Chapter 1

Overview and Critique of the Present Research into the Politics of Cultural Pluralism

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INTRODUCTION

Since Crawford Young (1976) placed the issue of cultural pluralism on the conceptual map, the literature on this phenomenon has exploded, as have debates about which theoretical framework is most fruitful. Until recently, three competing perspectives dominated empirical research: the primordialist, the instrumentalist, and the constructivist (Young 1993; Tilley 1997). Briefly, primordialists assume that ethnic and other forms of ascriptive identity are simply “given,” they are the “natural” divisions of humanity. While many scholars have been labeled as “primordialists” by their opponents, including Clifford Geertz, today it is hard to find scholars who hold this position in its pure form. However, the rhetoric of many identity movements does project such a position (e.g., the claims about the biological determinacy of race made by racists). In contrast, instrumentalists explore and explain attachment to ascriptive identities (e.g., ethnicity, tribe, race, religion, language, etc.) by assuming that the present nature of these attachments is a function of the modern nation-state and the nature of the politics carried on within its borders. In short, ascriptive identities function as the tools of political elites in their competitions for power. Constructivists, along with instrumentalists, hold that identities are invented rather than primordial and natural, however, they question whether identities are merely tools easily manipulated by elites. Constructionists point to the symbolic nature of human understanding and to the difficulty of ever fully controlling the symbol systems through which we perceive the world. Increasingly constructivists are examining the role of narrative in producing group solidarity and defining the character of intergroup conflicts.

Much empirical work remains to be done by scholars working within each approach. Even so, these approaches are increasingly being called into
question. Currently debates rage about which approach, or which combination of approaches, best explains the continued existence of ascriptive identities, as well as the nature of the political and social dynamics they engender. These debates are not easily resolved, in part, because the approaches have different strengths and weaknesses: each provides adequate answers to some but not all of the issues at the center of the present research agenda. Furthermore, underlying and interacting with these debates are the broader epistemological clashes between the “modernists” and “postmodernists.”

There are other important issues as well. Consider the topics that have comprised the research agenda: (1) the process of identity formation (through to political mobilization); (2) the links to modernization; (3) patterns of conflict and cooperation; (4) the connections between cultural pluralism and the nation-state; (5) the viability of the post–World War II nation-state system; and (6) the reasons for the intensity of the emotions surrounding nationalism.¹ While the first issue (i.e., the process of identity formation) is primarily phenomenological in character and, hence, amenable to an empiricist approach, all of the others, to a greater or lesser degree, also address important ethical issues. As such, researchers who explore these issues must come to terms with how to treat normative considerations, even as greater empirical information is being sought. Here phenomenological inquiry necessarily becomes entwined with normative concerns, for example, the moral status of identity claims, the proper structure, functioning, and role of state institutions, the justice of global patterns of development, and so on. There are also other crucial questions that are not on this research agenda, and many also raise troubling issues about the nature and status of truth claims within the social sciences, and about whether claims to being purely “scientific” can be justified.²

Given this confusing state of affairs, now is a good time to step back and reflect on the nature of present efforts to theorize identity politics and on how empirical research efforts are framed. This is necessary if we are to move forward on the levels of both theory and practice. These are the goals to which this book is devoted.

TERMINOLOGY AND HISTORY

Before proceeding, a brief word must be said about terminology. The terms nationalism, ethnicity, cultural pluralism, communalism, and identity politics often are used interchangeably.³ Here no objection is raised to this practice, however, some attention must be paid to the history of how these terms have interacted in previous discourses, for there the differences were critical. Specifically, nationalism’s agenda of nation building is antithetical to subnational identity politics. The fact that the terminology is more fluid
today indicates just how much the theoretical terrain has changed, hence, the need for this book.

In particular, it is helpful to note some of the theoretical shifts, which have taken place since the end of World War II, that coincide with the beginning of the end of European colonization of the Third World and the simultaneous bid by the United States for global dominance. Most important here is the rise and fall of the modernization paradigm of political development, for although it is no longer the dominant theoretical paradigm, its central tenets continue to condition our understanding of cultural pluralism and its consequences for politics.4

After winning independence (in the course of which a form of anti-colonial nationalism was generated), many new states, working within the modernization paradigm, consciously set out to “build” nations: to generate a Western form of territorial nationalism capable of combatting parochial andascriptive “primordial” identities. The idea was to generate the kind of homogeneous gesellschaft (i.e., rational cultural consensus based upon modern cultural precepts and structural organizational forms) that Western countries supposedly had done during their processes of industrialization. The argument was that modern societies required a culturally homogeneous form in order to function, because modern industry requires a mobile, literate workforce.5

While in the short run it was assumed that certain cultural symbols were important for identity formation (which itself was a necessary part of national integration), in the long run a gradual secularization of the political culture would, and should, accompany the socioeconomic structural differentiation which coincided with rising capacity. The final result was to be a unified “civic culture” characterized by trust of one’s fellow citizens, consensus about the “outputs” that government should provide, and agreement on the proper basis of legitimate authority. It should also include a citizenry that saw itself primarily in terms of the nation-state and was capable of political participation yet still imbued with enough “parochial” and “subject” proclivities to maintain the “proper balance” between governmental power and governmental responsiveness to citizens. This in turn would allow elites the freedom they needed to govern (Almond and Verba 1963, 356–60, 529–41). In short, the nation-building approach to Third World political development, which was the first approach generated by the modernization paradigm, assumed that a conscious policy of symbol manipulation could produce the same effect as the gradual historical development that had unfolded unconsciously in the West. It also assumed that a unified, homogeneous symbol system was essential for a strong, modern state.

