The study of policy and the study of power are closely related. Power is usually operationally defined in terms of policy outcomes — that is, as the ability of a political actor to influence the behavior of others in such a way as to gain a preferred outcome. Students of power and of policy-making generally assume that power is not distributed haphazardly among the population but rather, that any society develops stable influence patterns in and around governmental and nongovernmental institutions. In short, power is exercised within some kind of power structure, no matter how changeable and ambiguous that structure may be.

For many years, the prevailing paradigm among political scientists was the pluralist model. In this model, power is not controlled by a single ruling elite (as in the "minority" view expressed by Mills, Kolko, and others) but by fragmented elite groups which are divided both geographically and functionally. Though ordinary citizens do not participate actively, this system is seen as providing a reasonable approximation of democratic representation in at least three ways. First, the leadership of organized interest groups represents the concerns of many citizens not directly involved in the political process. Second, the democratic rules of the game help insure the openness of the system to new groups activated by some compelling need for
government action; and this openness is further encouraged by the fact that no single elite controls all areas of policy. Third, elected officials act as brokers who balance competing interests through compromise, thus building consensus on the direction of public policy.

The pluralist view was challenged by McConnell (1966) Lowi (1979) and others. Their critique was reinforced by studies of “subgovernments” in the public administration and policy literature (Freeman, 1965). In addition, leading pluralists such as Charles Lindblom (1977) later published substantial modifications of their views. These critics agree that power is highly fragmented, with different collections of interests dominating policy areas of immediate concern to them, but they differ as to the openness of the system to new groups. Existing groups often succeed in excluding from the decision-making process new groups with differing views or interests. A common strategy for such control is to develop close alliances with key members of Congress and with administrative agencies responsible for existing policies. These subgovernments strongly resist intervention not only by competing groups but by top level political leaders representing broader constituencies, such as the president and congressional party leaders.

Lowi further argues that the operation of the power structure may vary according to the issues involved. With regard to issues raising fundamental questions about the existing distribution of wealth among large groups within the population, a greater degree of top level control exists than in other policy areas. That is, policy change is highly dependent on initiatives made at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, and the formulation of these initiatives will be done by small groups of presidential advisors, assisted by specialists in the area. Thus, the power structure, though basically fragmented along policy lines, is capable of accommodating high level coordination when fundamental redistributive issues are at stake (Lowi 1964; Ripley and Franklin 1987).

These revisions of pluralism bring it closer to the reality of U.S. politics. However, while those writing from this perspective suggest widely shared U.S. political values which legitimize the system of interest group power, they do not give full weight to the effects on the political process of fundamental similarities across fragmented power centers. Thus, an examination of
another element of political reality, that is, ideology, is critical to the development of a more complete understanding of the policy process.

The relevance of ideology to the study of power was argued by Bachrach and Baratz in their classic article, "The Two Faces of Power" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). They argue that strong limits are placed on the range of decisions possible in the system by the shared values and assumptions of its participants. Certain problems, or certain alternative means of solving them, are never discussed or debated by decision makers due to their shared assumption that these problems or solutions are not legitimate topics for political debate. The authors refer to these tacit acts of exclusion as "non-decisions."

While stressing the need to look at shared beliefs, or ideologies, Bachrach and Baratz's discussion of non-decisions does not take us very far in understanding how participants' beliefs shape the decision-making process. They suggest that non-decisions operate to the advantage of established groups and to the disadvantage of "outsiders" such as the poor. However, ideologies clearly do more than provide criteria for those whose concerns are in and whose concerns are out. To better understand the impact of ideology on political decisions, it is first necessary to explore the general structural features of ideologies and to see how abstract belief systems take on an operational form which influences day to day policy decisions.

