Many politicians, academics, and planners define national service as a nation-wide program of community work that citizens, mostly young people, enter for one or two years. It is either voluntary or coercive, and employs participants in public sector or "voluntary" sector jobs at subminimum wages. In the process, participants serve the needs of the nation, acquire job and life skills, and learn the essentials of American citizenship.

This definition has evolved from William James's conception of national service in the early part of this century. James argued that the "gilded youth" of America ought to be required to serve the nation in order to "toughen" their spirit, and help them recognize the poverty which afflicts their country. James proposed a "moral equivalent of war" in order that Americans may become more concerned with their communities, and in order that a "peaceful" alternative to the military be offered to the public.\(^1\) Individuals could then view their country from different perspectives and not merely conform their behavior to certain nonmilitary standards.

After James, a number of other prominent Americans accepted his idea on principle, but offered competing proposals for a service program. Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed that programs were needed to put young people to work during the depression. On March 21, 1933, he announced his intention to create the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC):

We can take a vast army of these unemployed into healthful surroundings. We can eliminate, to some extent, at least, the threat that enforced idleness brings to spiritual and moral stability.\(^2\)

For Roosevelt, the CCC was necessary to employ underprivileged youth, not James's "gilded youth," and to provide them with certain physical and moral standards by which they could improve their lot.
After World War II, James's theme of educating youth returned in the form of John F. Kennedy's Peace Corps proposal. An international "moral equivalent of war," the Peace Corps offered thousands of privileged youth the opportunity to work selflessly for their country and for others. A domestic program, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), was established to provide similar opportunities for work in the poorer regions of America. More recently, there have also been a number of university programs that promote service—like Campus Compact and the Campus Outreach Opportunity League (COOL).

At the same time, various administrations have experimented with employment programs for youth. The Johnson Administration instituted a National Job Corps program, and that program has had various incarnations throughout the past twenty-five years. Regional conservation programs were created; among the most prominent have been the California and Wisconsin conservation corps. Finally, cities have developed service programs for their young citizens—for example, the New York City Service Corps or Seattle's Program for Local Service. These programs are aimed at giving young people job skills while teaching them the values they will need to prosper as adults.

The apparent success of such programs has recently sparked interest in a national program of voluntary service. These programs would create a new institution—generally in the form of a national service foundation—to oversee a comprehensive program of citizen service for young people. The arguments for this program are generally threefold: (1) the nation has needs that remain unfulfilled, like environmental conservation, day care, health care, etc.; (2) young people need to develop themselves morally, and national service can help (here supporters commonly cite such problems as drug dependency, crime, idleness, and teenage pregnancy); and (3) Americans, especially young people, need to develop a stronger sense of citizenship. Proponents of national service believe that the program can enhance the well-being of the nation and restore a sense of community to American public life.

Since the late 1970s, national service has become a very important issue. Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress promoting versions of this proposal, new books have emerged on the subject almost every year, national politicians have endorsed the idea, and public and private conferences and commissions have been held every few years on the matter. The most publicized proposal has been the Sam Nunn–Dave McCurdy national service bill.
(SR3-1989), which ties federal education aid to service programs. On a smaller, less systematic scale, the Bush administration has introduced the Youth Entering Service (YES) program, which earmarks twenty-five million dollars for voluntary service work for young people.

On November 16, 1990, President Bush signed into law the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (PL 101-610). This national service law differs from previous efforts in one very important way—it attempts to merge service programs for both "gilded" and underprivileged youth, in order to provide the youth of America with a common set of norms and opportunities. It is a comprehensive law which includes a variety of youth service schemes, and it is designed to test the feasibility of national service for a number of different socioeconomic groups.

All service programs, whether for rich or poor, have had one component in common. Proponents maintain that young people must learn citizenship, and either they argue that such programs inculcate this generally, or they have attached particular programs designed to increase the civic competence of young adults. Indeed, the rhetoric of citizenship justifies the program ideologically; that is, it defends national service on moral and political grounds, rather than instrumental ones.