When this approach to political development got bogged down with various problems, the focus shifted to state building. This strategy concentrated power in the state and sought to develop sufficient “institutional capacity” to “contain” the social mobility that typically accompanies economic and
political development (Huntington 1968). This was a more coercive approach founded upon suppressing rather than superseding identity politics. This strategy was no more successful than nation building, and after a few decades the salience of subnational identity groups was grudgingly recognized.

In some cases, new identity groups became relevant for the first time. In other cases, old identity groups gained a new lease on life because of the new conditions generated by the new state. In the latter instances, identity politics sometimes represents the success of state policies, as in cases where identity politics was successfully used to help consolidate democracy (e.g., linguistic identity in India). In other cases, however, the weakness or corruption of the state and/or economic sphere has produced a backlash by subnational actors who perceive their causes in identity terms.5

More recently we have seen an explosion of identity politics in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. The theoretical problems facing the leaders of these successor states are not very different from the ones faced by Third World post–independence leaders.7 Ironically, the theoretical framework also is not very different. Despite the radical differences between communists and democratic-capitalist regimes on many fronts, and despite the awareness of national identities in early communist writings, in practice, both ideologies share an understanding of history in which ascriptive identities are assumed to be anachronisms that are destined to disappear: issues of language, ethnicity, religion, clan, and so on are irrelevant to political economy and, hence, the political logic of the new age. This means that while the experiences of the Eastern European states are important to consider in their own right, they do not fundamentally alter the development of the literature that was already unfolding in response to the shifting realities in other regions of the world. Primarily, the eruption of identity politics in Eastern Europe (and also in Western Europe and North America) has helped solidify the now generally acknowledged view that interethnic conflict and other forms of identity politics are an almost universal reality in our times.

The reason for presenting this brief summary of the modernization paradigm is to keep its assumptions in mind as we examine the contemporary literature on identity politics and cultural pluralism. Even though modernization literature has been thoroughly critiqued and has lost its preeminence, many of its assumptions (e.g., about modernity and tradition, etc.) still affect our understanding of both theoretical and practical issues. In the last thirty years or so since the modernization paradigm began disintegrating, we have witnessed an empirical moment in the study of identity politics. Having seen the grand theoretical edifices of the 1950s crumble so completely, scholars have turned to more modest empirical inquiries: categorizing different groups, generating typologies of different types of politically relevant identities, detailing case studies of particular ethnic groups, and so on. Disillusioned with
the central theories, many scholars have been acting like naive Baconians, believing that the “facts” simply speak for themselves. Thus just when positivism was receiving heavy criticism from philosophers, those whose gaze was directed at the world were embracing a kind of primitive descriptivism. This has left the theoretical tenets of the modernization paradigm undisturbed, even if they are now well buried.

In addition to the modernization paradigm’s presupposition of progress and its assumption that a unified, homogeneous symbol system was essential for a strong, modern state, it relied upon another tenet that we need to confront in order to move out of its theoretical orbit. I am referring here to its assumption about the opposition of tradition and modernity. While more muted today, this assumption is still a feature of the theoretical terrain. This continues to be the case, in part, because this supposition is intimately linked to another dichotomy upon which much Western political and philosophical thought is organized, namely, the distinction between the community and the individual. In Western thought, the individual is the criterion for defining other concepts and values and for determining how political time and space are divided up. Against the backdrop of an evolutionary understanding of history, the treatment of the individual becomes the standard by which historical ages are measured, with greater freedom and individuality associated with being more advanced. Because it is believed that an individual should be absolutely free to choose her or his life plan, “substantive values” are seen as problematic, for they “limit one’s access to a wider field of possibility” (Kolb 1986, 6). Traditional communities, the bearers of such values, are seen as restrictive of individual freedom. It is this which lies behind the belief that to be modern is to shed the limitations imposed by traditional identities, values, and ways of life.

In other words, the dichotomy between the individual and the community is superimposed on the dichotomy between tradition and modernity, and these two dichotomies, along with the identification of other cultures with past eras of Western culture (that are themselves associated with tyranny), keep this “temporal” understanding of cultural pluralism (i.e., its transient historical significance) and its negative connotations in place even today. Even though scholars who do empirical studies of identity politics no longer overtly subscribe to these ideas, and even though some political theorists and philosophers have truly moved beyond this view, we are still only beginning to deconstruct the various philosophical and institutional edifices that are rooted in the temporal understanding of cultural pluralism and the related commitment to homogeneity and totality.

