Chapter One

MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S RELATIONSHIP TO ARISTOTLE

Heidegger’s Phenomenological Reading of Aristotle

Martin Heidegger is a key figure in twentieth-century philosophy. His work on Aristotle, a strong focus in the early stages of his career, plays an important role in the genesis of his thought and has a formative influence on his unique understanding of phenomenology. In some regards, one could rightfully claim that it was his reading of Aristotle that made it possible for him to redefine for himself the task of phenomenology, a philosophical direction and method first articulated by his teacher, Edmund Husserl. In fact he says as much in his essay, “My Way to Phenomenology.” More important for the purposes of this book, Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle had a significant impact on Aristotle scholarship in Germany in the early part of the twentieth century, and the controversial and revolutionary implications of his interpretations of Aristotle, and ancient Greek philosophy in general, continue to help shape the resurgence of interest in ancient Greek philosophy among continental philosophers today. Even in America, where the study of Greek philosophy is dominated by the Anglo-American methodological approach, Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle have indirectly impacted scholars through the work of Leo Strauss and others. Indeed, Strauss was a student of Heidegger’s in Freiburg at the time of the Aristotle breakfast club, as Heidegger’s early morning Aristotle classes were dubbed. These seminars and lectures were attended not only by Strauss but also by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hannah Arendt, and many other well-known students of Heidegger.

Heidegger had already taught several courses on Aristotle in Freiburg before going to Marburg, and several of his students went on to become well-known Aristotle scholars in their own right. There is ample testimony from these students of Heidegger about the philosophically formative effect...
of these seminars. Often, according to their own accounts, their work was presented under the direct influence and guidance of Heidegger’s early lecture courses. Thus, Helène Weiss, in her work on Aristotle, says: “I have freely made use of the results of Heidegger’s Aristotle interpretation which he delivered in lectures and seminars.” The Aristotle works of Walter Bröcker, Ernst Tugendhat, Karl Ulmer, and Fridolin Wiplinger, among others, are all equally indebted to Heidegger’s revolutionary interpretation of Aristotle.3

In this book, I hope to recreate at least a little of the excitement among ancient Greek scholars that was generated in Germany by Heidegger’s early phenomenological readings of the Greeks. In the last few years, several of the Aristotle courses have become available due to the publication of the Collected Works of Heidegger. These Aristotle courses were given over a span of many years, and I should begin by acknowledging that I will not primarily be tracing a developmental thesis, as others have done with regard to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, and its influence on his major work, Sein und Zeit.4

Many Heidegger commentators5 consider Aristotle’s work to be one of the most influential forces in the development of Heidegger’s own philosophical approach. Heidegger himself attested to this in his essay “My Way to Phenomenology”:

The clearer it became to me that the increasing familiarity with phenomenological seeing was fruitful for the interpretation of Aristotle’s writing, the less I could separate myself from Aristotle and other Greek thinkers. Of course I could not immediately see what decisive consequences my renewed preoccupation with Aristotle was to have.6

Though not the primary focus, one of the purposes of this book will be to demonstrate and assess the impact of Aristotle on the development of Heidegger’s thought.7 Heidegger’s major work, Sein und Zeit, was published in 1928. Prior to this, he taught in Freiburg and Marburg, and many of his courses were on Aristotle. In 1922, he offered a course entitled Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Ontologie und Logik.8 In 1924, he gave a course called “Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie,” one that appeared in 2002 as Volume 18 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe.9 This course, which focuses in large part on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and Rhetoric, was followed by a course now published as Platon: Sophistes that contains a lengthy analysis of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics Book VI. Over the same period, he offered other seminars on Aristotle’s Ethics, De Anima, and Metaphysics.10
This confrontation with Aristotle continued into the twenties and thirties with courses on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, *Metaphysics*, and *Physics*, as well as extended analyses of Aristotle’s treatment of logic and truth.

Since so much of Heidegger’s work in the early twenties was focused on Aristotle, it stands to reason that Aristotle is a hidden interlocutor in Heidegger’s first major published work, *Sein und Zeit*. But the explicit attributions and references to Aristotle in this work are few and far between, outside of section 81 where he offers his well-known, but brief “destruction” of Aristotle’s treatment of time in *Physics* IV.11 Much speculation has been written regarding the unpublished and incomplete final division of *Sein und Zeit*, which promised an extensive, critical reading of Aristotle. Much of this speculation assumed that Heidegger would have demonstrated in that unpublished portion of the text the oblivion of being that occurs through Aristotle’s work and subsequently in the history of Western philosophy.12 And indeed, this may well have been a dimension of his ultimate aim. However, it is now clear from the increasing availability of his early Aristotle courses that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is far from critical in that sense. What he for the most part offers instead is a revolutionary interpretation of Aristotle that aims to show his “greatness,” not because he gave birth to metaphysics, which is not untrue, but because he preserves, even in the face of his teacher Plato, an echo of originary Greek thinking. Heidegger tries to draw out of the inherited texts of Aristotle the resonances of this more radical way of thinking, if only in the end to be able more genuinely to trace the ambivalence and undecidability at the heart of Aristotle’s thought. Recently, with the publication of Heidegger’s *Collected Works*, these early, formative courses are beginning to be published. Several of them have been translated into English. The result of the increased availability of these materials has been a significant surge of interest in the question of the role of Aristotle in the genesis of Heidegger’s unique understanding of phenomenological philosophy.13

