzsche’s story, I believe, suggests that what we have tended to call respectively our mind and our body we experience as a relation without related things, that is—without discrete immaterial “mind” or discrete material “body.” If the (pre)menses example serves to illustrate Nietzsche’s story, then it seems Nietzsche’s story reciprocates by serving to expose the contemporary phenomenon of (pre)menses. Nietzsche’s story when applied to the (pre)menses example, indicates that the experience of (pre)menses is generally not a static function. In other words, when we turn from the genitive phrase, “What is the meaning of (pre)menses?” to the genitive phrase “What is the meaning of ascetic
ideals?” my view of Nietzsche’s story shows that a process of the production of meaning does not involve or produce a static function of reifiable identities.

The (pre)menses example shows that how women experience their bodies during the premenstrum is in part a function of how a society values women. It shows in other words, that that which we discover the premenstrum to be is in part a function of the role, status, and value we discover in or assign to women. Whether the pattern I develop in this model can be extended to the historical and social genesis of other apparently socially constructed diseases remains an open question, but the pattern itself is reproducible to that end.

PART IV. NIETZSCHE’S ASCETIC IDEALS
AS A PROCESS OF THE PRODUCTION OF MEANING

If extending the above model to certain other apparent bodily ills seems an open question, extending it to other concepts is not. In chapter 4 I show how the above model can help explain the genesis of one concept on which Nietzsche focuses: the concept of ascetic ideals. The general pattern of the (pre)menses example helps to show a reciprocal movement characteristic of the dynamic non-dualism I attribute generally to Nietzsche’s writing and especially to his On the Genealogy of Morals. It shows the reciprocity via a seemingly more “concrete” object of a genitive phrase, (pre)menses. In chapter 4 I show the same pattern operative through a seemingly more “abstract” genitive object: the concept of ascetic ideals. In both situations this pattern of a reciprocal movement expresses a culture’s valuation of a constitution and the individual’s conceptualization and embodiment of that value. How a woman experiences menses, or how a person experiences the concept of ascetic ideals—especially a semantic referent ascribed to it—will probably never correspond, Nietzsche’s story suggests—with a static and once-and-for-all identifiable entity. The process according to which phenomena arise for humans indicates instead that whether largely embodied ([pre]menses) or largely conceptual (the concept of ascetic ideals), phenomena lack reified existence. Phenomena seem to rise, vary, alter, or pass away according to a steady flow of complex factors.

My view of Nietzsche’s dynamic non-dualism shows the elastic and fragile origin of the concept of ascetic ideals. It implies likewise that the origin of any concept is probably like the origin of the concept of ascetic ideals. It is not—nor possesses ancestry in—an Origin. Concepts and their meanings, my story about Nietzsche’s says, originate not from a firm unchanging foundation (like Plato’s Ideas) but from a continual flow and exchange of complex factors. These factors fuel and constitute Nietzsche’s dynamic non-dualism. Through what I call Nietzsche’s dynamic non-dualism, Nietzsche’s story exposes an alternative to the legacy of Cartesian dualism and Enlightenment ideas of self. The Cartesian and
Enlightenment legacy has often been presumed possible by assuming the being of reified concepts—grounded in a firm Origin. Nietzsche’s story muddles the plot of this legacy. It peels away layers of genealogical flesh that have kept hidden from us, fruits intimating an apparent absence of reified concepts.

Nietzsche’s story peels back the skins of history. As skins are pulled back with regard to the concept he has come to call ascetic ideals and that has much to do with practices of self-denial, Nietzsche’s tale reveals for us a complex genesis. Although it seems that we all tell stories, the telling of any singular story is not, Nietzsche implies, necessary for any one of us. And yet we often cling to our stories. We often assume our stories about our pasts are necessary fixtures of who we are now, of how we might be heard and understood by others, and of who we imagine we might become. It is unconventional for people living in mainstream Western societies to believe that none of the attributes of these personal stories need be attached to us. Just because we experience an event, and perhaps integrate it into our sense of who we “are” or have become, does not mean, Nietzsche suggests, that we are—or need be—defined even partially by the event.6

