Subversions of International Order: An Introduction

Anthropology and Political Order

The transcontinental chaos at the end of the twentieth century calls attention to political disorder and its representation, issues that had been relatively neglected during the Cold War. Established states, nations, and cultures seem to be dissolving and reappearing with an uncanny ease, unsettling belief in the adequacy of descriptive terms and in our ability to comprehend the present. We are witnessing the appearance of curious objects—retroviruses, quarks, and novel kinds of tribal and national identities—that resist facile objectification. I am not alone in noticing a radical sea change in Zeitgeist. Across the humanities and social sciences, we are learning to ask new questions, to develop new positions relative to truth and authority, to participate in what Clifford Geertz nearly twenty years ago dubbed a “blurring of genres.” Most analysts agree that 1989 marked the definitive end of the Cold War regime, but they are at a loss as to how to represent the emergent world order. What are the most appropriate units of analysis and descriptive tools? From what framework or theoretical perspective can one best see the present and future contours of political order? The essays in this book present my attempt to develop an anthropological response to these questions. I have made only minor revisions, mostly
deleting repetitions in argument and in supporting evidence. Written over nine years, from 1986 to 1995, they also index my own intellectual development over a decade, its merits as well as its limitations.

To study culture as subversion of international order assumes that what we take to be particular cultures are both constitutive and subversive of international order, both alternative versions and subversions of large-scale global orders. In this assumption, I partake in a movement within the discipline of anthropology to contemporize our object and to engage ethnographic inquiry in formulating alternative political responses. Instead of identifying problems posed within simpler societies, we are concerned with forms of complexity; instead of traditional, stateless cultures or culture as resistance to the state, our accent is on identity conflicts imbricated in contemporary forms of state authority; instead of synchronic studies of ethnic solidarity in territorially bounded groups, our emphasis is on the historical dynamics of transnational or global processes such as migration, citizenship, war, and on the dissemination and effects of world ideologies. Critics within anthropology have stressed the need to refine techniques of participant observation (through increased reflexivity), to consider a wider variety of documentary forms (including poetry, film, legal texts, fieldnotes), and to reformulate the vocabulary used to conceptualize contemporary processes. My own response is to place the study of culture in a new thematic matrix that consists of globalization, nationalism, queer studies, and narrative theory, to mention a few key fields.

Describing and theorizing the place of local cultures or of culture-making within world order has always been an anthropological preoccupation, though most ethnologists have done so unsystematically and unselfconsciously. Fin-de-siècle anthropology had specialized on exotic peoples, or threatened and disappearing cultures. Most of these peoples and cultures were thought to be outside the “civilized world” from which the anthropologists themselves came. Nineteenth-century evolutionary schemes that placed peoples on a temporal and spatial developmental scale gradually gave way in the early twentieth century to functionalist accounts that assumed the autonomy and temporal stability of cultural sys-
tems. In some quarters, functionalist accounts were replaced, or at least supplemented, by a focus on the historical development of the local within a world system.

By the mid-twentieth century, most anthropologists had agreed to the view of a One World System composed of three interrelated parts: First World (developed, free, capitalist), Second World (developed, unfree, communist), and Third World (undeveloped). After World War II, anthropological research tended to follow the same exotic peoples who had been chosen at the end of the nineteenth century, peoples now placed in the Third World. In a neat academic division of labor, sociology and political science took for themselves the axis of Cold War power, the First and Second Worlds and relations between them. Hence relations between First and Third World peoples became a prominent focus of the discipline of anthropology. It was out of this extremely unequal relationship between observer and observed, and based on scholarly representations that frequently legitimized First World domination, that anthropological theory developed. Consequently, anthropologists tended to ignore the Second World, and to a large extent their own, but in particular they ignored relations between the First and the Second Worlds.

Given their concentration on peoples primarily located in the Third World, many anthropologists after World War II took up study of the decolonization processes in which their primary objects of research were involved. Because of this focus, anthropological contributions to understanding the making of the Cold War order have been minimal. Yet the two processes, of decolonization and Cold War ordering, though spatially distinct are temporally and thematically inseparable. For one, decolonization in places so disparate as India and Nigeria, for example, was always followed by a process of nation building, and the nation became the project of the former colony, deflecting its attention from both continued dependence on the former colonial power and new processes of internal stratification. For another, neither the loss of colonies nor the heat of the Cold War put a stop to nation building in First and Second World states; instead, these processes served to redirect and even consolidate older nations, such as France and Germany in the First, Poland and Bulgaria in the Second. In the First, and
to a lesser extent Second, World, external decolonization was often followed by processes of internal colonization—the growth of the welfare state and in some places the movement of colonized peoples from their homes in the periphery to London, Paris, Brussels, and Moscow, the centers of the (former) empires.

