Introduction
An Uncommon Orientalist:
Paul Hacker’s Passage to India

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I. Paul Hacker’s biography does not require much space. He was born on January 6, 1913, in Seelscheid near Cologne in Germany. From 1932 he studied Indology and various other philological disciplines (Romance languages, English, and Russian) at the universities of Bonn, Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Berlin. In addition to his philological studies, he attended lectures in Indo-European linguistics, theology, and philosophy. In 1940 he submitted his doctoral dissertation on the “realism” of the Russian novelist I. S. Turgenev at the University of Berlin (Studien zum Realismus I. S. Turgenevs). After World War II, during which he was drafted into military service, and various interim jobs, including a brief period of work for the Allied “German News Service,” he resumed his academic career in 1946 at the University of Bonn, where he had the support of Willibald Kirfel, the well-known Purāṇa scholar. In 1949 he submitted his “habilitation” thesis on the early history of Advaita Vedānta (Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des frühen Advaita). Major parts of this thesis were published in 1951 under the title Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaitavāda. 1: Die Schüler Śaṅkaras (Ak. Wiss. Lit. Mainz, 1950). A section on Vimuktaṭmaṇ’s Iṣṭasiddhi, which had been part of the thesis, was omitted from the published version.

In 1950 Hacker started teaching at the University of Münster. In 1954 he accepted a professorship at the Mithila Postgraduate Research Institute in Darbhanga, India, where he spent a little more than a year. In 1955 he returned to Germany to become W. Kirfel’s successor and occupy the chair for Indology at the University of Bonn. This was Germany’s
oldest chair for Indian studies, founded in 1818 and first held by A. W. von Schlegel. In 1963 he moved to Münster as director of the newly established Institute of Indology (Indologisches Seminar), a position he held until his retirement in 1978. In 1971 he taught Indian philosophy as a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. A major event in Hacker's life that was not part of his academic career took place in 1962: his conversion from Lutheran Protestantism to Roman Catholicism.

Paul Hacker died on March 18, 1979, less than a year after his retirement from the University of Münster.

II. On the occasion of Paul Hacker's sixty-fifth birthday, most of his articles and some major book reviews were collected and reprinted under the title Kleine Schriften (ed. by L. Schmithausen. Wiesbaden, 1978). This volume also contains an elaborate and almost complete list of Hacker's publications, including his book reviews. Various additional materials were published after the appearance of the Kleine Schriften and after Hacker's death in 1979. These include an article on "inclusivism" (1983), the text of Hacker's last lecture course at the University of Münster (Grundlagen indischer Dichtung und indischen Denkens, ed. by K. Rüping. Vienna, 1985; i.e., "Foundations of Indian Poetry and Thought"), and his doctoral dissertation of 1940 on I. S. Turgenev's realism.

We do not have to enumerate and discuss Hacker's publications in detail. Some general observations and references to a few exemplary pieces will be sufficient. Lambert Schmithausen, editor of the Kleine Schriften, has divided Hacker's articles into the following categories: a) methods and tasks of Indian studies; b) Indian philosophy, especially Advaita Vedânta; c) comparative studies; d) the religious history of Hinduism; e) Neo-Hinduism; f) modern Indo-Aryan languages; g) theology. Apart from his early work on Turgenev, these categories apply also to Hacker's monographs. Among these, the most significant ones deal with Advaita Vedânta, especially Śaṅkara and his disciples (Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaitavâda. 1: Die Schüler Śaṅkaras. Ak.Wiss.Lit.Mainz, 1950; see also Vivarta. Ak.Wiss.Lit.Mainz, 1953), and with Purānic mythology (Prahlâda. Werden und Wandlungen einer Idealgestalt. Ak.Wiss.Lit.Mainz, 1959). Another exemplary study deals with the function of auxiliary verbs in Hindi (Zur Funktion einiger Hilfsverben im modernen Hindi. Ak.Wiss.Lit.Mainz, 1958). In the field of theology, Hacker published a critical and controversial account of Luther's

A chronological overview of Hacker’s writings reveals some general trends and developments. For more than a decade, the philological exploration of Advaita Vedānta, in particular the works of Śaṅkara and his disciples, is clearly predominant. Excursions into other areas of Indian philosophy are relatively rare. The series of publications in this area begins with the article “Śaṅkarācārya and Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda” (1947); the topic of this article, which concerns Śaṅkara’s personal development and the authenticity of much of the literature associated with his name, is resumed in the article “Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin” (1968). The two monographs mentioned earlier and the important article “Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkaras” (1950) constitute further highlights in this series.6 The philological approach to Advaita Vedānta is supplemented by comparative studies which correlate and contrast Advaita Vedānta with Western, primarily Christian, philosophy and theology; as an example, we may mention the article “Sein und Geist im Vedānta” (1969) which compares and contrasts Śaṅkara with Thomas Aquinas.7