Heidegger scholars such as Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan in the United States are certainly correct in the pivotal role they assign to Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle in the development of Heidegger’s thought prior to *Sein und Zeit*.14 Indeed, Heidegger acknowledges in *Sein und Zeit* his indebtedness to ancient Greek philosophy as the impetus for his own original work: “But the question touched upon here is hardly an arbitrary one. It sustained the avid research of Plato and Aristotle, but from then on ceased to be heard as a thematic question of actual investigation.”15 One recent Italian author, Franco Volpi, went so far as to title one of his essays: “Being and Time, a translation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean
Ethics?” In chapter five, I attempt to offer an account of Sein und Zeit that, in agreement with Volpi, sees this work as having been made possible in part by Heidegger’s discovery that Aristotle’s practical thinking is ontological and offers an account of human community that does not fall prey to the limitations of normative or biological treatises on human behavior. Part of my task in this book, then, will be to examine these lecture courses on Aristotle and the link they provide to a fuller understanding of Heidegger’s own thought.

The major thrust of this book, however, will not so much be concerned with a better understanding of Heidegger through his reading of Aristotle. Rather, the focus will be on what we can learn about Aristotle from Heidegger. We will discover, in examining many of the most central of Heidegger’s works and essays on Aristotle, that the prevalent, long-standing belief that Heidegger reads Aristotle as the metaphysician par excellence is erroneous. Those who assume that Heidegger’s philosophy involves an overcoming of the forgetting of being that starts with Aristotle’s distortion of early Greek thinking will be surprised by what they read in this book. As suggested earlier, this false impression of the confrontation between Heidegger and Aristotle stems in large part from the announced final division of Sein und Zeit, which never appeared and was supposed to have contained a detailed destruction of Aristotle’s account of time. But Heidegger’s well-known essay on Plato’s teaching on truth, so critical of Plato, no doubt also led many to assume that if Heidegger sees Plato in this way, as having transformed truth into correctness and representation, then so much the worse for his student Aristotle. But, instead of a critique of Aristotle as the first metaphysician, Heidegger offers a persuasive and revolutionary rethinking of Aristotle’s work, which he argues is more original and radical than that of his teacher Plato. Heidegger goes as far as to claim: “Aristotle never had in his possession what later came to be understood by the word or the concept ‘metaphysics.’ Nor did he ever seek anything like the ‘metaphysics’ that has for ages been attributed to him.” Indeed, Heidegger directly associates his own understanding of phenomenology with Aristotle’s philosophy. In The History of the Concept of Time, he writes: “Phenomenology radicalized in its ownmost possibility is nothing but the questioning of Plato and Aristotle brought back to life: the repetition, the retaking of the beginning of our scientific philosophy.”

Many of Heidegger’s most important essays and volumes on Aristotle are, in actuality, extended translations of key passages from the texts of Aristotle. These interpretative “philosophical” translations and commentaries
open up a new way of reading Aristotle that challenges many long held philosophical views that are embedded in more standard, though often less “faithful,” translation decisions. Indeed, much of the very vocabulary and central concepts of philosophy, for example, substance and accident, essence, potentiality and actuality, matter and form, and so on, are inherited from a Latinized version of Aristotle. Thus, Heidegger’s new “translations” of these terms and concepts often challenge presuppositions about Aristotle rooted in “metaphysical” interpretations of his terminology. Through these translation/commentaries on key passages in the central texts of Aristotle, Heidegger opens up a way of understanding the entire corpus of Aristotle’s work that demands a radical rethinking of our traditional assumptions about this “father” of Western thought. These texts also help to dispel the unjustified impression conveyed by critics of Heidegger that he disregards philological and scholarly care in his “speculative” interpretation of Greek philosophy. Even though Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of key passages from Aristotle may force us to reexamine our basic understanding of Greek philosophy (and therefore of the Western tradition), nevertheless these interpretations remain thorough and careful renderings of Aristotle’s thought that derive their force from the texts themselves. They also teach us how to read texts in a philosophically penetrating way. In a course on Book Θ1–3 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Heidegger says of this kind of reading of Aristotle: “It is necessary to surpass Aristotle—not in a forward direction, in the sense of a progression, but rather backwards in the direction of a more original unveiling of what is comprehended by him.”

The dialogue between Aristotle and Heidegger spans across the horizon of Western culture and is itself a richly philosophical endeavor; one that, in a manner of speaking, transcends the privileged, isolated domain of either thinker alone. In the next section, I will address a series of issues regarding hermeneutics in general, and related questions of history and tradition, that call into question the space within which we are attempting to do philosophy here, the space between ourselves on the one hand, and Aristotle and Heidegger on the other, namely, the space of commentary.

What It Means to Read Aristotle as a Phenomenologist

In 1922, Heidegger wrote a lengthy Introduction to a book on Aristotle he was planning for publication. This Aristotle book itself never appeared, eventually supplanted by Sein und Zeit, which was presented for

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publication in 1927. Prior to this Introduction to a book on Aristotle, Heidegger published only one work, his 1915 habilitation on Duns Scotus. Yet he had become a famed teacher. It was on the strength of his Duns Scotus work, as well as his teaching reputation, that Paul Natorp invited him to apply for a position in Marburg. To obtain this position, Heidegger put together in three weeks this Introduction in order to outline his plans for the book, and explain the historically situated, hermeneutic framework of his research on Aristotle. Of course, it was a distillation of the work he had done in weaving together phenomenology and Aristotle over the course of several preceding years.