That the dichotomies of individual and community and tradition and modernity became so conflated may be understandable given the historical experience of some West European states, in which popular politics emerged partly for the sake of greater individual freedom and autonomy. However, this
is not a universal development. In the East and the South, the dichotomy of individual versus community is not synonymous with the dichotomy of modernity and tradition. In Africa and Asia, the struggle for independence was the beginning not only of mass political mobilization but also of the reemergence of traditional communal identities. It was in the name of these identities that Third World peoples rejected colonialism. In the course of the independence struggles, however, what it was to be African or Indian or Muslim or Hindu changed. Members of such communities were now to be equal partners in the democratic polity that was to follow. Because traditional identities were reenergized within the context of mass-based liberation movements, a democratic dynamic was revived and/or injected into the traditions that went through such struggles. Today the political problem facing new states is to fulfill the democratic promises made at the time of independence. If they succeed, subnational identity groups can become the vehicles for participation, but if they fail, the shift in the locus of identity to ever smaller entities also may carry with it a repudiation of the normative demands of democracy as part of a general rejection of the status quo.

So when we talk about emancipating cultural pluralism, as we do in the title of this book, one of the things we are referring to is the need to examine the lens through which identity politics and cultural pluralism themselves are studied. We need to do this in order to delink examinations of cultural pluralism from the evolutionary view of history, its dichotomies of modernity and tradition and individual and community, and its assumptions about the anachronistic nature of ascriptive identities. If this is not done, our theoretical framework will remain essentially hostile to these phenomena.

If we are to find new ways of thinking about and working with cultural pluralism, it is also necessary to critically evaluate the perceived need for homogenizing projects, institutions, and processes (e.g., state building, melting pot metaphors, suppression of minorities, etc.). We need to question the assumption that community and tradition are intrinsically opposed to freedom, justice, and cultural plurality. Only when we truly are operating from principles that are no longer tied to a framework that was the product of the Western colonial project, and believed to be doing so by those engaged directly in identity politics, are we likely to find a new vision of the possible, as well as true resolutions for behaviors and practices that are unacceptable in themselves (and not because they are linked to identity politics).

Our contention is that identity politics are ubiquitous today, with nationalism and ethnicity being two versions of the same drive and conceptual framework, though played out by people differently situated with respect to power and state resources. We also see a proliferation of other forms of identity politics (e.g., linguistic, religious, indigenous, racial, etc.). These also need to be viewed in light of their relationship to the state, as well as in the global economic and cultural context. What also must be considered are the
moral parameters within which identity politics operate. Therefore, rather than develop typologies of identity politics or delineate the unique features and histories of different forms of identity, future research must explore issues that until now have largely been ignored by students of cultural pluralism. Before we describe this further, however, let us consider some of the most recent areas of research for they provide some interesting new insights that will be helpful in reading this book.

**Political Identity in Broad Brush Strokes**

In addition to the standard summary of the literature mentioned earlier (i.e., primordialism, institutionalism, and constructivism), another approach is gaining importance. It can be summarized nicely using the words of Emmanuel Levinas (1989, 236): “Contemporary thought is the thought to the nations among whom we live . . . [it] is the thought of a human society that is undergoing global industrial development, a fact that should not be treated lightly.” This statement brings to mind research into global systems, and the growing importance of what Benjamin Barber (1992) calls the confrontation of “Jihad vs. McWorld.” The very processes responsible for generating an increasing homogenization of cultures globally also are producing exaggerated and antagonistic forms of cultural difference.

This internationalist approach resonates with a branch of structuralist research that is coming to be known as “border theory.” The latter argues that we should not discuss identity without also talking about borders and boundary setting, because the process of identity formation is highly interactive. It is important to pay attention to how power operates at the boundaries between groups, and to the nature of the spaces that separate groups, both of which are constantly in flux. As this process is very much impacted by the broader location, and by where and how power circulates, it also is important to examine the role played by the state. So rather than simply examine the cultural contents of various groups, we must understand who is located on the boundaries of the group. We also must examine how and why those particular boundaries are maintained, for we know that territories and populations that are associated with particular politically important identities can shift, because boundaries are as much ideological as territorial phenomena.

From this point of view, another important factor in identity politics is social mobility, in part because it is one of the central legitimizing claims in modern polities. While liberalism, at least theoretically, celebrates the social mobility of individuals, it largely ignores the fact that this often occurs as group mobility. Identity groups do not remain in a fixed position within what typically remains a stratified system (even though most traditional principles of hierarchical ordering are no longer acknowledged to be legitimate).
Both the fluctuating locatedness of identity groups and frustrated aspirations to advance expose the officially denied hierarchy, and this creates tensions.

Finally, we must note that, like many scholars working within a postmodernist framework, many constructivist students of cultural pluralism are now focused on the role of discourse. They are examining legitimating discourses to explain how these help some identities to form, while disallowing others, and how these discourses regulate the types of interactions that can occur between groups, as well as the kinds of normative claims that can be made. That is, discourses establish their own communicative fields within which political identities, movements, and institutions are defined and legitimated, and around which boundaries are established (Apter 1997, 17), for it is through political discourse that moral principles and interests connect in politically significant (i.e., legitimating) ways. Hence, even though the processes of boundary setting and boundary maintenance are frequently associated with power expressed violently—in fact, a great deal of political violence centers around boundaries—even acts of sheer violence are regulated through political discourses that make moral appeals and call upon actors to "use their intelligence." In other words, "[p]eople do not commit political violence without discourse. They need to talk themselves into it" (Apter 1997, 2).