Beginning in the late fifties, Purānic mythology, the general development of Hindu religious thought, and Neo-Hinduism play an increasingly conspicuous role in Hacker’s research and publications. We have already mentioned the classic study of Prahlāda (1959). To this, we may add a study of the concept of vrata (Ak.Wiss.Lit. Göttingen, 1973) and important articles on the development of the avatāra doctrine (“Zur Entwicklung der Avatāralehre,” 1960), the concept of śraddhā or faith (“Śraddhā,” 1963), and related topics.8 Neo-Hinduism, or Hindu modernism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, emerges as an area of provocative research and interpretation in articles on the modern reinterpretation of the concept of dharma (“Der Dharmabegriﬀ des Neuhinduismus,” 1958), the influence of Schopenhauer’s thought on the idea of “practical Vedānta” (“Schopenhauer und die Ethik des Hinduism,” 1961), Vivekananda’s religious nationalism (“Der religiöse Nationalismus Vivekanandas,” 1971), etc.9 Concerning Hacker’s research on the Hindi language, we may note that, in addition to his linguistic studies, he also showed a special interest in its historical role as a national language and the problems concerning its semantic adjustment to the modern Westernized world (“Probleme der indischen National­sprache,” 1966).
Theological interests and preoccupations became more conspicuous in Hacker’s later years. A remarkable personal statement, “Today’s India and We Christians” (“Das heutige Indien und wir Christen”) was published in 1962, the year of his conversion to Catholicism. Numerous theological publications followed after his conversion. In addition to his book on Luther (1966; English version 1970), we may mention such articles as “Priestertum und Eucharistie heute” (1970) and “The Christian Attitude toward Non-Christian Religions” (1971). In his last contributions to Indian studies, Hacker tried to sum up the most basic results of his previous work and to define some of the most general and distinctive features of the Indian religious and philosophical tradition. In particular, this applies to the lectures on the “Foundations of Indian Poetry and Thought” published after his death.

III. In his later years, Hacker liked to present himself as an outsider, and even as an outcaste, among German Indologists; at the very least, we may agree that he was a somewhat unusual figure among his colleagues. But he also distanced himself from much of what was going on in contemporary theology, philosophy, and religious studies. There was overt confrontation not only with the objects of his research, i.e., the Indian religious and philosophical teachings, but also with the ideas and methods of his fellow-researchers. In his methodological articles as well as in other (written and oral) statements, he criticized some of the leading figures of German Indology. His methodological critique of the work of Paul Thieme gained special significance and recognition, as well as a certain degree of notoriety. This critique found its most coherent expression in an article on the “method of philological concept research” (“Zur Methode der philologischen Begriffsforßchung,” 1965). The article deals, above all, with the postulate of “consistent translating” (“konsequentes Übersetzen”), i.e., the idea that one and the same term and concept should be used to translate a foreign (specifically Sanskrit) word. The case in question is Heinrich Lüders’ consistent rendering of rta as “truth” (“Wahrheit”), which Thieme defends against critics, such as Gonda and Renou, and tries to justify in a more theoretical fashion. Hacker resumed and continued the debate in his later monograph on vrata (1973), in which he argues in detail against the attempt of Thieme’s disciple, Hans-Peter Schmidt, to render and explain the word vrata in all its occurrences invariably as “vow” (“Gelübde”). Hacker’s sustained critique of the postulate of “consistent translation” has, of course, wider ramifications.
It implies some fundamental disagreements concerning the very nature of translation, interpretation, and philological research, as well as the role and relevance of methodological reflection and hermeneutic awareness. It also shows that Hacker found such reflections either to be lacking or inadequate in the work of some of his most distinguished colleagues.

There is another major point of contention which Hacker saw, once again, exemplified in the work of Heinrich Lüders, specifically in Lüders’ studies on the Rṣyaśṛiga myth and its historical transformations. What he found here was, in his view, a form of historical and philological positivism which was, nonetheless, committed to the Romantic ideal of the “origin,” or the “original version,” an obsession with “earlier stages” and disiecta membra, an attitude of reduction, dissection, and unrestrained objectification, and a corresponding disregard for organic historical growth and meaningful totalities. With some intended hyperbole, Hacker describes the results of Lüders’ analysis as follows: “The scholar has won a total victory. The textual bodies are lying on the philological battlefield, smashed and lifeless, beautifully lined up with one another, side by side with a garbage pile of inner contradictions, misunderstandings and textual corruptions. But distantly above the bloody philological battleground, the romantic ‘blue blossom’ of the origin shines in positivistic abstractness.” Hacker proposes an idea of philology which is not restricted to dissection and the pursuit of origins or earlier versions. The positivistic method fails to realize that legends, myths, doctrines, etc., constitute meaningful structures (“Gestalten”) and totalities, which undergo historical changes and remain meaningful through such changes. This means that “later versions” deserve as much attention as their earlier or “original” elements, and that the changes and transformations themselves have to be explored as meaningful historical processes.

Of course, one might object at this point that Hacker’s own philological contributions, in particular his investigations concerning Purāṇic mythology, apply the same methodological patterns which he denounced in his critique of Lüders. Didn’t he follow the lead of Willibald Kirfel, his predecessor at the University of Bonn, who certainly was no less positivistic than Lüders? Isn’t his Prahlāda, his magnum opus in the field of Purāṇic studies, dedicated to Kirfel? Indeed, Hacker did pay tribute to Kirfel’s work, but he also distanced himself from it. In particular, he rejected the claim that the reduction of the Purāṇas to certain ultimate units, and thus the dissolution of the very form and structure of a Purāṇa, was the “final result” (“letztes Ergebnis”) of Purāṇic philology.
dissection may be legitimate as a first step, but in the end it should contribute to a better understanding of the Purāṇas as "individual totalities" ("individuelle Ganzheiten") which combine the various parts and pieces in a historically and spiritually meaningful fashion. Philology itself not only permits but requires this step beyond the goals and methods of Kirfel.21

Hacker’s own contributions as a philologist lie in two different areas: 1) in his exploration of anonymous Sanskrit literature, primarily the Purāṇas; 2) in his search for criteria of authorship and authenticity and for distinctive individual features in the literature of Advaita Vedānta, specifically the works of Śaṅkara and his disciples. In the second area, too, the first step has to be one of analysis and dissection of what is often presented as one unified school of thought. We have to determine what sets Śaṅkara’s genuine works apart from those of Sureśvara or Vīmuktātman, as well as from those countless works which were falsely ascribed to him; we may even try to distinguish between his own late and earlier works.22 But in the end we also want to know what holds Śaṅkara’s thought together; we want to understand its inner unity and its most fundamental philosophical and theological premises, as well as those of Advaita Vedānta in general. There can hardly be any doubt that, once again, Hacker was at least as committed to the second step as to the first.23

