Two certainties attend the scholarly comparison of ancient China and ancient Greece. First, those who pursue this study are participating in a venerable intellectual endeavor that will persist. Second, scholars who enter this daunting field are almost certain to attract sharp criticism. The first of these certainties results from an unavoidable fact of history: the civilizations of ancient China and ancient Greece exerted a defining influence on much that followed in Asia and in Europe. How can we—and indeed why should we—resist the temptation to compare the two, even as we recognize, to quote Jacques Gernet, that “one cannot say anything in this domain that would not be provisional and incomplete, limited by personal understanding that is always very partial”? With apologies for the no doubt masculinist bent of the following comparison, we would like to register our sense that Sino-Hellenic studies has, for us, the excitement we felt in our boyhood about major league baseball’s World Series before interleague play rendered less stunning the magical confrontation at the end of each season between the two victors of the normally discrete and separate entities of the American and National Leagues. The field of Sino-Hellenic studies puts into play with each other two great and immensely influential cultures that probably had little or no contact with each other in the ancient period. The patterns of thought and the cultural productions of ancient China and ancient Greece represent two significantly different responses to the myriad problems that human beings confront.

The issue of partiality that Gernet raised brings us to the second certainty. Criticism of the work of others in this field is always easy precisely because the pitfalls of comparative study are so numerous and so difficult, perhaps impossible, to avoid. Chief among these pitfalls is the fact that all of us who make these comparisons stand somewhere, belong to some cultural context, and where we stand can have a pro-
found affect on what we say about a different cultural context. This particular pitfall is strikingly illustrated in statements by two of our greatest intellectual forebears, Aristotle and Confucius. The former reveals himself as thoroughly Greek in the following analysis of Europe and of an Asia well west of the one we discuss in this volume:

The nations of the cold places and those of Europe are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill, so they continue comparatively free, but lacking in political organization and capacity to rule their neighbors. The peoples of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and skillful in temperament, but lack spirit, so they are in continuous subjugation and slavery. But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent.3

Confucius is more succinct, but no less convinced of the superiority, at least the political superiority, of his own people, the xiai who occupied the center of what we now might call the Chinese cultural world: “The Yi and Di peoples with rulers are not as good as the various Xia states without rulers.”4

Of course, Aristotle and Confucius are not alone in placing their own culture in a position of centrality, for few if any innocent bystanders are found in the business of cultural comparison. This truth is demonstrated nowhere more sharply than on the first significant page in the history of the comparison of Chinese and Western civilization: the writings resulting from the Catholic mission in China that extended from Matteo Ricci’s arrival in southern China in 1583 until the decline of the Catholic missions that followed the dissolution of the Society of Jesus in 1773 and the death of the Qianlong Emperor in 1796. This fascinating confrontation, which took place at the highest intellectual levels, but with ethnocentrism (or maybe we should say religio- and culturocentrism) never far below the surface on both sides, has been studied brilliantly by Jacques Gernet, who reaches the conclusion, not irrelevant to our effort here, that the Europe represented by the Jesuits and the China represented by the Confucian bureaucrat were so distinct as to make mutual understanding virtually impossible.5

The comparative study of Greece and China that the missionaries stimulated back in Europe could hardly be described as disinterested scholarship. This is illustrated well in a piece, typical of its day, written by the French writer and prelate Fénelon (1651–1715). Enmeshed in an intellectual world dominated by the heated debates between Jesuits and
Jansenists, debates that were concerned, among other issues, with what the attitude of the Church should be toward Confucianism, Fénelon (in his *Dialogues des morts*) hypothesizes a dialogue between Socrates and Confucius. Socrates is plainly the winner in this imaginary tête-à-tête, hardly allowing his Chinese counterpart to speak at all. To be sure, the Greek does, on occasion, “compliment” Confucius, if one can consider being congratulated for “avoiding the subtleties of reasoning” a compliment. What Fénelon’s piece illustrates so clearly is that the perspective of so many comparisons of this type has everything to do with contemporary intellectual issues in one’s own cultural world and little to do with the reality of the other culture.