NATIONAL SERVICE AND THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY

The idea of national service is thus significant today not only for its political import, but also for its philosophical implications. It speaks to an important philosophical debate about the civic competence of the individual. It suggests particular kinds of discourse about citizenship and its attendant rights and duties. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to examine this discourse in order to de-mystify the relationship between the concept of citizenship and the program of national service.

Historically, American political philosophy has been dominated by the Hartzian argument that the public philosophy of America is a Lockean one. According to this approach, Americans are liberal individualists who hold the tenets of Lockean contractarianism so closely that they do not even recognize it as a conscious ideology. In the past twenty years, though, some have challenged these theoretical assumptions. Such historians as Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J. G. A. Pocock contend that the ideals that were to nourish American civilization took root in
the renaissance, and grew out of the practice of civic humanism. These historical arguments have coincided with sociological and philosophical ones that maintain that America needs a civic philosophy—one that abandons the principles of atomistic individualism found in liberal philosophy. Instead, the argument goes, American public philosophy ought to be grounded upon an ethic of community and republican virtue—one that recaptures the lost or submerged language of shared citizenship.

National service is identified as a policy that can contribute to this public ethic. The leading proponent of the idea of citizenship through national service, Charles Moskos, cites the works of the most important philosophers of this school (Michael Sandel, William Sullivan, Benjamin Barber, and Michael Walzer) as evidence that American public philosophy is recovering the civic. He suggests that “in the emerging political philosophy, national service is regarded as a form of civic education,” and that a “civic-oriented national service must ultimately rest on some kind of enlightened patriotism.” Moskos recommends that such service could provide a “renaissance” for American political culture, and that it would “entail a search for a new balance after an indiscriminate weakening of the sense of citizenship duty.” National service, then, can be a concrete policy that introduces the notion of civic obligation to a population of individualists largely ignorant of the notion.

Furthermore, some of the philosophers Moskos cites also call for a program of national service. Benjamin Barber argues that “universal citizen service” is one of many significant institutions in the quest for “strong democracy.” He maintains that it possesses many virtues: (1) it is realistic and workable, (2) it complements representative institutions today, (3) it offers safeguards and opportunities for minorities, and (4) it gives expression to participation and citizenship. National service, then, can be one institution among many that inculcates “citizenship”—a necessary condition for “strong democracy.” Barber’s vision is a participatory one, which affords individuals opportunities for deliberating over public issues and learning the virtues of “citizenship.”

Barber also argues that national service can improve citizens psychologically and morally. For instance, service fulfills a “growing desire to do service” and nurtures “membership in communal associations.” Moreover, he deploys common metaphors used repeatedly by proponents to describe the program. The need to serve
must be met by healthy democratic forms of community in a democracy or it will breed unhealthy and anti-democratic forms: gangs, secret societies, conspiratorial political groups, hierarchical clubs, and exclusive communities.  

Service, then, not only satisfies the individual citizen’s need for community, but it can help cure the pathologies of a society. This medical metaphor emerges in the discourse of all strong supporters of national service, as we shall see in the last section of this chapter. Finally, Barber contends that “compulsory” national service should be a duty, not an altruistic act. “It assumes that our rights and liberties do not come for free.” The exchange metaphor also reappears in the discourse on national service, especially in those texts where there is an emphasis on the service “contract.”

Similarly, Michael Walzer contends that national service may be a policy which can help create the civic society. He maintains that national service can be part of a domestic work force which does the “dirty work” of society. He justifies this on grounds of equality, that such work may “break the link between dirty work and disrespect,” and maintains that it (perhaps) ought to be done by the young because “it isn’t without educational value.” In this way every young citizen, at least, will have a “working knowledge of the working days of his hardest working fellows.” But Walzer cautions that national service is only a temporary solution: “over a longer period, the work can be covered only by an enhanced sense of institutional or professional place.”

