THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES are undergoing a conceptual transformation. While some of this change is taking place in the method and focus of research, at this time most of it is located in the realm of ideas concerning the theory, history, and philosophy of the human condition. There has been a shifting over the last century, and especially during the latter half of the 20th century, from a classical science approach to a more hermeneutic mode of thinking about the study and understanding of people. Rabinow and Sullivan (1979) describe this interpretive turn in the social sciences as refocusing attention onto “the concrete varieties of cultural meaning, in their particularity and complex texture,” where cultural meaning is “intersubjective and irreducibly fundamental to understanding” (p. 5). Modeling themselves after the hard sciences, the social sciences have reached a limit to understanding. By looking across disciplines and into other epistemologies, a rethinking has swept the social sciences. “Re-thinking is the order of the day” (p. xvii), according to Goodman and Fisher (1995), who point out that the overarching problem is one of knowledge: its meaning, values, methods of inquiry, and applications.
Toulmin (1988, 1995) argues that Western epistemology has remained largely unchanged since Descartes's influence in the mid-17th century. He shows how the Cartesian program of modern Enlightenment has been based on three assumptions: the locus of knowledge is personal and individual, not public or collective; knowledge must accommodate itself to the knower's physiological mechanisms, to the “inner theater” of the brain; and the building blocks of knowledge must take the form of a demonstrably certain deductive method (e.g., classical geometry). This belief remained unchanged up until the second half of the 20th century. Toulmin maintains that we are returning to a pre-Enlightenment practical philosophy with less emphasis on written, universal, general, and timeless values and an increased focus on the oral, particular, local, and timely. Ritzer and Smart (2001) describe social theory as “almost constantly in flux . . . characterized by transformation and uncertainty” (p. 4). They argue that the most prevalent themes in current social theory include innovation, retrieval/rediscovery, translation, reinterpretation, and changing intellectual priorities and social conditions. Perhaps we are in the midst of Alexander's (1995) “epistemological dilemma,” trying to separate the knower from the known, or Nagel's (1986) “view from nowhere,” trying to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity. This shifting toward practical philosophy has taken place across the social sciences, upsetting much of their territorial spaces and resulting in debate, polarization, sometimes ridicule, and, more recently, dialogue.

Psychology, too, has begun to feel this movement. Some, like Smith, Harré, and Van Langenhove (1995), believe that psychology is similarly “in a state of flux” (p. 1), and they refer to a new psychology, a new paradigm encompassing such ideas as subjectivity, meaning, interpretation, language and discourse, holism, context, and particularities. While such stirrings are certainly taking place, we would argue that they are still highly marginalized within academic psychology. Most of the authors in Tolman's (1992) collection find that positivism is still strong in the discipline, a situation that seems not to have abated. Hatfield (1995) indicates that psychology was remade into a natural science (natural philosophy) from the beginning of the 18th century in a historical narrative that defines scientific psychology as quantitative and experimental. This narrative continues, as Manicas (1987) argues that most psychology is “fully committed to the autonomy of the cognitive life” (p. 315) rather than to a more socially conceived approach to the mind.

There has been some cost to psychology's insularity. For example, psychology is often not included among the social sciences. In Mazlish's (1998) philosophical history of the human sciences, which includes the social sciences, psychology is given “uneasy entrance” as it “teeters” (p. 11) between the natural and human sciences. Manicas (1987) mentions psychology in passing when he discusses the social sciences, as if to remind readers that it might have a place there. Recent books on the historic turn in the
human sciences have largely ignored psychology (e.g., Ankersmit and Kellner, 1995; Cohen and Roth, 1995; Goodman and Fisher, 1995; McDonald, 1996). Likewise, works in the philosophy of psychology are typically centered within the discipline of philosophy rather than psychology, and they rarely draw on contemporary psychological discourse (e.g., MacDonald and MacDonald, 1995; O’Donohue and Kitchener, 1996a). What we hope to accomplish with the current chapter, as well as with the contributions that follow, is to restate a form of psychology, rethought as a social science, sensitive to historical, philosophical, and theoretical turns. Giddens (1990) notes that, at this historical moment, the social sciences are called to respond to the moving of modernity. In this book we argue for psychology to join in this response.