Meanwhile, from 1945 to 1992 the number of internationally recognized sovereign states, each claiming its own nation, grew exponentially from 51 to 184. During the Cold War, newer nation-states, much as the older ones, had no choice but to choose sides, or to play the sides off against each other, notwithstanding the attempts of the Nonaligned Movement to find a position elsewhere. Hence, decolonization, whatever its local aims or goals, could never proceed independent of Cold War order. Group legitimacy depended on the ability to approximate national form. And nations could take form only within an inter-national order. Still, the process of nation formation was never as coherent in practice as it was in its representational forms. From the inevitable push and pull in different directions, national versions and their subversions were produced one after another.

My first attempt to deal with this complex of problems, in field research conducted from 1986 to 1989, resulted in Belonging in the Two Berlins, where I examined the project of kinship formation, nation building, and political authority during the Cold War in the two Germanys. At the same time, I edited and co-translated Gay Voices from East Berlin, a book articulating alternative sexual subjectivities at that time hidden from the eyes of the “free world.” Even before these books were actually in print, however, my own project had shifted to an interest in the disintegration of identities and nations in the terminal stages of the Cold War order. In fact, I came to realize only in hindsight, while beginning a project on Berlin’s repatriated German Jews in 1989, that the Cold War order I had been witnessing while living in East and West Berlin was already in an advanced stage of decomposition. “1989” only accelerated this dynamic, which I sought to explain in After the Wall, written between December 1989 and April 1990. Whereas ethnographers have long been interested in endangered and disappearing worlds, their regnant framework of cultural relativism and the listing of culture traits seemed inappropriate to my project, which
was to describe an unintended revolutionary transformation. And while anthropologists had long been active in constructing models of cultural continuity and change, they had not taken up the macro-themes which had occupied other scholars of the *Ostblock*: the totalitarian collective body, mass terror, Communist utopian revolutions. Above all, I could not imagine myself engaged in a nostalgic recovery of a particular tribal, ethnic, or national identity, which, regrettably, has become the project of not only many former socialist scholars and residents in those states but also of many of their counterparts in the First World. Situated at this intersection of the No Man’s Land of a disappearing First–Second World and an academy that has largely not positioned itself to describe this world critically, my own work has necessarily been idiosyncratic, or, in the full sense of the word, “queer.”

Making Culture and International Order

For several decades now, many anthropologists have been mourning for the “good old days” of representing cultures as totalistic, autonomous, self-reproducing wholes. This genre found its perhaps most elegant expression with the publication in 1934 of Ruth Benedict’s *Patterns of Culture*, in which she represented cultures as unified Dionysian or Apollonian personalities. There has been a long history of critique of this particular form of representing peoples and cultures, with many contributors to the debates. But only in reaction to the critique of this form of representation in *Writing Culture*, edited by Jim Clifford and George Marcus and published in 1986, did the mourning sentiment begin to crystallize into a wave of nostalgia for the tried and true representational forms of the past.

Between 1934 and 1986 (my own rough dating for forms of Cold War representation), anthropologists in Britain, France, and the United States had come up with a standard formula for representing the world. Inspired by the geopolitics of Herder and the spirit of Rousseau, they agreed on a “cultural gardens” approach, as Johannes Fabian (1984) has characterized it. They chronicled indigenous (usually stateless) cultures as communities of customs,
habits, and traditions, and then equated these cultures with expressiveness, critique, even emancipation. In the postwar period, some anthropologists did indeed work with political authorities, but only an exceptional few thought they were working for the state. To the extent that they included interaction with states in fieldwork descriptions, they tended to situate political authorities in opposition to authentic “cultures,” which they then proposed to represent. In fact, the norm among anthropologists continues to privilege distance from the state, as if spatial proximity is polluting and to be avoided at all costs. Such distancing from political authority has been based on a general suspicion that most governments are intent on either assimilating or annihilating authentic cultures, or on denying “indigenous peoples” rights and entitlements. However warranted, this suspicion does not justify representing folk cultures as authentic, organic, timeless, and apolitical. Of course there was no universal agreement about this folk model, as Peter Worsley, Eric Wolf, Eleanor Leacock, and Claude Meillasoux, to name but four major figures, proposed alternative representations involving Marxist-inspired world systems theory.