In the plan for the Aristotle book that he sent to Natorp, Heidegger begins by presenting some remarks on the hermeneutic situation involved in any contemporary reading of Aristotle. As in his Introduction to *Sein und Zeit*, he speaks in this essay of the need for any ontologically fundamental approach to begin with a destruction of the history of philosophy. Heidegger understands this deconstructive reading not only as an overcoming of the bias and prejudices that arise from an unclarified relationship to the past, but as a movement between destruction and retrieval. Hermeneutics not only dismantles the tradition, it also retrieves an authentic philosophical dimension of that tradition that tends to get covered over in the uncritical way in which the tradition is handed down. This double movement of destruction and retrieval is not to be understood as two separate stages of philosophical investigation, where one moves from the first task to the second, but rather as a belonging together and reciprocity between these two tasks such that this double movement is itself Heidegger’s way of returning to Aristotle. Ironically, it becomes evident that Aristotle also practices this way of philosophizing, as can be seen in Book I of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle begins by situating his own philosophical questions in relationship to his predecessors. For Aristotle, this task is not merely a preliminary investigation, but a philosophical way of recovering and discovering the questions that motivate his own project.

The overall objective of Heidegger’s preliminary discussion of hermeneutics is to show that originary philosophy today requires a return to Aristotle. That is, by turning to Aristotle we can free philosophical inquiry for the possibility of genuine questioning that constitutes it as philosophy. Thus, Heidegger quotes Hegel favorably, in his essay “Hegel and the Greeks,” when Hegel says: “If one were to take philosophy seriously, nothing would be worthier than to hold lectures on Aristotle.”22 It is not for the sake of Aristotle, or because Aristotle is somehow privileged in his access
to being, that Heidegger and Hegel say this, but rather because of their hermeneutic appraisal of the contemporary philosophical situation.

Why is philosophy always a double movement of destruction and recovery? Because, Heidegger contends, philosophy, as ontology, is fundamentally historical. The genuine pursuit of the question of being, the task of philosophy, is the same as the pursuit of the historical meaning of being. To recover the meaning of being requires a gathering back of that which is the ongoing source of tradition. The meaning that this historical approach to the question of being uncovers, as we know also from *Sein und Zeit*, turns out to be time. Already in 1922, Heidegger has in mind that the return to Aristotle will permit a more radical investigation of the question of time.\(^23\)

Ontological research, according to Heidegger, is basically historical in character. The situation of understanding is hermeneutical, that is, always already found in an interpretation, historically embedded. Any philosophical, systematic articulation of the categories of being must therefore remain historical. Heidegger is attempting to reach beyond the division of system and history:

If the basic question of philosophical research, the question of the being of entities, compels us to enter into an original arena of research which precedes the traditional partition of philosophical work into historiological and systematic knowledge, then the prologomena to the investigation of entities in their being are to be won only by way of history. This amounts to saying that the manner of research is neither historiological nor systematic, but instead phenomenological.\(^24\)

In explicating the facticity of understanding—in his 1922 essay he calls this the hermeneutic situation—Heidegger uncovers the major difficulty that must be considered in all attempts at philosophical inquiry. Any reading of Aristotle that professes to let what Aristotle says be seen from itself must first of all make explicit and let be called into question its own situation, and the horizon in which it operates. The possibility of truly being addressed by an ancient text on its own terms requires that we free ourselves from our familiar and customary horizon. The task of interpretation then becomes a genuine questioning in which we open ourselves to the possibility of new paths and perspectives. Because of this tendency in history to cover over the originary questioning that discloses being, the task of phenomenology becomes what Heidegger calls the “destruction” of the tradition. The destruction of the tradition has the positive aim of destructuring the sedimented deposit of knowledge in order to set free the creative roots and vital sources that are preserved in this history.
Philosophy is defined by Heidegger as the attempt to open up again the domain of originary thinking, and the release of this radical questioning. In contrast, Heidegger suggests that Western metaphysics, while governed by such originary, radical questioning, often holds these questions in a repository. In *The End of Philosophy*, he says that metaphysics “can never bring the history of being itself, that is, the origin, to the light of its essence.” The tradition is viewed as a deposit of doctrines that develop and progressively work out the meaning of being. Aristotle and Greek philosophy are thereby taken to be primitive expressions of truths that have since been incorporated or superseded by a higher development and systemization that surpass it.

It is clear from Heidegger’s writings that he considers a de-structuring of Aristotle’s works to be essential if philosophy and thinking are to be set free for their proper task. But simply returning to Aristotle is not so simple. If it is true that every historical epoch of philosophy owes its impetus to the Greeks, it is also true that our interpretation of the Greeks has derived from assumptions rooted in later history (Scholasticism, for example). And this confusion is not accidental. It reflects an essential characteristic of interpretation itself (fallenness). But we should not cast Heidegger’s hermeneutic project of reading Aristotle in terms of an attempt to view Aristotle as a non-metaphysician. Such a project would be naive. Heidegger says: “The greater a revolution is to be, the more profoundly must it plunge into its history.” The return to the origin of the tradition is not a return to a past that is now over. Heidegger says: “Repetition as we understand it is anything but an improved continuation with the old methods of what has been up to now.” The historical life of a tradition depends on a constantly new release and interpretation of the overabundance that cannot be confined to any one saying. Language is founded on this unsayable origin, and the disclosure of this originary *logos* is essentially a creative and poetic response to being.