PART V. NIETZSCHE ON A PRACTICE AND CONCEPT OF GUILT

Many of us in techno-rational societies try to live up to self-imposed ideals, ideals we view as proper ways of comportment. Even if they are so subtly ingrained that they flow from us prereflectively—like habits—we try to live, it seems, by certain precepts. Many of our precepts have been influenced by certain Christian or American-Puritan ethics. “Don’t be a burden” is a precept some of us tell ourselves, simultaneously discouraging interdependence and encouraging self-reliance. “Eat and drink in moderation” might be another, as well as “Keep your word.” These three precepts arguably have roots in the Plato-Christo-Protestant origins of much of Western culture. The precepts to which we hold ourselves, like mullions bending light through windowed glass, alter our self-seeing and seeing of others. When we believe we have fallen short of our internalized precepts and self-expectations—a common experience for selves in the West—our perceived inability grows up as a feeling of guilt. Chapter 5 explores Nietzsche’s writings as a critique of a concept of guilt.

We lean strongly, Nietzsche shows, into a view of the feeling (and concept) of guilt as a built-in human condition. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, some began to query this assumption. Herbert Fingarette, for instance, explores the practice and texts of ancient Confucianism and tells us that guilt is an especially Anglo-European behavior and concept. Among early Confucian-Chinese societies, he alleges, there is a concept and feeling of shame but not guilt (Fingarette 1972). Whereas shame implies a public and externalized sense of
wrongdoing—usually relating to one’s family or country—guilt, explains Fingarette, implies a private and internalized one. According to Fingarette, the Confucian of ancient China has almost no internalized sense of self nor by extension, guilt. One’s identity, strengths, and shortcomings commingle necessarily with an externalizing “self” that involves more than one individual—a “self” (more like what we understand as family) that extends to and includes one’s brothers, sisters, mother and father, grandparents—and encompasses by degree and proportionately lesser potency, neighbors, and nation-state.

In her visits with the Dalai Lama, American teacher of Buddhism Sharon Salzberg asked the Dalai Lama for advice. How does he teach his students to show metta (the Pali word often translated “loving-kindness”) for themselves and mitigate the suffering that comes from attitudes of self-loathing and feelings of worthlessness and guilt? At first the Dalai Lama doubted the importance of the question. He told Salzberg that such self-loathing is probably particular to her, implying that feelings of personal guilt are not a common form of human suffering. Indeed, he had not given the topic much thought. The Dalai Lama had difficulty fathoming it a widespread experience among any society. Salzberg continued to press him on the question, insisting that many people in the United States suffer from feelings of unworthiness. Still incredulous, the Dalai Lama proceeded to go around the room asking each person of Western background if they and those they know had had such experiences. Each said yes. He concluded that this is a great difference between his Tibetan society and those of Western descent. It seems, that based on this tale, suffering from feelings of unworthiness and personal guilt may not be a significant aspect of the lives and practices of people in all societies.

Nietzsche’s attitude toward the concept and practice of guilt like Fingarette’s and the Dalai Lama’s, invites folks saturated in Western Judaic, Christian, Muslim, or American-Puritan precepts to imagine the possibility of human lives without guilt. By questioning traditionally perceived conceptual and felt limits, Nietzsche’s story is one of several participants in this invitation.

We selves, Nietzsche tells us, seem to be immediate fields seeded and sowing permeable planes—planes traditionally (and misleadingly) understood as discrete, and as bifurcating selves and others, subjects and objects. Nietzsche’s story anticipates and even breathes into other nontraditional stories by Bergson (1908/1991), Heidegger (1927/1996), and Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), to name a few—bridges across human felt and imagined worlds. Nietzsche’s nontraditional story with respect to a dominant Western practice and concept of guilt, like to that of ascetic ideals—shows the production of such a practice and concept happening according to the concepts of dynamic non-dualism and relation.

At the beginning of my introduction, I described Nietzsche’s storytelling method in terms of Nietzsche positioning competing substories. Nietzsche, I
wrote, rarely weaves a substory without also weakening the story by challenging it. Among these substory positions, none is an “official” position. And yet, in telling Nietzsche’s story thus far, I have emphasized two concepts: dynamic non-dualism and relation. If one contends that dynamic non-dualism and relation consistently guide Nietzsche’s story, does one not suggest that Nietzsche’s story does offer an “official story,” if not a traditional one? Is one’s view of Nietzsche’s, in the end, contradictory?