HISTORICAL TURNS

It is apparent to many that the social sciences are experiencing a resurgence in historical interests. Areas of study such as the new historicism, history of philosophy, ethnohistory, and historical sociology have ascended in recent years. The new history, however, is not a social sciences (i.e., Cartesian) program but approaches the past from multiple perspectives (see Jenkins, 1991). Ross (1998) describes “a succession of ‘new histories’ ” during the 20th century and the “newest” new history as “the diffusion of historicism across disciplinary boundaries into the humanities and social sciences,” forming a “new alliance between history and theory” (p. 100). Typical of this perspective, Cohen (1997) distinguishes between event, experience, and myth in the analysis of historical subjects. The discipline of history is experiencing conceptual, political, methodological, and practical crises of representation (Kral and Hill, 1996). Some of this “essential tension” comes from the meeting of history, theory, and philosophy, and the subsequent problems of objectivity, evidence, truth, context, teleology, concepts/categories, method, and interpretation (Stanford, 1998).

As a result of history’s incursion into these other realms, some interesting questions arise. New historians shun historical truths, instead looking for historical rewrites and making the historian’s “lens” itself more visible. Some, for instance Kellner (1995), are beginning to contemplate a new vision for history:

It is that history can be redescribed as a discourse that is fundamentally rhetorical, and that representing the past takes place through the creation of powerful, persuasive images which can be best understood as created objects, models, metaphors or proposals about reality. (p. 2)

Encouraging a new cultural history, Hunt (1989) argues that “[d]ocuments describing past symbolic actions are not innocent, transparent texts; they
were written by authors with various intentions and strategies, and histori-ans of culture must devise their own strategies for reading them” (p. 14). She more recently calls for historical study to consider the interplay of intersubjectivity, aesthetics, cognition, and politics (Hunt, 1998). Some of this echoes Ware (1940), who called, some time ago, for interdisciplinary convergence and for new intellectual tools and historical methods.

Many of psychology’s historians have been inspired by Foucault’s (1971/1977) genealogical approach to history. As Kral and Hill (1996) argue, Foucault’s genealogy identifies discursive discontinuity and dispersion, tries to undo the view of history as continuous, and emphasizes the material conditions of discourse—such as institutions, political events, economic practices, and the operations of power—as they affect the body, knowledge, and subjectivity. His historical project shows how power impinges upon historical subjects, documents events without finality, and opposes the search for the “timeless and essential secret” (Foucault, 1971/1977, p. 146). If this is the case, Hamilton (1996) is correct: “[w]e should therefore expect the process of understanding the past to be as unending as is the future” (p. 18). Historical work in psychology has already joined in this critical perspective, as Harris (1997) and others argue for knowledge of critical historical methods and thinking within psychology, lest it promote its own simplistic histories.

These and other conceptual, political, methodological, and practical crises have, borrowing from Berkhofer (1995), placed Clio, the muse of history, at a crossroads. In this sense, history becomes a hermeneutic enterprise, entering into and borrowing from the humanities, anthropology, and cultural studies (e.g., Hamilton, 1996). This blurring of disciplinary boundaries is moving many from the mere “history of” a discipline, written primarily from within, to “history and,” converging disciplines with history and historiography (see Cohen and Roth, 1995).

**THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL TURNS**

There is nothing new about theory and philosophy in psychology. Is it not an old story that psychology was once simply natural philosophy and its founders eminent philosophers? For a long time now, theory has been something logical positivists have used to explain observations after the fact, while avoiding the more speculative. That is, if theory in psychology was ever allowed a place at the table. Philosophy was the domain of philosophers, eagerly shunned by empiricists wishing to get on with the description of observed reality. Yet there has probably always been an undercurrent of interest in theoretical and philosophical issues in psychology. For instance, *Philosophy of Psychology* is the title of books appearing throughout the last 25 years (e.g., Block, 1981; Brown, 1974; Bunge and Ardila, 1987; Margolis, 1984; Robinson, 1985), a tradition that continues (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1995; O’Donohue and Kitchener, 1996a).
So how can we claim that there is currently a theoretical and philosophical turn in psychology? Many point to the recent rise in journals (e.g., *Theory & Psychology*) and books (e.g., Kukla, 2001) as well as doctoral psychology programs dedicated to theoretical psychology. One line of reasoning is that psychologists have only returned to theory and philosophy after a period of absence during the heyday of behaviorism and logical positivism in the first half, and especially the middle, of the 20th century (O'Donohue and Kitchener, 1996b). During this period, the philosophy of psychology was relegated to a marginal position within psychology and studied mostly by philosophers, a pattern that continues to this day (see O'Donohue and Kitchener, 1996a). A key to our argument about psychology taking a theoretical and philosophical turn is recognizing just what kind of theory and philosophy is currently being used and how. The theories that psychologists are turning to are not embedded in specific domains of inquiry (e.g., attribution theory) but more general and broad perspectives (i.e., cognitive theory, as constructed by Bem and de Jong, 1997). In this sense, psychology has been turning to grander meta-theories such as feminism, poststructuralism, social constructionism, and postmodernism (Smith, Harré, and Van Langenhove, 1995). The influx of postmodernism into psychology (e.g., Kvale, 1992) should be understood as part of a more recent general interest with postmodernism in the social and human sciences in the early 1990s (e.g., Doherty, Graham, and Malek, 1992; Hollinger, 1994; Rosenau, 1992). This philosophical and theoretical turn has led to a concern and critique of the epistemological, ontological, and moral/ethical assumptions underlying modern psychology.

**The Crossroads and Beyond**

Like the other human and social sciences, psychology is “turning” increasingly to history, theory, and philosophy as serious endeavors unto themselves while scholars reflect on psychology’s current identity and location among the disciplines. Yet few books on psychology explicitly address these three areas together. The newer calls for a theoretical psychology, while grounded in philosophy, have yet to address the place of history within its frame (e.g., Bem and de Jong, 1997; Faulconer and Williams, 1990; Kvale, 1992). However, an increasing number of psychologists are relying on developments from history, theory, and philosophy in their work. We believe that this calls for a consideration of their confluence in psychology.

Admittedly, many in academic psychology do not see the point. The general avoidance of theory, history, and philosophy in the writing and practice of psychology has long been evident. The teaching of the “philosophy of” or “history of” psychology in psychology departments is usually relegated to the fourth year of undergraduate work, if it is taught at all, and is often lost in graduate programs. Many academics shy away from theory in their work. Most “theories” in psychology are relevant to only a specific
domain or content issue and should be best called frameworks or models, not theories (Slife and Williams, 1997). The history of psychology is also usually packaged in self-contained courses for the senior psychology undergraduate or graduate student but otherwise avoided. There are even explicit institutional sources of discouragement. One such example is the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (American Psychological Association, 2001). It instructs authors to review theoretical implications and previous work “in a paragraph or two” (p. 16). As far as the history of a concept, it offers this advice: “Discuss the literature, but do not include an exhaustive historical review” (p. 16). It suggests that one should provide “an appropriate history” but avoid works of “general significance” (p. 16). These are clear signs that psychology’s positivist approach eschews history, theory, and certainly philosophy.

Thus for many in our discipline, historical explorations of Joseph Breuer’s psychology or philosophical explorations of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy may be intellectually useful but practically useless. Those who integrate philosophy, theory, and history within psychology have the opposite opinion. By and large, it is purpose and function that drive many to what we call “the crossroads” and beyond. What we see happening with psychology’s turn to history, theory, and philosophy is not just intellectual play. Such efforts are not practically useless but practical history, theory, and philosophy.

