I am honored to have been asked to write this foreword, grateful to have been given a completely free hand, and responsive to the editors’ invitation to range widely. I would like to focus on four specific issues, in the spirit of encouraging debate between the community of professional Jungian analysts and the academic world, and also in the hope of stirring up some disagreements and controversies among the authors of this historically significant and groundbreaking collection that seeks to establish a Jungian “track” of literary criticism on as firm a basis as other tracks, such as the many varieties of psychoanalytically derived literary criticism. It is clear that the time has come for those who have opposed the entry (or re-entry) of C. G. Jung into our universities to consider whether their opposition might be more the result of prejudice than of anything else. I write as a practicing post-Jungian analyst, in a spirit of congratulation for (and celebration of) this book, though with some mischievous intent.

I introduced the term “post-Jungian” (Samuels, *Jung and the Post-Jungians*) as a conscious imitation of the term “post-Freudian” (Brown). I was not aping terms like “postmodern” or “postcolonial,” though—that is the telos of intellectual activity—those connections soon became manifest. By post-Jungian, I meant both a connection to and a critical distance from Jungian thought and practice. The idea was to create a permeable boundary around a discipline, allowing analysts and scholars to go freely on hunting expeditions to distant parts without having to worry about the gates being barred when they returned home. This present volume of essays is manifestly “post-Jungian” in this respect, and not only in its title.

My issues here are: (i) the reception of Jung and his ideas in the Western academy; (ii) the hidden and not-so-hidden politics of the evolving
relationship between Jungian analysis and Jungian studies in universities; (iii) the manifold ways in which the clinical practice of analytical psychology can be enhanced by contact with academia; and (iv) the special problem of what I am going to call “the conservative academic Jungian” in relation to literary criticism.

There continues to be massive ambivalence towards Jung and his ideas in most disciplines in most universities. Many scholars report that they have to keep their Jungian proclivities secret, taking care to give camouflaged titles to lecture series and so on. In a way, universities could be seen as performing a useful function in their resistance to Jung, given the massive popular success of Jungian ideas. The cultural penetration of Jungian ideas, on the back of bestsellers such as Thomas Moore’s “soul” books or Clarissa Pinkola Estes’s Women Who Run with the Wolves, far exceeds that achieved by popularized psychoanalysis in its heyday from 1950–1970 (Tacey)

At the same time, there are equally popular (that is, in the sense of “less significant” from a scholarly point of view) criticisms. Richard Noll’s The Jung Cult (1994), though academically slight, achieved notoriety with its claims that Jung was just a guru who achieved success by promising his followers godlike status. Similarly, those angry over Jung’s intimate relationships with some female patients ignore the fact that contemporary ideas about sexual misconduct by psychotherapists had not crystallized by the first decade of the twentieth century.

But this is not to say that all criticisms of Jung are ill-founded from an intellectual standpoint. Far from it. In my travels around the world, lecturing to students of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic studies (that is, not to students of Jung in any comprehensive sense), I ask them to join in a simple word-association experiment by associating as spontaneously as possible to the stimulus word “Jung.” I have now had nine hundred individual responses to this request. By far the most common response to “Jung” is “Freud.” Then there follows associations of anti-Semitism, Nazism, Germany, World War II, the 1930s. The third most common association is “mystic” (and, when unpacked, it is clear that these respondents mean “mystic” in the sense of woolly thinking, religious mania, or even psychosis). The fourth association is “archetypes.” The results of this little experiment bear difficult tidings for Jungians. Imagine trying to sell a product when the main association in people’s minds is to the rival product. Anti-Semitism is a matter of particular sensitivity in universities, conscious (as most academicians are) of twentieth-century history and how the Shoah and its consequences have impacted upon the world’s universities. The charge of near-psychotic mysticism is not going to endear Jung to skeptical and rational academicians, either.
Now, I don’t know how conscious it has been, but it is as if these seemingly intractable problems preventing the (re-)entrance of Jung into Western universities have stimulated research in precisely these areas where the case for Jung’s inclusion seems weakest. We saw that “Jung” led to “Freud.” In response, perhaps, there has been a growth of what has been called “the new Jung scholarship,” based on the recovery of a “non-Freudocentric” reading (Taylor), which proceeds from the assumption that most of the ideas and approaches we now understand as quintessentially Jungian owe nothing at all to Freud and to Jung’s relationship with him. Other influences (Theodore Flournoy and William James, for example) receive more careful consideration than hitherto and Jung’s pre-Freud texts—for example, his student fraternity Zofingia Lectures of 1895 (CW Supplementary Vol. A)—are given greater prominence than in the perspective that sees Jung primarily as Freud’s gifted critic and his most important dissident or schismatic.

