Introduction

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In a little known essay, Wallace Stevens (1951) suggests that "the desire for resemblance" is an innate part of human nature—one that, he implies, emerges from the order, the pattern of resemblances, that exists in the world. Hell for Stevens is precisely an imagined world where similarity to the known is absent. "What a ghastly situation it would be if the world of the dead was actually different from the world of the living . . . [where] nothing resembled anything we have ever known" (1951:77). But if dissimilarity is a fountain of pain, resemblance is as much a source of pleasure. It is the contemplation of likeness that brings us joy, and poetry, he implies, is the most suitable vehicle for bringing about this pleasure—the pleasure that comes from the satisfaction of the desire for resemblance (1951:77).

Stevens’s is a generalized narcissism. One step removed from the pursuit of pleasure through perpetually gazing at our own countenance, we seek gratification instead from seeing the world through our own, familiar experiences, even if our expectation to find resemblance is so strong that "we find nothing else" but resemblances, remaining forever blind to difference. Nor does Stevens find this problematic. Narcissism might be a problem if we could be otherwise than preoccupied with the contemplation of likeness, but we cannot: "Narcissism itself is merely an evidence of the operation of the principle that we expect to find pleasure in resemblances" (1951:80).¹

¹ This introduction has benefited from the editorial comments of Dan Arnold and from the substantive reading given to it by my colleague Sheila Davaney. Thanks also to Eric Massanari for help with proofreading and indexing.
The student of comparative religious thought, smitten too by a desire for resemblance, also seeks a means for its fulfillment. Though of a different sort, our vehicle—more abstract, systematic and, alas, far less elegant—is nevertheless as much an attempt to satiate this desire as is the poet’s art. But what of the charge of narcissism? Are comparativists, like Stevens’s bards, fated forever to see the world in their own likeness? The question is not a trivial one. Most of the categories we work with as comparativists—pilgrimage, scripture, even philosophy and religion themselves—have their origin in Western culture, and on the surface possess meanings that are given to them by their respective semantic ranges in Western languages. In the history of the comparative study of religious thought it is not that uncommon to find the scholar succumbing to the temptation to read the cultural other in terms of static categories imported in toto from the culturally familiar.

That narcissism of this kind has existed—and continues to exist—hardly can be denied, but surely this need not be the fate of our discipline. The antidote is to be found in the nuanced treatment of the conceptual categories that we use, one that pays attention both to the similarities and to the differences. Equally important is the realization that such categories, as the byproducts of human imagination, are malleable and subject to change in the encounter with what is culturally other. The starting point of analysis usually may be the familiar, but a familiar category becomes modified when it confronts the heterocultural, leading not to complete unfamiliarity (Stevens’s hell), but to a new kind of intimacy that comes about from taking into account the broader, cross-cultural context. This process leads to a kind of de- and then re-construction of the original category, culminating not in meaninglessness, but in new meaning(s) embodied in the now modified and necessarily more complex category. This process is in principle unending. Imputing finality to a comparative analysis reifies the category under investigation, making it seem as though any further consideration of data is superfluous. But surely this is never so. All categories are by nature open, tentative, and therefore subject to further analysis and modification.

This volume represents one moment in the reconstruction of the category of scholasticism—achieved by applying it as an interpretive tool to a variety of cultural settings. But why scholasticism in particular?

As several of the contributors to this volume point out, scholasticism as a practice generally has been looked down upon by philosophers and intellectuals since the Renaissance, and the adjective scholastic has been used in a derogatory fashion at least since the time of Erasmus (1466?–1536). Scholasticism thus has served for modernists the role of “object to be transcended,” in much the same way as modernism has for postmodernists. The modernist derogation of scholasticism continues to
find expression in the work of a variety of contemporary philosophers. Hence, Russell (1945) calls the scholastics "disputatious" (435), and their system "an intellectual strait jacket" (500). And Gramsci (1971:200) ascribes to scholasticism "the regressive tendency to treat so-called theoretical questions as if they had a value in themselves, independently of any specific practice." Whether as ideology, world view, or practice, scholasticism thus has been treated derisively by Western intellectuals. Still, this has not prevented its perpetuation even in the West (in the form of movements such as the neo-scholasticism espoused by Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson, for example). Even the early Heidegger believed that the scholastic method in its true form represented a fresh perspective on the problems of philosophy, one that, concerned more with the actual doing of metaphysics than with methodological speculation about how to do it, could be of value in dispelling what he considered the oblivion of being (see Caputo 1982:18 passim). Responses to scholasticism as a practice therefore have been various, but when considered as a whole it is clear that these reactions for the last five hundred years have been predominantly skeptical, if not out and out disapproving.