The way in which one gives expression to an understanding of being is not arbitrary. It is not our own planning or direction that makes possible a genuine conversation in which we bring what is yet unthought in the history of being into the open. Rather, it is our opening ourselves to listen with an ear that is sensitively attuned for the unthought and unexpressed possibilities hidden in the tradition. The creative word that expresses this hidden source of a text does not merely describe what is present, but calls it forth by returning it into the unconcealment of its being. A human being can uncover the hidden possibilities for thought only insofar as he first listens to the meaning of being that addresses and claims him through the text. “Destruction means: to open our ears, to make ourselves free for
what addresses us in the tradition as the being of beings. By listening to this address, we attain the correspondence (Entsprechung).” Only if we are attuned and ready to let it say something to us will the “phenomenon” itself guide our interpretation. Only then will phenomenology be possible. Only then will our questioning be an ontological pursuit. The overcoming of tradition is not an abandonment or surpassing of what has come before. It is rather something like a thinking that delivers over the past to its possibility. Heidegger says: “That which is original occurs in advance of all that comes. Although hidden, it thus comes toward historic man as pure coming. It never perishes, it is never something past.”

Heidegger reads Aristotle’s philosophy as the end and fulfillment of Greek thought. He says: “The great begins great, maintains itself in existence only through the free recurrence of greatness, and if it is great also comes to an end in greatness. So it is with the philosophy of the Greeks. It came to its end with Aristotle in greatness.” Because Aristotle’s thinking is the end of Greek philosophy, it also brings this philosophy to its inherent limitations. The end of Greek thought is not an end that stops or reifies the movement of this thought, but one that lets it be brought forth into presence and un concealment. But here lurks the danger that requires us to read Aristotle with a certain degree of ambivalence. At the end of Greek philosophy, Aristotle’s thinking stands forth in this end and can be taken therefore as something available and at-hand. As such it is simply a body of doctrines that are handed down to us. Taken in this way, philosophical thinking stops and history begins.

In the decline of ancient Greek civilization, the presupposed understanding of being was being threatened, and needed to be preserved. That is, it needed to be grounded and justified so that it could be secured against the decline. Aristotelian philosophy arose out of this need and the experience of this threat, this Bekümmerung as Heidegger names it in his 1922 essay on Aristotle. Thus, it is within Aristotle’s very project that metaphysics is initiated. Heidegger says:

We shall master Greek philosophy as the beginning of Western philosophy only if we at the same time understand this beginning in its originating end. For the ensuing period it was only this end that turned into the ‘beginning,’ so much so that it at the same time concealed the original beginning.

Thus, it is within Aristotle’s philosophy that we also find the origin of the forgottenness of being that determines the history of metaphysics, an oblivion that Heidegger’s philosophy aims to overcome. But it would be
very misleading to conclude that Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle focuses primarily on this aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy. Many commentators on Heidegger’s philosophy assume that Heidegger understands Aristotle in metaphysical terms, and they argue that he places his own thinking in opposition to Aristotle. Thus, Werner Marx writes: “we regard ourselves as justified in terming the thinking from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel simply as ‘the tradition’ and viewing, on the other hand, Heidegger’s thinking as the attempt toward a ‘turning-away’ from this tradition.”

But in fact, as we will see, Heidegger’s preoccupation in his readings of Aristotle is quite the reverse of this assumption. He is much more concerned to free Aristotle from Romanized and Christian interpretations and to retrieve the radical, originary, and nonmetaphysical dimension of Aristotle’s philosophy.

The Lost Manuscript: An Introduction to Heidegger’s Interpretation of Aristotle

As more and more of Heidegger’s work on Aristotle became available, and it became more and more evident that Aristotle was an influence and constant source of insight along the path of Heidegger’s own philosophical thinking, one could only regret that Heidegger’s short but seminal 1922 piece on Aristotle, referred to as the Aristotle-Introduction, had been lost during the war. The rediscovery of the complete version of this essay, the one that had been sent by Heidegger to Marburg and Göttingen in support of his nomination for a position at these institutions, helps to further our understanding of the important link between Heidegger’s early work on Aristotle and the development of his own method of phenomenology.

This 1922 essay, titled “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle (Indications of the Hermeneutic Situation),” begins with an explanation of philosophy as hermeneutic phenomenology, and addresses the implications of this for a genuinely philosophical interpretation of the history of philosophy and of philosophy itself as historical. Hans-Georg Gadamer addresses this deconstructive and hermeneutic aspect of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in his prefatory remarks to the publication of the 1922 essay in the Dilthey Jahrbuch. In fact, Heidegger’s treatment in this essay of factical life and the philosophical practice of destruction is remarkably Gadamerian. It confirms, perhaps more so than any other available text, that Gadamer’s understanding of
the hermeneutic destruction of texts, and his notion of a fusion of hori-
zens, has its roots in Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology. Gad-
amer reports that he labored over virtually every line of this text and
found it full of ingenious insights that have not become superfluous
through the recent publication of Heidegger’s early courses.