It also is increasingly recognized that we should regard conflict as a normal condition of politics. This claim is part of the broader rejection of the homeostatic views of society so prominent in the modernization literature and other strands of American political and social thought. Instead we need to start with the assumption that the normal condition of social systems is one of tension and intermittent conflict. "Such a view directs attention to the complexities arising out of conflicting, centrifugal tendencies in any society" and frustrates any effort to formulate simple explanations that stress only the integrative processes of a social system (De Vos 1975, 12). This view allows us to distinguish between the issues of conflict and violence. Furthermore, it also justifies the need to focus on the transformations of social identities that are constantly changing, often substantially, even in one generation. 11

We must discuss as well why politics organized on the basis of cultural markers continue to have such appeal. Writers coming from an instrumentalist point of view argue that identity is just another resource used by "cultural entrepreneurs" to press their real or material claims, consolidate power, and/or gain access to resources. Another explanation points to the social dislocations caused by rapid modernization and population migrations: in times of rapid and confusing change, people cling to tested institutions and worldviews. While raising important issues, neither provides a complete explanation. Without discounting "rational" (i.e., strategic economic and political) reasons for the continued salience of "ascriptive" identities, we also must discuss such issues as the universal importance of myth, the nature of meaning, the role of discursive narratives, the nature of the human, and the psychological di-
dimensions of individual identity and group solidarity. A metaphor, mentioned by George De Vos (1975, 377), of a California Indian sadly commenting on the death of his culture, helps capture what is at stake: identity is found in the “cup of custom” passed on by one’s parents, from which one drinks the meaning of existence. It allows one to “taste” one’s past and to plan and give meaning to one’s future. Identity is a means and an end, something to savor. Once the cup is broken, one can no longer taste life.

De Vos goes on to say that in this metaphor further features of identity politics become evident. First, many forms of identity politics, including ethnicity, are linked to the myths that explain a group’s origins and/or continuity. Such identity often is linked to religion, at least indirectly, as a central means of regulation and maintaining order. This has important implications:

Origin myths establish who one is, and, because of one’s progenitors, with which group one has rights and obligations. Such knowledge helps individuals resolve priorities of loyalty and allegiance in terms of a past frame of reference. It helps to integrate and regulate one’s behavior. It defines the classes of persons to whom one can express affection or vent aggression. It indicates those who deserve respect and those who are to be derogated. (De Vos 1975, 358)12

This is an extremely important point to which we will return. Suffice it here to repeat Roberto Toscano’s Levinasian argument that it is exactly the existence of such “partial ethics” that makes intergroup conflict possible. By this, Toscano means that at the root of violence toward “the Other” is the non-applicability of ethical judgments to those considered beyond one’s own group. In conventional morality, state-sanctioned group violence has not only been exempted from ethical stigma, it has been morally exalted; nothing should be considered wrong that defends the culture against outsiders. Indeed, this is a root of violent conflict between groups, for it is how the process of denying rights of others is justified (Toscano 1998, 63–81).

The enlightenment tradition attempted to overcome this approach to ethics, however, it is precisely its roots and suppositions that are called into question today by the continuing relevance of identity politics. The challenge, therefore, is to explore other approaches that take seriously cultural locatedness. Such approaches must address the fact that the rituals that reaffirm myths of origin often center on ancestral sufferings and triumphs. Out of these, future purpose is born (De Vos 1975, 358). In ethnic identity (as in other politicized identity), there is a commitment to endure suffering. Each group thinks that in maintaining itself, it has to undergo unique suffering not experienced by others. This commitment to endure suffering, combined with partial ethics, can become the basis upon which denials of the humanity of others are justified. When the group is under stress, the myth about surviving past
harms can be transformed into a justification for inflicting harm on other
groups. This, however, is the perverse side of identity politics. Its positive
side, and raison d’etre, is to express meaning, uniqueness, connectedness—in
short, to define one’s humanity.

The linkage between myths of origin and religion shows that identity
politics exist in a moral universe and are experienced as a moral commitment.
This very important and much overlooked fact needs to move to the forefront
of research and theoretical writing, as indeed is beginning to occur in some
of the recent publications (see, e.g., Weiner 1998; De Vos and Romanucci-

WHAT TO INVESTIGATE AND HOW TO INVESTIGATE

The title of this book, *Emancipating Cultural Pluralism*, alludes to three dif-
ferent dimensions that must be part of the reorientation of scholarship that
is now beginning to take place. First, we need to interrogate, and by this
process emancipate ourselves from, the paradigm through which we under-
stand identity politics as “the Other” of rationality and modernity (i.e., as
anachronistic). One dimension of this was already noted earlier when discuss-
ing the evolutionary view of history and the interlocked dichotomies of tra-
dition/modernity and individual/community. Identity politics exists in a world
both created and hemmed in by these notions.