Apart from judgments about its validity as a world view, however, there can be little doubt that as an analytical category, "scholasticism" has been widely accepted. Even its detractors, of course, find the category valuable, if only for polemical purposes. Hence, the question of its assessment as a mode of philosophical praxis aside, in modern times there have been serious attempts to treat scholasticism as a historical philosophical category worthy of consideration. Any comprehensive intellectual history of Europe, for example, cannot but take stock of scholasticism. What is more, already in the early twentieth century there were attempts to treat scholasticism as a cross-cultural, comparative category. For example, P. Masson-Ourseil (1911, 1916, 1920) makes a strong case for the importance of treating scholasticism as a pivotal phase in the history of thought across cultures. Whatever their view concerning the phenomenon of scholasticism as a philosophical practice—and they are varied—the chapters in this volume are unanimous in offering positive (re)appraisals of it as a category of cross-cultural and comparative analysis. Each of them will show in its own way why scholasticism is an important interpretive category worthy of consideration and further theorization.

Before turning to the chapters themselves, it might be useful to take a step back in order to see what has brought us to the present point. In an earlier book in this same series (Cabezón 1994), I argued for the usefulness of the notion of scholasticism as a way of understanding Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought. Being interested—like Griffiths (1994)—in the intellectual-linguistic dimension of Buddhist life.
as epitomized by the study of doctrine, I found in the category of
scholasticism a useful handle on the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist world
view, one that allowed me to picture it as a holistic and unified intellec-
tual tradition engaged in a systematic scholarly enterprise. I
developed in that study a picture of Buddhist scholasticism that was the result of
the dialogical interaction between the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist textual tra-
dition, on the one hand, and, on the other, the sources of European
scholasticism and the work of certain Euro-American theorists, chief
among them P. Masson-Oursel (1911, 1916, 1920)—arguably the father
of the discipline of comparative philosophy and, as I have mentioned,
the first Western thinker to evolve a mature notion of scholasticism as a
comparative category. But my aim in that study was not simply to sug-
gest that scholasticism was a useful category for understanding a cer-
tain branch of Buddhist thought. I believed then—and the essays in this
volume bear this out—that scholasticism also could be useful to the
study of other religio-philosophical systems. Thus, through a process of
abstraction and generalization, my goal also was to free “scholasticism”
from its parochial associations, as an appellation for a medieval Euro-
pean intellectual movement, and to suggest instead a notion of scholas-
ticism that, now more broadly construed, could serve as a preliminary
locus for the comparative and cross-cultural analysis of a variety of
other traditions. Though perhaps not essential to every tradition we
might wish to call “scholastic,” I felt that some of the characteristics
that I found in my study of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism could be central to
many others. And though aware that the traits of the scholasticism I
proposed were peculiar to my particular analysis, I believed that they
could—if only by virtue of their absence—at least serve as the starting
point for a broader conversation that made the category of scholastic-
ism available as an interpretive option to scholars of other traditions.
We shall turn shortly to consideration of some theoretical issues con-
cerning the construction of an analytical category like scholasticism,
but given that several of the essays in this volume are responding to the
list of characteristics in my earlier study—albeit, occasionally as foils—
it might be useful to summarize them now.

1. A strong sense of tradition: self-identification with a specific
tradition and lineage and commitment to its preservation.
Scholastics have a strong sense of their own religious roots. See-
ing themselves as the successors to a long and unbroken line of
previous thinkers, their powerful sense of religious history
(whether mythic or not) allows for their distinct feeling of location
vis à vis the great historical figures of their particular lineage. This
tradition centeredness also creates a sense of allegiance and iden-
tity that seeks to perpetuate itself through defensive polemical strategies aimed at the critique of rivals.