As the primary text on the basis of which Gadamer went to study with
Heidegger and over which he pondered in his own very influential under-
standing of hermeneutics, the discovery of this text might also be said to be
the resurfacing of the link that connects Gadamer to Heidegger, a link that
goes through Aristotle. For this to be entirely and even more dramatically
true, one would have to accept Gadamer’s insistence that what is going on
in this discussion of factual life and Aristotle is an enormous struggle by
Heidegger to release himself from and come to terms with his (and Western
history’s) entanglement in Christian theological concepts and conscious-
ness. Gadamer insists that this critique of the Christianized reading of Aris-
totle—through Scholastic eyes—was the reason for the revolutionary im-
 pact of Heidegger’s Aristotle interpretation. Thus Gadamer entitled his
own prefatory remarks on this essay: “Heideggers theologische Jugends-
chrift.” According to Gadamer, this is the horizon within which Heideg-
ger is questioning during this period.

Indeed, textual evidence abounds to lend credence to Professor Gada-
mer’s claim. Heidegger says that “destruction” is concerned with how we
stand in relationship to the tradition:

Destruction is rather the authentic way in which the present must be encountered
in its own basic movements, and encountered in such a way that thereby the ständige Frage, the persistent questioning, breaks out of history to the extent that
it (the present) is concerned with the appropriation and interpretation of the pos-
sibility of a radical and fundamental experience.34

According to Gadamer, Heidegger defines his own standpoint, out of
which his own philosophical question arose, as stemming from Lutheran
theology and late scholastics such as Duns Scotus. That is, it was his at-
ttempt to philosophically appropriate these figures that led him back to
Aristotle’s philosophy as the ultimate horizon and primary source of the
philosophical and theological position that dominated this later historical
period. Indeed, Heidegger makes the claim that the works of Kant, Hegel,
Fichte, Schelling, and so on are rooted in uncritically appropriated Lu-
theran theological presuppositions.35 Luther himself, in turn, is said to
have retrieved Pauline and Augustinian sources and developed his thinking
Heidegger and Aristotle

as a confrontation with Scholasticism. Ultimately, Scholasticism depended on a distorted transmission of Greek concepts into Latin.

It would be misleading, however, to conclude from Gadamer’s provocative title—“Heidegger’s Theological Early Writings”—that this text is in any way a theological essay. This is a title that Gadamer takes up, at least in part, to parody Dilthey’s decision to give the same title to the discovery of the early works of Hegel. But in this essay, Heidegger only briefly refers to his earlier theological concerns and makes the explicit point that Scholastic as well as Lutheran reformed theology need to be brought to their source in Aristotle and that this overturning of theology through philosophy is central to the movement of destruction in the text. Indeed, we will see that one of the striking characteristics of Heidegger’s ontological reading of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is its incompatibility with the theologically oriented readings of Thomistic philosophy. In dismantling what he calls onto-theology, Heidegger clearly sees Aristotle on the side of ontology. In fact, there is a telling footnote in his 1922 Aristotle essay in which Heidegger insists on the fundamentally atheistic perspective of all genuine philosophizing and hints that it was because the history of philosophy remained guided by a theological bias that it was unable to fully and genuinely philosophize. He queries whether the idea of a philosophy of religion is not itself contradictory, even though his own courses had more than once bore this title.

Phenomenology, Heidegger demonstrates, is not just a hermeneutically naive appeal to the things themselves, as if it were a matter of recapturing or approximating some lost original position. It is the self-address of factual life. Heidegger’s pervasive claim in this essay is that philosophy *is* life, that is, the self-articulation from out of itself of life. This is why Heidegger says that genuine philosophy is fundamentally atheistic. To the extent that theology takes its cue from outside factual life, it can never do philosophy. All philosophical research, and Aristotle is seen as paradigmatic, remains attuned to the life situation out of which and for the sake of which it is inquiring. The first sections of this essay have to do with this situatedness, this overwhelming facticity, that defines the being of life.

What Heidegger emphasizes in his “destruction” of the history of philosophy in the second part of this essay is not the ability to point out the various trends and interdependencies that can be traced through the history of philosophy. The more important task of destruction is to bring into focus and set apart the central ontological and logical structures at the decisive
turning points of history. This is accomplished through an originary return to their sources. Though the source is never an “in itself” that is captured, so that Aristotle’s philosophy could no more capture this origin than could that of his followers, Heidegger considers the turning of Aristotle’s thinking to be especially crucial.\footnote{39} This is certainly, at least in part, because of Aristotle’s peculiarly phenomenological bent. The fact that Heidegger looked to Aristotle for help in clarifying the many ways of being and knowing that found the possibility of hermeneutic phenomenology complicates the traditional explanation of Heidegger’s destruction as a critical movement back through the history of philosophy in order to overcome it. In the case of Aristotle at least, Heidegger discovers that the very future of philosophical thinking has already been prepared for but covered over by the scholasticism of the tradition.