IV. This is not the place to discuss Hacker’s philological achievements in detail, to review the specific results and problems of his treatment of anonymous Sanskrit literature, or to assess his arguments concerning the authorship and authenticity of particular Advaita Vedānta works. In any case, it would be safe to say that his contributions are both challenging and exemplary, and that they have had a considerable influence on the development of Indian philological studies. His Prahlāda has become a kind of classic in its field, even though its actual readership has remained rather limited because of linguistic and other reasons. His philological explorations of Advaita Vedānta, and specifically of the nature and authenticity of the literature associated with the name of Śaṅkara, have been continued by Sengaku Mayeda, Tilmann Vetter, and others.24

As we have seen, Hacker’s notion of philology is wider and more open than that of other leading Indologists. But even in this extended sense of the word, Hacker’s work was obviously not restricted
to philology. With growing intensity, it crossed over into the areas of theology, philosophy, and cross-cultural and comparative studies.

In an article published in 1967/68, Hacker made some programmatic statements about "Indology between Past and Future" ("Die Indologie zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft"): "If Indology has a future, then this is possible only in the same manner in which it began: i.e., in a living interaction with European spiritual and intellectual life. ... There ought to be a philosophizing which is based on an immediate knowledge of Indian and European sources." In the following section, Hacker emphasizes the special affinity between Indian studies and theology (which had become his own major preoccupation by this time): "Today, the proximity of theology is greater than ever before. ... But today as ever, India is the classical land for the study of source materials in the history of religion." Such study requires a clear perspective, a sense of direction, a "religious decision" ("religiöse Entscheidung"). A complete absence of preconceptions, a total freedom from any sense of commitment, pure objectivity, would be counterproductive. "Theological thought can open the religious scholar's eyes for realities which would otherwise remain hidden from him." In conclusion, the article calls for scholars "who combine theology and philology in one and the same person, whose eyes have been opened for the essentials by theology, and who have learned through philological means to grasp the meaning of religious or theological notions of Hinduism in their own appropriate context, and then to contrast them in a precise manner with Christian thought, before venturing into speculations." It is hardly necessary to emphasize that this may be read as an expression of Hacker's own self-understanding and as a programmatic statement of the goals and standards he had set for himself at this point in his career several years after his conversion to Catholicism.

It would certainly be wrong to view Hacker's earlier philological work as a deliberate preparation for his later attempts to combine Indology and theology. Nonetheless, there is an undeniable direction in his development. His philological dedication to the works of Śaṅkara and Advaita Vedānta reflects his intense personal fascination with the teachings of nondualism. His resolute resumption of a Christian standpoint and finally his conversion to the Catholic faith are certainly not unrelated to the challenge of Advaita Vedānta. The monograph Vivarta (1953), which concludes the series of his earlier philological Vedānta studies, indicates that Hacker was now moving toward a more confrontational approach.
At the end of this study, he deplors what he considers to be the ultimate failure of the concept of *vivarta* in the works of Vimuktātman and Prakāśānanda, and he speaks of an “attitude, which was no longer committed to an increase of knowledge, but only to the rigid redemption of monistic mysticism.” This element of confrontation becomes much more central and explicit in some of his later articles on Advaita Vedānta, such as “The Idea of the Person in the Thinking of Vedānta Philosophers” (“Die Idee der Person im Denken von Vedānta-Philosophen,” 1963) and “Being and Spirit in Vedānta” (“Sein und Geist im Vedānta,” first published in an Italian version in 1969). Again and again, his arguments revolve around what he considered to be the great challenges, but also fatal flaws of radical nondualism; above all, the devaluation and, ultimately, elimination of the idea of the person, i.e., the human person as well as the personal God. Nonetheless, he continued to search for a fundamental rapport and the potential for a dialogue in this most crucial and problematic area of religious thought. He was convinced that he had found an implicit, unacknowledged anthropology, even a latent theory of personhood, in Śaṅkara’s philosophy of the spirit. (See, for instance, “Śaṅkara’s Conception of Man,” 1970). Hacker’s fascination with the Vedānta concept of *cit* or spirit is still evident in his last article on Advaita Vedānta, which compares the thought of Śaṅkara with that of Plotinus and other Neoplatonists (“Cit and Noûs, or the Concept of Spirit in Vedāntism and in Neoplatonism,” 1976).