As we contemplate the crossing of history, theory, and philosophy in contemporary Western psychology, in this era of interdisciplinary communication and blurring of academic genres, we focus on several basic questions. What forces are at work in pulling these areas together or keeping them disparate within psychology? How are the borders between these interests maintained and transgressed? What are some potentials and perils of crossing these boundaries? The convergences and divergences on these issues form an agenda for future psychologists working at the intersection of history, philosophy, and theory and developing an interdisciplinary psychology.

Considering current thoughts on the uses of history, theory, and philosophy in psychology, along with the chapters that follow, we have identified what we think are three key arenas of convergence being studied by those working in these endeavors: a reexamination of context in modern psychology, broad considerations of the morality, values, and politics of current psychology, and integrating theory, history, and philosophy in psychological practice.

**CONSIDERING CONTEXT**

One of the central themes in current writing is contextualization. What is context, why is it so crucial, and is it crucial for all? We see context as the events pertaining to a person or persons. This broadly encapsulates such immediate effects as interpersonal behaviors and more general structures such as roles, race, history, and culture. When psychology considers its topics,
Convergence and Conjunction at the Crossroads

conducts its research, and publishes its findings, how much is context a factor? If context is important, as few would deny, what do we do with it, and how do we account for it? Moreover, if context is important, then how generalizable are the things we construct and study?

The emerging field of cultural studies represents one way in which the humanities are refocusing on context. Cultural studies, however, has all but ignored psychology. A brief purview of some main reviews of cultural studies (e.g., Culler, 1999; During, 1993; Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler, 1992) reveals very few chapters on psychological topics and none written by psychologists. But there are exceptions. There are many references to Chodorow, Irigaray, and Lacan, such as Penley’s (1992) analysis of homo-erotic imagery in Star Trek fanzines based on Chodorow’s psychoanalytic theory. However, these are marginal figures in contemporary North American academic psychology. At first glance, the *Culture and Psychology Reader* (Goldberger and Veroff, 1995) offers hope, but it is more accurately described as cross-cultural, cultural, or multicultural psychology, not cultural studies. The key difference is that the Goldberger and Veroff (1995) collection looks for the “role of culture” (culture as an independent variable) in various psychological constructs, whereas cultural studies is “committed to the study of the entire range of a society’s arts, beliefs, institutions, and communicative practices” (Nelson, Treichler, and Grossberg, 1992, p. 4) or “the study of contemporary culture” (During, 1993, p. 1). This is the new context for psychology.

Two books appearing in 1990—one by Bruner (1990) and the other an edited volume by Stigler, Shweder, and Herdt (1990)—serve as catalysts for North American psychology to ask questions from a very different angle, with historical antecedents in writers such as Vico, Dilthey, and Wundt with his “Volkerpsychologie” (Shweder, Goodnow, Hatano, LeVine, Markus, and Miller, 1998). Shweder and colleagues (1998) define cultural psychology as “the investigation of both the psychological foundations of cultural communities and the cultural foundations of mind” (p. 867), such that “the study of the way culture, community, and psyche become coordinated and make each other possible” (p. 868). In the first prominent appearance of an article on this subject in the *Annual Review of Psychology*, cultural psychology is viewed as a “project designed to reassess the uniformitarian principle of psychic unity (which its authors associate with cross-cultural psychology) and aimed at the development of a credible theory of psychological pluralism” (Shweder and Sullivan, 1993, p. 498). The units of analysis for a cultural psychology include conscious and unconscious “mentalties, folk models, practices, situated cognitions, and ways of life” (Shweder et al., 1998, p. 872). Borrowing from Vygotsky, cultural psychology sets out to account for the psychic internalization of culture. Theoretical work is currently examining both innate and sociocultural constraints on the mind, and the field of cultural psychology is viewed as interdisciplinary rather than merely a subarea of psychology (see Shweder, 1999).
Many psychologists might take the side of “the particulars,” that the specifics of any given context shape and influence the phenomenon observed, so that the focus is on certain populations, or even individuals, rather than pan-human universals. Sure, these psychologists admit, general principles may eventually be derived from the particulars, but we are nowhere near figuring out what these universals are or how they operate contextually. Moreover, if we ever hope to come up with theories and models that work well in specific contexts, we need models and theories that are sophisticated enough to account for variations in circumstance. For example, Danziger’s chapter reflects on the state of history in psychology and urges us to consider how the meaning of psychological objects is created within specific historical contexts.