PART VI. NIETZSCHE, METAPHOR, AND BODY

Does Nietzsche offer in the final analysis not so much a bunch of mutually mobilizing stories, but instead a privileged story among them—one that settles his view of the way things are such that the concept of dynamic non-dualism and relation becomes a sedimentation that is Nietzsche’s story of “reality”? Chapter 6 answers these questions by turning to Nietzsche’s 1873 text, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” (1999), which becomes pivotal for the argument. It is by 1873 that Nietzsche has shed the residue of Schopenhauerian metaphysics—of ‘correct perception’ and its cause—arguably present in his The Birth of Tragedy (1872/1967). As critical to this part of Nietzsche’s story is an aspect of Nietzsche’s tale-telling revealed by Eric Blondel.

According to Blondel, Nietzsche’s writings indicate that the body constitutes reality as it interprets it. For Nietzsche the bodily drives do not reproduce an object. They include simultaneous capacities to constitute and interpret. These dual capacities to constitute and interpret, co-create, and comport the very objects of our experience. I contend that for Nietzsche the body’s status as interpretation is made possible in part “as metaphor and through metaphor.” Indeed, the concepts of dynamic non-dualism and relation respectively could in this light be said to be instances of metaphor. I emphasize like Blondel and at least one recent Nietzsche interpreter, Tim Murphy, that the concept of metaphor works for Nietzsche as a (non)foundational basis of language, concepts, and perception.

One view opened up by the concept of metaphor in Nietzsche’s writings is Aristotle’s definition of metaphor. Aristotle writes in Poetics (trans. 1941) that the concept is logically “proper” and the metaphor “improper.” Metaphors, says Aristotle, compare items that belong to one category of being to items housed in a completely different category. Because metaphor involves carrying an item out of its allegedly proper sphere into an improper sphere, metaphor is logically improper, suggests Aristotle.

A view like Aristotle’s emerges in “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” when Nietzsche describes human sensory and intellectual experience as a multiplicity of translations or transfersences from one sphere to another. There
is no right perception of an “item”—no proper object nor any proper sphere. There are, rather, permutations of constellations of forces as they move within and across arenas. Here I consider any conceivable part of a whole—or whole “itself”—an arena. All phenomena could be said to be metaphors in the sense that they are translations of or stand-ins for an item. The item may have been otherwise because of the effect of memory and the passage of time regarding the item/metaphor, as memory translates the item/metaphor from one moment to the next within an arena; or it may be otherwise because it is being perceived across arenas, let us say to the arena of smell, and thus is translated by the nose into a scent.

For instance, I might come across a hillside of grey-green sagebrush. I smell its scent. It is a fragrance too complex to generalize by words like “pungent,” “cleansing” and “astringent.” My perception of the sagebrush fragrance does not capture any aspect of the sagebrush in a proper sense. The scent I perceive is more like a translation of, or metaphor for, certain sagebrush forces. The bitter-fresh scent may in turn be translated again into another metaphor as it becomes a memory for me—a simplified brand of the initial smelling experience and of an entirely different composition. I might later discuss the idea of “sagebrush” in a botany class and conjure in my mind the abstract concept “sagebrush.” For me and other students respectively, the abstract concept “sagebrush” stands again as a metaphor—this time further removed from one’s experience of particular sagebrush bushes than the first two. In each of the sagebrush phenomena above—in the smelling, the scent remembering, and the sagebrush conceptualizing—each can be called a “metaphor.” Each carries over, literally metaphors or translates from one time or arena into an entirely new time or arena.

The sagebrush example suggests the absence of any proper human experience of sagebrush. It illustrates the sort of anthropomorphizing of forces that Nietzsche discusses in “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.” Another living being, like a bird or a tree, Nietzsche writes, will not share a like translation of the sagebrush, but will create and share among its kin like translations or metaphors of them. These shared metaphors are not identical but more similar within than across species.

In this part of Nietzsche’s story emphasizing metaphor and conceptual propriety, proper meaning appears—as in parts described earlier—not to exist for humans. Nietzsche’s apparent elevating of the improper over the proper, this time, in the form of the metaphor over the concept—parallels an aspect of what I call relations. It also overlaps with an aspect of the concept of dynamic non-dualism. It does so through a new linguistic and conceptual prism: through the language and concept of metaphor. Whether using the language or concept of metaphors, relations, or dynamic non-dualism, in all three cases one names constellations
of forces that are identifiable only provisionally. With respect to their “objects” respectively, a metaphor, a relation, and a dynamic non-dualism is not proper but protean and otherwise-ing.