2. A concern with language: with sacred language (scripture) and its exegesis and with language generally as medium of expression. Scholasticism is generally confident, rather than skeptical, of the communicative ability of language and is committed to the importance of conceptual thought and categories. This is not to say that linguistic analysis is for scholastics an end in itself. As the early Heidegger was wont to point out, scholasticism and the religious (especially mystical) life go hand in hand (Caputo 1982:44). Of course, the religious life that is the post- (if not extra-) linguistic expression of scholastic speculation manifests itself differently in different religious traditions. In some, it consists of a series of transformative mystical experiences, in others, of proper behaviors (social, ritual, and so forth).

3. Proliferativity: the tendency to textual and analytical inclusivity rather than exclusivity. Scholastics, I maintain, opt for broader (even if inconsistent) canons and for minute and detailed forms of analysis that leave no question unanswered, no philosophical avenue unexplored. Rather to include, even if this requires reconciling inconsistent texts or positions, than to exclude, thereby risking the loss of what might be soteriologically essential.

4. Completeness and compactness: the belief that the tradition overlooks nothing and contains nothing that is unessential. Related to the proliferative tendency of the scholastic mindset is the generally held scholastic tenet that the tradition is complete: that nothing essential to the project of salvation has been neglected. Moreover, to insure that the tradition is taken seriously in its entirety, scholastics often maintain that their traditions are what I call “compact”: that no doctrine, text, or custom is extraneous.

5. The epistemological accessibility of the world: the belief that the universe is basically intelligible. Scholastics share with modernist science the fundamental axiom that the world is knowable. Some maintain that, at the very least, everything that is of soteriological importance is accessible, while others go farther and claim that every phenomenon, every fact, is knowable. This latter position especially is related in a direct way both to the proliferative character of scholasticism and to the claim of completeness.

6. Systematicity: order in exposition. Scholastics strive to reproduce in their writings the basic orderliness they believe to be
found in the world. Their philosophical literature often evinces a complex structure that divides and subdivides the subject matter under discussion to insure (a) a logical flow to the "narrative," seen as essential to pedagogy, (b) consistency between former and latter points, and (c) completeness (that nothing has been omitted).

7. Rationalism: the commitment to reasoned argument and non-contradiction. Although not sufficient, that is, not an end in itself, rationality is nonetheless considered soteriologically necessary. Scholastics consider reasoning to be integral to the religious path. The systematic elucidation of doctrine, the "elimination" of inconsistency, and the rational defense of tenets are perhaps the most central attributes of scholasticism. At the same time scholastics see the rational/conceptual understanding of doctrine to be transcended either in mystical experience, in action, or both. Hence, scholasticism as a method strives for a reconciliation of the rational and experiential/active dimensions of human religiosity.

8. Self-reflexivity: the tendency to objectify and to critically analyze first-order practices. Hence, scholastics not only engage in the first-order task of exegesis or commentary, but also in the second-order task of hermeneutics, the self-critical reflection on the rules, principles, and problems related to the act of exegesis. They are concerned not only with systematicity and rational argumentation, but with developing criteria for what constitutes a rational argument, that is, with logic as a second-order discourse.

Now the characteristics of scholasticism just outlined are, as I have mentioned, the result of my reflecting upon texts and movements within the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition. If scholasticism as an abstract category came to be applied successfully—that is, in such a way that it yielded new and interesting questions—to other religious and philosophical traditions, these characteristics would of necessity, I thought, undergo modification, raising in turn new questions of the present analysis. Hence, as far as the present project is concerned, the foregoing list is meant as a heuristic, as a starting point of inquiry. Scholasticism emerges as a cross-cultural, comparative category by the cultural decontextualization that takes place as different traditions are brought into conversation with each other dialogically. This is what this volume seeks to do. But how does one choose which traditions—let us call them "candidates for scholasticism"—to bring into the conversation in the first place? The theorist would seem to be caught in what I will call "the comparativist's dilemma": she cannot choose which exemplars to compare until some decontextualized, general category has
been established, while the establishment of such a category presumes a process of comparison that requires choices to be made regarding the comparanda.