Today, faith and security in the culturalist form of representation has been so undermined within anthropology that only people in other disciplines and fields dare to employ it without some gesture to self-criticism. Many political scientists and sociologists, for example, have begun to embrace “culture” (or even its predecessor “civilization”) as an independent variable, a (good) stabilizing factor or alternately the (evil) factor that stimulates change and exacerbates conflict. Culture, then, is either a “component,” a set of symbols separable from measurable economic or political processes, or it is a whole used to explain the dynamic relations between the “nation,” the “people,” and the “state.” These latter units are now too fluid and already too “deconstructed” to be convincing as a prior, empirical base that generates current international disorder. When influential analysts in other fields, such as the political scientist Sam Huntington (1993: 22–49) in “The Clash of Civilizations?” or the journalist Robert Kaplan (1994: 44–76) in “The Coming Anarchy,” do employ the Cold War vision of the world as stable cultural gardens or ecological niches to understand political order, they seem to speak to contemporary needs to see the world in terms of Benedict’s
1934 vision. They seek the security in a nostalgic view of coherent cultures in the Second and Third Worlds, but instead they are threatened by sights of fragmentation and lost order: tribalism, civilizational struggle, fundamentalism, anarchy. In a New Yorker review of Huntington and Kaplan, Philip Gourevitch (1996: 8) lumps them together with several other “misfortune tellers” (including Benjamin Barber (1995) and Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1994)), accusing them all of “proceeding from generality to generality without providing convincing access to the particular; ... they are selling fear more than understanding.”

An underlying assumption of these “misfortune tellers” is that expressive cultures are unified wholes in natural opposition to national states, although such cultures are now also frequently assumed to be self-interested political actors themselves actively in search of either collective citizenship rights and benefits or of their own states. This culturalist vision remains extremely powerful and convincing despite the fact that the world clearly never has been and never will be ordered accordingly. Analysts employing this vision inevitably reduce world tensions to fights between ahistorical cultures (Arab and Jew, Tamil and Sinhalese, Hutu and Tutsi, Serb and Muslim, American and Japanese), between cultures and states, or to clashes between civilizations (Europe and China, the West and the Orient) in a caricature of the actors involved.

What makes these new culturalists everybody’s darlings? Their popularity rests, I suspect, on the easy-to-understand cartoonish nature of their cultural and political models. Their writing mimics Roy Liechtenstein’s paintings: simple figures drawn in clear outline who speak everyday truths in short bubbles of discourse that float above the scenes portrayed. We are definitely outside these scenes, yet they are easy to “read.” Such cartoon forms demand representation in sound bites of conversation or images for contemplation that television and radio journalists can use: much as Clark Kent turns Lois Lane down again, Saddam Hussein says “no” to U.N. negotiators. The work of such cartoonists would be innocent enough if it remained in museums or the academy, or even in the fantasy world of the culturalists—but it does not. These forms of representation enter public life quickly and reorder it. They are Xeroxed, faxed, wired, picked up by the world’s media networks and advertising
artists and put into international circulation where they ineluctably lead to the stabilization of prejudices and to the proposal of false solutions to problems of inter- and intra-cultural tensions, genocide, economic crises, and political authority.

I am not here trying to exculpate anthropologists for their responsibility in creating cleaner, more classical, more elegant representations of culture. The fact is, however, that an entire generation of young American anthropologists has now deserted this mode of image production, leaving in its wake a contemporary void into which other disciplines have stepped by simply appropriating this older version of anthropological representation. Since it is impossible to do away with this archetypical form of cultural representation, with all its allure and power, the question for anthropology becomes how to subvert it. Is it possible to fill the need for understanding cultural complexity and political order without reducing peoples to stereotypes and caricatures? How can one make convincing pictures that explain and account for self-understandings without reproducing them and without resorting to cartoons?