V. Hacker’s confrontational approach to Indian thought takes a somewhat different turn in his work on Neo-Vedānta, i.e., nontraditional, modern Vedānta, as exemplified by Swami Vivekananda or Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. Here we are not simply dealing with a foreign, non-Christian, non-Western philosophy and religion, but with ways of thinking which are, more or less explicitly, responses to Western and Christian ideas. According to Hacker, they are no longer authentic expressions of the Indian tradition; they are, in a sense, hybrid formations. They require a different mode of access. ‘Understanding,’ as well as ‘confrontation,’ cannot have the same meaning in this case as in the case of classical Advaita Vedānta represented by Śaṅkara and his followers. Whatever Hacker’s disagreements with classical, traditional Advaita Vedānta may be, he certainly respects it in its genuine, authentic otherness, as a challenge against which he has to rediscover and reaffirm his own identity. Such fundamental respect seems to be absent when he is dealing with what he calls Neo-
Hinduism. Here, the otherness has become questionable. Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan, and the other Neo-Vedântins are treated as dialogue partners with a broken identity who cannot truly and authentically speak for themselves and for the Indian tradition. They have made too many concessions; they have blurred crucial lines of demarcation. Instead of confronting them directly as representatives of genuinely different religious and philosophical views, Hacker seems preoccupied with exposing what distinguishes their thought from that of the tradition. He may even present himself as an advocate of the tradition against its modern spokesmen and interpreters. He invokes, for instance, the “magnificent discipline” (“grossartige Zucht”) of classical Indian thought against the propensity for an “undisciplined rambling of the spirit” (“regelloses Schweifen des Geistes”) which he finds in the works of such Neo-Hindus or Neo-Vedântins as Radhakrishnan.31 We may note here that the term “Neo-Hinduism” (“Neuhinduismus”), which Hacker borrowed from the Jesuit scholar Robert Antoine (who may have adopted it from Brajendranath Seal, 1864–1938), is much more visible and significant in his writings than “Neo-Vedânta,” which appears only sporadically.32 “Neo-Vedânta” or “Neo-Vedântism” and the corresponding Bengali expression abhinava vedânta had been used earlier by Christian missionaries as well as Hindu traditionalists against the innovations of Rammohan Roy.33

Nonetheless, there may be something vicarious and not entirely genuine in Hacker’s own philological and historical denunciation of the inauthenticity of Neo-Vedânta. This is the impression one gets from a close reading of his article on “Schopenhauer and Hindu Ethics” (“Schopenhauer und die Ethik des Hinduismus,” 1961), in which he deals with the idea of “practical Vedânta,” i.e., the attempt to apply the “great saying” of radical nondualism, tat tvam asi, in a practical, ethical sense. Hacker describes the “tat tvam asi ethics” as a symptom of a generally hybrid, derivative, and inauthentic way of thinking, a reflection of the colonial situation, an apologetic response to foreign critique. Yet his article shows that, even in its Neo-Vedântic reinterpretations and alleged adulterations, Vedântic nondualism continues to be a challenge for him. Hacker presents himself as an “Indologist and historian”;34 the contents and methodology of his article seem to support this claim. Yet through all the textual documentation and historical analysis and the triumphant display of philological and chronological evidence, we also hear the voice of an advocate of the European tradition and, more specifically, of a Christian theologian. The historical analysis itself, in all its “objectivity,” reflects but also conceals a very pronounced sense of religious and cultural
identity and an uncompromising commitment to certain Christian and European premises and values. Of course, as we have seen elsewhere, Hacker himself rejects pure objectivity as an abstract and vacuous ideal.\textsuperscript{35}

Hacker presents the historical argument that in traditional India, prior to the influence of Western (i.e., in this case, Schopenhauerian) thought, Vedântic nondualism was not applied in an ethical sense. But he also claims that it could not possibly have been applied in this way. Nondualism, in particular the purely "cognitional" nondualism of classical Advaita Vedânta, is, in his view, simply incompatible with ethics: "Nondualistic ethics" is a "logical impossibility," a "monstrosity."\textsuperscript{36} Nondualism leaves no room for the idea of the person. Without recognition of the existence of persons and interpersonal relations, ethical conduct, as understood by Hacker, would be impossible.\textsuperscript{37} This is, of course, a premise which Vivekananda rejects. In his lecture on "Practical Vedânta," he is an eloquent advocate of an impersonalistic metaphysics and ethics, and of the compatibility of impersonalism and ethical commitment. As he sees it, only impersonalism gives us the necessary freedom from attachment, fear, and egoism which makes ethical behavior possible.\textsuperscript{38}

Hacker’s general diagnosis of modern Indian thought and of what he calls “Neo-Hinduism” which concludes his article on “Schopenhauer and Hindu Ethics” sounds very harsh indeed. Among the cases of Neo-Hindu reinterpretation and accommodation which he cites in this section, we find the concept of dharma. In several other studies, most explicitly in his article “The Concept of Dharma in Neo-Hinduism” (“Der Dharma-Begriff des Neuhinduismus,” 1958), which opens the series of his studies on Neo-Hinduism, he tried to demonstrate how this key-concept of traditional Hindu self-understanding assumed a fundamentally new meaning and function in modern Indian thought, beginning with Bankim Chandra Chatterjee in the nineteenth century. This process, in which dharma was presented as an equivalent of, but also a response to, the Western notion of "religion," reflects a fundamental change in the Hindu sense of identity and in the attitude toward other religious and cultural traditions. The foreign notions of “religion” and “nation” became tools of self-definition, and a new and precarious sense of the “unity of Hinduism” and of national as well as religious identity took root.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{VI.} The sense of identity and otherness, the meaning of unity and plurality, and the potential for interaction and dialogue with other religious groups in both traditional and modern Hinduism emerge as an
important complex of themes in Hacker’s work. His interest in and commitment to these themes found a very visible and at the same time problematic and controversial expression in his propositions concerning the role of inclusivism in Indian thought.40

“Inclusivism” (“Inklusivismus”) is the title of a posthumous article by Hacker, and it is a topic which accompanied his Indological research as well as his theological and philosophical reflection for several decades. It concerns his Christian self-understanding no less than his understanding of Hinduism and the Indian tradition in general. He presents numerous exemplifications from both traditional and modern Indian thought; he refers to the Purānas, the Bhagavadgītā, Tulsīdās, but also to Radhakrishnan and other Neo-Hindus. The central element in his definitions and exemplifications is the practice of “claiming for, and thus including in, one’s own religion” or world view what belongs in reality to another, foreign or competing system.41 It is a subordinating identification of other teachings with parts or preliminary stages of one’s own religious system, which is thus presented as a superior structure, and an implicit anticipation of competing views.