One solution to this dilemma has been offered by Robert Baird (1971). Focusing not on scholasticism but on the category of religion, Baird has argued that, as a methodological principle, it is incumbent upon the historian of religion first to offer a stipulative, functional definition of religion. Such a definition will determine unambiguously what will count as a religion, thereby marking out the limits of a study. The functional definition offered, he says, is semi-arbitrary: “arbitrary” in so far as “there is no inherent reason why any word cannot be used for any thing” (7), but “semi-” because not all categories are equally useful “in enabling the scholar to do what he has chosen to do” (126).

There is much that I find valuable in Baird’s treatment of this issue. Although he does not identify it as such, his essentially pragmatic stance on what makes a definition valuable is, I believe, on target, as is his emphasis on the stipulative nature of categories. However, Baird’s insistence that categories need to be delimited in order to be useful is problematic. Baird presumably would solve the comparativist’s dilemma by contending that a stipulative, functional definition of scholasticism must precede any study of the subject. The category “scholasticism” is first delimited, and the exemplars that fall within such limits then are studied. Unfortunately, the rules for interesting scholarship cannot be prescribed so neatly. How are we to choose the limits of the category? The traits that I have outlined above are based on a process of comparative decontextualization that takes into account only two traditions. Why should these be privileged in delimiting a category that may be equally—and perhaps even more—applicable in elucidating the dynamics of other traditions? True, scholasticism is a term whose original semantic range extends over things European, but this is of little consequence to the comparativist, whose goal is to encourage its cultural decontextualization for analytical ends. What is more, is it not the case that considering the candidacy of a movement that is only marginally scholastic can yield valuable insights (if only by way of providing a contrast to more prototypically scholastic traditions)? By virtue of its rigidity, Baird’s method would preclude such potentially valuable forms of analysis.

In the process of decontextualizing a concept like ‘scholasticism’ cross-culturally, no single definition, no one set of features born from reflection upon the practices of one or two historical traditions, can be considered normative—the standard against which all other traditions are judged to be scholastic or not. As Ernest Gellner (1989:169), paraphrasing Wittgenstein, states, “All data in our possession are always, inevitably, fi-
nite. We can never be sure that data which come our way in the future will still fit into the generalisation set up on the basis of past data."

Rather than delimiting the category "scholasticism" from the start, I believe that a different strategy is called for: one that from the outset opts for leaving the category open and malleable, that encourages the new data that "may come our way," and that urges vigilance against inflexibility. Now it is true that we must start somewhere, and so I have offered my reflections upon the Indo-Tibetan scholastic tradition vis-à-vis that of medieval European, heuristically, as a point of departure; but these are meant as nothing more than a heuristic point of departure. Rather than forming the basis for a definition, they should be viewed instead as an invitation to modification.8

Though I see no value in—or need for—an a priori definition of scholasticism preceding comparative work on the subject, I do recognize that as a result of such work there may emerge a series of traits that will be considered more characteristic of scholasticism than others. They will become so not by virtue of being part of the innate character of scholasticism—its essence—but because the traditions that have most benefited from being considered under the rubric of this category have these as their traits. Not every encounter of a religious or philosophical tradition with scholasticism as an analytical category will be equally profitable. Those that are will leave a much more durable imprint on the category in the wake of such an encounter. In this way, over time, and as the a posteriori result of the unpredictable nature of scholarship, the texture of scholasticism as a category will emerge: a texture given to the category by the fact that certain traits will be more prominent than others, and this as a result of the fact that certain traditions will be considered more prototypically scholastic than others. If scholasticism is a useful category—if it yields new questions and insights, if it spawns new research programs—then, like other such categories (religion, myth, symbol, scripture, ritual), it will survive and evolve in this way over time. Although the chapters in this volume go a long way toward providing scholasticism as a decontextualized category with the kind of texture just mentioned, it would be foolhardy to consider an a priori delimitation of the category either necessary or useful at the outset.

Let us now turn to the chapters in this volume. My characterization of the various contributions is here at most impressionistic and is intended only as a way of whetting the reader’s appetite. A more detailed treatment of the essays and their relationship to the broader project is to be found in the Conclusion.