More broadly, we must emancipate our understanding of the nature of
modernity, the “modern project” and its problems, for ethnicity and other
forms of identity politics implicitly expose the limits and failures of existing
understandings. These dynamics raise serious questions about the nature of
reason per se, about its role in the social world in general, and about its role
in identity construction and group solidarity in particular. It also raises ques-
tions about the continuing importance of symbolic and mythopoeic dimen-
sions of the human.

Another aspect entails seeing identity politics as normal politics. With
Patha Chatterjee, we advocate a more political view of politics generally.13 By
its volatility and unpredictability, identity politics exposes this truth, thus
encouraging us to emancipate ourselves from a view of politics that remains
tethered to key tenets of positivism as well as to technologized and bureau-
cratic theories of politics.

In contrast to traditional approaches to cultural pluralism, we argue that
the basic problem of politics needs to be redefined, away from the problems
of the peaceful aggregation of individuals and the development of cultural
homogeneity and strong state institutions, to the problem of how a plurality
of cultural groups can coexist without domination. In short, rather than being
an interesting anomaly, identity politics define the central theoretical and
institutional issues of our times.
We also intend emancipation in the sense that Crawford Young mentioned in his first work on this subject: finding formulas "for the preservation of intercultural harmony" (1976, 11). Broadly understood, this is emancipation from specific violent acts and practices that cause pain, harm and fear. It is of the utmost practical importance to demonstrate how new scholarship into identity politics, which takes the above-mentioned theoretical considerations seriously, can generate the kinds of knowledge that can help decrease the amount of harm (both to individuals qua individuals and to whole peoples) associated with identity politics. This suggests that the research agenda should include questions such as the following: How might we effectively address aggressive expressions of identity politics? Is it useful to distinguish between movements which (or moments when) intentions are emancipatory rather than predatory? For instance, is there something fundamentally different about the kind of ethnicity that is behind a regime that engages in ethnic cleansing and that of indigenous peoples’ movements that are resisting state incursions into their homelands? What about movements whose participants are seeking to redefine their political position within an already segmented political community? Are all of these diverse expressions of identity politics ontologically and/or normatively equivalent? How might the answer to this question influence policy? Does it matter whether a particular expression of cultural politics is the product of the maneuvering of those in power, or whether it is a “grassroots” attempt to overcome the new forms of alienation and oppression produced by modernization, the integration into the global economy, and the growth of bureaucratic-authoritarian state institutions? Finally, how can we extend the legal meaning of the term harm to encompass cultural wrongs and thereby extend institutional protections?

To do all of the above, we need to more thoroughly expound an epistemology rooted in a social and cultural definition of the human that can articulate a reconceived vision of the rational: an epistemology compatible with the continuing existence of culturally defined identities and the continued importance of cultural politics. We need an epistemology that is engaged and contextualized, whose questions come openly from a committed stance, for it is on this basis that a transformation in the way that the social sciences approach identity politics can be achieved. Much work has already been done in this area, but it is not always accessible, and its practical implications are not always apparent.

Ultimately, this book’s aim is to be counted among those recent works that are developing new strategies for approaching cultural pluralism. It will have achieved its goal if it contributes to any of the following tasks: (1) identifies ways in which hegemonic projects themselves generate some of the forms of violence and unrest associated with cultural pluralism; (2) focuses attention on the emancipatory possibilities inherent in some instances of cultural pluralism; and (3) elaborates on ways to prevent or resolve the kinds of harms that have been associated with cultural pluralism. In short, the
approach we will be developing begins by asking what the study of cultural pluralism would look like if it were carried out by those with a commitment to what Habermas called the "emancipatory interest" (see note 2 in this chapter).

**ELABORATIONS ON THE THEME**

In addition to this introduction and Crawford Young’s concluding chapter, this book has three main sections. The first addresses underlying epistemological, theoretical, and ethical issues. More specifically, the first chapter in Part 2, "A Propaedeutic to the Theorizing of Cultural Pluralism," by Jeff Hoover, argues that we should conceive of identity movements as answering the basic needs of human subjectivity. However, Hoover rejects the primordialist view of identity groups as expressing essential differences between human groups, nor should identity groups be conceived of as the residue of premodern ways of life, or as the instruments of elites. Rather, identity movements are a historically constructed means of satisfying the conditions for the flourishing of human subjectivity. As such, cultural pluralism belies an emancipatory interest, hence, theorizing about cultural pluralism should include an exploration of the role of identity movements in producing, for their members, such goods as self-awareness, security, and social space, as shaped by the reciprocity of aid and protection. From this vantage point it is possible to suggest ways of avoiding harm to nonmembers.