Such problems notwithstanding, the sinological endeavor, which formally began in France when the great Jean-Pierre Abel Rémusat (1788–1832) was granted the first chair of Chinese studies to be established in the West, has been inherently comparative from its beginnings. The reason for this is quite simple: almost all of the earliest sinologists were steeped in the literature of the classical West and consistently used Greek and Latin studies as their frame of reference for the scholarly investigation of China. Indeed, study in the West of subjects such as philosophy and language were so thoroughly shaped by the Greek tradition that it must have seemed inconceivable that discussions of these issues could avoid the Greek experience as a point of departure. This is illustrated in an obvious and productive fashion in the still useful *Chinesische Grammatik* of Georg von der Gabelentz, which was first published in 1881. His application of the grammatical categories derived from the study of Greek to the vastly different structure of classical Chinese has continued to influence the teaching of the latter language to the present day. The long-standing search for the “Chinese epic,” an issue on which at least two of the contributors to this volume have made important contributions, provides another example of the way a Greek paradigm has influenced Chinese studies. Because Greek literary history begins with the epic, China must either have had a comparable literary form, the reasoning goes, or must at the least yield an explanation for the alleged nondevelopment of a sequence of genres that Western literary history views as normative.

Many more recent works of China studies continue to use ancient Greece as a dominant point of reference. The second volume of Joseph Needham’s *Science and Civilization in China*, entitled *History of Scientific Thought*, is an example. This work contains hundreds of references to
the Greek tradition—indeed, as with almost all the volumes in Needham’s monumental series, the particularly useful second volume is comparative from beginning to end. A still more recent survey of Chinese philosophy, Benjamin Schwartz’s *The World of Thought in Ancient China*, although much more sharply focused on the Chinese tradition itself, includes more than thirty references to ancient Greek philosophy. And lest one conclude that the influence of Greek studies on Chinese studies holds only for the West, we urge the reader to examine the grammatical studies of the early twentieth-century Chinese scholar Ma Jianzhong, which apply Greek-based grammatical categories to classical Chinese even more stubbornly than did Von der Gabelentz ten or so years earlier, or Hu Shi’s *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*, in which Hu ferrets out the logical methods of ancient China “to make my own people see that these methods of the West are not totally alien to the Chinese mind.”

We note the comparative dimension of the sinological endeavor in part because specialists in the classical West have rarely reciprocated it. The study of Greece has proceeded, and continues to proceed, with little attention to the contemporary high culture of early China. We see signs, however, that this may be changing. The distinguished historian of Greek science, G. E. R. Lloyd, has focused much of his scholarly energy in the last decade on the history of science in China and not only has published an extremely insightful comparative study of the Greek and Chinese traditions, but also makes frequent reference to Chinese thought even in his Greek-centered scholarship. The latter is particularly significant because it presumes that much in the early Chinese tradition might actually help to elucidate the distinctiveness of early Greece, as several of the articles included in this volume suggest.

The appearance of Lloyd’s work—as well as the works of others in the area of comparative Sino-Hellenic studies—reflects the fact that, in spite of the criticism and suspicion comparative work will always attract, such work continues to flourish. We note briefly, in this regard, three additional scholarly projects that will continue to exert influence (and, no doubt, draw criticism) in the years ahead. The first of these is the collaborative work of the sinologist Roger T. Ames and the philosopher David L. Hall. Their three provocative volumes attempt to establish a strong contrast between a classical Western emphasis on transcendence, order, and permanence and a Chinese tendency toward pragmatism, vagueness, and change. Despite the sharpness of the contrast argued in
their books, Hall and Ames acknowledge philosophical counter trends in each of the civilizations they study, thus blunting criticism that they have reductively essentialized the two sides of their comparison. The sheer scope of their ambitious work, as well as the boldness of its argument, is likely to provoke debate among those who compare China and the West for many years to come.