Hacker first used the terms ‘inclusivism,’ ‘inclusivistic,’ etc., in a somewhat casual and tentative fashion, in his article “Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in Hinduism” (“Religiöse Toleranz und Intoleranz im Hinduismus,” 1957). Here, he classifies various types of tolerance in the Indian tradition, focuses on what he calls “doctrinal tolerance” (“doktrinäre Toleranz”), and suggests that it amounts very often to an “inclusivistic attitude.”42 In conclusion, he questions the applicability of the terms ‘tolerance’ and ‘intolerance’ to the Indian religious situation. In a series of subsequent statements Hacker supplemented and modified his observations. In a review article published in 1964, his statements became more pronounced. He now described inclusivism as “typically Indian” and essentially different from tolerance, and suggested that its presentation, or rather misrepresentation, as tolerance was a device to maintain “the fiction of unity in Hinduism.”43 The topic became most conspicuous toward the end of Hacker’s life, especially in his posthumous article “Inklusivismus.” In another posthumous publication, Grundlagen indischer Dichtung und indischen Denkens (1985; based on his lecture course of 1978), he treats inclusivism as a case of “gradualism.”44

A chronological review of Hacker’s statements reveals a development in which his views became more sweeping and radical. In his earlier approach, he dealt with various modes of religious encounter and interaction in India and discussed the applicability of certain Western
terms, especially ‘tolerance,’ to these phenomena. In his later statements, above all in his posthumous article, he presented inclusivism as a peculiar mental and spiritual attitude, genuinely different from tolerance, which was quintessentially, even exclusively, Indian and had no real equivalent outside of the Indian “cultural domain” (“Kulturkreis”). However, Hacker did not make any serious effort to demonstrate its general absence in all other religious and cultural traditions. What he is ultimately concerned about is its distinction from the Christian approach to other religions, which presupposes, in his view, a clear recognition of others in their otherness. More specifically, he contrasts the dynamic interaction of early Christianity with the Greco-Roman world, its active and deliberate “use” (chrēsis) of “heathen” concepts to articulate its own message, with the attitude of inclusivism.

Once again, Hacker is asserting his Christian identity against what he considers to be an Indian form of self-assertion. He seems genuinely convinced that his notion of inclusivism is the result of Indological, i.e., historical and philological, research and thus an essentially empirical discovery. Yet it is obvious that it is also an expression of specific religious and philosophical premises and convictions. In his use of the idea of inclusivism, Hacker is not only making statements about India, but also about himself. He is a personally committed participant in the encounter between India and Europe, and in particular between Hinduism and Christianity. Here, as elsewhere in his work, philology and confrontation go hand in hand. At this point, it is not necessary to discuss the more specific questions to which Hacker’s treatment of inclusivism gives rise, or the criticism to which it has been subject.

VII. More or less explicitly, Hacker reiterates his questions concerning the Hindu sense of identity and his critique of the idea of the “unity of Hinduism” in a number of different articles and book reviews. In his view, the unity of Hinduism is a modern postulate, a product of Neo-Hinduism. It is “essentially inspired by apologetics and nationalism,” proclaimed by “the leaders of Neo-Hinduism” and adopted to a certain extent outside of India. In reality, the unity of traditional Hinduism is not much more than a geographical unity; and Hinduism itself amounts basically to a group of religions which coexist in the same geographical region and display numerous common features, but even more signs of division and antagonism. Medieval figures like Vidyārāṇya, who found themselves exposed to the challenge of Islam, may have been
distant forerunners of Vivekananda and advocates of the inclusive superiority of Advaita Vedānta, but even they certainly did not promulgate the unity of Hinduism. And the sense of unity and coherence which is associated with the traditional notion of dharma is obviously very different from the religious and national unity proclaimed by the Neo-Hindus.

In the same review article in which he presents the leaders of Neo-Hinduism as the main propagators of the unity of Hinduism, Hacker also suggests that the concept of Hinduism as such is basically a Western creation. It is, in his words, a "collective label" ("Sammelbezeichnung"), which was produced by Western scholars of religion in order to have a common designation for "the innumerable, partly cognate, partly divergent religious phenomena of one geographical and historical region" ("die zahllosen, teils verwandten, teils divergenten religiösen Erscheinungen eines geographisch-geschichtlichen Raumes"). Hacker does not explain the correlation between this Western input and the Neo-Hindu propagation of Hinduism as a unitary entity. He does not discuss the specific Western share in the Neo-Hindu ideology of Hinduism, nor does he try to determine how or to what extent Neo-Hindu ideas were echoed in the West.