One response to the critique of culturalism has been to focus on the relation of the global to the local. Even here, though, the “condition of postmodernity” (Harvey 1989; Jameson 1983) has made the positing of separate local and global spaces less than useful. If the global now consistently penetrates local space, just as quickly and readily the local seems to become global. Ulf Hannerz (1992), for one, has characterized this process as “creolization,” part of a new “global ecumene.” At the end of the twentieth century, most Coca Cola is produced and drunk outside the United States, and it makes little sense to dismiss calls for free speech in China as the imposition of Western ideals. Both Coca Cola and free speech are categories of things that not only shuttle between local and global but are located simultaneously at both levels. They are categories of things as transnational and controversial as are “the family,” “mother’s brother’s uncle,” and phallic authority. The same can be said for Andean music, United Nations peacekeepers, nationalism, tourism, gay identity, Marielito refugees, horse breeds, and the Greenhouse Effect. To be sure, anthropologists can always find isolated examples of localisms that resist appropriation outside the contexts of their production,
and of globalisms that leave little imprint on the local. Still, it no longer makes much sense to set global and local in opposition to each other when describing most of what we see. As Arjun Appadurai (1990: 15) suggests, local primordia, “sentiments whose greatest force is in their ability to ignite intimacy into a political sentiment,” have now become a global force.

Nor does it make sense, however, to collapse global and local processes into vectors, flows, and imaginary spaces. People everywhere continue to invest in objects that appear to have their own integrity; they continue to understand meaning in terms of parochial definitions of kin, color, and property—and this very specificity of objects in a field of power is the precondition for any vector or flow to take place. The so-called modular effect, the copying of things like the nation or rock music or territorial sovereignty in places far removed in time and space from the original situation of production, often confuses social scientists into thinking that they have identified the same thing everywhere. Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) seductive vision of the medium controlling the message, of a global village where people’s local differences would become negligible due to media standardization, has proven to be an extremely misleading conceptualization of the emergent world order. Experience may be globally inflected through the use of identical technologies, but it is always lived locally, in concrete surroundings, regardless of how convinced some people are of their own otherworldly, extraterrestrial, virtual reality, or of their cosmopolitan sensibilities. At least this is what most ethnographic studies consistently tell us.

Hence, we are left with the task of situating the local and global in relation to one another without either assuming an opposition between levels or collapsing the two into one, or ignoring the political field in which they generate meaning. Ethnographers are uniquely positioned to locate the global in the local, and vice versa. Most anthropological research is framed and conducted in a way that mirrors the dialectical process whereby objects, persons, and things shuttle between local and global spaces. Although there has always been a movement within anthropology encouraging certain categories of people (primarily “indigenous,” “minority,” or “Third World”) to study themselves, most anthropological knowledge has
focused around a foreign-identified researcher generating knowledge about self-identified natives. It is this aspect of culture making that I address in “Anthropology as Foreign Policy,” first delivered in abbreviated form as a talk, titled “Rethinking Anthropological Coherence,” on a circus-like panel intended to present an intergenerational and international dialogue at the American Anthropological Association Meetings in Washington, D.C., November 1993.

What distinguishes anthropology from other disciplines is its direct and unavoidable confrontation with the distinction between foreign and native. Anthropologists consistently produce not merely particular but privileged knowledge, meaning knowledge distinct from that in other disciplines, through a singular, accidentally discovered method and because of the challenge to construct a particular object. That method is fieldwork: face-to-face interactions requiring some kind of sensory experience, in time at a particular place, of the person or peoples one seeks to describe. That object is the “human” or “humanness,” formerly called “man.” In the Enlightenment tradition, anthropology’s challenge has been to adumbrate humans in a continuous process of unmaking and remaking man. We do this, I suggest, by distinguishing the native (or us) from the foreign (or them).

Anthropologists happened onto this experiential and participatory method accidentally as they took up the task of describing and documenting people who had no written texts. Our ethnographic pioneers, such as Bronislaw Malinowski, whom everyone credits as the father of modern fieldwork, were forced to interact with the natives. With no alternative but to use themselves as instruments of research in intensive fieldwork, they were constantly confronted with the impossibility of the Enlightenment goal of methodological objectivity through distance from the object of study. The discipline has come a long way in developing and critiquing this method. In the process, anthropologists have largely rejected Alfred C. Haddon’s Torres Straits method (1888–1899) of interviewing natives by having them brought to his tent, Ruth Benedict’s wartime culture-from-a-distance reading of texts, and Robert Murdoch’s postwar Human Area Relations File of systematized comparison of the world’s distribution of culture traits. But these rejections have not led to a unified method of fieldwork, and the discipline remains in this sense experimental.
One of the responses to the contemporary critique of participant observation has been to embrace textual analysis and to prioritize "representations" over practices. Such a return to textual authority often marks a parallel movement away from face-to-face interaction. It also ends up fudging the distinction between representations and discursive practices. Documenting practices requires dealing with the problematic but ethnographically indispensable categories of "experience," "being there," "participation," and "observation." My response has been not to see texts and representations as an alternative to participant observation but to seek ways of incorporating them into the interactive fieldwork setting. Given the proliferation of new, powerful forms of non-face-to-face interaction, the kinds of ethnographic methods today must necessarily vary as widely as the types of processes and peoples which ethnographers try to describe. Anthropology toward the end of the twentieth century is characterized by eclecticism in methodological approach and problem selection. At the same time, it coheres around a reflexive project that is just as important now as it was at the end of the nineteenth century: adumbrating the human.