The next two chapters revise our way of approaching international and institutional issues. In chapter 3, “The Ethnic State,” Virginia Tilley analyzes the way in which the state impacts on identity politics. Rejecting the prevailing wisdom that the state is ethnically neutral, hence, able to play the role of a mediator vis-à-vis ethnic conflict, she argues that the state itself plays a key role in fostering ethnic conflict, due to its unique function in connecting international security concerns to the domestic ethnic environment. The state does this routinely by translating international norms regarding nation building into domestic nationalist discourses that are invariably imbued with ethnic logics. Moreover, the state often takes on an “ethnic” identity in crafting its security concerns and, hence, its allies. This has a negative impact on domestic diversity. By identifying how ethnic interests are built into the state itself, this chapter questions whether we should continue to rely on the modern state as the main mitigator of ethnic conflict.

In chapter 4, “Cleansing Ethnicity,” Thomas Simon develops this book’s third goal (to prevent harms associated with cultural pluralism) by developing an alternative to the two main approaches to understanding ethnicity that currently inform policy formation (i.e., the identity and strife views). Simon argues that these views lead us to believe that all ethnicity is either valuable or harmful, and thus policy makers ignore the political dynamics that make ethnic identification contingent and malleable. To improve upon this situa-
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Simon articulates an alternative “group harm” view that focuses on the harms frequently associated with ethnicity, for example, discriminatory policies, apartheid, genocide, and so on. A key aspect of Simon’s view is to point out a common sequence of stages (designation, discrimination, and brutalization) that typifies many instances of group harm. He then demonstrates the usefulness of this approach by applying it to the Yugoslavian and Rwandan cases. In so doing, he makes the case that in order to generate policies that might prevent group harms, policy makers should track the severity of harms, beginning with the initial designation of group identifications.

After Simon has shifted our attention to the harms associated with cultural pluralism, Part 3 presents several other profoundly disturbing expressions of cultural pluralism. Robert Buffington’s chapter, “Forjando Patria,” forces us to consider complex and often unforeseen problems associated with efforts to justly accommodate cultural pluralism. Specifically, he examines the unforeseen consequences of competing discourses within a state and shows how even well-intentioned efforts can be undercut by strands of cultural discourse that at first appear to be unrelated to matters of ethnic inclusion. Examining the case of the Mexican Revolution, Buffington argues that its failure to create a truly inclusive society can be traced in part to perceptual and discursive causes. The first of these is the intersection of anthropological discourse and eugenics that stressed the biological and cultural “improvement” of the indigenous peoples while it depreciated their current state. Second is the intersection of anthropological and criminological discourses, for even as radical anthropologists were attempting to revalue indigenous cultures, as part of an effort to incorporate indigenous peoples into a broader vision of citizenship, criminologists were defining the terms of acceptance in ways that undermined this effort. In raising issues about how knowledge is created and about how disciplines interact, Buffington goes to the heart of the epistemological problems that underlie any effort to emancipate cultural pluralism. In fact, as more and more states enact inclusive cultural policies, the perceptual and discursive issues that are raised here become increasingly relevant.

Ismail Abdalla, in chapter 6, “The Shari’a State,” attempts to get us to think outside of the Western paradigm by examining the Islamic regime of General al-Bashir in Sudan. He examines the ideas and actions of the Sudanese Brotherhood’s leader and ideologue, Dr. Hasan Abdallah al-Turabi, who is the main intellectual force in contemporary Sudanese politics. This chapter defines the essential features of the Sudanese Islamic paradigm and situates its discourse within the ideology of contemporary self-conscious political Islam. It also attempts to identify some salient features in this case that may enable us to establish some general theoretical formulations useful in understanding similar experiences elsewhere.

Manfred Steger, in chapter 7, “Mahatma Gandhi: on Indian Self-Rule,” returns to the debate about which theoretical approach works best for cultural pluralism by arguing that any purist answer is unsustainable. He argues that
the various approaches are not mutually exclusive and goes on to state that a more promising way to analyze the potency of nationalism is to explore how various instrumental, symbolic, and psychological elements contribute to its construction and perpetuation. To make such an approach manageable, Steger adopts a micro-level analysis of a specific text in its context(s). Assuming that nationalist leaders play a vital role in this process, he develops his argument by focusing on Mahatma Gandhi’s seminal work, *Hind Swaraj*, in which Gandhi developed his influential views on *swaraj* (self-rule, independence), Indian civilization, and *ahimsa* (nonviolence). In this unique hermeneutic, Steger identifies and accounts for the various instrumentalist, ethno-symbolic, and psychological aspects that give Gandhi’s nationalist discourse its unique gestalt and power. While the analysis in this chapter is focused on one unique source, the lessons learned from engaging in the exercise have much broader implications, most importantly perhaps for those who are working to counter the efforts by those in India today who are attempting to reconstruct Indian nationalism into a politically reactionary force.

In chapter 8, “Here We Do Not Speak Bhojpuri,” Beth Simon’s work, which also focuses on India, picks up on some of the themes raised earlier by Toffolo, Hoover, and Steger about the connection between individual identity negotiations and the construction of communal identities. Analyzing a set of real-time conversations about language and identity through the lens of speech act theory, Simon explains the dynamic connections between individual instances of situated language use and ongoing group processes of constructing communities. Her analysis reveals these connections as social practices and activities that are individually instigated and enable certain symbolic identities while demonizing others. She thus raises normative issues concerning the basic notions of identity, individual, and social group. Simon’s type of close analysis in an empirical investigation is crucial in providing a foundation for the theoretical and methodological debates embroiling cultural pluralism.