My argument emphasizing the concept of metaphor in Nietzsche’s writings adds new folds to this shared protean fabric. It shows Nietzsche’s metaphors deliberately blurring a distinction between mind and body. It shows cognitive imagery and language typically associated with intellection configuring Nietzsche’s descriptions of physiology, and diction often linked with the body illustrating the intellect. One effect of Nietzsche’s switching the traditional attendant imagery and language is an obscuring of a perceived boundary between body and intellect. Another effect is that a switch in priority takes place. Because the language traditionally associated with intellect has typically been more positive than that linked to the body, in Nietzsche’s accounts there is, conversely, an elevation of body over intellect. The concept of body now has in its territory the flattery usually attending the concept of intellect. Vice versa, adjectives such as “obtuse,” “dumb,” “irrational,” and “simplistic”—typically attending descriptions of the body—cluster around the intellect. A reversal of values occurs. The body is both conflated with (if not entirely) cognition and playfully and strategically elevated above it. As Nietzsche conflates body and mind, he distinguishes them too, in part by interposing the body between the chaotic forces of the external world and the simplified concepts of the internal mind. My view is similar to Blondel’s on this point. For Nietzsche, the body unites the mind and impinging forces of the outside world into an interpenetrating non-dualism according to which a mixing, but not a reductive merging, of difference occurs. Nietzsche’s mix tries to interconnect, but not reduce, body to mind or mind to body. It tries to avoid a reductive material or spiritual monism while at the same time trying—via the hypothesized mix—to avoid a Cartesian-like dualism.

If for Blondel, Kofman and Murphy, however, the concept of metaphor names the primary way, if (non)foundational, to understand body as interpretation for Nietzsche—that is, to understand human perceptive and linguistic experiences—my view differs in the following way. It steers away from an implied reduction of Nietzsche’s philosophy to the concept of metaphor. That is to say, it avoids understanding itself in terms of a single if (non)foundational basis. “As and through metaphor,” I contend, articulates only one way that Nietzsche suggests humans can say and experience their (non)foundational status as beings. My interpretation of Nietzsche’s story points to at least two others. It points to the concept of dynamic non-dualism and it points to the concept of relation. These three concepts—dynamic non-dualism, relation, and metaphor—say “the same” idea. According to my position, the same idea however does not exist determinately. Each of the concepts describes this same idea through a different argument.
My interpretation of Nietzsche’s story could not be articulated independently of the three concepts and their respective arguments, language and style. This is not to say that these three concepts are the only ones through which this same idea might be articulated. My argument divulges, perceives, and co-constitutes the concepts of dynamic non-dualism, relation, and metaphor with Nietzsche’s text. It exists as and through these three variegated concepts. It exhibits itself through their splayed sameness, and through their implied interstices and spontaneous ruptures in Nietzsche’s writing.

The concepts of dynamic non-dualism, relatedness, and metaphor, then, are the same in that they say the same idea and different because they speak different arguments and styles. Specifically, the concepts are the same for these reasons: each involves an array of origins but not a proper origin; and each reveals impermanence and change as persisting factors of force configurations. The arguments of the concepts are different in these ways: Nietzsche’s story says the concept of dynamic non-dualism in terms of a triad of overlapping planes; one ideational, one psychosomatic, and one socio-physical; it says the concept of relation in terms of a buried etymological argument of the German word Verwandtes; it says the concept of metaphor in terms of human perception, language and concepts operating from metaphor as their (non)foundational foundation. The three concepts, then, are both the same and different.

For Nietzsche, I show in chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, that there appear to be no proper concepts. If one applies the idea of the absence of proper concepts to the concept of dynamic non-dualism, it means that the concept of dynamic non-dualism is the same as itself and yet not identical to itself. This is because the concept of dynamic non-dualism appears to have no persisting identity. In a weakened but parallel manner to the self-relation of a concept, the concepts of dynamic non-dualism, relation, and metaphor can be said to be similar but not identical to one another.