Since Hacker made his observations, questions concerning the nature and the very existence of Hinduism have become much more familiar, and the critique of Western constructs and superimpositions has become far more sweeping and radical. More or less contemporaneously with Hacker, W. Cantwell Smith states: "There are Hindus, but there is no Hinduism." H. von Stietencron describes Hinduism as a European invention, "an orchid bred by European scholarship. . . . In nature, it does not exist." Other, even more radical denunciations of the concept of Hinduism are associated with the general critique of Orientalism, "Orientalist constructions," and Western "discourses of domination" which has gained popularity and momentum in recent years. Indeed, Hacker's observations may appear trivial and obsolete after the intellectual and rhetorical fireworks displayed by Edward Said and Ronald Inden. Moreover, Hacker himself might be seen as just another, though somewhat idiosyncratic, instance of common Orientalism, and as a convenient target of criticism and deconstruction. Yet Hacker's position in relation to Orientalism itself (arguably just another "orchid bred by European scholarship"), on the one hand, and its latter-day critics, on the other, may not be quite as clear and unambiguous. His approach to India, awkward and offensive as it may appear in the present climate of debate, is perhaps less obsolete than it seems at first sight.
Critics of Orientalism and of Orientalist constructions, such as R. Inden, have complained that the West has tried to "represent" India as well as other non-Western traditions, and that Western scholarship, in an unholy alliance with the political and economic power of the West, has taken away the intellectual and epistemic sovereignty of the Indians, their own independent self-understanding, their ability to speak for themselves. The West should return the "capacity to have true knowledge," i.e., epistemic sovereignty, to India and other non-Western traditions by withdrawing its own superimpositions, its "Orientalist constructions." 59 Hacker would have agreed that modern Indian thought lacks in intellectual and spiritual sovereignty and authenticity, and that Westerners have imposed foreign and inappropriate categories upon the Indian self-understanding. In fact, he proposed his own elaborate and provocative diagnosis of this situation. 60 But he would not have agreed with any suggestion that it is up to the West to return "epistemic sovereignty" to the Indians and to restore the authenticity of their self-understanding. Such an act of restoration cannot come from Western self-abrogation or self-critique; it has to come from Indian initiative, from Indian self-assertion and self-critique. Indians and others can and must speak for themselves; they are responsible for themselves. In all its harshness, Hacker’s critique of Neo-Hinduism and his disagreement with fundamental teachings of traditional Hinduism retains a fundamental respect for the ability and obligation of the other to speak for himself. Hacker’s diagnosis of Neo-Hinduism addresses and challenges modern Indian thinkers and intellectuals; it does not try to please and accommodate them. What they deserve is not Western generosity and accommodation, but a respect which can very well be expressed in disagreement and critique. This should be kept in mind by those who will be offended by the (real or apparent) exaggerations and distortions which they may find in Hacker’s statements.

Time and again Hacker presents himself as an advocate of clear boundaries, of open confrontation, of an honest recognition of otherness. Just as he criticizes the trend toward accommodation and assimilation in Neo-Hinduism, so he deplores the sense of compromise, assimilation, and accommodation which he finds in certain contemporary Christian approaches to India. This is expressed in numerous reviews of literature in the fields of comparative religion, theology, and the so-called "theology of religions." It may suffice to mention the names of R. Panikkar, K. Klostermaier, E. Cornelis, and, more indirectly, K. Rahner. 61
VIII. Hacker responded strongly to what he found questionable and unacceptable in Indian thought, above all in Advaita Vedānta and its modern interpretations. But his most intense and passionate critique was reserved for certain developments within Western and Christian thought. After his intense and personally committed studies of Advaita Vedānta and after his return from India, he distanced himself increasingly from the Protestantism with which he had grown up. As we have noted in our brief biographical sketch, he converted to Catholicism in 1962 after years of inner conflict. His book on Luther, which appeared in 1966, gives us some of the reasons for this decision. What he found most threatening in Lutheranism was an excess of subjectivity, reflexivity, and anthropocentrism. According to Hacker, Luther’s “ego in faith” tries to establish itself in its subjective “certitude of faith” (“Glaubensgewissheit”) and to ascertain its salvation through an act of consciousness and reflection.62 This self-proclamation of the autonomous subject of faith was then transferred into the epistemic and secular sphere by philosophers like Descartes, and it led to the grand subjectivistic schemes of German idealism which Hacker abhorred. For him, this was an even greater threat and provocation than Śaṅkara’s radical nondualism and impersonalism, and it was something for which he did not have the deep and fundamental respect which he always retained with regard to Śaṅkara.

According to Hacker’s own interpretation of his Catholic experience, he found a certain structured freedom in the Catholic dogma (and he used to emphasize the word ‘freedom’). He also felt that he had gained a sense of identity within an objective framework.63 Of course, over the years he also found much to disagree with concerning particular developments within Catholicism. As usual, he voiced his concerns and disagreements in an open and sometimes passionate fashion.64

This is not the place to discuss the specific and somewhat idiosyncratic nature of Hacker’s Catholicism or the role it played in his personal life. But we may reflect, in a tentative and perhaps slightly speculative fashion, on the question of how his fascination with the Indian spiritual tradition and his encounter with and understanding of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta may have affected his Christian faith in general and his movement toward Catholicism in particular, and how, on the other hand, his Christian and Catholic commitment may have informed his Indological work. We have already referred to Hacker’s belief that the philosophical study of the Indian sources had to be guided by a sense of spiritual relevance, that there was a special affinity between Indology and theology,
and that a "religious decision" was necessary to do justice to the Indian religious and philosophical texts. We have quoted his statement that "theological thought can open the religious scholar's eyes for realities which would otherwise remain hidden from him." There is no reason for us to doubt the sincerity of Hacker's remarks and their applicability to his own situation. We may even go a step further: it seems that his desire to do justice to the Indian religious and philosophical teachings, to explore them not just historically, but to respond to them, was for him not only compatible with his commitment to the Catholic faith, but could even reinforce it by adding a sense of hermeneutic necessity to it. Such commitment seemed to provide him with an adequate vantage point, an antenna so to speak, in order to be truly receptive to teachings such as those of Śaṅkara, to be a potential dialogue partner for them, to agree or disagree with them in a meaningful manner, to face them at a commensurate level of discourse. The Indian religious tradition cannot speak to positivistic philology or to mere historicism. And it can, we may add, certainly not speak to the Hegelian subordination of all other traditions to modern European thought; nor can it speak to those who reduce religion to an object of anthropological or sociological study. Europeans who are confined to the secularity and modernity they have brought about will remain confined to a kind of monologue. To overcome this monologue of modernity with itself was one of Hacker's deepest aspirations. The choice of a firm religious and theological position was, paradoxically, a step toward dialogue. That Hacker was deeply committed to religious encounter and dialogue, and that he had great expectations as to the potential Indian contribution to such a dialogue, is made clear by a remarkable article published in 1962, the year of his conversion to Catholicism. No doubt, Hacker speaks not only as a Christian, but also as an advocate of the active propagation and defense of Christianity. Once again, he denounces assimilation and accommodation and speaks in favor of *chrēsis*, the use of Indian terms and concepts to rearticulate the unadulterated Christian message. But this in itself is not a one-sided affair, and in Hacker's presentation it is not just a missionary device. It is also a vehicle of listening and learning.