"Race, Ethnicity, Species, Breed" is an early attempt of mine to relate the local and global in the way suggested above. Written originally in 1985 as an attempt to theorize part of my own history, it is simultaneously an ethnographically-informed reflexive history, a comparative sociology, and a critique of anthropological theory. I begin with native categories and local practices of horse breeding and performance, a field in which I worked professionally for eight years before becoming an anthropologist. I examine these practices in light of anthropological theories of totemism and demonstrate that animal and human classifications (of race and ethnicity) in the United States cannot be understood independent of the history of nation-state formation. When U.S. American horse breeding practices are compared to those in France and Germany, it becomes clear that all three cases are interrelated yet each nation has its own peculiarities. The specificity of each case is explained in terms of the dynamic processes by which three unstable units—"state," "nation," "horse breeding and performance"—take on durable form over time.

Ethnographic work that deals with larger world systems risks losing the feeling for concreteness, for the evocation of experience
of particular people at a particular time. To avoid this risk, I situate the historical development of national orders in the actual experience of horse breeds, in the categories of breeding and performance as they are practiced in everyday life and in ritual. The local experience of breeds is then related to the categorization of peoples in the United States, which in turn is illuminated by comparing this relation to a different though interrelated set of experiences of breeds and peoples in Europe. Even the category European ("Continental" in U.S. American jargon) has different local inflections, which I specify at the French and German national levels. Further, accounts of the various national categories and experiences required an explanation of state-building processes.

This essay reformulates the relation of culture to international order with several postulates. First, that anthropological concepts such as "totemism" are equally appropriate and enlightening when applied to complex "Western" societies, and perhaps only in this reflexive application can one understand their full utility and limitations. Second, that the utility of anthropological concepts is best illustrated not in the synchronic study of isolated societies but when informed by a comparative historical sociology. Third, by using this mundane example of the relation between horse breeding and performance and racial/ethnic classification, I demonstrate that international order does not exist as a practice outside of local categories. Rather, local practices generate national and international political orders, which in turn work to refashion the local into a simulacrum of the international. In this refashioning, the national of course fails measured by its own goals, for local variations are never fully uniformized through the discursive practices of the nation or the international; yet one cannot deny the singular influence of the national on local category formation.

National Identities in a Disintegrating Political Order

Increasingly dissatisfied with the old binaries of culture/individual, modern/traditional, global/local, public/private, and state/society, many anthropologists have begun to talk of subjectivities, flows, polyvocality, and multiple identities. This shift is particularly wel-
come with reference to the study of nations and national identifications. Most anthropologists no longer consider the nation form the sole property of the state, since both states and local societies claim its loyalties and insist the nation belongs to them. Traditional state-centric studies tended to assume that national pomp replaced local ritual, modernity replaced tradition, and public replaced private. With respect to the states and societies of East-Central Europe during the Cold War, such a perspective led to the belief that "civil society"—intermediate institutions between state and individual will—was either weakened or had virtually disappeared, and therefore all that was left to observe was the state (meaning pomp, modernity, and public routine). Because a sudden dissolution or radical transformation of these states marked the end of the Cold War, analysts with state-centric perspectives were left attributing change either to pressures from foreign (capitalist and socialist) states or to internal contradictions within (socialist) states. While both external pressures and internal contradictions certainly entered into the dynamic collapse of Central-Eastern European states, it is singularly absurd to assume that Cold War states existed in social vacuums, responsive only to themselves and other states.