Walzer also suggests that national service might be a way to socialize distribution within the welfare state. Through national service, both deliverers and recipients of social service empower themselves, and learn the value of participation.

[It seems to me at least possible that participation in the delivery of services might constitute a kind of training for participation in the management and direction of services.”

National service, then, requires an ethic of egalitarianism and participation, and instills a civic sense into its participants. At the same time it alters the political economy of the state very subtly. For Walzer, national service inculcates civic education, but it also reorganizes society and institutes democracy and participation in the everyday lives of the participants.
In short, contemporary public philosophers support the idea of national service on the grounds of civic education, participation, equality, and democracy. They contend that this new institution might be part of a general program grounding American political culture in an ethic of community and obligation. Moreover, such an ethic helps overcome the atomism afflicting the culture today. Thus, national service expresses institutionally the ideas of authors who argue for a new civic philosophy in America.

But these arguments give rise to a number of questions. For instance, how well can the practice of national service fulfill its theoretical goals? What does "inculcating civic education" mean in concrete terms? In what sense will national service offer opportunities for democracy, equality, and participation to those who serve? Is the goal of citizenship appropriate to all people, regardless of their race or gender? Does national service contribute to citizenship in any material way? Furthermore, how should citizenship be nurtured? Do the ideas of the planners of national service coincide with those of the philosophers who might view it as appropriate to their ends? This study hopes to answer these questions, and especially the last one. For the question remains as to whether the practice of national service, as it has been and is being devised, fulfills the promise of the ideal. If not, one would need to argue for such an institution on grounds that do fulfill those ideals. Furthermore, as these questions indicate, what constitutes the "civic" is debatable, and one needs to incorporate this ambiguity into the program.

I contend that the concrete practices of national service, as planned by theorists who address the subject directly, may not fulfill the civic hopes of the philosophers who support it. Planners of national service see it as a vehicle for the socialization of a variety of groups in a pluralist America. They do not focus on the issue of civic education as a means for the intellectual and civic training of the citizen. Rather, they focus on national service as a partial solution to many of the nation’s social problems. As will become apparent later in the study, by focusing on the socializing possibilities of national service, planners have neglected or derogated its educational possibilities. And, as I argue in the next section, political education, not just political socialization, ought to ground a civic philosophy. The following study helps clarify the institutional context within which a civically oriented republic can be realized. Consequently, I hope it can contribute to the debate over the public philosophy of America.
THE CONTESTABILITY OF CITIZENSHIP

I begin my argument with two premises—first, that national service is a good idea and that it ought to be involved in the activity of citizenship. Most, if not all, contemporary proponents of the program assume these premises as well, and for good reason. One could construct some sort of community service without recourse to arguments about citizenship, but the citizenship argument gives youth service its particularly national character. Without the rhetoric of citizenship one cannot easily find ideological and ethical reasons for youth service (though one might have practical and economic ones). The citizenship argument emphasizes that youth service has a political purpose. Otherwise the program becomes the mere administration of manpower programs to fulfill the economic and social needs that go unfulfilled in a market economy. Finally, the citizenship aspect to national service sheds light on the nature of citizenship and citizenship education, and helps us understand better those political theorists who put the concept at the center of their ideological agenda. Thus, the study focuses on the rhetoric and ideology of national service, on its ability to instill good citizenship, not on its economic and social utility.

My second premise is that citizenship is a contestable concept. One cannot simply posit a single definition of citizenship and then construct some sort of service program that seeks to fulfill a concrete goal. Or if one does posit a single definition it ought to include contestability as the overriding characteristic. National service can encourage citizenship by accepting its conceptual contestability, and by exposing adults to what the grounds of the argument might be. Contestability is one characteristic necessary for a democratic polity governed by the consent and participation of the governed. Each citizen should be able to reason toward his or her own understanding of what citizenship means because this will strengthen his or her cognitive ties to the community. Where national service helps individuals think about why they consent to, and participate in, their government, it strengthens their commitment to democratic processes.