Moreover, each of the three concepts names a (non)foundational basis that can be said to permeate, flexibly organize, and disrupt a centralized ordering of all three by any one. This works like a balance of power. Each of the concepts configures an argument that can be said to tie together (in its own manner) all three of the concepts. The concept of dynamic non-dualism displays an architecture that is (non)foundational for Nietzsche’s story. Its tri-planed architecture provides geometrical strategy for conceptualizing Nietzsche’s undermining of Cartesian dualism. It provides a spatially oriented structure with which to associate and envision the concepts of relation and metaphor. The concept of relation shines light on the rich entanglements of Nietzsche’s words—their etymologies serving as a wealth of excavated goods for showing the historically qualified origins of apparent Origins often perceived as unqualified. It provides a thesis about the (non)foundational ancestry of a word: To associate this thesis with the concepts of dynamic
non-dualism and metaphor lends an added vantage point from which to consider the arguments displaying the other two concepts. Indeed they too are scripted in words with etymologies even if they are not ostensibly about words and etymologies. Likewise, the concept of metaphor expands the set of angles for beholding and living the concepts of dynamic non-dualism and relation. New vistas emerge when aspects of the concepts of dynamic non-dualism and relation are considered both in terms of certain metaphors I produce to symbolize them, and in terms of the layers of “meta-phor” or “trans-lation” constituting in general a subject’s perception of objects, and in particular a reader’s perception of my argument about Nietzsche’s story.

Nietzsche’s story of interpretation locates the concept of metaphor alongside those of dynamic non-dualism and relation. Each of the concepts appears to be similarly basic and (non)foundational in Nietzsche’s story. Each expands, complements, and challenges the organizing logic of the others. Each remains permeable to the forces of the others. My argument about the concept of metaphor in Nietzsche’s writings differs from those of Blondel, Kofman, and Murphy because it views in it the described limited stature. The concept of metaphor competes among other possible (non)foundational foundations in Nietzsche’s writing. My interpretation of Nietzsche’s story plies out the possibilities, bringing three into relief. In a position to answer the chapter’s opening questions, I show why asserting the (non)foundational intersection where the concepts of metaphor, dynamic non-dualism, and relation cross as Nietzsche’s official story about the “real” recoils in at least three ways.

PART VII. NIETZSCHE AFTER NIETZSCHE

If Nietzsche’s writings stand out for their wariness of an official story, they nonetheless stand with at least some scholarly and artistic inquiry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in their exploration of human experience as dynamically non-dual. Indeed, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Nietzsche’s story can be said to be less a submerged story than in preceding centuries.

Like the writings of Nietzsche, the writings of phenomenologists Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas have been recognized by many as providing alternatives to a Cartesian-dualist and Enlightenment-subjectivity worldview. If Nietzsche’s response to Cartesian dualism, enlightenment subjectivity (i.e., Kant), reductive materialism (i.e., Marx), and reductive idealism (i.e., Hegel) is not the only nineteenth-century response, it is one of the most effective. In the purview of twentieth-century phenomenology, the same might be said of the writing of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. For this reason, chapter 7 extends the project beyond Nietzsche to the ways Merleau-Ponty approaches some of Nietzsche’s concerns.
A phenomenological approach provides one of the most promising ways to contend with inquiries of Nietzsche. Methods of phenomenologists are more structured than those of Nietzsche. Although I do not want to suggest similarity between Nietzsche’s methodology and that of phenomenologists, striking commonalities do exist among some of their assumptions, themes, and emerging insights.

Two such similarities regard the concepts of “concept,” “self,” and “origin.” Merleau-Ponty, for instance, suggests an absence of a proper limit to any of our felt or imagined experiences of each. Like Nietzsche, he tells of beginnings, but not a beginning; of appearances of concepts—including the concept of self—but appearances whose borders shift and fade away into a horizon imperceptibly. And although it would be wrong to attribute to Merleau-Ponty’s story the dynamic non-dualism, relationality, and metaphor I attribute to Nietzsche’s, a comparable concept emerges in Merleau-Ponty’s writings. This is the concept of Gestalt. According to the concept of Gestalt, human experience is a whole, not dual (mind and body). And as a whole, it unites mind-body-world while maintaining multiplicity and singularity. It unites them in a story that uses the language of “intention,” “motivation,” “direction,” “desire,” “sexuality,” “expression,” and “thought” to describe elastic and intertwining human behaviors. Using a more visibly structured method than Nietzsche’s story, Merleau-Ponty’s story invites comparison to Nietzsche’s. It dynamically unites—or tries to—traditional dichotomies of mind and body, interiority and exteriority, and subject and object.