It is true that Ostblock states had very little independent "civil society," as the term is conventionally applied to Western Europe and the United States. Parent-teacher associations were usually run by Party members, Boy Scouts were organized around a Young Pioneer model of socialist brotherhood rather than a Horatio Alger self-help story, religious groups were regularly harassed and infiltrated by the state, oppositional political groups were outright banned. But it is just plain wrong to claim that the organizations of civil society that are independent of the state are somehow more civil and friendly to society than those influenced or controlled by the state. Hitler’s Storm Troopers, an intermediate uncivil organization that sought to undermine the democratic Weimar state, particularly its civil society, differs negligibly from Mao’s Red Guard, a state-directed group that sought to intimidate civil society. The relevant question is not who controls social groups in public life but for whom, for what purposes, with what results. The current proliferation of uncivil, anti-state organizations in many parts of the
world, including the United States, should make us doubt both the utility of assuming a cross-cultural state/society antagonism and the cross-cultural civility of civil societies.

It is also true that First and Second World states during the Cold War regularly exaggerated their self-importance, often convinced themselves (and scholars who studied them) of this illusion, and accordingly ignored the lived realities of the people whom they supposedly represented. Hence the legacy of environmental catastrophes, bloated governments, and peoples extremely suspicious of governmental legitimacy. But because “the people” in the Ostblock had never disappeared during the Cold War (but were only represented that way), they are not today readily amenable to re-creation in the heralded U.S. American model of weak state-civil society—private life and culture. Rather, there exists a plurality of forms of individual and group identification with states, old and new, and these forms are now in rapid flux. Today the readily observable subjectivities of peoples in the First and Second World—irrespective of which collective form they take, such as families, clans, tribes, classes, ethnicities, races—are the result of reciprocal influences of individuals with state structures in the reproduction of the nation form.

The three essays in this section analyze the attempt to define national identities in Berlin at a time of disintegrating political order. If the national form of belonging is the result of reciprocal influences of state doctrine and individual experience, then how does this form coalesce and change at a time of competition for and rapid disintegration of state loyalties? How do the resulting national identifications themselves function as political processes to reconstitute, in turn, states, local societies, national and international orders? In this I have not followed Ernest Gellner’s top-down focus on centralized education, industrialization, and the creation of national homogeneity, nor Benedict Anderson’s emphasis on print-capitalism, territorial mapping, museums, and census taking, nor Katherine Verdery’s concentration on intellectual discourse and ideology, to refer readers to three alternative approaches that have much to offer. Additionally, while other analysts see national identities as fixed in semiological systems, which then can be analyzed in terms of a self-contained cognitive or cultural system separate
from political order, or a habitus that encloses the national, I have insisted on studying the nation as a set of public practices that are generated and made sense of in the so-called private life of the domestic sphere. Moreover, each nation is a non-autochthonous unit, always forming as part of an international order.

"Time-Space Compression and the Continental Divide in German Subjectivity" analyzes the sequences in East and West German experience of "time-space compression"—the quickening of time, the collapse of spatial barriers—in the first three years following the opening of the Wall. Here I do not restrict myself to single individuals but consider elaborate collective identity formations that continue to work within Cold War processes, despite the formal end of the Cold War. Above all, these processes include East-West mirroring and a dialectic of asymmetrical recognition. I examine the way in which the occasion of the opening as well as events in the year following it—primarily the currency reform and political elections—affected a reordering of temporal and spatial categories in both East and West Berlin. During the Cold War, the East and West created the effect of being outside and external, whereas they were in fact inside and internal, to each other: the other was always already there. In the push for formal unity, East and West Germans began representing themselves as kin reuniting, denying or misconstruing the differences that had been created in the forty years of political division and cultural demarcation. Two separate peoples, internally marked with each other’s differences yet each with its own set of dispositions, were suddenly assumed to be equal parts of a national whole. Unification between East and West unfolded in a process similar to a "first encounter," as a sequence of eroticization, striptease, and an incomplete funeral/burial of the East.

"Narrative, Genealogy, and Historical Consciousness" examines a single autobiographical account of East Berliner Susan R. as she attempts to narrate her life in September 1989. At this moment the state and society in which she lives are disintegrating and her citizenship and nationality are rapidly losing coherence. I focus not so much on the ethnographer and text produced as on the processes of narrativization during the telling, that is, on the act of authorship or inscription of identity. This analysis is used to make an argument about method and interdisciplinarity: that the relationship between
anthropology and literary studies is not merely one of convenience but necessary and indispensable. The two disciplines are inter-related through the process of narrativity, the method of genealogy, and the condition of historical consciousness, all of which presuppose one another in a mutual practice centered around the production and interpretation of narrative texts. Susan R.'s telling demonstrates that the ethnographic encounter is extremely revealing precisely at the moment of inscription of experience, when Susan R. struggles for self-articulation and definition, in other words, before her story obtains coherence. I conclude from this analysis that the inescapable embeddedness of the fieldwork situation in the present should not be seen as a problem to overcome. Instead, the moment of inscription in a fieldwork situation is a fundamental and specifically anthropological source of knowledge. Today, when national and international political orders are unstable and disintegrating, or, to paraphrase Marx, when all that is solid melts into thin air, anthropological knowledge produced through fieldwork is limited only if one seeks fixed, self-reproducing cultures and un-changing traditions. Alternatively, if anthropologists pay attention to struggles for articulation, the moment of inscription itself, then they are positioned to observe or document firsthand the processes of disintegration and reconstruction of order.