Seeley is no doubt a proponent of looking for particulars. Her chapter on cultural turns in psychology leaves the reader with the sense that the universal truths psychology seeks cannot be found because of cultural variations in human experience. That is, human concerns are grounded in local and particular circumstances. She identifies the reasoning underlying psychology’s search for universals as ethnocentric logic. As such, psychology’s ethnocentric logics “compromise [psychology’s] ability to speak with authority and impartiality about human behavior.” Clearly, Seeley questions universalizing claims, wondering who these claims address.

Kimball’s chapter is also primarily concerned with the particulars, the historical and political circumstances that contribute to conceptions of gender. Moreover, she argues that critiques of these gender models arise out of particular historical circumstances, both inside and outside the academy. She also cautions us that each critique has strengths and limitations in its own particular contexts. Thus, at least for gender, such highly contextualized limits make generalizability a distant possibility.

While a focus on particulars dominates work in history and theory, the authors in this book who are more philosophical seem inclined to work with universals. These theorists admit local context is important, but this does not dissuade them from speculating about the generalities that we may all share, or at least from lamenting the loss of universalism. So some, such as Tolman, remain optimistic about the attainment of a common good, a social consensus on what is “good,” while Martin and Sugarman try to articulate what is essential, fundamental, and universal to the self. The sense is that, yes, we need to understand context, yet we also need to be looking at generalities. The search for a middle ground is a current theme in the human and social sciences. A challenge for psychology is the development of knowledge concerning a meeting ground for psychic unity, human plurality, and the varieties of contextualization. A number of scholars argue that the post–postmodern period will be one of reconciliation between classical science and hermeneutic epistemologies, with a serious reconsideration of
the former (e.g., Alexander, 1995; Hunt, 1998; Mazlish, 1998; McDonald, 1993).

**MORALITY/POLITICS/VALUES**

The second key convergence that we have identified in historical, theoretical, and philosophical psychology is a concern with the morality, politics, and values underlying psychology. By morality, we mean a general concern for “good” along with the agency to choose what we believe is “good.” Tolman’s chapter contends that psychology is a moral enterprise, since “no human endeavor can be free of moral liability.” Indeed, moral judgement is at the heart of our most valued scholarly practices. Reflections on the moral vision of psychology question what exactly is it that contemporary psychology is trying to achieve?

Early writers on this topic, such as Sullivan (1984), explicitly note that there had been very little critical reflection on the aims of psychology, but that this had changed substantially since the 1960s. That said, many of the early criticisms came from outside psychology. For example, philosopher Charles Taylor (1989) inspired many psychologists seeking to connect morality to the study of the self. Taylor highlights the interconnection between notions of selfhood, identity, and goodness. His comments such as “To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand” (p. 27), and “In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going” (p. 47) rang true with many psychologists. Moreover, Taylor’s clear explication of the need for agency, and therefore moral choice, in accounts of “the self” was a wake-up call that could not be ignored by those inside (theoretical or philosophical) psychology. Indeed, self theorists (at least philosophically minded ones) have been debating the moral self ever since.