The Latin West is of course one of the principal sources for the history of the study of scholasticism. It was the flourishing of scholastici-
cism in that particular context that led to the identification of scholasticism as a category in the first place; and hence it is fitting that the volume begin by considering medieval Latin scholasticism as its first exemplar. What Louis Roy finds as he investigates this tradition, however, is not a simple, pristine, uncontaminated intellectual movement, but one that bears the traces of many culturally heterogeneous ideas. Daniel Madigan's contribution focuses on Islam, and, like Roy, he finds there to be a great deal of complexity to the phenomenon of scholasticism even within a single religious tradition. By considering several movements within Muslim history as possible candidates for the term scholasticism, Madigan shows us how complex the question of identifying an intellectual tradition as scholastic really is. In his contribution, Robert Goss demonstrates how common scholastic presuppositions made possible the polemical dialogue between an eighteenth-century Jesuit missionary and his Tibetan Buddhist interlocutors. Michael Swartz's contribution is concerned with Rabbinic Judaism. Through his analysis we glean how many of the characteristics of scholasticism outlined above (and still others not mentioned there) can be exemplified in very different ways and to varying degrees in a different religio-philosophical context. Like Swartz, Livia Kohn, who writes on Taoism, emphasizes the social context of scholasticism. Kohn, like several other contributors, also stresses the importance of investigating the historical moments at which different scholastic traditions come into contact. In my own essay I explore the relationship of Tibetan Buddhist scholastic ideology and material culture by suggesting that a thesis defended by the medievalist Erwin Panofsky regarding Gothic architecture might be applicable (albeit with some modification) in a very different cultural milieu. John Henderson, whose work centers on Neo-Confucianism, begins his essay with some remarks on the historical evolution of scholasticisms generally, and then goes on to explore how this is played out in a Chinese context. In his contribution Francis Clooney uses three examples from the Hindu tradition to demonstrate some of the problems involved in using scholasticism as a comparative category. And finally, Paul Griffiths offers us an example of the way that scholasticism can be used as an instrument of cultural criticism by suggesting that an ideal-typical form of scholasticism is a way of responding to the deficits implicit both in modernist and in postmodernist modes of intellectual practice.

In the Conclusion I examine in greater detail the ways in which the various essays transform the category of scholasticism by engaging and challenging the different characteristics of scholasticism as I have laid them out above. In that chapter, I explore, in effect, how the cross-cultural analysis of the category that forms the bulk of this book
effectuates its further decontextualization, and how this in turn leads to new questions, the subject-matter of possible future research.

In a recent book, *A Study of Concepts*, Christopher Peacocke (1992:177–97) argues that what he, as a philosopher, and what cognitive psychologists have to say about concepts cannot be independent of one another. Peacocke believes that psychological theories are relevant to the philosophical study of concepts (and vice versa). How relevant is cognitive psychology to our task as scholars of comparative religious thought—as wielders of comparative, conceptual categories? I would like to suggest, by way of conclusion, that it is quite pertinent. Recall that I began with the simple question, Why scholasticism? As comparativists we are used to justifying our categories in a variety of ways: practically (in terms of their usefulness), historically (in terms of precedence), pedagogically (by virtue of their utility in the classroom). I would now like to propose that there may be a cognitive-psychological answer to the question, Why scholasticism? Psychologists provide us not so much with a justification of the concept as they do (or might do) with an explanation of why it is that we tend to construct categories such as scholasticism in the first place.

Eleanor Rosch (1978) has argued “that human categorization should not be considered the arbitrary product of historical accident or of whimsy but rather the result of psychological principles of categorization” (27). Rosch and her colleagues conducted a series of experiments and found that the human mind tends to categorize the external world into classes of objects of differing levels of abstraction or inclusiveness. They found, moreover, that of these different levels of abstraction one—an intermediate level of abstraction—tended to be more “basic” than the rest. These basic level categories had the property of being “the most inclusive level of classification at which objects have numbers of attributes in common” (Rosch 1978:32). Superordinate categories are categories more abstract than those at the basic level, and subordinate ones are less so. Hence, if “chair” is a basic level category, “furniture” represents its superordinate counterpart, and “kitchen chair” its subordinate. When subjects were asked to list all of the attributes they could think of that were shared by all of the members of a particular category, the researchers found that comparatively few such attributes could be named for the superordinate class (furniture), many more for the basic class (chair), and not that many more for the subordinate class (kitchen chair). Put another way, basic-level categories are the most general categories which evince for subjects the greatest richness of detail. They are also the most general categorical levels at which an object belonging to the category is identified. Hence, when shown a picture of an object with four legs that could be used to sit on, the nat-
ural response was to call that thing a chair (not furniture or a kitchen chair). The human mind, Rosch concludes, tends naturally to categorize the world at the basic level.