"Grenzregime (Border Regime): The Wall and Its Aftermath" traces the experience of the collapse of the "dual organization" of Germany in the life of one woman and her three daughters. Born in 1944 in Cottbus, Heidi is one of those women on whose labor the socialist state had staked its future. This essay analyzes the changes in her relation to the state as it loses its Utopian vision. Raised with cradle-to-grave security, she eventually decides to move to an insecure life in the West but only manages to obtain an exit visa for November 11, 1989. The Wall is opened three days before. I fashion Heidi's story to address the peculiarities of balancing liberty and security while living along the border in a "border regime" during the Cold War and its aftermath. Borders, I conclude, are the products of ambivalent and multiple inputs; they are fortuitously constructed and dismantled because of contradictory processes that simultaneously support and undermine their continued existence.
Resistance and Opposition to Authority

In this section, I ask not only what it means to construct a subjectivity within a state, or to reformulate one in a disintegrating state, but what it means to attempt to construct one in opposition to the state. The first essay takes up modes of critical leftist resistance to authority in East Germany during the Cold War, the second traces this resistance generationally in an attempt to understand the generation of contemporary forms of radical-right wing resistance to authority in the unified Germany. Both essays situate forms of resistance in their particular times and places, and in their relation to the key ideologies of this century (totalitarianism, fascism, communism, and democracy) and to institutions of legitimate authority (e.g., states, the media, supranational organizations).

“Trouble in the Kitchen” examines the efficacy of forms of resistance to genres of state authority in East and West Germany during the Cold War. It compares two sets of relationships in East and West: that between citizens and the state generally, and that between self-proclaimed dissidents or resisters and the state. In East Germany, the dominant genre in which authority was represented and legitimated in relations between state and citizen was romance, in contrast to West Germany, where satire was the dominant genre. Use of one or the other genre by the state in law and public policy created different generational dynamics and therefore different modes of identification and resistance. Satire has proven to be a more effective form of authority in dealing with resistance than romance because of its particularism, with roots in the local, in contrast to romanticism, which is abstract and universalistic. As a consequence, satire must first recognize or acknowledge difference before undermining it, whereas romance, due to its basically monologic and narcissistic idealism, is rooted in a denial of reality.

The final part of the essay focuses on resistance to romantic forms of authority and examines the relative efficacy of the responses of three self-proclaimed dissidents in the East German state. The first response was what I call a “hetero sex withdrawal into a private niche,” the second a satiric response of modernist resistance, the third a postmodernist response. I argue that the most important criterion for efficacy is whether actions provoked
reactions and repressions by the state. In the latter two cases, both kinds of dissidents forced the state to show that it relied on coercion for its legitimacy, which, in turn, revealed dangerous knowledge about the limitations of its control—and, I would argue, accelerated its loss of legitimacy. Moreover, the “dissident” was neither an emic nor etic invention, neither merely a result of some autonomous free will nor merely a reaction to the dominant authority, but a complicitous category, a supranational product of Cold War competition between states and their nationals over the legitimacy of political representation. I conclude that the end of the Cold War is likely to mean a universalization of forms of satiric authority, as well as an end to romantic authority and to forms of resistance tied to it, such as those of revolutionary action.