Regarding Jung’s anti-Semitism, my own work (Political Psyche; see also Maidenbaum and Martin) was written in response to the fact that senior members of the Jungian community had signally failed to take the lead in mounting an open, empathic, and scholarly response to such well-founded allegations. Succinctly, I believe that Jung’s work was indeed anti-Semitic but that, if one tries to understand what he was attempting (albeit with disastrous results), other evaluations become possible. Jung was trying to create a culturally sensitive “psychology of difference,” in which there would be no totalizing or universal discourse about how humans operate psychologically. Rather, Jung thought that Freud was trying to level out all psychological differences among groups by producing just such a discourse with a claim for universal and timeless applicability. Now, if Jung had gone on with this in a more sober manner, basing his claim on differences of culture and experience (rather than on something more literal, sometimes even on “blood”), he might well be hailed today as the pioneer of current attempts to create a transcultural or intercultural psychology and psychotherapy, something much needed in a world torn by ethnic, religious, and national strife.

Unhappily, instead, Jung based his approach on an assemblage of paired complementary qualities arranged in lists organized on the basis of “opposites.” So, if Germans are earthy and emotional, Jews have to be presented as urban and rationalistic. If Germans have all the advantages of a young culture, then Jews have all the disadvantages of an old culture. If Germans have physical strength (like men), then Jews have to be devious to gain power over them (like women). When people adopt Jung’s approach to “opposites,” they should recall where that way of thinking can lead. And the main intellectual (as opposed to cultural or
political objection to Jung’s theorizing about gender is also that it is much too dependent on “opposites” (Samuels, *Plural Psyche; Political Psyche; Politics on the Couch*).

So, Jung opened something up and then blew the opportunity to make something constructive and humane out of it, leading to the quite understandable charge of anti-Semitism. The task for contemporary Jungian analysts and scholars is to engage openly in debates about such matters and to work out a firm ethical foundation for Jung’s “psychology of difference,” so that we shall no longer feel the need to throw the baby out with the bath water.

The third association is that Jung was a mystic, with nothing nice being meant by that. The response has been an enormous body of work by Jungians on the psychology of religion in general and on mysticism and gnosticism in particular. I think that this work has been underpinned and informed by what Jung wrote in 1911 to 1912 on “two kinds of thinking” (CW 5, 7–33). There he said that, in addition to “directed thinking” (meaning thinking in words), there was something to be called “undirected thinking,” meaning thinking in images, fantasy thinking, intuitive thinking. It is noteworthy that Jung called both “thinking,” thereby anticipating the British psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion by many years. The relevance for our discussion of “mysticism” is that Jung can be reframed as a pioneer in a huge epistemological shift that has taken place in the West in the past hundred years. It is a shift with which universities are slowly coming to terms. Knowledge used to be legitimized from two distinct sources: information claims and authority. The third leg that has been added in the past fifty years or so is experience. This is why so many academic discourses now use notions of “story”—because notions of narrative truth (as opposed to historical truth) require a repositioning of “subjectivity,” not as a handicap to be pruned or eliminated but as a new fount of knowledge. This is not the place to go further into developments in such areas as “tacit knowledge” or “soft knowledge” or (an unfortunate phrase) the “feminization of science,” but they feed off the same shift in consciousness that Jung was pioneering with his “undirected thinking.” Hence, what a mystic has to say can be taken more seriously these days by those whose mind-set remains strictly that of the Enlightenment.

The fourth association was to archetypes, and there has been a huge growth in the ways the theoretical concept of the archetype can be understood. We could begin with brain research, since current neuroscientific research on linkages between emotional experience and brain development cries out for a psychosomatic construct like the archetype. Then there are child developmental studies showing how there is a self
in the baby that unfolds or unpacks over time (Fordham). This primary or original self contains “everything” (except the environment!) that the baby needs to grow and, in its organismic wholeness, bears a morphological similarity to the later and more archetypal version of the self that Jung developed—which includes everything (physical, mental, spiritual, social) to do with the subject. Finally, there is a total rethinking of archetypal theory in terms of affects that is gathering momentum (which I will discuss below).