Critics within psychology have also developed a wide-ranging agenda for a new critical psychology. Drawing on European concerns with “bourgeois psychology”—and its focus on prediction and control—critics accuse psychology of absolving commitments to challenge oppressive societal arrangements in psychological practices (Tolman, 1991; Tolman and Maiers, 1991). Certainly as a largely positivist science, psychology is predicated on the search for truth, but without any contemplation on the role of “vested-interests” in the creation of that truth or how some might be oppressed by such “truths” (Maiers, 1991). By the mid-1990s, Prilleltensky (1994) leveled a damning challenge to practices throughout psychology’s sub-disciplines. Prilleltensky characterizes psychology as perpetuating inherently conservative, and even regressive, tendencies by upholding a status quo that exploits vulnerable groups in Western culture. Moreover, by claiming a neutral, apolitical, and anti-ideological stance, psychology unwittingly supports the existing social order, which continues to oppress and marginalize those without power.
These impulses, a relatively new endeavor in psychology, are gathering momentum and may perhaps reach “critical mass,” despite their own marginalized position within psychology. Those psychologists contributing to a moral/critical turn are just beginning to establish an agenda for the revisioning of psychology. Fox and Prilleltensky (1997) explicitly direct psychologists to work on the “welfare of oppressed and vulnerable individuals and groups” (p. 1) by challenging disempowering theories and practices of psychologists. A recent collection of writings by critical psychologists shows that psychology's contributions to a just society may be starting to take on a wider appeal (Sloan, 2001). However, questions about this recent program remain. If psychology is not value-neutral, what values does it hold? Are there universal moral principles to which we can ascribe, or is morality inherently positioned? How can psychology, with its overtly individualistic focus, account for power and social factors (Mather, 2000)? A critical turn, as well as broader reflections on the morality of psychological theories and practices, is definitely underway, but many issues have yet to be resolved.

In addition to moral discourse, political concerns are being addressed in many areas of psychology, most notably in feminist psychology. Many of the themes discussed thus far in this introduction are complemented by feminist turns in psychology. Feminist criticisms of psychology begin with the premise that psychology has been gender-biased (Sherif, 1994; Wilkinson, 1997). Critics argue that mainstream psychology often has neglected the study of women and women's activities in favor of men's lives (Nicholson, 1995). Thus feminist criticisms challenge not only the content of knowledge but the way in which psychological knowledge is understood, produced, and ordered (Nicholson, 1995).

Feminist theories, like critical psychology, reinforce the claim that psychological research can be an instrument of oppression. Psychology's methods, largely positivistic and empirical, have failed their emancipatory potential, subordinating women (Lather, 1991). In other words, psychology functions to maintain power structures and practices that often exclude and oppress women (Burman, 1990). For many feminists, the most contentious issue is the claim that science is objective and neutral. Some feminist critiques of science contend that scientific epistemology is governed by an androcentric ideology hiding its interests behind objectivity (Burt and Code, 1995; Harding, 1986). Within psychology, in particular, Nicholson (1995) identifies three ways in which the assumption of objectivity manifests. First, experimental psychology focuses on the behavior of the research participant rather than people in their social, subjective, and cultural contexts. This stripping of context creates artificially autonomous entities. Second, experiments are often conducted by male researchers who interact with mostly male participants. Thus psychological research takes place in a context that disadvantages women. Third, psychological science is constructed and reproduced in a culture that subordinates women.
In response to these criticisms, feminist psychologists propose a variety of resolutions. Some seek remedial solutions, hoping to make science less gender-biased, but others seek more transformative gender-fair methods (Morawski, 1997). Transformative methods are situated and embedded in context, relational (in terms of a place in a social order), and sensitive to moral implications, personal awareness, and social context, especially in terms of how power relations such as gender contribute to subjectivity (Morawski, 1997).