In the first part of the study I argue that national service planners do not accept the contestability of the concept—they base national service, and its philosophy of citizenship, on a particular definition of citizenship, and they assume that young adults can somehow be socialized toward its ends. On this understanding, citizenship becomes a defined end that can be measured with relative precision.
But as Michael Walzer reminds us, to define American citizenship invites controversy, because the American people are too diverse: “America has no singular national destiny—and to be an ‘American’ is, finally, to know that and to be more or less content with it.” Where national service nurtures this diversity it promotes American interests. Yet some of its proponents see its strength in its ability to unify and homogenize a variegated people. I argue this point in the next section.

Furthermore, the very concept citizenship describes activities of deliberation, discussion, and participation that involve contestation and conflict. To be a good citizen—in definitions ranging from Aristotle to Locke, Rousseau, Marx, and Dewey—means to be independent, politically active, politically aware, and engaged in the issues of the community. From this general definition, though, it becomes difficult to specify its terms. Should “good citizens” participate actively in all the central political decisions of the country? Should they merely serve as a democratic check on their elected representatives? Is citizenship a political status, or does it also help constitute the individual self and identity? Are there ethical norms to which citizens ought to conform, or does citizenship imply a measure of independence from the dominant cultural ethic? And if we are citizens, to whom do we owe allegiance: the local community, the city, the state, the national government, the global order? Clearly theorists and concerned citizens offer many different answers to these many different questions.

One clear example of contestation over the meaning of citizenship emerges from feminist scholarship. Here the practice of modern democratic citizenship belies its essentially patriarchal and fraternal roots. Carole Pateman maintains that the original Lockean contract (upon which American ideas of citizenship are premised) is a fraternal one. The civic contract between political subjects and the labor contract between workers and employers hide a marriage—or sexual—contract between men and women.17

During the genesis of civil society, the sphere of natural subjection is separated out as a non-political sphere. The non-political status of familial and private life is confirmed by Locke’s label “paternal power” for its constituent relationship. Sex-right or conjugal right, the original political right, then becomes completely hidden. The concealment was so beautifully executed that contemporary political theorists and activists can “forget” that the private sphere
also contains—and has its genesis in—a contractual relationship between two adults.\textsuperscript{18}

In other words, political obligation (a constituent element of modern citizenship) is historically and culturally constituted and rests upon a particular imbalance of power between men and women.

On what grounds can women’s political obligation be justified? Women have not been incorporated as citizens in the same way as men; women’s ‘contribution’ is deemed to be private, nothing to do with citizenship; and the benefits of the welfare state have usually been distributed to women not in their own right as citizens, but as dependents of men, as private beings.\textsuperscript{16}

Pateman calls this “Wollestonecraft’s dilemma.” Women, who have historically been the care and welfare providers in western societies, are excluded from participating in the rights and entitlements of the modern welfare state, because their work has not been publicly and officially branded as “welfare” or “service.” This marriage contract emerges in certain other spheres as well—the social and legal acceptance of date rape and rape in marriage, minimal economic assistance for day care, and systematic discrimination in the labor market.

Where national service recognizes the existence of this contract it helps remedy the imbalance of political power between men and women. For instance, if national service educates men on the issue of date rape it makes them more aware of the sexual contract. And where national service participants lobby and educate lawmakers to change laws regarding marriage rape they advance the juridical status of women. But most national service proposals expressly forbid such political activity, and in doing so they relegate women’s issues to secondary status. Coercive national service proposals can potentially separate families, as mothers (and fathers) are called to duty. Voluntary programs do the same for families where the parents use it to escape poverty.