The growing oeuvre of François Jullien has gained a wide, even popular, readership in France and has begun to be read and discussed elsewhere. Jullien argues against what he describes as “naive assimilation, according to which everything can be directly transposed from one culture to another.” Instead, he tries to discern tendencies thoroughly and naturally embedded within Chinese thought that have only rarely been discussed. These features, such as privileging of indirect expression or an emphasis upon the “deployment” or “situation” of a thing rather than its inherent quality, to give two examples, become a means for Jullien to open up Western thought by looking at it from the perspective of Chinese “difference.” One often senses that Jullien’s ultimate concern is more with the West than China, that is, that the aim of his project is to use Chinese thought as a way of rethinking and expanding the dimensions of Western thought.

The third recent item of relevant scholarship is Christoph Harbsmeier’s volume, entitled “Language and Logic,” which has appeared as volume 7.1 in Needham’s Science and Civilisation in China. This valuable study is comparative from beginning to end and serves as a most useful summary of much of the previous work attempting to describe Chinese logic and language. Inevitably, Harbsmeier, like his predecessors in this field, uses the Greek tradition as a starting point. He proceeds in this volume to provide what we believe to be the most precise catalogue now available of how Chinese language and philosophical argument differ from that of the Greeks. Harbsmeier ends his impressive volume with the important observation, if we may paraphrase, that comparative study must rise above “the internalized censorship” that comes with today’s concerns about political correctness. He advocates a new boldness that is not afraid to speak of the “relative strengths and weakness” of the Greek and Chinese traditions. And, we might add, that dares to acknowledge difference or similarity without too much regard for whether either side of this balance is currently in or out of critical vogue.

The chapters in this volume attempt to contribute to this growing body of scholarship comparing early China and ancient Greece (or the
West in general). They originated as papers delivered for a symposium at the University of Oregon in spring of 1998. The title of the symposium, “Thinking through Comparisons,” was inspired by Hall and Ames’s first book, *Thinking through Confucius*, and it is meant to suggest two critical ideas that were central to the conference. First, thinking is itself an inherently comparative activity. Nothing exists in isolation. We are always making comparisons, whether we are aware that we are in fact doing so. Through making comparisons, the familiar becomes strange, and the strange somewhat more familiar. Second, because we think through comparisons, we should think them all the way through. We need to ask how valid and productive are the comparisons and contrasts we feel drawn to make between particular works of ancient Chinese and ancient Greek literature, between two styles of thought that emerged from two very different—although contemporaneous—cultural contexts?

Our original intent in arranging the chapters for this volume was to put those more concerned with theoretical and methodological issues first and then to present those chapters that focused on specific texts and applications. Although we generally adhere to this principle, we find drawing a clear line between these two categories difficult. The essays that address broader theoretical issues contain specific applications, and even the more focused comparisons, such as those of Raphals or Yu, have important theoretical or methodological implications. Nonetheless, the first five essays can fruitfully be considered as participating in the first category, whereas the remaining six fall into the second.

The first chapter in the volume, “What Has Athens to Do With Alexandria?”, is by the late David Hall, whose death regretfully preceded publication of this book, which we dedicate to his memory. Hall was a philosopher who has collaborated with Ames on several books comparing Chinese and Western thought. In his chapter, Hall addresses some of the reasons for the unwelcome reception that such comparative studies often meet in the professional academic world. Arguing against the sinological experts who resent the incursions of amateur sinologists into their entrenched terrains, Hall suggests that collaborative work is necessary in a field such as comparative Chinese and Western thought, and even in composing translations of Chinese philosophical works into English. A serious translation project—such as Hall and Ames’s version of the *Zhongyong*—requires not only a precise philological understanding of the language of the original text, but also an education in the philosophical traditions of the West. The translator needs to take into account not only the meaning of the Chinese words but also the target
language of the translation and the audience for whom the translation is intended. If the text is philosophical and the translation is made into English for a Western audience, then the Chinese words need to be mediated by an understanding of the Western philosophical tradition. Such a translation, Hall contends, will be more successful than one undertaken by a licensed sinologist with little or no command of the history of Western thought. Hall makes a powerful case for the place of the amateur—taken in its root sense of “lover” or “enthusiast”—in comparative studies. Comparative studies, in brief, is too important (and too enjoyable) to be left to the professionals.