Perhaps the main problem for academicians in the humanities has been their perception of Jung’s (and hence Jungians’) essentialism, foundationalism, and even fundamentalism. Often this comes up in relation to gender, though that is not the only topic so criticized. Jungians and post-Jungians are perceived as over-formalized, with our neat little quartets of archetypes and our oh so carefully balanced structures of the psyche, too definitional given the misuse of the theory of “opposites” that I described earlier, too backward-looking and even reactionary when treating of cultural values and politics. It is said (rightly) that there is a massive Eurocentrism in Jungian explorations of non-Western cultures, including the demeaning idealization of traditional cultures as “primitive.” Some scholars would argue that an interest in mythology and the possession of right-wing political viewpoints often seem to go together (see Ellwood).

I turn now to the hidden and not-so-hidden politics of the relationship between Jungian analysis and Jungian studies in universities. I know from personal contact with several contributors to the present collection that this is by no means an irrelevant or peripheral issue. There would be little point in working on the relations between Jungian-oriented academicians and the wider intellectual world if we do not also consider relations within the Jungian communities. Let me begin by saying that the psychological leitmotif of this working-out of a new set of relations between clinicians and scholars is, of course, a massive and mutual projection. There are no prizes for such an obvious and global analysis. If the problem is projection, the prize is legitimacy. By legitimacy, I mean something quite precise: authority, power, influence (with their economic sequelae), and the whole paraphernalia of a top-dog/bottom-dog dynamic. In any struggle over legitimacy, each side will seek to characterize the other side in ways that enhance its own strengths.

Sometimes, certain analysts say that academicians cannot really feel or suffer complex emotions because of their precocious intellectual development, which vitiates empathy and sensitivity. As this character assassination of the typical academician continues, she or he cannot really understand most of the concepts derived from Jungian psychology,
because their provenance, and certainly their utility, are matters on which only practicing clinicians can rule. No matter how subtle the theorizing of academic research may be as a therapeutic or analytical activity involving transference and countertransference, to rip all these ideas from their clinical setting is to do violence to them, and their subsequent deployment is likely to be misguided at best. Some analysts say that, because these are not really concepts but psychic images, they only respond to a certain kind of knowing or gnosis that is not usually found in universities.

So pervasive is this contemporary continuation of Jung’s oft-repeated distrust of intellectuals that it creeps in even where unintended. Consider this extract from an intelligent and positive review of Christopher Hauke’s *Jung and the Postmodern*. The reviewer is not intending anything nasty by what she says; it simply follows from her immersion within the political intricacies of the relationship between the Jungian analysts and the Jungian scholars.

Hauke’s intention to find a broad-market readership can make the text seem at times a bit too wide-ranging in content for my taste and it loses its focus because of this. I preferred the chapters that had more relevance to my work in the consulting room, aware that, for me, analysis is more about “affairs of the heart” than “affairs of the head.” His book will, I feel sure, find a secure place as a standard text in many academic courses, and not just Jungian and psychoanalytic studies. As he makes no reference in his personal biography to his clinical training at the Society of Analytical Psychology, I imagine that Hauke considers himself first and foremost a scholar and an academician, rather than a clinician. Indeed, his book is a testament to his considerable intellectual abilities. (Wiener 120–21)

I said that the projections were two-way, and they are. Sometimes, certain academicians point out that many analysts do not think systematically or even rationally. Academicians tend to assert things rather than argue them through, and they have no grasp at all of the need for methodology. The analysts misuse their authority as the keepers of Jung’s flame to exclude the great unwashed, and they show every sign of attempting either to control or to disparage the growth of Jungian studies (and the application of Jungian concepts to other disciplines in universities) so as to preserve their privileged position. The main research tool of the analysts—the case study—just does not pass muster. When Jungian analysts attempt to enter other fields, their lack of up-to-date knowledge is quite startling; so, what they have to say—about literature, anthropology, politics, popular culture, and so on—is intellectually second-rate. Some academicians who have had close encounters with the world of Jungian analy-
sis point to its abuses of power, both in terms of how its organizations and institutions function and in the treatment situation itself. There is a good deal of anecdotal evidence that analytical admissions committees make life extremely difficult for professors who seek to train as analysts.