There has been increasing attention to the writings of Merleau-Ponty in the last two decades. I emphasize themes of trauma with regard to corporeal adaptation. Few have placed Merleau-Ponty’s work in conversation with contemporary trauma studies, or acknowledged a concept of trauma implicit in Merleau-Ponty’s writings. I show Merleau-Ponty’s thought illuminating ordinary experience through an examination of the extraordinary—traumatic experience. What becomes visible is corporeity existing as communication that varies from primordial to complex; and that such communication is rooted in corporeity that directs itself outward to delineate itself and make of itself a presentation; and elasticity and interpenetration across the overlapping planes of human behaviors.

Merleau-Ponty appeals to the case studies of brain-injured men, and amputees of World War I—survivors of “physical” and “psychological” trauma. If Merleau-Ponty implies the exceptional status of trauma for his project, he nonetheless leaves virtually unexamined the concept of trauma. In chapter 7, I begin such an examination. I specify three kinds of bodily adaptation—anatomical, technological, and verbal—and show each as expressions of fulfillments of preconscious desire. My analysis looks especially at these three modes of adaptation when they are responses...
to trauma, that is, when they are in the throes of living and adapting to human being’s most demanding kind of preconscious desire.

Two kinds of bodily adaptation are anatomical and technological adaptation. By anatomical adaptation I mean the prereflective bodily process according to which organs, tissue, veins, and other aspects of anatomy shift to accommodate bodily needs stimulated by changing conditions (i.e., a developing callous on a part of the body newly exposed to repeated pressure or friction). By technological adaptation I mean a dually reflective and bodily process. Our body exercises reflection and built-technology in order to accommodate bodily needs that are not or cannot be met by anatomical shifting. One would first reflect and “make-up”15 an adaptive apparatus to meet a felt need (i.e., imagine a chair to relieve the pain of one’s feet) and then actually build the apparatus (build the chair to actually relieve the pain).

Important here is the way corporeal responsiveness reveals anatomical and technological adaptations to exist as communication. In the case of anatomical adaptation, I examine processes of spinal nerve systems after spinal cord trauma. Complex communication (learning and memory), traditionally presumed exclusive to the more complex cerebral neurons above the spinal cord, has been shown in recent studies of spinal-cord trauma to occur below the cerebrum. Attempting to survive the new circumstances after an injury, spinal neurons vigorously interrogate, respond to and learn from their new conditions. The nerve processes of a spinal-cord injured body can be seen reorienting themselves and creating new strategies for survival in the altered conditions. This is significant because it challenges traditional views that separate bodies from minds by allowing for complex communication—traditionally associated with mental and cerebral activity—to happen below the cerebrum. The disclosure of such creative activity independent of the cerebral cortex allows us to “return” language to the “place” it has always been: our bodies and nature.

If some felt needs are successfully met by anatomical responses to them, others are not. In these circumstances, corporeity often responds by building technologies for a person with a certain disability in order to meet a need typically managed independently by persons without the disability. Such technologies—a prosthesis or wheelchair for example—extend our lived bodies beyond our anatomies. If technological adaptation does not, as anatomical adaptation, return communication to the interior organs of anatomical body, it reorients and newly demarcates the exterior surface of body as a signifying symbol. By revealing that corporeality is a self-designated self-showing intending itself to be seen by others as a symbol of oneself, we can see that a body that accrues assistive technology is compelled to re-structure itself for itself and others as a self-designated self-showing. The broad significance of technological behavior
is similar to that in the example of anatomical behavior. It shows communication operating not merely above the spinal cord but amidst the lived body, thereby returning language to bodies and nature.

A third kind of bodily adaptation is verbal adaptation. A mode of verbal adaptation of speech that I explore is narrative storytelling. Merleau-Ponty only implicitly indicates the role such storytelling might have in expressing or fulfilling a preconscious desire (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 177–193). To lend informed explicitness to Merleau-Ponty’s study, I consider Judith Herman’s *Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror* (1997). Judith Herman is a clinical psychiatrist. Her case studies focus almost exclusively on male survivors of combat and female survivors of rape. Combat and rape trauma, Herman writes, are the two most prevalent forms of trauma for men and women respectively in the twentieth century. In *Trauma and Recovery*, she documents combat and rape survivors reintegrating and reconstructing traumatized memory through speech.