The obvious question then is this: do we, as taxonomists of religion, tend naturally to categorize our—albeit more abstract—world into basic-level objects? If so, do these correspond to the categories that have today (or will in the future evolve to) become the backbone of the field: scripture, pilgrimage, and scholasticism? Scholasticism then might become a natural categorical construct for comparativists because it is a class of the most abstract level at which our minds can work with the greatest number of attributes. Hence, to the question, Why scholasticism? the answer might be, Because it is in some sense basic.

With some exceptions,¹⁰ cognitive psychologists and anthropologists have focused their research on “real-world” objects such as colors, plants, and furniture. And of course, it is not at all clear that their findings with regard to this relatively circumscribed area can be generalized to the kind of hyper-abstract categories used by scholars. However, there is no a priori reason why this should not be the case. What, cognitively speaking, should make a category such as scholasticism natural or useful for scholars is in principle an askable and interesting question. Even if the cognitive sciences are able to offer no substantive answers to questions of this sort, however, this by no means implies that the data of the cognitive sciences cannot or should not be used heuristically to stimulate discussion, for example, among comparativists, concerning the evolution, nature, and function of comparative categories.

As might be expected, even in regard to simple, real-world phenomena, there is considerable controversy as to why the mind tends more naturally to categorize objects at the basic level, and as to the implications of the existence of such natural categories. Lakoff (1987) suggests that our tendency so to categorize the world has to do, not with anything intrinsic to the categories themselves (the objectivist view), but with our nature as embodied beings. We do so because “at this [basic] level, people function most efficiently and successfully with discontinuities in the natural environment . . . so that our bodies can interact optimally with them” (269–70). Integrating the work of Mark Johnson and Gilles Fauconnier, Lakoff suggests that complex cognitive models about abstract things are based on image schemas that have their origin in our embodied experiences. It is obviously beyond the scope of this introduction to go into any detail concerning Lakoff’s views on the formation, nature, and function of categories. Suffice it to say that his is one attempt to extrapolate from the cognitive scientific data concerning categorization, one that I see as having major implications for a cognitive theory of cross-cultural comparison.
The preceding discussion obviously represents an oversimplification of the cognitive scientific research data. My hope in raising some of these issues here is to be provocative rather than conclusive. I leave it to other scholars to determine whether I have achieved even that more modest goal. Whether the conceptual category "scholasticism" is in some sense basic or not, whether it is analyzable in terms of Lakoffian kinesthetic image schemas, what such an analysis might look like, and what its implications might be for comparative theory generally are questions that can only be pursued elsewhere.

However the cognitive sciences do or do not impact on our construction of a category like scholasticism, at the very least the essays in this volume are a testament to the fact that a variety of traditions benefit from being considered through the lens of such a category. As a whole, the essays also confirm the importance of a nuanced treatment of categories: one that, giving equal weight to both similarities and differences, is far removed from Stevens’s narcissistic paradise of likeness only. They also, it seems to me, cause us to pause and reflect on the likelihood of a postulate set forth by Durkheim almost a century ago, namely, that "comparison is the only practical means we have for the understanding of things" (1898, reprinted 1974:1).

Notes

1. That Stevens’s theory is motivated in part by a philosophical attraction to realism is evident from his work. What is perhaps less apparent is the way in which his views are the expression of his white, suburban, middle-class social situation and ideology. See Morse (1970) and Gioia (1992: 113–14, 141–53).