One of the clearest indications of the legitimacy of efforts that have been undertaken to show the link between the genesis of \textit{Being and Time} and Heidegger’s work on Aristotle is found in this manuscript where Heidegger announces that the question he is asking as he approaches Aristotle’s texts is the question of the being of human being.\footnote{40} He makes clear that his projected reading of Aristotle is to be a \textit{Daseinsanalytik}, a questioning about the being who experiences and interprets being. His aim in reading Aristotle is to uncover “\textit{der Sinn von Dasein},” the various “categories” that constitute the way of being that in some manner always already is in relationship to being. It is indeed fascinating and informative that so many of the sections of \textit{Being and Time} were already so cogently and compactly presented here in outline form. Already in place in 1922 was much of the philosophical vocabulary of \textit{Being and Time}, words like \textit{Sorge}, \textit{Besorgen}, \textit{Umwelt}, \textit{Umgang}, \textit{Umsicht}, \textit{Bedeutsamkeit}, and so on. This is the text in which Heidegger begins to speak of the notion of \textit{Verfallen},\footnote{41} not as an objective event that happens to one but as an “intentional how,” a way of being directed toward life that constitutes an element of facticity and is the basic character of the movement of caring. What are not so clearly fixed in these pages are the strategy and divisions of \textit{Being and Time}. Themes like death, the averageness of \textit{das Man}, individual existence as possibility, truth as unconcealing wrestling from concealment (a notion of truth, as we will see, that Heidegger attributes to Aristotle), the tendency of life to drift away from itself in fallenness—these themes are not so clearly divided in these pages as they are in \textit{Being and Time}. In some regards, in reading this essay, one gets a better sense of the interdependence of each of the parts of \textit{Being and Time}. 

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One of my purposes in using Heidegger’s 1922 outline for his Aristotle book as the framework for my own initial remarks is to show that the plan for his interpretation of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, though the actual courses and texts do not appear until the thirties, is already in place in the early twenties. There is a certain identifiable strategy that Heidegger employs in his reading of Aristotle, and a certain basic insight into Aristotle that governs all of his interpretations. This insight, as I previously stated, is simply that Aristotle thinks being as twofold. The capacity to reveal the twofold is the defining characteristic of human being, according to Aristotle. Thus, Heidegger says, in this 1922 essay, that the guiding question of his Aristotle interpretation will be: what is the sort of object and character of being that Aristotle had in mind in interpreting and experiencing human life? Is human life interpreted on its own terms or within the framework of a broader understanding of being that Aristotle brings to bear on his interpretation of human being? Heidegger’s claim is that the primordial sense of being for Aristotle—the field of beings and sense of being that govern his general understanding and interpretation of beings—is production. For the most part, beings are interpreted in their being as available for use in our dealings (*Vorhandensein*). Thus, according to Heidegger’s analysis, the idea that Aristotle employed a theoretical, impartial, and objective model of understanding the being of beings is false. Beings are understood in terms of how they appear (their look to us or *eidos*) and in terms of their being addressed and claimed in a *logos* oriented to and by its surroundings. Heidegger insists that Aristotle’s word for being—*ousia*—still resonates with its original sense of availability for use, in the sense of possessions or belongings. Heidegger insists further that Aristotle’s ontological structures arise from this preliminary way of grasping beings in general. The question is whether human being is also analyzed on the basis of this general conception of being in terms of production.

In saying that production governs the Aristotelian conception of being, Heidegger is not arguing that Aristotle understood all beings including human being on the basis of a model drawn from *technē*. What is at issue, rather, is something like world, though Heidegger does not make this explicit in this essay. Beings from *technē*, produced beings in the sense that their coming to be is handled and managed by a craftsperson, natural beings, and human beings all are produced differently, but all are interpreted (through *technē* or *epistêmē* or *phronēsis*) as ways of being produced or brought forth. In fact, when it comes to making explicit the ontological structure of beings, Aristotle’s field of research is not beings from *technē* at
all but beings from phusis. The primary text for an ontological investigation of produced beings is the Physics. Inasmuch as beings are understood in terms of their being-produced, movement must be what constitutes their being. Aristotle’s Physics is primarily an investigation of moved-beings and of being-moved as the way of being of these natural beings. Finally, the Nichomachean Ethics is about the “movement” or way in which one becomes human.

A significant portion of Heidegger’s treatment of Nichomachean Ethics VI in this Introduction to his projected book on Aristotle has to do with the meaning of alētheia and its relationship to logos and legein. It is seldom noted or paid attention to, but Heidegger is certainly correct that Book VI of the Ethics, which treats dianoetic (intellectual) excellence or virtue, is a treatise on truth. The virtuous intellect is virtuous to the extent that it holds in truth and safeguards (Verwahrung) the disclosure of beings. Aristotle says in the beginning of Book VI that the ergon, the work of both parts of the intellect (theoretical and practical), is truth. Furthermore, inasmuch as they are virtues, these parts of the soul are hexeis, habits or dispositions. That is, theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom function like moral virtues. They are ways of being disposed toward what is, of being extended in relationship to what is, of revealing what is. In other words, the issue is not about specific acts of the intellect that relate us to things but about a way of being for which revealing, being extended toward, and intending are characteristic. When this availability of intellectual life is operative, then the intellect is excellent; when involvement is cut off, then this way of being is defective.