Haun Saussy, in a chapter that also concerns the methodology of comparison, “No Time Like the Present: The Category of Contemporaneity in Chinese Studies,” suggests how the ghost of Hegel—for whom otherness is precisely what is to be overcome by knowledge—continues to haunt our comparative work. In surveying the approaches of Johannes Fabian, Giuseppe Ferrari, F. S. C. Northrup, and David Hall and Roger Ames, Saussy subtly interrogates one of the pitfalls of thinking through comparisons between “East” and “West.” Such contrasts, when undertaken by Western thinkers, run the risk of turning China into a reverse image of what the West urgently thinks it lacks. If we engage in thinking through comparisons, Saussy suggests, we must be very careful not to construct rigid stereotypes that have been abstracted from, but do not accurately reflect, the complexities of history. Because history is experienced temporally, we betray history if we construct an atemporal China that answers mainly to contemporary needs and projections.

Michael Puett’s chapter, “Humans and Gods: The Theme of Self-Divinization in Early China and Early Greece,” like Saussy’s, argues against setting up rigid, ahistorical categories that are assumed to embody the essence of either early Chinese or of ancient Greek thought and culture. Puett shows that assumptions about a monistic (and “continuous”) Chinese cosmology, on the one hand, and a dualistic (and “tragic”) Greek cosmology, on the other, are belied by a historically informed reading of specific early texts. In early China, for example, arguments (such as appear in the Guanzi) in favor of what Puett calls “self-divinization” arose, as in the case of Empedocles in ancient Greece, as acts of resistance against the entrenched power structures of the day—structures that claimed that they, and they alone, could heal the breach between the human and spiritual worlds. Hence what scholars have taken to be the defining characteristic of an entire culture, such as early China’s cosmology that blends humans, gods, and nature into a single, continu-
ous whole, in fact originated as a strategic critique against the prevailing assumptions of disunity and lack of connection. Puett offers a model of comparative study that would ask how particular individuals, in different cultural contexts, confronted similar political and cultural concerns.

In his chapter, “These Three Come Forth Together, But Are Differently Named: Laozi, Zhuangzi, Plato,” Steven Shankman suggests that one of the dangers of comparing early Chinese and ancient Greek thought is that of stereotyping one culture in relation to the other, each of which is assumed to have an identifiable essence. Hence, for example, if we think of the articulation by Laozi in the first chapter of the *Dao de ding* of the paradoxically simultaneous presence of both the intentionalist and participatory dimensions of consciousness, we might be tempted to characterize Greek thought as more intentionalist than Chinese. If we are to be true to Laozi’s analysis, however, we will perhaps be persuaded to realize that articulations in language of experiences of unity with the *dao* are just that (i.e., ways of using language to evoke experiences). Although he is often thought of as a “rationalist,” Plato, like Laozi and Zhuangzi, is likewise concerned about the damage done to the balanced consciousness by too exclusive a preoccupation with viewing reality as an object external to itself. Shankman finds an equivalent figuration to that of Laozi in Diotima’s remarks made to Socrates in Plato’s *Symposium* (203b–204a) when the prophetess relates a myth that describes the erotic experience of the philosophical quest as a combination of intentionalist seeking (*poros*) on the one hand and of needy receptivity (*penia*) on the other. Hence, in this crucially important passage in the *Symposium* in which he is attempting to articulate the nature of the philosophical quest, Plato suggests the importance of achieving a balance between the experiences, as expressed by Laozi, of “not having an intention” (*wu yu* 無欲) and “having an intention” (*you yu* 有欲).