2. As Ames (1989: 265) points out, “When a concept is assigned an English equivalent, much of the depth of the original concept tends to be lost: its word image, its allusive effectiveness, its morphological implications. At the same time, especially with philosophical vocabulary, inappropriate associations are evoked by the translated term to the extent that it is burdened by its own cultural history.” When this is so of translation—where there is presumably some level of resemblance to a term in the source language—how much more so must it be of conceptual categories derived originally from the culturally same, where such resemblance is not at all guaranteed. See also Daya Krishna 1989 and Smart 1989.

3. For an critique of the tendency to impute an etic category in toto to other cultures, to the detriment of the analysis, see Mary Douglas’s charge against Malinowski in her foreword to Marcel Mauss’s The Gift (1990: vii–viii). For a more general, theoretical treatment of this problem, see Larson 1989.
4. This point of course has been emphasized repeatedly in the theoretical literature on cross-cultural comparison. See, for example, J. Z. Smith (1982:21 passim) and John B. Carman and Steven P. Hopkins (1991:302).

5. An interesting exception is Alfred North Whitehead, who presents a more balanced picture (1933: 117).

6. As an aside, it is worth reiterating that my emphasis on the intellectual dimension of Buddhism as expressed in its preoccupation with doctrine is not meant to exclude other forms of analysis: anthropological, literary critical, sociological, art-historical, and so on. This is a point that I have explicitly made in the conclusion to my Buddhism and Language (1994: 197–198), one that seems to have escaped Eckel (1994: 1094) in his characterization of my approach. But even if Eckel had read my last chapter more carefully, it is probably the case that even my more modest claim—that the philosophical and systematic study of doctrine was/is central to Buddhist intellectuals and therefore must be so to us in our study of those intellectuals—would be problematic for him. Eckel’s basic position, at least as expressed in his To See the Buddha (1992), is that (a) the identity of Bhavaviveka as a philosopher is somehow secondary to—perhaps even having its source in—his identity as a religious figure, which comes “to a climax with a devotional vision of the Buddha” (7) achieved through grace (94, 146), and that (b) his more philosophical language as expressed in formal argument is secondary to his use of metaphorical and other literary devices, which, far from mere embellishments (22), somehow reveal “the deeper structures of Bhavaviveka’s thought” (21, 141), make it cohere in ways that formal philosophical argument cannot (144), and are what truly make the tradition “his own” (114). Indeed, Eckel goes to the extent of making Bhavaviveka’s philosophical vision “gratuitous” (146–47). Much could be said in response to such a view. Suffice it to summarize my reply as follows: though I grant Eckel the importance of nonphilosophical forms of analysis when it comes to understanding the identity of Bhavaviveka, I deny his claim that these can take precedence over—that they carry greater explanatory weight than—philosophical ones.

7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, of course, has written, if not extensively, at least influentially, on this topic. And Lofti Zadeh’s fuzzy set theory represents a formalization of this intuition in the realm of mathematical logic; see Lakoff (1987: 14, 21–22).

8. This, incidentally, is similar to the view espoused by anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, a view which Eggan (1975: 205) characterizes thus: “In place of the comparative method he (R-B) proposes the ‘experimental method,’ in which preliminary conclusions are formulated and then tested by the same or other social anthropologists on different societies, thus gradually developing broader and more adequate hypotheses.” However, I see no reason for considering such a method comparative. Nor, apparently, does the later Radcliffe-Brown (1958). This same approach also seems to be taken by Bronislaw Malinowski in his few comparative forays, in regard to which Lowie (1937: 240–41) states: “His generalizations support merely to provoke parallel in-
quiries in other regions; he has indeed expressly demanded ‘a fuller testing in
the various anthropological provinces.’ ”

9. In actuality, the field I am drawing from, called “categorization theory,” is
interdisciplinary, being comprised of the work of psychologists, linguists, and
anthropologists (see Rosch and Lloyd, 1978), but I will chiefly be invoking the
work of the psychologists in what follows.

10. See Lakoff’s (1987: 45–46) discussion of the work of Lawrence Barsalou on
ad-hoc categories, “categories that are not conventional or fixed, but rather are
made up on the fly for some immediate purpose.” Although closer to the ana-
lytical categories used by academics than those normally considered by cogni-
tive psychologists, Barsalou’s examples (“what to get for a birthday present”)
are still considerably more mundane and concrete than categories such as
“scholasticism.”

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