OPERATIONALIDEOLOGIES

An ideology is a set of interrelated assertions about the world which guides the behavior of individuals and groups. To many, the term ideology conveys the notion of a complex, logically structured set of beliefs which has been refined to a fairly high level of intellectual sophistication. Certainly this is true for such ideologies as democracy and capitalism. Yet, other equally pervasive systems of beliefs are much less sophisticated and come close, in the minds of most believers, to primitive, emotional we-they distinctions. Racism, sexism, and nationalism fall into this category, although each has its intellectual defenders. For present purposes, I will include such beliefs under the term ideology.
Most ideologies contain three types of statements. First, they contain assertions about reality — that is, statements which purport to be empirically valid generalizations about the nature of the world or of human beings. Second, they contain ethical prescriptions for human behavior derived from the assertions they make about reality. Third, they contain as a special case of their ethical precepts, prescriptions for the arrangement of social institutions in ways consistent with their central values. No ideology is a totally consistent package which explains all aspects of reality. Most have major internal contradictions which emerge as they are applied and elaborated.

Furthermore, the institutions these ideologies purport to justify do not exist in a vacuum. Complex societies contain familial, economic, political, and religious institutions, each legitimized by slightly different ideological principles. In a stable society, these institutions and ideologies tend to reinforce each other, but there is also competition for influence between institutions. Major inconsistencies often exist between beliefs supporting different institutions of the same society; for example, the complex agreements and contradictions existing between democracy and capitalism.

As a result, ideologies enjoying wide acceptance in a society usually develop a set of operational assumptions and values which may deviate significantly from the pure ideals contained in formal statements of the ideology. The ideals set forth clearly and consistently what is to be valued most by believers. However, these moral absolutes rarely enter directly into the political process except as vague symbols, brought out on ceremonial occasions to legitimate the system as a whole. The operational form of the ideology, in contrast, stresses the concepts and behavior patterns most crucial to the long-term survival of the institutions which the ideology justifies, and it incorporates the compromises those institutions have made to survive. As such, the operational ideology is much more likely to directly influence political behavior, and it is only when we look for ideologies in their operational form that we can fully gauge their impact. It should also be emphasized that an operational ideology, as defined here, is more than a haphazard bundle of exceptions to the ideal. Rather, it is a transformation of the ideal into another, fairly consistent set of concepts which correspond more closely to current reality.
Because ideologies are so closely related to institutions and because individuals and organizations tend to interpret common ideologies in ways that match their unique situations, there has been a tendency among Western political analysts to see ideology as a dependent variable which is shaped by a much more potent source of human motivation: interests. An interest may be thought of as consisting of two elements: (1) a need experienced by an individual or a group; and (2) an external object or state of affairs which is seen as fulfilling that need. Interests are immediate and concrete, and they are believed to be the main driving force behind political behavior. Material interests are usually seen as the most important type, but needs such as power, security, prestige, or growth also serve to inspire political involvement. In this view, individuals and groups use ideology primarily to convince themselves of the justice of their demands and to legitimize them to others.

A more thorough examination of the relationship between ideologies and interests shows, however, that it is much more complex than this view suggests. At the heart of this complexity is the fact that interests, when examined more closely, are not the concrete, self-evident motivators that interest-based notions of politics make them out to be. Of the two elements constituting an interest—a need plus an object or state of affairs which is seen as satisfying that need—the need element would appear least ambiguous. Although there is wide disagreement among students of motivation as to what are the most basic human needs, one can generally identify some widely shared human need behind most political actions. The other element of an interest—the object which can satisfy that need—is much more variable and ambiguous. Any human need can be satisfied in a variety of ways, and, in most situations, it is not clear in advance which of several alternative future states will best satisfy a need.

Thus, in order to pursue his or her interests, the individual must first identify which object or state of affairs will best satisfy his or her needs. Then, means must be chosen to achieve the desired future state. These often involve intermediate goals and objects which also appear on the political scene as interests. Moreover, these choices are often made with limited information as to the full costs and benefits of any alternative and in the face of unpredictable responses from others with a stake in the decision. As Schlozman and Tierney point out,
Clearly, then, our definitions of what is best for us are rarely free, self-conscious choices, made in the way we assess the merits of the limited number of items on a restaurant menu — that is, made in the knowledge of all the relevant alternatives. Rather, our preferences are influenced by a multitude of socially structured factors in our background and experience. (Scholzman and Tierney 1986, 20)

If interests are more accurately viewed as points in a complex decision-making process, rather than fixed, self-evident motivators, then one must ask what are the common methods by which actors determine their interests in a given situation. Many studies of political decision-making emphasize the large amount of policy-relevant information from a variety of competing sources which the typical decision-maker is asked to interpret (see, for example, Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980; Kingdon, 1984). He or she must also attempt to predict the actions and reactions of multiple sets of competing actors. The typical actor lacks the time, resources, and expertise to fully and rationally analyze the costs and benefits of each alternative. As a result, actors try to maintain established patterns of behavior which they regard as successful and tend to evaluate new data in terms of simple decision rules which they feel have worked in the past. (See, for example, Aaron Wildavsky's analysis of the decision rules used by the House Appropriations Committee, 1979.)