Roger T. Ames, in “Thinking through Comparisons: Analytical and Narrative Methods for Cultural Understanding,” argues that the metaphysical essentializing “dominant” in Western thought, which begins by asking “what a thing really is,” contrasts with a Chinese tradition that is “essentially historicist and genealogical.” Ames seems to imply that the very tendency to essentialize and hence to dehistoricize (a tendency identified by Saussy and Shankman as problems for comparatists) is a Western and not a Chinese inclination. Chinese thinkers are more interested in exploring relationships, associations, and contexts than in moving past appearance to discern the nonapparent essence of a thing. To understand a controversial term such as *Confucianism*, one should therefore not seek
some essential doctrine that stands behind the shifting emphases of particular Confucian teachers, but one should rather regard Confucianism as “a narrative of a community of people” concerned with “how to get on effectively in the world.”

C. H. Wang’s chapter, “Alluding to the Text, or the Context,” true to his poet-persona Yang Mu, is less an excursion into theory than a claim that both Chinese and Greek culture develop out of the earliest poetic traditions. Wang begins his chapter with a poem of his own written in response to the opening passage of the “Wu ch’eng” chapter of the *Book of Documents*. His chapter then suggests how, in both early China and ancient Greece, the philosophical texts of Confucius and Plato establish their meaning through allusions to poetry—to the *Classic of Poetry* in the case of Confucius and, for Plato’s Socrates, to Homer’s *Iliad*.

David N. Keightley’s “Epistemology in Cultural Context: Disguise and Deception in Early China and Early Greece” examines the prevalence of the theme of disguise in early Greece, particularly in Homer, and its relative absence in Chinese narrative. Keightley then explores this contrast by referring to two epistemologies. In the first, that of ancient Greece, the relation between reality and appearance is regarded as a fundamental philosophical problem, as Ames also observes in his chapter. In the other, that of early China, misapprehension of reality may be noted, particularly among the Taoists, but is not regarded as a central concern. Keightley’s arguments are far-reaching and touch upon such topics as the narrative and visual arts, as well as philosophy.

David Schaberg’s “The Logic of Signs in Early Chinese Rhetoric” is an important and original contribution to the growing literature comparing Chinese and Greek logic. Schaberg argues that Aristotle’s notion of the “sign” and his description of “the tools of non-truth,” elaborated in the *Organon* and the *Rhetoric*, provide a most useful matrix to examine and rethink certain features of the argumentation of Chinese *ru* (sometimes called “Confucians” but perhaps better translated as “ritualists”) during the Warring States period. Although Schaberg’s essay has important implications for the study of logic in such *ru* philosophical texts as *Mencius* and *Xunzi*, texts that other scholars of Chinese rhetoric have discussed frequently, his primary evidence is drawn from the large collection of persuasions found in *Zuo zhuan* and *Guoyu*, texts that have rarely been used in this type of study. Schaberg shows that the Aristotelian *paradeigma*, an example that then leads to generalizations through a sort of logical induction, “is the basic mode of argumentation in the
Moreover, the Chinese ru paradigms are inherited standards and principles, always imputed to the Western or early Eastern Zhou, formulated and reformulated in light of the much later events described in these two texts. Put somewhat differently, historical reality is constantly made intelligible only through the paradigms ascribed to antiquity. Schaberg’s article is an important contribution to the effort to define and characterize the rhetorical distinctiveness of one important group of Warring States thinkers, the ru, a group that was to become much more influential in subsequent centuries.

Andrew Plaks, in “Means and Means: A Comparative Reading of Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong,” looks at similarities and differences between Aristotle’s view of the mean as described in the Nicomachean Ethics, in the case of Greece, and as articulated in the Zhongyong, in the case of China. Both texts recognize the difficulty of attaining the mean; both see the mean as something that needs to be continually renegotiated; both articulate the nature of the mean achieved by the individual in relation to the larger social context. Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia (happiness or well-being), moreover, finds an equivalent in the Zhongyong’s conception of cheng (self-cultivation). Differences exist, as well. For example, the ancient Greeks apply a more rigorous logical method that makes use of mathematical reasoning; and Greek moral philosophy articulates a notion of justice that has no real equivalent in the Chinese texts.