What can be done about this state of affairs? To a certain extent, there is nothing much that can be done, except to acknowledge the existence of struggles over legitimacy and publicly commit to do whatever is possible to diminish their intensity and prevalence. Still, as a proactive attempt to heal such divisions, those who teach Jungian ideas in universities might try to introduce experientially driven approaches to learning. For example, in the Master’s program in Jungian and Post-Jungian Studies that I direct at the University of Essex, the students write a learning journal that brings an affective/experiential dimension into their research. The students write self-reflexively about what it has been like to study such-and-such a concept, topic, or theme. Similar moves include the use of arts-based approaches in conceptual learning, bringing the imagination in as a support for, and not in opposition to, cognitive learning.

The last section of this foreword raises a ticklish problem—that of the conservative Jungian academician who, it could be argued, has not kept up with developments in analytical psychology or (so it can seem) uses these ideas in mechanical, desiccated, or plainly wrong-headed ways, ignoring problems with the ideas that have been known about for a long time. From this depiction, it can be seen that, by “conservative,” I mean dyed-in-the-wool, traditional, and old-fashioned, rather than committed to preserving something good from thoughtless change. Now, these remarks are not aimed at essays in this collection; this is not a review. Nevertheless, I would not feel comfortable if I did not mention the problem. Please note that I am not saying that new thinking, “post-Jungian” thinking if you like, comes only from the analysts. Quite the opposite. But the problem then becomes why some Jungian-oriented academicians are ignorant of the revisionary and post-Jungian work done by others of their number.

This conservatism can lead to the embarrassingly simplistic deployment of ideas. In a novel or play, any woman important to a man at a deep level is his anima. Any piece of controlled self-presentation to the world is the persona. Opposites abound, mandalas are sought for, tricksters found out, heroes and heroines spotted on their journeys. Now it might seem churlish to mention this, but something has to be done about it or these incredibly promising developments in many areas, not just literary studies, will diminish, and without really fulfilling their potential. The way the concepts are utilized is often in too stately or static a manner, laid over and across the (literary) material. Violence is done to Jungian context and literary text alike.
Let me give one illustration of what I am talking about, taken from a conference that I recently attended, which included a marvelous panel on film studies. The panelists referred to “archetypal figures” or to characters in films as being “archetypal.” These were usually larger-than-life or stereotypical characters. Everyone could see why they were being called “archetypal,” but it was more difficult to discern what was gained by the designation. It might have been that the character was regarded as a timeless and placeless expression of something universal, hence capable of exciting a universal response (an argument undermined by the dominance of Hollywood in many film vocabularies). But is this all there is to the archetypal dimension of experience—something more or less synonymous with stereotype? In post-Jungian analytical psychology, the view is gaining ground that what is archetypal is not to be found in any particular image or list of images that can be tagged as anima, trickster, hero, shadow, and so on. Rather, it is in the intensity of affective response to any given image or situation that we find what is archetypal. This can be something very small scale, not coming in a pre-packaged archetypal or mythic form. What stirs you at an archetypal level depends on you and where you sit and how you look at things and on your personal history. The archetypal can therefore be relative, contextual, and personal. This reframing of archetypal theory as a theory of affects is something that has not yet reached conservative academic Jungians.

When concluding salutary pieces like this, it is customary to end with a quote from Jung, usually done to improve the writer’s chances of winning his or her audience. Hence the writer chooses a bit of Jung that he or she likes. Perversely, perhaps, but also (as can be seen) necessarily, I want to end with a bit of Jung that I do not like and that I see as a spur to all of us involved with taking Jungian ideas into our academic fields. In his memorial piece for Richard Wilhelm, written in 1930, Jung wrote:

As a doctor who deals with ordinary people, I know that universities have ceased to act as disseminators of light. People are weary of scientific specialisation and rationalism and intellectualism. They want to hear truths that broaden rather than restrict, that do not obscure but enlighten, that do not run off them like water but penetrate them to the marrow. (CW 15: 58)

A book like this one can establish something quite the opposite: that academic literary studies, in an alliance with analytical psychology, can broaden, enlighten, and penetrate people to the marrow. In short, a book like this proves Professor Jung wrong.

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WORKS CITED