Recent work on public opinion formation draws on similar notions. From the literature of cognitive psychology, attitude researchers have drawn the notion of an attitude schema, a collection of interrelated images and facts which individuals associate with particular persons or events. These help them sort out and make sense of the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of political reality (Conover and Feldman, 1984b; Hamill, Lodge and Blake, 1985).

Given that actors try to organize and simplify reality in this way, it is likely that widely shared ideologies serve as potent and readily available sources of the expectations and of the preconceived decision rules brought into any situation by political actors. As noted above, ideologies contain both descriptive and prescriptive elements. Thus, they create expectations as to the behavior of others in concrete situations. To the extent that these expectations become operative as predictors of the future, ideol-
ogy becomes deeply intertwined in the process of interest formulation. Actors use ideology not only to justify behavior but also to interpret data from their own experience and to predict the costs and benefits of future actions. To be sure, they may deliberately manipulate shared ideological precepts to cloak self-seeking behavior. But the world view upon which they draw for this "symbol manipulation" (Edelman 1964) has also shaped their own perceptions of the situation and through these the very interest they pursue.

To suggest that ideological categories are used as a source of decision rules is not, however, to suggest that a uniform set of values guides the thinking of all or most political actors. Widely shared ideologies are broad enough in their structure to permit wide variations in interpretation. There are, of course, idiosyncratic variations between individual interpretations of shared values. However, an equally common pattern is the development of two or more distinct sets of interpretive frameworks, each held by a certain group within the society's active decision-makers, which involve different notions of how common ideologies should be applied to concrete social problems. Each of these interpretive frameworks supplies a different set of decision rules to be used in specific situations, and the differences in these approaches generate much of the ongoing political conflict over policy alternatives. The choice of one framework or another is usually influenced by the concrete interests of the actor; however, similar viewpoints are likely to be shared by a broad spectrum of actors from a variety of institutional roles. A succinct label for these competing interpretive frameworks is coalition ideologies, because they link together actors whose specific interests may vary.

The competing coalition ideologies which will be discussed in this work are subsumed under the terms liberal and conservative. While I will argue later that the principles widely attributed to these two viewpoints are not accurate reflections of their actual operational values, it is clear that these two terms symbolize distinct interpretations of a common ideology, democratic capitalism, which dictate different solutions to common problems. Both have been influenced by other belief systems besides capitalism. Some liberals have incorporated socialist ideas while many conservatives adhere to notions of government enforcement of morality which predate and contradict Adam Smith.
Nevertheless, in their actual usage, these two outlooks are firmly rooted in a common capitalist world view. They both support the central economic institutional arrangements of capitalism, but they differ as to how these institutions, and the social order which supports them, can best be stabilized and perpetuated.

Shared ideologies may also be elaborated into specific sets of preconceptions about particular areas of public policy. While widely shared ideologies encourage continuity in the way decision-makers respond to a variety of problems, each substantive policy area has its own unique history, which tends to create shared assumptions among those involved about what can be and what should be done to solve problems in that area. Both Heclo (1978) and Kingdon (1984) suggest that policies are framed within distinct policy communities, composed of interest groups and governmental specialists concerned with a particular set of issues. Participation in these communities may be somewhat fluid, but common ideas and assumptions develop. These assumptions are linked to the immediate interests of the actors involved, but their roots can also be traced to the ideological frameworks within which the policy developed. In part, they represent the application of general ideological assumptions to that policy area.