As in the Logik course three years later, Heidegger here distinguishes two modes of truth. Noetic truth necessarily comes before and makes possible the kind of truth displayed in the propositions or logical truth of language. This more original noetic revealing discloses the archê, that out of which beings emerge and that which is responsible for their being. This is the original legein, the gathering into the oneness of being. Aristotle calls this alētheia, this mode of revealing, philosophical thinking (Met. 1003 a1), a beholding of being (theörein) as being, a letting beings be seen as being. Philosophical knowledge is in part a simple standing in the presencing of being. Aristotle says that no falsity or deception is possible in this noetic way of seeing, this pure Vernehmen. But then Heidegger makes a somewhat controversial claim. He says that for Aristotle this noetic activity that is open to the truth of being is accomplished in two different ways: through sophia (hinsehendes Verstehen, inspective understanding)
According to Heidegger, both \textit{sophia} and \textit{phronēsis} are noetic activities, ways of accomplishing our relationship to what is in a primordial manner. What then is the difference between them? Heidegger suggests that the difference between \textit{sophia} and \textit{phronēsis} is that different realms of beings are revealed in these intellectual dispositions. Heidegger translates \textit{phronēsis} as \textit{Umsicht} (circumspection). He also, at least implicitly, offers \textit{Sorge} (care) as another translation. In this text, \textit{Sorge} has mostly to do with one’s dealings in everyday factual life, what Heidegger calls \textit{Sorgensumsicht}. To the extent that in \textit{Sein und Zeit} \textit{Sorge} is the defining term for Dasein’s ownmost being, retrieved from fallenness, it is noteworthy that he uses the term here in a distinctly practical sense and in connection with circumspection and practical dealings.

What specifically concerns Heidegger in this text is the movement of this practical disclosure wherein the fullness of the moment of being (the \textit{kairos}) can draw back into itself its past and future. \textit{Phronēsis} is here understood as a way of having one’s being, a \textit{hexis}. Just as the analysis of death that preceded this discussion belonged to the broader context of the question of factual life, so here also Heidegger has not so clearly worked out the primacy of the future and of possibility as he later formulated it in \textit{Sein und Zeit}. In this regard, his analysis here of Aristotle’s project is still close to Husserl and his concept of phenomenology. But this is also because Aristotle has in mind being-produced and being at hand as produced as the primary meaning of being. In other words, beings are understood primarily in terms of their having already been produced and their standing there in their availability for use. That is to say, being-present is the primary \textit{ecstasis} of time for Aristotle, and perhaps also for the early phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. Thus, Heidegger says “‘the not-yet’ and ‘the already’ are to be understood in their unity, that is, they are to be understood on the basis of an original givenness.”

But, as Heidegger shows, this way of “having” its being that belongs to human factual life is peculiar. There can be no pure, atemporal beholding of such being since the resolute moment of \textit{praxis} is always already caught up in the coming to be of factual life. Therefore, \textit{phronēsis}, though a kind of revealing and a noetic activity, always shows itself as \textit{eine Doppelung der Hinsicht}, “a doubling of the regard.” Human life is situated in this double regard of \textit{phronēsis} as a way of revealing and seeing being. Heidegger says this double view of Dasein, this duplicitous, twofold character of Dasein’s being in Aristotle’s treatment of it, has been decisive for the history of our under-
standing of factical life. The failure to think this twofold in its character as a doubling movement led to a splitting of the analysis into two different movements—something like apophantic circumspection and something like intuitive contemplation. In other words, a dualistic interpretation of human life replaced Aristotle’s understanding of human life as held in a double regard. That is not to say that the seeds of this misunderstanding are not already found in Aristotle to some extent, in his insistence that sophia is a higher way of revealing than even the disclosing that emerges out of the doubling regard of phronēsis.

Let us look then at Aristotle’s treatment of sophia, wisdom. In contrast to his rather approving attitude with regard to Aristotle’s understanding of phronēsis, Heidegger’s treatment of that other noetic activity, sophia, is ambiguous. He clearly attempts to show that sophia has to do with divine movement, not the movement of living being. The mistake that has pervaded the tradition, namely, interpreting all being on the basis of what is revealed in sophia has its roots in a certain theological bias, as Heidegger laid out in an earlier part of this text. But it also can be traced to a certain ambiguity on the part of Aristotle. To a certain extent, Aristotle’s concern about the eternal and necessary movement of divine being causes him to define living being in terms of what it is not, that is, in terms of its not being necessary and eternal. This covers over, to some extent, the more original and positive access to the peculiar kind of movement and being that is involved in the case of living beings. Among the many Heideggerian notions that come into play in his 1922 Aristotle essay is the notion of authenticity. Hermeneutic philosophy is inauthentic when it imposes structures from outside on what is being investigated, rather than following the movement from out of itself, and making this movement of facticity explicit in its origin.

But, more important, Heidegger also finds that the dominant concern with the movement of production—with technē and poiēsis—and the use of produced beings as exemplary beings in Greek ontology has its roots in this same failure to properly distinguish sophia and phronēsis. For, sophia is also the appropriate basis for the way of revealing that is involved in technē. In other words, art is governed by a kind of understanding of sophia. Sophia is a privative way of revealing that requires a looking away from the beings as they are revealed in circumspective dealings and replacing it instead with a way of dealing with beings that involves a kind of bare care-less looking. When beings from technē become the exemplary beings for the analysis of living being, then the double regard and the double movement that we discussed earlier, the movement of those beings whose
archē belongs to their being and does not come from outside, gets overlooked. The being of a being is seen as outside of the being itself.