Finally, the contractarian, quid pro quo nature of the service program reinscribes an autonomous, instrumental manner of thinking at odds with the ethic of care that many feminists argue is relevant to women’s experience.\textsuperscript{20} The actual tasks of service correspond to care-giving, but the incentives and punishments offered in entering service, whether voluntary or coercive, sustain the gen-
dered act of contracting one's citizenship with the state. Where national service "contracts" empower women and men to begin thinking and acting in noncontractarian ways, and where they make the sexual contract and its implications clear to all participants, they contribute to equal citizenship among Americans. Where they do not, they help perpetuate a fraternal order.

In the first part of this book, I conclude that national service in its most prevalent forms does not inculcate citizenship, because these rest on the idea that citizenship can be defined or that a definition can be assumed or agreed upon. This has led its main proponents to contend that the program should socialize young adults toward preestablished norms of morality and citizenship. However, if national service can be reconceptualized so that it accounts for the contestability of citizenship, then, maybe, national service can be justified ideologically and rhetorically. If it cannot be reconceptualized in this way, its justification rests strictly on economistic and utilitarian arguments—arguments which do not have strong moral or civic force.

In the second part of the book, I account for the contestability of the concept of citizenship, and I devise an alternative argument for national service accordingly—one grounded on principles of political education. By appreciating the contestability of citizenship, the national service participant can glimpse more clearly into the workings of political democracy, and understand better the ideals of participation and collective deliberation. In this way, the individual citizen understands his or her role in a democracy and reproduces that democracy more faithfully.

The ideas in this book are open to debate, thus my conclusion is provisional. If national service is a desirable institution to create, then it ought to be constructed with education, not socialization, as its goal. I have not resolved the problem of whether it is desirable to create such an institution in the first place. Rather, I hope to redirect the grounds of the debate, understanding that the debate will progress anyway, and that many policy-makers remain convinced that the idea of national service is a good one.

**POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION, POLITICAL EDUCATION, AND CITIZENSHIP**

Political socialization is the means by which society transmits basic political and social orientations, and the processes through
which individuals learn to behave appropriately in political and social contexts. This definition focuses less on developmental processes, or psychological mechanisms of political learning, for I consider these to be aspects of political education. Rather, institutions of socialization transmit norms which help guide people’s behavior, and often establish an attitude of civility between individuals. We will see that some proponents of national service seek to inculcate this idea of civility in all young people. While this goal is an important one, service planners have often made it the central, or the only, purpose of youth service, and the cornerstone of good citizenship.

Political education consists of those processes that help individuals to think about politics and society, and to reason about the purposes of the political community. This model of political and social learning emphasizes the critical assessment of a polity, on the behavioral norms of that polity. Democratic education engages individuals in a critical dialogue with their society, and encourages people to learn about their society by participating in it. Democratic political education, then, is not a process of transmission, it is a two-way exchange between the individual and his or her society—one in which the individual learns from others but in which others also learn from him or her. Political education treats political concepts as material for discussion and learning, and thus citizenship becomes an ideal about which students can reason.

Amy Gutmann argues that political socialization is the process of unconscious social reproduction, while political education is the process of conscious social reproduction. Her distinction is generally apt, though it avoids the question of how educational institutions socialize individuals. Nevertheless, Gutmann suggests rightly that democratic education instills character in individuals. Character is necessary because moral freedom in society demands it—individuals must know how to make correct moral choices (that is, choices which reproduce a democratic society). And they must also be afforded the choice to identify with their communities. In this sense, they are not being socialized to their communities, but are learning how to reason about their communities and how to come to a thoughtful decision about joining them. Consequently, democratic education teaches democratic social virtue—“the ability to deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social reproduction.” In sum, political education strengthens the citizen’s commitments to democracy, political socialization merely transmits those commitments.
Citizenship, I would argue, is a matter of political education, not only political socialization. The civicly competent individual ought to understand his or her society and polity critically, and ought to engage that society in a discourse in order to learn how to think about it (not necessarily what to think about it). By participating in a critical discourse with society, the citizen can also reason about the problems that afflict society. Thus the citizen can hold values such as independence, self-reliance, and tolerance more deeply because they are values which the educational process forces that citizen to defend rationally.