Insides and Outsides
For many in this book, discussions of the morals, politics, and values of psychology involve talk of insides and outsides. This discourse debates where morals reside and values are enacted: interior or exterior to the individual, in the personal or social realms, within value systems or outside value systems? Consider Tolman for a moment. In an analysis of the “moral enterprise” that we call psychology, he contends that we must be able to deduce some sense of good. Tolman grounds his moral foundation, the essence of morality, in social action. Yet when he considers the different kinds of “goods” that exist, he proposes that the relationship between universal and individual goods is logical—one can be deduced from the other. In this sense, morals are shaped in the outside world, in social action, but we must deduce them from our interior logic.

Insides and outsides also infuse Martin and Sugarman’s chapter on self theory. They find that sociocultural considerations in the nature of self and personhood have unnecessarily ignored more “ontologically prior” elements of personhood. These ontologically prior components include an identifiable, agentic, embodied human being. This is a conception of personhood with morality at its heart, consistent with Taylor, based on an essentially agentic moral being, able to choose a direction in life. But these moral elements, for Martin and Sugarman, are ontologically prior to the self, perhaps existing in the society and then internalized into the person, an outside becoming an inside.

In contrast to Martin and Sugarman’s quest for self essences, Greer’s genealogical analysis of the self asserts that some of the foundational bases of selfhood—agency, intentionality, and moral choice—have been abandoned by contemporary self psychology. Indeed, the self, as it is constructed in psychology, does not have a person inside, largely because it was stripped away by positivistic methods (see Smythe, 1998).

Lastly, inside/outside organizes the debate reviewed by Slife, Fisher Smith, and Burchfield in their chapter on values in psychotherapy. Are values an intrinsic aspect (inside) of psychotherapy, or can psychologists “step outside” values in their practice? Starting from the allegation that clinical, counseling, and applied psychologists may be “crypto-missionaries,” converting their clients to their own values, Slife and colleagues explore different philosophical assumptions underlying values in psychotherapy and historically
important theoretical developments in research on values in psychotherapy. Given several problems in the basic assumptions of each approach, Slife and colleagues arrive at the conclusion that it is impossible for psychotherapy to be value-free. If therapy cannot surpass values, if the “talking cure” is really the “talking mission,” then what are we to do? They arrive at the philosophy of hermeneutics as a solution. From their perspective, values are inside us, so dialogue—externalizing values—may be one possible way of interrelating values.

**Doing Philosophy, Theory, and History in Psychology**

The last convergence pertains to those who build conjunctions between history, theory, and philosophy in psychology. They use this interdisciplinary inquiry toward a particular goal. Moreover, they face barriers and obstacles integrating insights from this study into their work.

**Uses**

At first glance it may seem obvious how to use theory, philosophy, and history in psychology. Simply review the theory that pertains to your concept, perhaps see what philosophers have to say about it (or connect it to relevant ideas), and try to conceptualize the history of the topic, including the historical context in which it emerges. According to Danziger, we must consider history, since theory alone fails to account for the “biography of objects.” Historical forces—including material and nondiscursive—are central to the construction of a concept. His is a call to examine the historical nature of psychological objects and how “institutionalized practices or discursive traditions” influence this history, while emphasizing the mutability and incoherence of objects.

Other considerations are also involved. Many authors in this book use history, theory, or philosophy to develop and articulate a critical challenge to mainstream psychology. Slife and colleagues are probably the most explicit in their uses of theory, philosophy, and history. In their hands, history provides “perspective illumination,” theory examines underlying assumptions and tensions, and philosophy reveals the meta-frameworks of positions. Ultimately—at least for Slife and colleagues—philosophy, in the form of hermeneutics, is a solution for understanding values in psychotherapy, but one also could easily envision other dimensions playing a crucial role.

Kimball's chapter on how political challenges to conceptions of gender have influenced the theory of gender in psychology, and how these theories have been resisted by events in historical contexts, is also instructive. Her work can be, consistent with Danziger, a biography of the psychological object we call “gender.” Although Kimball's analysis is optimistic that further radical critiques of gender are now possible, since these critics do not use the concepts and language of the majority, they have less impact. Moreover,
we take the lesson from cultural psychology such as that reviewed by Seeley: if we do not consider context, which ultimately circumscribes generality, we are missing the point.