It should be stressed that the description of ideological preconceptions just presented applies primarily to political elites who are directly involved in the decision-making process. In addition to these activists, there often exists a somewhat larger attentive public, who are concerned enough about an issue to articulate a consistent set of beliefs about it (Cobb and Elder 1981). Beyond this, however, the great mass of citizens is poorly informed about most issues. They may have schemata organized around specific political events, but they lack a clear ideological framework within which policy preferences are organized. They have absorbed some of the ideal statements about American society purveyed by the media and the educational system, such as the value of free enterprise, yet they have rarely worked out their implications for complex policy decisions. Therefore, they are vulnerable to symbol manipulation by elites wishing to justify their policies (Edelman 1964).

If, in fact, ideologies penetrate the decision-making process as pervasively as has just been suggested, then they may be expected to exert a profound influence on public policy out-
comes. As suggested above, this influence will be in the direction of an underlying continuity in assumptions and approaches across many policy areas, even when each area is dominated by different functional groups. There are at least two ways in which shared ideologies act to generate such continuities. First, they act as intellectual and emotional filters through which policy initiatives must pass before they are considered acceptable and responsible proposals. Again, this filtering is often seen as a matter of interest protection — that is, proposals will not be considered which seriously threaten the power, wealth, or status of groups or individuals currently active. However, this is only part of the picture, for these preconceptions strongly influence judgements as to whether an alternative threatens the interests of those in power. A proposed expansion of governmental activity will, in part, be evaluated by affected groups on the basis of short-term concrete benefits, but they will also look at its long-term effects. If they have strong ideological biases against any government involvement in their affairs, this assumption will create the expectation of long-term harm which may override their desire for short-term gains.

Closely related to the ideological filtering of policy initiatives is the ideological filtering of participants in the political process. On the surface, it would appear that the U.S. system allows for the expression of a wide variety of concrete interests. Industry groups compete vigorously for government favors and protection, while labor unions, farmers, and groups of public spirited citizens also enter the fray, often with direct challenges to the pursuit of profit by particular firms. Yet, underlying this seeming plurality of interests are shared assumptions, often unstated, as to which groups and which types of individuals can be trusted to follow the rules of the game (i.e., to confine their pursuit of interests to methods which will not disrupt or threaten the system as a whole).

The most obvious set of criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of participants consists of the manifest beliefs of the individual or group in question. Those who espouse ideologies which are opposed to prevailing beliefs will find it difficult to move into positions of permanent stable influence, due to the profound distrust they engender in other participants. In addition, biases concerning social class and education act as selection criteria (Scholzman 1984). Businessmen and professionals
find access to the political process much easier than the poor or working class, and where the latter are represented it is by leaders who have been coopted into the prevailing value structure. Finally, institutional position itself is a criterion for inclusion in the larger decision-making arena. A person who has risen to a position of authority in a large public or private organization is not only recognized as a spokesperson for that organization, but is also presumed to have demonstrated the skill, reasonableness, and social conformity necessary to be a responsible participant in the larger political process.

This line of argument suggests that, while it may be too simplistic to talk, as Mills (1959), Dye (1983), and Kolko (1962) have, of a small tightly knit ruling elite, it makes more sense to think of a ruling stratum of people of similar education, skills, and values who dominate most economic and political institutions. This ruling stratum is, of course, a very complex entity. Different institutional roles recruit persons of varying training and values, and individuals are idiosyncratic in their beliefs. Also, there are important inequalities within this stratum. A few members control larger institutions which set broad policy directions, while most direct policy only in their own specialized areas. Nevertheless, the recruitment process insures that their underlying similarities in background and values outweigh their differences and make them a distinct group within American society.

Having noted the general types of filters which apply to virtually all aspects of decision making, I will now look at some of the more specific institutional expressions of broad ideological perspectives in the political process. The revised pluralist model described earlier calls attention to the narrowness of the concerns and interests which motivate most political actors. Yet, to view government as exclusively composed of a series of discrete, isolated decision-making arenas is a distortion. One must also take into account the institutions that permit and encourage the formation of broader ideological coalitions.