In chapter 9 “Reclaiming Sacred Hindu Space at Ayodhya,” Ellen Christensen expands on themes raised by Steger and Beth Simon by exploring the symbolic and ritualistic mechanisms by which the Hindu right mobilized the population in order to reconstruct Indian nationalism as an exclusive form of Hinduism that portrays Muslims as the dangerous and demonized “Other.” Through her analysis, we see not only how the manipulation of traditional symbols has astonishing power to move people to action, but that this effort is being undertaken both to obtain and further modern aims, and as a response to modern conditions. This case study takes seriously the central importance of symbols and rituals, and their continual reinvention and manipulation. In the instance recorded by Christensen, this is being done for exclusivizing and excluding ends (i.e., asserting Hindu dominance and deepening the division between Hindus and Muslims), however, the lesson to be drawn is not the necessary association between symbol manipulation and
reactionary identity construction but that symbolic manipulation is central to any identity construction. The implication is that those who seek to strengthen emancipatory forms of cultural pluralism also need to utilize symbols. As long as we see modernity as opposed to tradition, with reason versus the mythopoetic as the measure of that divide, then the power of the symbolic will remain solely with those who consciously link identity with tradition. It is possible though to imagine ways to use the symbolic to create a liberating form of cultural pluralism. In other words, the classic liberal modernist answer of juxtaposing universalistic identities to counter parochialism unravels, for it refutes nothing, and creates nothing. So emancipating ourselves from violent forms of identity by its methods is a hollow victory indeed. Rather, what these studies of India suggest is the need for a new form of symbolic interaction that picks up inclusive symbols and posits moral discourses, where the other is constructed via reference to moral categories (ala the rhetoric of Gandhi or Martin Luther King).

Part 4 turns to an important set of institutional questions. Specifically these chapters examine various attempts to devolve power as a means to address the demands made by those adhering to identity politics in culturally plural political systems. In chapter 10, “Self-Government in the Darjeeling Hills of India,” Selma Sonntag reports on the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Area Council of West Bengal. She shows how this model is informed by principles of liberalism, federalism, and democracy, and she discusses the potential of autonomous councils to successfully accommodate the plurality needs of culturally distinct minorities (rather than simply viewing the practice as a last resort to avert secession and civil war). She also discusses both the virtues and limits of “muddling through” as a strategy for dealing with cultural pluralism.

Paul Adogamhe, in chapter 11, “Politics of State Creation and Ethnic Relations in Nigeria,” gives a critical and an ambivalent assessment of decentralizing power in his examination of Nigeria’s effort to reduce ethnic conflict by carving larger states into smaller, more homogeneous units. His conclusion is that this effort has not lessened but has increased ethnic competition, which in turn has produced an increase in the level of intercommunal tensions. These conclusions are reached by focusing on how these changes have affected that part of eastern Nigeria formerly incorporated as the state of Bendel. Adogamhe points out that emancipating cultural pluralism cannot simply mean increased governmental autonomy or separate governing units. Rather, attention also needs to be paid to the sum of the parts and to the nature of the division of resources nationally.

Assefaw Bariagaber, in chapter 12, “Ethnicity and Constitutionalism in Ethiopia,” concludes the discussion on devolving power by examining the effects of Ethiopia’s 1995 constitution on its politics of cultural pluralism. With this constitution, Ethiopia claims to have transformed itself from a centralized state into a federation of ethnically defined territories that have a
unique constitutional right to secede under certain circumstances. Comparing the current federalism to Ethiopia's previous arrangement, Bariagaber discusses why the federal approach is a better alternative, and also why the devolution of power in the context of an extreme multiparty system, with segmented ethnicity, makes sense.

In Part 5 our efforts to develop an alternative, emancipatory approach to cultural pluralism are reviewed and critiqued by Dr. Crawford Young, in chapter 13, the concluding chapter of this book. As the convener of the National Endowment for the Humanities seminar, out of which this work grew, and as one of the first to recognize the importance of cultural pluralism and identity politics, Young is well positioned to evaluate and critique our efforts.

NOTES

1. This list was generated from a survey of the existing literature by Crawford Young. It served as an organizing framework for a National Endowment for the Humanities seminar on “Nation, State and Cultural Pluralism,” held at the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1997.

2. These debates came to the fore in the late 1970s and are nicely captured in various places, including Dallmayr and McCarthy (1977). Habermas (1968) argued that knowledge is always generated out of some interest (for the sake of some end, pursued by some group). Most academic research pursues either “technical” or “practical” interests. The former is utilized mainly in the natural sciences, which seek to explain the world in order to control it more efficiently. The latter is used in the humanities, which interpret the meaning of ancient texts, unique human events, and other epochs. The goal of this hermeneutic approach is to generate mutual understanding. While the technical and practical interests generate much useful information, neither should be at the center of the social sciences. Given that their subject matter is human beings, it is not enough either to take account of regularly recurring events and structures or to explore the meanings of such phenomena. It also is necessary to generate normative judgments and the type of knowledge that will allow us to escape from pseudo-natural constraints and to thereby transform our culture and institutions, to make them less oppressive. This is the “emancipatory interest,” and it coincides with the unique human trait to seek self-enlightenment.