Hacker says: "Yes, there is something to learn for us. We should be put to shame by the Indian openness for religion which is still very much alive in our days." He adds that, even in conversations with Westernized Indians who have become skeptical about religion but cannot get away from it, one can be reminded of "what it means to speak of God." "Then we will (it is to be hoped) notice that we have missed something—so
much so that our speaking of God seems unauthentic . . . the very manner in which our theologians speak today reveals our lack of authenticity.”67 Once again, Hacker emphasizes that we should be “put to shame by the spiritual sensitivity which continues to be alive in many representatives of modern Indian spiritual and intellectual life, including such personalities as Radhakrishnan—alive to such a degree that we do not have standards to assess it; instead, we have to put up with being judged by it. We should, indeed, listen to the critique to which the sensitive Indian spirit subjects us.” Christianity itself would benefit from any chrēsis, any successful use of Indian terms and concepts, or from Indians themselves presenting the Christian message in accordance with Indian ways of thinking. Europeans and Christians of all denominations bear part of the responsibility for the fact that this has not happened. They are incapable of a truly religious dialogue. Instead, they have been confined to an occidental monologue. The fascination with Indian religious discourse which we find today in the West is only an effect of this “sad situation of our monologue” (“unsere traurige Monologsituation”).68

In general, Hacker credited traditional India with a sense of purpose and meaning which he found missing in the West. Throughout his teaching career, he reminded his students that in India knowledge was supposed to have a purpose (prayojana). Hacker thought that the Western notion of “pure,” “value-free” knowledge and research was an abstraction and an aberration.69

IX. It should not be necessary at this point to emphasize that we are not trying to present Hacker’s intensely personal and provocative passage to India as a repeatable and generally available method or hermeneutic strategy; nor are we trying to promote the hermeneutic virtues of a Catholic standpoint in Indian studies. Nevertheless, we have to respect Hacker’s conviction that his commitment to Christianity and Catholicism had great significance for his scholarly work on Indian religion and philosophy. Indeed, it is inseparable from his fascination and confrontation with India. This distinguishes his case from another, more famous conversion to Catholicism which occurred at the very beginning of German Indology, i.e., the conversion of Friedrich Schlegel in 1808, after the publication of his pioneering work Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier (“On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians”). For Schlegel, his conversion marked the end of his serious commitment to Indian studies; for Hacker, it was a new beginning.70
The question may suggest itself whether Hacker’s religious commitment has helped or hurt his Indological work. Has it helped him to discover realities which he would have overlooked otherwise? Has it interfered with his rigorous philological standards and the soundness of his historical judgment? Has it really opened his eyes or given him a false sense of discovery? We may, indeed, dispute the validity of Hacker’s discovery of inclusivism and its description as a quintessentially or exclusively Indian phenomenon, or the soundness and historical accuracy of some of his statements on Neo-Hinduism and on the origin and nature of Practical Vedānta and the role of ethics in Indian thought.71 In some specific instances, the voice of the homo religiosus, if not religious polemicist, seems to be louder and clearer than that of the philologist and historian. Yet it would be preposterous and counterproductive to balance Hacker’s religious commitment and philological research against each other, and to try to determine the positive or negative impact of such commitment in a definitive and entirely impartial manner. It is precisely the combination and interaction of commitment and research, philology and confrontation, which makes Hacker’s work unique and which accounts for the fact that even his errors and exaggerations provide fruitful and challenging perspectives.

Hacker himself described his work as a “field of rubble of unfinished projects” (“Trümmerfeld des Nichtsfertiggewordenen”), and he expressed his hope that others might use these fragments for their own work, either in a positive way or through critique.72 We may want to disagree with Hacker’s characterization of his own work; there is probably more finished architecture in it than his own metaphor would seem to suggest. But at any rate, there can be little doubt that he has left us with a rich supply of precious building materials, as well as with some major, but equally precious, stumbling blocks.

The essays compiled in this book are representative of Hacker’s work in general. They are important documents in the history of Indology, but they are also exemplary statements in the encounter between India and Europe. In more than one sense, they continue to be a living challenge.

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Notes


5. The American edition is Hacker’s own “condensed recast” (p. IV) of the original. The preface to both editions is by J. Ratzinger.

6. See below, Chapters 3–5. Apart from Advaita Vedânta, the article “Anvikṣiki” (*WZKS* 2, 1958, pp. 54–83; *Kl. Schr.*, pp. 137–66) deserves special attention; in this article, Hacker deals with the problem of an Indian equivalent for the term and concept ‘philosophy.’ On this problem and its treatment by Hacker, see also *India and Europe*, Chapter 15.

7. See below, Chapter 9. Chapters 7 and 10 are also comparative studies.


9. See below, Chapters 13–14; as well as Chapter 11 (“Aspects of Neo-Hinduism as Contrasted with Surviving Traditional Hinduism,” first presented as a lecture in 1970).