The most prominent of these institutions is the presidency. Writers on the presidency such as Neustadt (1980) have justifiably emphasized the limits on the power of the president — the need for him to bargain with and persuade not only Congress but segments of the bureaucracy which he nominally heads. Yet there is also tremendous power inherent in the administrative and the agenda-setting role of this office. Interest groups and
agencies, entrenched in their iron triangles, may be able to defeat the president on specific issues, and they may be able to rewrite the detailed language of legislation so as to maximize its benefits or minimize its costs to them, but the president has a powerful influence on the overall political atmosphere. He is the source of most major policy initiatives, and so interest groups often find themselves in a reactive position vis-à-vis issues he has forced them to address (Kingdon 1984).

It is also clear that each administration has a distinct ideological flavor. Each president chooses a team of advisors and cabinet officers who reflect his own ideological perspective. Usually his views correspond with one of the broad liberal or conservative ideologies prevalent at that time. Voters may not be clear on the values or issue positions of the candidate they choose, but party elites and other active, informed groups understand them more clearly, and they are ready to see their world view put into action when a sympathetic president is elected. More than any other single political leader, the president is expected to respond to issues with a coherent philosophy, rather than with adjustments to interest group pressures.

Ideological motivations are also prominent in Congress. It is certainly true that most members of Congress are policy specialists with strong commitments to interest groups and programs in their district and in their specialized areas of expertise. Voting patterns on these issues of immediate concern may, therefore, follow subgovernmental loyalties, which are not always ideologically consistent. Yet, on the vast majority of issues, each member has little intimate knowledge and no overwhelming commitments. On these issues, ideology becomes an important predictor of voting behavior (Savitch 1979; Caraley 1976). In addition, the election of an individual by a certain constituency often reflects that constituency's ideological flavor, and the recruitment of a particular member to a specialized policy subsystem is influenced by that individual's value preferences.

IDEOLOGY AND POLICY CHANGE

One other important dimension of the influence of ideology on the policy-making process must be dealt with before these general
comments can be applied to the creation of an analytical model appropriate to the examination of housing policies. This is the dimension of change in ideological perspectives. It is common to look at the process of change in beliefs as shaped by events in the external environment. In this view, the actor may, like Voltaire's Candide, start out with preconceptions about the world (i.e., Dr. Pangloss's optimistic dictum that "this is the best of all possible worlds"). These beliefs are then crushed, altered or expanded by the sheer impact of reality — by glaring inconsistencies between the actual behavior of others and the behavior predicted by one's initial beliefs.

However, as suggested above, the separation between events and beliefs is somewhat artificial for several reasons. First, the expectations with which actors enter a situation strongly affect their behavior and, therefore, shape the reality of that situation. Second, unless the impact of a policy is direct and powerful, there is always room for interpretation as to whether the policy has actually failed or succeeded. Political leaders are bombarded with feedback about program outcomes from many sources, and they can choose to listen to and believe those which confirm their predispositions. Finally, even when unanticipated and/or harmful consequences are too obvious to ignore, the actor will often try to explain failure in terms that maintain the overall structure of his or her world view intact. There is no doubt that genuine changes in attitudes occur, but they are likely to be incremental and actors will often deny that any real change has occurred. And, the resiliency of beliefs in the face of changed circumstances leaves open the possibility that the same mistakes or problems will occur repeatedly.

Looking at the larger political arena, another possible response to changing circumstances becomes apparent. Since shared ideologies are broad enough to be subject to conflicting interpretations which crystallize into coalition ideologies, it becomes likely that in the face of failure of the environment to respond as predicted by the overall ideological system, political leadership will shift back and forth between differing ideological coalitions. Rather than question their fundamental assumptions, elites may struggle for the power necessary to try out their conflicting applications of these assumptions to the current situation. Out of this struggle, gradual change may emerge, as one coalition or the other incorporates new ideas. Yet, the struggle
may also produce drifting or incoherent policies, as none of the solutions acceptable, in terms of current beliefs, proves to be relevant or effective.