3. According to Young (1976, 12, 16) “cultural pluralism” should be defined in terms of three basic components: “(1) Plurality is with relationship to an authoritative arena, the sovereign territorial state . . . which provides sharply demarcated boundaries within which groups define themselves and each other, and their interaction occurs; (2) Two or more socially and politically significant aggregates, differentiated by cultural criteria . . . whose competition, interaction, and conflict constitute one important ingredient in the overall pattern of political transactions in the polity; (3) The bases for these solidarity groupings are commonalities or affinities of ethnicity, language, race, caste, assumed blood tie, custom, and/or territory.” For an excellent description
of the unique dimensions of each aspect of cultural personalism, see Young's conclusion in this book.


5. Central to the West's view of itself is a series of conceptual dualisms, including the one between traditional and modern society. That distinction grounds sociology, which developed as a discipline by using this distinction to understand and critique the shifts being caused by the Industrial Revolution. While Marx's and Weber's work also are of central importance, it was the work of Tonnies that served as the template for how this distinction is conceived. Tonnies conceived of the difference as a distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). The former is like a living organism. It is the natural condition of humanity in traditional society and arises because human wills are linked by connections of kinship, locality, and mind. These give rise to an instinctive, paternalistic tenderness among the strong for the weak members of the community, which is the basis of feudalism. In contrast, modern bourgeois society (Gesellschaft) is characterized by a spirit of "apartness." In this social form, people remain separate, held together only by convention and law. All busily seek their own interests and are devoid of familial relationships. Durkheim went on to argue that the distinction is rooted in differing levels of labor division. Gemeinschaft is rooted in a low social division of labor and is expressed by the homogeneity of individuals. As the division of labor increases, a new form of "organic solidarity" becomes the unifying principle. Each person comes to fill a different function, so that individuals can no longer be easily separated. Individuals are now no longer grouped according to lineage but according to the nature of the social activity they perform. Durkheim's functional differentiation is analogous to Darwin's account of the differentiation of species within a given environmental niche. Thus when the tradition-modern distinction collided with social Darwinism, as it did in the modernization literature, the distinction between traditional and modern society, which originated as a heuristic device for critiquing modern society, came to be seen as evidence that confirmed the superiority of modern social organization (see Tonnies 1957, 47, 53, 66, 74; Durkheim 1933, 130, 148, 172, 180–81).

6. Victor Uchendu has summarized this point nicely: some ethnic revivalist movements are defenses against extinction, which is threatened when an externally imposed ruling polity seeks to secure the ultimate loyalty of all those it governs by annihilating local cultural symbols and practices. Other identity affirmations counter the effects of population dispersions or degradation by evoking old images and emblems around which members can rally to shed shame, renew pride, and gain a sense of self-acceptance.

7. In the conclusion of this book, Crawford Young explores these issues further.

8. This has been a persistent thesis in various strains of the literature, going back to Barth (1959). It is seen not only in the psycho-cultural theories of ethnic identity but also in more postmodernist/discursive views. More recently, border theory has become a field of inquiry in its own right, with its own organizing presuppositions. According to Michaelson and Johnson (1997, 10–12), who draw upon the work of Todorov, Jean-Luc Nancy, Homi Bhabha, Hicks, and Anzaldúa, the central assumptions
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of border theory can be summarized as follows: (1) The difference between modern and premodernism is that in modernity, border crossings are common and welcome, but in the premodern world, distinct cultures lived separately; (2) This body of literature is morally committed to saving all cultures; (3) Cultural isolationism is dangerous, and border crossing will be our salvation; (4) The latter is the case, because cultures are now forced to be in increasingly complex relationships with one another; and (5) Indigenous people can help heal the modern world, which suffers from fragmented subjectivities.

9. Friedman (1998) discusses the shifting back and forth between being somewhat permeable “borderlands” and being more impenetrable boundaries.

10. Examples from the United States include the migration of African Americans from the rural South to the urban North and the rise of the Irish through control of big-city politics. An example from Pakistan is the capture of state institutions by Punjabis. This has greatly improved the fortunes of many individuals belonging to this ethnic group.

11. This is increasingly the case, perhaps due to the fact that today there is a growing amount of social mobility (related to individual achievement), as well as an increase in geographic mobility (due to shifting labor markets). Additionally, all groups today, no matter how committed to traditionalism and/or orthodoxy, find it necessary to make self-conscious, repeated articulations of their supposedly unchanging, primordial claims. It also may be a product of the fact that today no group is content to remain mute (De Vos 1975, 16, 17).

12. In a rather alarming development, David Miller (1995) has developed an exclusivist ethnic ethics on the basis of just such an argument.

13. Chatterjee (1993, vii) notes that “it is remarkable how seldom political theorists have taken seriously the fact that ‘politics’ necessarily operates in an ideological world . . . where choices are strategic and relative, not univocal and absolute.”

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