10. See below, section VIII; the article appeared in *Radius* 2 (1962), cols. 30–39 (*Kl. Schr.*, pp. 732–37). Hacker characterizes the “success” of the Christian missionary activities in India as follows: “We have done missionary work among the Indians, and their educated class has become what our fathers have demonstrated to them: humanistic, secularistic, political—but not Christian.”


12. *Grundlagen indischer Dichtung und indischen Denkens*, ed. by K. Rüping (Vienna, 1985). See especially pp. 105–41, where Hacker gives a survey of what he considers to be basic “schemes of thought” (“Denkschemata”) in India, such as “anthropological-cosmological parallelism,” “substantialism,” “gradualism,” and various forms of paradox (see p. 139).

13. In Hacker’s view, debate and controversy are a natural ingredient of scholarly life; see the opening statement of the article referred to in n. 14 (*Kl.*
14. See Kl. Schr., pp. 18–32.


22. See below, Chapter 5; also Hacker’s preface to his monograph *Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaitavāda. 1: Die Schüler Śaṅkaras* (Ak.Wiss.Lit.Mainz, 1950).

23. This is, of course, most obvious in Hacker’s later comparative studies, and in the ways in which he contrasts Advaita Vedānta with Christian thought.


30. See below, Chapter 10 (*Kl. Schr.*, pp. 320–37); the article was also published in: *Neoplatonism and Indian Thought*, ed. by R. B. Harris (Albany, 1982), pp. 161–80.

32. See, for instance, Kl. Schr., p. 584; and below, p. 233; also p. 526 (below, p. 339; Vivekananda as “Neo-Vedāntin”). On Antoine’s use of “Neo-Hinduism,” see Kl. Schr., p. 581; for Seal, see Bankimchandra Chatterjee, Essays in Perspective, ed. by B. Chatterjee (New Delhi, 1994), pp. 85ff.

33. See India and Europe, pp. 219 ff.; especially 222. The polemical undertone in these uses is obvious.

34. Kl. Schr., p. 531; and below, p. 531. The following section is based on my article “Practical Vedānta,” in Hinduism. Self-Perception and Assessment of Tradition, ed. by H. von Stietencron (Delhi, forthcoming); see also India and Europe, pp. 239 ff.

35. See above, n. 26.

36. See Kl. Schr., pp. 561, 563; and below, p. 305 ff.


38. Cf. the conclusion of my article “Practical Vedānta” (see above, n. 34).

39. Cf. India and Europe, Chapter 18; and below, Chapter 12.

40. Cf. India and Europe, Chapter 22, for a more detailed discussion.

41. India and Europe, pp. 404 f, 411.

42. See Kl. Schr., pp. 384, 387.

43. Kl. Schr., p. 480.

44. See Grundlagen, pp. 132 ff., especially 134.

45. See Inklusivismus (as above, n. 3), pp. 11, 28.

46. Inklusivismus, p. 28; see also the contribution by G. Oberhammer, pp. 105 ff.

47. Cf. India and Europe, pp. 417 ff. (with references to Hegel’s notion of “substantialism” in relation to Hacker’s “inclusivism”).


49. See Kl. Schr., p. 802; cf. also p. 790.

50. Kl. Schr., p. 482.

51. Kl. Schr., p. 570; cf. also pp. 496, 790; and below, p. 324.


53. Kl. Schr., pp. 509, 482; cf. also India and Europe, Chapters 17–18.
54. Kl. Schr., p. 480; cf. also p. 290, n. 43; and Tradition and Reflection, p. 8.

55. Occasionally, Hacker seems to suggest implicit Neo-Hindu influences in the work of Western Indologists, such as J. Gonda; see, for instance, Kl. Schr., p. 479 (on Śāṅkara and "Hindu unity").


60. Especially in his articles on "Schopenhauer and Hindu Ethics" (below, Chapter 13) and "Aspects of Neo-Hinduism as Contrasted with Surviving Traditional Hinduism" (Chapter 11).


62. See Das Ich im Glauben bei Martin Luther (Graz, 1966); especially pp. 1 ff., 35 ("Rückbeugung auf das eigene Ich").

63. Hacker made this clear in several personal communications, mostly during his visit to Philadelphia in 1976.

64. This included direct confrontations with Catholic clergymen and letters to high-ranking officials in the Vatican.

65. See above, n. 26.

66. We are referring to the article "Today's India and We Christians" ("Das heutige Indien und wir Christen"); see above, n. 10.


68. Kl. Schr., p. 734; in the same context, Hacker mentions the "purely materialistic" conception of "Entwicklungshilfe," i.e., economic aid to developing countries, as another symptom of the "occidental monologue."

69. See Grundlagen indischer Dichtung und indischen Denkens, pp. 14 ff., 48 ff., cf. also K. Rüping, "Paul Hacker" (see above, n. 1), p. 5.

70. On F. Schlegel's Indian studies, see India and Europe, pp. 74 ff.

71. See above, sections V and VI; we may also mention that Hacker's distinction between "Neo-Hinduism" and "surviving traditional Hinduism" may be in need of some qualifications; the Hindi tracts published by the Gita Press in
Gorakhpur, which Hacker cites as documents of “traditional” Hinduism, are themselves products of a deliberate and commercially motivated program of revivalism initiated by the publishers of the Gītā Press, beginning with Hanumānprasād Poddār around 1920. Their “living continuity with the past” (Kl. Schr., p. 583; and below, p. 232) should not simply be taken for granted. Hacker himself recognizes “cases of assimilation of foreign elements” (p. 235) in the tracts of the Gītā Press.