The critical perspective certainly becomes clear with Stam’s analysis of the two histories of the 1970s’ crisis in social psychology. Traditional historical accounts partition the crisis into one isolated point in time, lay to rest the contestations of the day, and have a minimal impact on theory in psychology. Critical histories, however, assert that these issues have always been with us, question boundaries between social psychology and sociology, and show how basic social psychological theories are historical. Thus while traditional histories often substantiate disciplinary boundaries and theoretical stasis, critical histories point to the historical nature of theory and the illusory nature of disciplinary boundaries.

Barriers and Obstacles
Recent work on the history, theory, and philosophy of psychology encounters many barriers and obstacles. If the above arguments are accurate, then, as Tolman asserts in his chapter, unless psychology comprehends the moral dimensions of its theories and alters its concepts to account for human needs and interests, it will distort and mislead us about human experience. This is most certainly the argument of self theorists, as Greer and Martin and Sugarman illustrate in this book. But others urge caution in this quest for the moral dimensions of humanity. In the very least, cultural psychologists (e.g., Seeley) warn against any hegemonic or universalizing claims to moral knowledge. However, it is likely this quest for human interests is incompatible with the methods of mainstream psychological research (e.g., Greer).

Kimball’s chapter is more explicit than most about the barriers and obstacles that theoretical innovators face when they consider gender. A major barrier is that theoretical articulations are often so critical of dominant ideology or practices that they are rejected by the majority of the discipline. Critiques cannot be incorporated into the existing theoretical framework, a framework in which many have much invested. Moreover, politically driven critiques often challenge even the most basic of assumptions—such as the naturality of gender—so they are rejected without question. Or, as Stam so eloquently summarizes: there are those who wish to perpetuate the status quo, and they will resist critical histories that question boundaries, both disciplinary and theoretical.

The relationship between theory and practice becomes a crucial item in the future agenda of psychologists working at the crossroads of these inquiries. Some believe that making theory is a social practice. In their chapters both Tolman and Danziger write about “social practices” that are inherently moral, theoretical, and historical. For Tolman, social practices—socially cooperative efforts—are necessarily moral, because they
are fundamentally human enterprises, as is psychology. Thus it may be through practice that we ultimately understand a common good (see Bourdieu 1977). Greer’s chapter is blunt about this: disciplinary practices—power/knowledge relations among researchers, practitioners, and the consumers of psychological knowledge—create theoretical concepts in both their methodological and investigative forms. Thus the self, like other constructs in psychology, is the product of social practices. However, often it is the case that such theoretical conceptions are at odds with the methods used to study them, as is the case in self research. So another challenge is making disciplinary practices consistent with theoretical assertions. Yet there are reasons to be pessimistic: for example, cultural psychology has had only a limited impact on psychological concepts and practices (e.g., Seeley).

CONCLUSION

While psychologists have always worked with history, theory, and philosophy, currently something different is going on. At this point in time, psychology is undergoing a radical reconsideration. Returning to Toulmin (1995), we are reminded of the Kuhnian paradigm shift:

At the end of the century, we have the same tasks that faced European thinkers in the 1650s: to rebuild not merely our intellectual account of “knowledge,” but also a social and political order within which epistemology will be free of the excess individualism of the Cartesian tradition. (p. xv)

The intellectual times certainly are changing, and we believe that psychology must examine closely its own epistemology, language, categories, methodologies, and the multiple turns that continue to raise questions about its own “psyche.” To know psychology’s frames of mind is to make explicit its options. We strongly urge psychologists to turn, actively, to these newer messages and to examine their own work and thought. It is the best of times for psychology to now passionately join forces with history, theory, and philosophy, and to see what evolves. It may not be an easy fit, but it is a necessary one. Psychology and history and theory and philosophy. As Geertz (1995) aptly states, “take care of the conjunctions and the nouns will take care of themselves” (p. 261).

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