Merleau-Ponty differs from Herman in that he does not emphasize recovering through storytelling. My argument shows that Merleau-Ponty and Herman’s analyses fill lacunae in one another’s projects. For both Merleau-Ponty and Herman, human experience of trauma creates an overwhelming preconscious desire in the survivor. Moreover, for Merleau-Ponty, speech or thought shows itself, like other behavioral processes (phantom limbs, anatomical adaptations, technological adaptations), to be born of preconscious desire. Speech is an additional way corporeity expresses such desire. The work of both Merleau-Ponty and Herman shows how bodily adaptation in the mode of speech, can express bodily desire and create a sense of meaning, the roots of which spring from prereflective yearning absent of the eventual meaning. In comparison to the two previously discussed adaptive modes, verbal adaptation points not so much to a process of communication below the cerebrum, nor to a technologically extended corporeity redemarcating one’s surface symbolism of self. Rather, verbal adaptation points to one’s reflective experience—and correspondingly, one’s relationship to others—becoming restructured. This can involve reassessing one’s religious or philosophical convictions and compel one to a new organization of one’s metaphysical views and self-understanding. Changes in one’s self-organization reverberate out, often requiring whole-scale restructuring of one’s relationships with family members, friends, and social communities. Verbal adaptation does not dissolve extreme preconscious desire born of traumatic experience; it appears instead to be preconscious-desire inspired expression that can lead to a pragmatic reorganization of oneself. The significance of verbal adaptation mirrors that of anatomical and technological adaptation in two important ways. First, verbal adaptation exhibits one’s reflective life tied to bodily desire, showing it rooted
there. Second, having returned language (here understood as reflection) to the body, an analysis of verbal adaptation also shows the body “returned” to a natural environment that includes a community of others.

In addition to describing verbal, anatomical, and technological adaptation, chapter 7 proposes a more general thesis: that trauma for Merleau-Ponty operates as a magnifying extreme that makes visible, dynamic adaptations of our verbal, anatomical, and technological bodily processes. These processes show lived body as an intended self-showing rooted in and displaying bodily desire. Finally, that each of the explored bodily processes (speech, anatomy, and assistive technology) participates in a shared aim of self- and other designation, also underlines Merleau-Ponty’s view of human experience as a dynamic whole. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s thought can be compared to Nietzsche’s. It too suggests an experience of self and world as non-dual.

PART VIII. NIETZSCHE BEFORE NIETZSCHE

Not only after Nietzsche’s death, but before his birth, stories akin to Nietzsche’s appear. In *Twilight of the Idols* (1889/1968b), Nietzsche singles out the early Greek philosopher Heraclitus. Heraclitus is one of the few philosophers in the West, says Nietzsche, deserving praise. Just what is the significance of Nietzsche’s favoring Heraclitus? And just how does its significance bear upon one’s view of the concepts of dynamic non-dualism, relation, and metaphor in Nietzsche’s story? In chapter 8 I consider how the concept of dynamic non-dualism could be said to relate to the sayings of Heraclitus. Nietzsche offers only a few cryptic comments about why he respects Heraclitus so. Because Nietzsche offers little actual analysis of the writings of Heraclitus, I root my interpretation of Nietzsche’s attitude toward Heraclitus in my interpretation of select Heraclitean fragments.

In certain fragments of Heraclitus, one can find a story different from that which Nietzsche calls “Socratism.” Nietzsche notes that there is a tendency in the European cultural and intellectual tradition to privilege reflective intellection over prereflective physiology. This tendency is generally bad aesthetics, Nietzsche writes, and can be seen emerging with Socrates. Nietzsche attributes to Socrates the unleashing of this “poor taste” and calls it Socratism. It was Socrates, Nietzsche writes, who emphasized that that which is beautiful must also be intelligible. It was Socrates who launched this basic premise of Socratism, Nietzsche alleges in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