Lisa Raphals’s article “Fatalism, Fate, and Stratagem in China and Greece” explores “the complex semantics of Chinese ming 命 and Greek moira” and concludes that the Chinese notion of fate (ming) did not lead to the fatalism associated with the word moira in Greece. The emphasis in early Chinese discussions of fate is on strategy and efficacy. Moreover, fate in China, unlike in Greece, could be gainsaid. Raphals’s study is important not just for its exposition and examination of the semantic range of words for fate in China and Greece, but also for her careful examination of the metaphors that surround these terms in each of the two civilizations.

Anthony C. Yu’s probing essay, “Cratylus and Xunzi on Names,” contrasts Socrates’s notion of a name as a reflection of an ideal nature with Xunzi’s persistent nominalism, which understands names as conventional and fixed by Sages and True Kings of the past for essentially political purposes. Chinese names, at least in Xunzi’s analysis, are “pragmatic” and are fixed “to endorse the authority of centralized orthodoxy, obviate
tribal differences, and domesticate linguistic otherness.” Professor Yu’s thesis thus appears to affirm Ames’s view of the pragmatic nature of ancient Chinese thought.

Michael Nylan’s “Golden Spindles and Axes: Elite Women in the Archaemenid and Han Empires” is a bold challenge to stereotypes of elite women in Han China, stereotypes that portray these women as much less powerful and aggressive than their ancient Greek counterparts. Nylan argues that the early textual evidence, particularly as contained in the *Han shu*, often presents a picture of elite Han dynasty women as well-educated, politically influential, and highly capable. The misapprehension of the power of women in early China, Nylan argues, derives not from ancient historiographers but from neo-Confucians and May Fourth reformers who had their own particular axes to grind.

Stephen W. Durrant, in “Creating Tradition: Sima Qian Agonistes?” takes up the contrast that is sometimes made between “the agonistic Greeks and the irenic Chinese.” Although Durrant agrees that early Chinese historical writing reflects a respect for tradition not shared by the Greeks, he attempts to complicate the usual contrast. First, he provides evidence that the early Chinese historians were not at all uncritical of their predecessors; indeed, the “father of Chinese history,” Sima Qian, was sometimes harshly criticized. Second, a close reading of Sima Qian indicates that the latter was engaged as much in what we might call “the manufacture of tradition” as in a straightforward compliance with the patterns of the past. Although the Sima Qian that emerges from Durrant’s examination remains distinct from the more clearly agonistic Thucydides, who is deeply critical and even arrogantly scornful of his predecessors, characterizing Sima Qian as blindly devoted to tradition would be a distortion.

The field of Sino-Hellenic studies is a challenging one that makes daunting linguistic and philosophical demands of its practitioners. It requires the joint efforts of Hellenists willing to cross unexpected borders and thus to expand their knowledge of the ancient world in unpredictable ways and of scholars of early China eager to enhance their understanding of ancient Greek and Western thought. We hope that these pioneering chapters that think through comparisons between Chinese and Western thought will spark curious readers from a variety of humanistic disciplines to make comparisons of their own and thus to participate in our unpredictable and therefore bracing cross-cultural conversation.
Notes


2. We are not entirely sure that some communication did not occur between the two cultures. Étiemble says that the great Marcel Granet used to suggest to his students that one “can not [sic] push aside a priori all idea of relations between China and Greece in the fifth century B.C.E. and even between the thought of Confucius and that of Socrates.” See L’Europe chinoise, vol. 1, De l’Empire romain à Leibniz (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), p. 50.


4. Lun yu 3.5. The Yi and Di were peoples living on the periphery of the Xia states. Translating the former as “non-Chinese” and the latter as “Chinese” is tempting although anachronistic. We are referring here to Confucius as presented in Lun yu, knowing full well that many of the statements attributed to him, this one included, are much later than the Master himself. See Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 127.


10. Ma Jianzhong, Ma shi wentong (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1904).


12. See especially Aristotelian Explorations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). One of the best examples of what we mean here appears in his discussion of Huainanzi in a chapter on “Spontaneous generation and metamorphosis” in Aristotle (pp. 106–11). Lloyd’s most clearly comparative work is Adversaries and Authorities: Investigations into Ancient Greek and Chinese