“Education after the Cold War” asks how to explain the right-wing violence following unification of the two Germanys. In particular, does this violence illustrate a repetition compulsion, and if not, what is it a result of? Intellectuals in the two Cold War Germanys had developed different positions with regard to eliminating the preconditions for Nazi crimes, with the Federal Republic arguing for more democracy, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) maintaining a position that the proper response to fascism entailed the elimination of capitalism and anti-fascist education, especially in the schools. This essay depicts the relation to authority of three generations of East German intellectuals as part of an inquiry into the conditions that made possible a Cold War and how to educate to prevent its repetition. I argue that both “more democracy” and the “elimination of capitalism and anti-fascism” were examples of successful education after World War II, but that successful education after the Cold War must begin by acknowledging a different set of historical problems. Hence, the violence in Germany today should not be seen as a repetition of old antagonisms suddenly allowed to resurface, the “eruption of the past,” as it is often put, but as a new phenomenon, a product not of fascism, nationalism, and World War II but of the Cold War. Postunification violence in the East and the West must be understood not as a repetition of repressed aggression and traditions rooted in “Auschwitz” but as generated by the disintegration of mechanisms that structured Cold War order. Violence is being
“regenerated” because of post-unity problems: lost orientation, fear of the future, economic and status insecurities growing out of present concerns. Today, I argue, intellectuals, especially those in the West, have a special responsibility to take insecurities—regardless of their “real” status or origin—seriously instead of demonizing or humiliating people in the East, or trivializing the concerns of disenchanted youths.

Territorial Sovereignty and Its Violation

The final set of essays examines the effects of the principle of territorial sovereignty on European and American order, respectively. They take sexual practices and movement of peoples as objects of analysis, specifically male rape of men and ethnic cleansing in Europe and responses to an international border crossing of homosexually identified men in the United States. Both essays investigate border sites where the principle of territorial sovereignty is most vulnerable, therefore frequently violated and at the same time most transparently asserted as necessary.

Many contemporary ethnographers are studying the state from the Weberian perspective that focuses on increasing technical rationality, power and control, and interactions with bureaucracies. Another Weberian question, that of state legitimacy and violence, is of equal if not more importance. A focus on legitimacy redirects us from top-down or bottom-up models to the reciprocal effects of the state and citizen on the formation of national practices in everyday life. In both essays, I begin with sexuality—sexual fantasies, practices, and identities—not because I consider it prior to other social identifications or relations but because it is the one set of discursive practices that is constantly evoked to speak about and legitimate relations of domination in particular social orders. It never fails to be there. And it doesn’t speak “mere gibberish either” but screams, as Maurice Godelier (1986: 232–233) argues in his analysis of the New Guinea Baruya. Indeed, Godelier concludes, “sexuality is an indiscreet screaming chamber for relations of oppression and exploitation. “I wish to ask how sexuality functions as the “screaming chamber” through which the practices of genocide and illegal movements of people are both represented and
constituted. How does sexuality function to legitimate “the social order to which it is obliged to submit” (Godelier 1986: 232)? In events such as genocide and immigration, one can observe the state reasserting the principle of territorial sovereignty, which the international system represents as its generative principle of legitimate order. Because territorial sovereignty is intricately tied to sexuality, both the state and social groups involved speak, or scream, through the discursive practices of sexuality. In doing so, the state reveals its strategies for constructing particular people and, because some sexuality always escapes attempts to control it, these events also indicate the limits of the state’s ability to control sex. Exploring these limits might direct anthropological analysis to alternative categories and practices where change is possible or even likely.

“Emigrees as Bullets/Immigration as Penetration” takes as its object the Marielitos, a group of Cuban refugees from a 1980 boatlift, and it examines how three groups of Americans perceived these emigrees. In contrast to the extremely generous welcome U.S. Americans had given to former groups of Cubans who had escaped to the United States, the Marielitos were received with ambivalence. The key to this ambivalent perception was that approximately 10,000 of the 120,000 emigrees were self-described homosexuals. Whereas the generic “Cuban refugee” had always been welcome in the United States, the category “Cuban homosexual” prompted an open conflict between U.S. American positive valorization of Cuban escapees and negative valoration of homosexuals. A heretofore political event—reception of Cuban refugees—was interpreted in a psychosexual idiom, which in turn created the possibility for shifts in the semantic content of both categories, of emigrees and homosexuals.

“Toward a Theory of Ethnic Cleansing” begins a genealogy of the historical and local expressions and effects of two pan-European institutions: territorial sovereignty and heterosexuality. If ethnic cleansing is an old European practice that grew out of the state’s vision of a homogeneous nation, then what specific institutions continue to motivate it? And under what circumstances might these institutions be influenced to change? The first part of the essay asks about the influence of international or European principles and structures on Yugoslavia’s dissolution, and vice versa, the sig-
Hannerz, Ulf

Harvey, David

Huntington, Samuel

Jameson, Fredric

Kaplan, Robert D.

McLuhan, Marshall

Said, Edward