My interpretation of Heraclitus’s story shares similarities with my view of Nietzsche’s story. It shows that Heraclitus’s fragments help Nietzsche to fend off Socratism’s associations of the beautiful with intelligibility. Heraclitus’s fragments can be said to undermine this proto-modern aesthetic via three preliter-
ate perceptual structures visible in the fragments. The first shows the possibility of the existence of human prephonetic speech and writing to depend upon the animal creatures, vegetative life, and geo-elements of the natural sensuous environment. This is significant because it suggests that the possibility of abstract thought—often understood in Christo-Platonist dominant cultures as the human capacity that renders human life separable from other forms of earthly life and from the human body as well—also depends upon a “more-than-human world.”17

The second preliterate perceptual structure visible in several Heraclitean fragments, points to, like Nietzsche’s writings, an obscured boundary for distinguishing subject and object. A conflating of subject and object happens in those of Heraclitus’s sentences which dispense with a subject-object construction. Such sentences are unlike most in the West in the last 2,500 years—sentences in which the structure generally implies the existence of a subject and an object. Some of Heraclitus’s sentences, by contrast, are structured by a verb tense of ancient Greek that specifically obscures the distinction of agent and patient and tenses the event midway between subject and object. This Greek-verb tense is called the middle voice.18

The third and perhaps most striking similarity between Nietzsche’s and Heraclitus’s speech respectively is the implied absence of a proper origin and permanent self. Although the two preliterate perceptual structures above implicitly point to such an absence, Heraclitus’s concept of psyche explicitly does. It indicates a human perception of self that has not yet made the eventual transition from an indeterminate “Homeric” to a sedimenting “Platonist” self. A perception of psyche (soul or self) that some say persists from the time of Homer to roughly 500 B.C.E.19 is not yet viewed as having a so-called “proper” conceptuality and origin. The concept of psyche has not yet come to be experienced as persisting, identifiable, and rational—attributes emerging especially with the reception and preferred interpretations of the writings of Plato and Aristotle. The traditional view that such attributes do attend one’s self-understanding is not to be confused with the writings of Plato and Aristotle per se.

Each of the characteristics I enumerate above—(1) a perceptual existence that depends upon a “more-than-human” sensuous world; (2) sentence structures that obscure traditional boundaries of subject and object; and (3) an indeterminate concept of self—possesses characteristics akin to those implied by concepts of dynamic non-dualism, relation, and metaphor. They show kinship between Nietzsche’s story and Heraclitus’s. Such kinship may explain Nietzsche’s affection for Heraclitus. It shows that well before Nietzsche, a story with resemblance to his appears. Most important, Nietzsche’s nod to Heraclitus’s speech opens his and our arguably constricted speech and perceptual structures

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to possible understandings and opportunities from which we could benefit and of which we are habitually unaware.

Thus, although Heraclitus and Nietzsche’s styles are anything but similar, some of their remains appear as next-of-kin. Notable is their shared sensibility about origins and human selves. For both, human origins appear for us as no Origin. We humans, they suggest, seem to continually begin again, renewing and reshaping origins that, however freshly present, forge a trail of complex ancestry. And as we start, it would seem, we have choices. We can choose to tell cousin-stories about starts. My examination linking Nietzsche, Heraclitus, and Merleau-Ponty chooses such a start. It indicates that we can choose whether to tell versions of official stories or unofficial ones—of ones that anchor our renewed origins in an Origin, or ones that do not. We can choose to frame our stories from the middle of a cultural stream, or from the water’s edge. Whether we choose to proceed from the one or the other, is any one of our telling stories in the end necessary? If not, should this dissuade our telling them?

It has been said that the telling of our stories is not only important but self-defining. What we say about ourselves and our world shapes the texture of who we are. For those of us living in a society aware of its own modern and postmodern situatedness, a human Origin is often in question. The meaning in our lives, some would say, seems primarily to emerge from that which we ascribe it and create. It has been said that, in a related sense, we become our telling ascriptions. And yet, if we become our stories, do we un-become them too? If no story is necessary, then we are not—in any precise sense—any one of our stories. If we wanted to stop telling a story rooted in certain personal memories, could one? And if one could, would one become accordingly otherwise? My analysis of Nietzsche’s story says yes and yet, not so easily. Nietzsche’s story says an agon—a struggle. We are free if by “unfree” we mean unable once and forever to change certain essentia. We are unfree if by “free” we mean “the foolish demand to change one’s essentia arbitrarily, like a garment” (PTG 7).