An awareness of the struggle between competing ideological perspectives also draws our attention to the centrality of compromise. Compromises occur on hundreds of technical and substantive points during the policy process. However, beyond these specific concessions, it appears that policies that have long term success exist in a political equilibrium between opposing groups. Proponents of a program must usually push it through in the face of considerable opposition. In the process, they must modify it to attract marginal supporters and to satisfy key interest groups. The final product, if it is to survive over the long term, must be acceptable not only to a short-term coalition of supporters but to a more stable majority, because opponents will continue their efforts to weaken or eliminate it. If support for the program grows, these opponents will reduce their efforts at drastic change and concentrate on containment of its impact. At this point, even if opponents succeed in preventing the program from attaining the degree of impact desired by its most ardent supporters, it will have gained a secure niche in the system until conditions generate broader support for new directions. Programs attaining equilibrium usually contain provisions which make them palatable to a rather broad range of ideological perspectives.

This notion that policy is shaped by an equilibrium between opposing ideologies might, at first glance, appear incompatible with some recent research on public policy-making. Kingdon (1984) and others stress the fluid, almost haphazard way in which problems and proposed solutions emerge, and they emphasize the changing cast of actors moving in and out of various policy arenas. However, this incompatibility is more apparent than real, since it is not being suggested here that ideological orientations rigidly dictate specific policy options. Within shared ideological perspectives, various options are put forth by a wide variety of actors. Nevertheless, Kingdon stresses that the source of an idea is not as important to its adoption as the existence of an overall political climate in which the idea is taken seriously. He also suggests that the ideological predispositions of decision-makers are an important part of that climate (Kingdon 1984, 75–82).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Figure 1 schematically summarizes the broad analytical framework suggested in the last few pages. As is readily apparent, the decision-making subsystems surrounding each distinct policy area form a central element in this framework. These subsystems will, in some policy areas, be organized along the lines of the subgovernment alliances suggested by Freeman. In others, participation may be more fluid and open, as suggested by Heclo and Kingdon. In either case, these subsystems play a central role in shaping the problems which reach the public agenda and the alternatives considered. Moreover, each subsystem has its own history, in which certain approaches have been accepted as technically or politically viable. This creates resistance to change within each area which, as the incrementalist decision model suggests, tends to make new proposals differ as little as possible from the status quo.

Because of the importance of these subsystems, the use of broad ideological orientations and coalitions as a major variable in explaining policy decisions should not be seen as an attempt to substitute an idealized, bipolar issue conflict for the convoluted processes by which ideas and decisions emerge. Rather, ideological conflicts must be seen as a central element in the broader political environment in which specialized policy subsystems operate.

This framework also outlines the processes by which ideological orientations influence policy subsystems. Broad ideological coalitions within the political/economic elite compete for control of legislative and executive institutions. The coalition currently in a dominant position will, based on its ideological orientation, generate strong messages to policy subsystems concerning the kinds of general policy directions considered acceptable or unacceptable. These messages will then be interpreted by the participants and applied to the problems with which they are concerned. The nature of the national leadership will also affect the ideological makeup of participants in various subsystems, either directly through key appointments, or indirectly through the types of ideas viewed as current or acceptable. Thus, as shall be shown, Nixon’s general preferences for cash (rather than in-kind) social welfare benefits and for block grants
(rather than categorical programs) stimulated housing policy proposals along these lines.

Finally, the framework presented in figure 1 also suggests that the outputs created by each policy subsystem generate feedback, which is utilized in the broader ideological debates over the direction of public policy. Conclusions about the positive or negative effects of programs are publicized in the media, and programs are evaluated by various governmental and nongovernmental institutions. These conclusions are usually interpreted differently by those with different ideological perspectives and, thus, become ammunition in the ideological struggle. Thus, it will be shown that Nixon used the well-publicized scandals associated with Section 235 and other housing programs to support his general assertion that federal bureaucracies do a poor job of providing housing for the disadvantaged.

Scholarly treatments of public policy generally take one of two routes to an understanding of an area. One is to examine the broad historical sweep of policy change and to account for it in terms of shifting conditions and attitudes. The other route is to narrow the focus to specific decisions and look in detail at participants and processes. The present study generally follows the first route, and it is from this perspective that ideology emerges as an important influence on the course of public policy. However, this study also gives sufficient details about crucial policy choices to illuminate the impact of longer-term changes on specific outcomes. Therefore, on the theoretical level, I have tried to suggest patterns by which changes in ideological climate and national leadership influence more narrow decision-making processes. The model presented here will guide the treatment of housing policy decisions in subsequent chapters.