What sophia, in the sense Aristotle speaks of it when he means philosophical thinking, uncovers in its pure beholding is the archē of beings, the origin. Philosophy takes for granted the concern for beings and raises that concern to the level of questioning why. This question points in the direction of what lets the being be revealed. The treatise where he makes this archē-questioning explicit is the Physics. The archē as the movement that constitutes the being of beings is the subject matter of this treatise. The starting point for archē-research, that is, for an ontological investigation of beings, is the fact that beings move. To deny motion is to preclude oneself from the question. The Eleatics did precisely this. Their insistence was that being has to be understood, as Parmenides dictated, as one and not many. But motion implies a manifold. Thus, they concluded, motion cannot be. Aristotle instead will attempt to think multiplicity at the heart of unity.

Heidegger does use the words Dasein and Existenz in this essay in reference to his interpretation of Aristotle, but for the most part he speaks of factical life. Facticity is the fundamental way of being that constitutes human life for Aristotle, in Heidegger’s understanding. In fact Heidegger uses the word care (Sorge) to characterize this movement of facticity. Existence is interpreted here as a possibility of factical life that can be retrieved only indirectly by making facticity questionable. To do this—to make factical life questionable—is the task of philosophy. Heidegger calls this questioning movement of retrieve the decisive seizing of existence as a possibility of factical life. But this existential return is also a recovery from the movement of fallenness that Heidegger calls an Abfall, a descent from itself, and a Zerfallen, a movement of dispersion and disintegration. But the primary category of life (Dasein) is facticity rather than existence. It is the movement of fallenness and not existence that opens up world and that Heidegger here explains through the care structure. Thus, in 1922, under the influence of Aristotle, Heidegger still remained preoccupied with phenomenological concerns over facticity.

Existence, as a countermovement to care and the movement of fallenness, has a temporality other than that of being in time. It occurs in the kairological moment and is not called care but the Bekümmerung, the worry or affliction of being. Through the Greek notion of the kairos, Heidegger has here already begun to distinguish temporality from the chronological sense of time associated with being in time. In a very revealing footnote, Heidegger suggests that the notion of care needs to be thought more
radically, and even points to the possibility of thinking of care in terms of ecstatic temporality through a retrieval of the Greek middle-voice form. Heidegger suggests that we should think care (Sorge), here associated with Umsicht (phronēsis) or circumspection, as comparable to the way the middle voice operates in ancient Greek, as a movement and countermovement, as a recoil of being; in which case, he says, Bekümmerung would be die Sorge der Existenz, the care that belongs to existence. This probably marks the place of a major shift in Heidegger’s thinking that prepared the way for Sein und Zeit. The back-and-forth double play between fallenness and existence that is signaled by Heidegger’s invocation of the Greek middle voice also indicates a suggestion by Heidegger on how to read the relationship between facticity and existence, even in his later work. As care reveals being in the world, so the existential moment opens Dasein to the whole of being. But, the existential Gegen opens Dasein to a not-being that belongs to its very way of being. Heidegger suggests that Aristotle recognized this in his notion of sterēsis, a notion of nonbeing and refusal that Aristotle says (against the Eleatics) belongs to being itself. Referring to chapter 7 of the Physics, Heidegger says that the basic category of sterēsis dominates Aristotle’s ontology. Sterēsis means lack, privation. It can also mean loss or deprivation of something, as in the example of blindness, which is a loss of sight in one who by nature sees. Sterēsis can also mean confiscation, the violent appropriation of something for oneself that belongs to another (Met. 1022 b33). Finally, Aristotle often calls that which is held as other in an opposition of contraries a privation. Heidegger will point out in his later essay on Physics B1 that Aristotle understands this deprivation as itself a kind of eidos. Thus, sterēsis is the lack that belongs intrinsically to being. According to Heidegger, with the notion of sterēsis Aristotle reaches the pinnacle of his thinking about being. Heidegger even remarks that Hegel’s notion of negation needs to be returned to its dependency on Aristotle’s more primordial conception of the not.

In the context of Heidegger’s discussion of privation and ontological lack, it becomes clearer why Heidegger introduces a discussion of death and the finality of factical life in this 1922 essay on Aristotle. Factical life is such that its death is always somehow there for it, something that always stands in sight for it as an obstinate and uncircumventable prospect of life. What Heidegger discovers here, then, is a kind of double movement, a movement and a countermovement, a dual movement of descent and recall that unfolds the span within which human life is. This doubling, middle-voiced kinēsis is the authentic mode of being of life.
One of the most powerful aspects of this essay is Heidegger’s cogent characterization of the nature of philosophy. One could argue that the entire essay is about this. Philosophical research is the taking up and carrying out of the movement of interpretation that belongs to factual life itself. Philosophy is radical, concerned questioning because it positions itself decisively at the movement wherein the threatening and troubled character of life—die Bekümmerung der Existenz—unfolds, and holds itself steadfastly out toward the questionability of life. Thus, Heidegger describes philosophy as letting the difficulty, the aporia, of life gain articulation by engaging in an original, unreduplicatable, and unrepresentable moment of repetition. For Aristotle, the focus of this aporetic, philosophical thinking is, of course, the archê. The philosopher wonders about the origin of what is. The aporia, the stumbling block that the philosopher needs to think and address, is this: the origin must be one and yet, as Aristotle shows, the origin is manifold. The philosopher is called upon to think the unitary multiplicity of being, in particular, the twofoldness of being, the double archê. This task of thinking is approached in different ways by Aristotle, but the twofoldness of being is Aristotle’s fundamental insight.