Political education involves self-government, and citizens are charged with the responsibility of maintaining and transforming political institutions as their ideas of justice dictate. In this way, learning to be a citizen is learning the diverse means by which rational people govern themselves in a democracy. Citizenship means being conscious that one is responsible to a polity, and this idea of responsibility is one that an individual must recognize through both loyalty and reason. For a citizen should understand what it means to act responsibly if he or she is to do so. Citizen self-government, therefore, is a part of an intellectual learning process that is ongoing for however long the individual resides in a particular community.

By this definition, citizenship also means participation, and participation leads to political learning. Participation is possibly the most important means by which individuals come to learn useful public and moral knowledge and political judgment. Political judgment is an exercise in practical reason, and can be learned by deliberating with others about the ends of a particular community and by acting with others to advance certain common ends. It rests, then, on political conduct—a way of acting appropriately with others on political and social matters. Within a democracy, political judgment means knowing how to comport oneself with other, equal citizens.

On this understanding, conduct signifies more than behavior, rather it is the means by which individuals understand the politics of their community rationally in order to act in the best interests of the community. In a democratic community one ought to understand how to treat others with respect, how to tolerate difference, how to contest issues, how to deliberate collectively about problems, and how to resolve those problems without repression or discrimination. A system of political education that involves participation offers individuals numerous ways of learning the rules
of rational political conduct, and gives them the opportunity to learn through experience. This method of learning seems most appropriate to individuals who have finished formal schooling, who have received a rudimentary education in democratic conduct, and are prepared to educate others to do the same.

Citizenship education should inculcate civic virtue, the cultural disposition apposite to citizenship. Such virtue involves a number of elements: (1) a willingness to assume the burdens of public office, (2) a willingness to subordinate private interest to the public concern, (3) the capacity for rational choice in order to understand the requirements of (1) and (2), and (4) a willingness to learn those things necessary to make rational choices.31

The fact that the individual ought to be prepared to assume the responsibilities of public office signifies a number of things. First, the citizen ought to be a self-governing person who recognizes that one must participate in order to perpetuate the democratic traditions of a society. In this way, the individual exemplifies democratic conduct to others, and can teach others to act democratically. Second, as a public officer, the citizen comes to understand how he or she transcends his or her own private interest, and works for the good of the community. In this way, that citizen holds the common good in trust for the rest of the community. The citizen becomes a public representative of the community, and is thus responsible to that community for the actions he or she takes. Thus, the citizen will be inclined to act prudently, and not for his or her own narrow interest.

Moreover, the person will not only be a public representative, he or she will be a public person. In this way, that person's identity is partially constituted by the public acts in which he or she engages. Thus, political participation and the responsibilities of public office have a psychological role to play in the development of the good person. In fact, one contemporary proponent of civic education claims that such education ought to foster the good person more than simply the good citizen; and he argues that citizenship education is a moral education, not merely a political one.32 Active citizenship may also help individuals come to a greater understanding of themselves and of the practices of the community that help define them as citizens and as persons.33 Consequently, occupying public office is not merely a lesson in moral reasoning, but can also be an exercise in self-consciousness. It helps the individual citizen come to his or her own conclusion about what it means to be a citizen.

Inculcating civic virtue also means overcoming political apa-
thy. Political apathy, and even alienation, in America is well known—we have very low turnout rates at the polls for elections at all levels, social scientists have recorded increasing evidence of political distrust and alienation in all age groups, races, and classes in society, fewer Americans are identifying with a particular political party, and fewer social movements are developing (with some notable exceptions—the abortion issue is one). Political apathy often precludes the search for solutions to political and social problems. Apathetic residents of the national community either assume that there are no problems with that community, or that such problems cannot be resolved through public effort. In response to these problems, individuals return to their private concerns, thus aggravating the seriousness of the problems by ignoring them. An apathetic public also abdicates responsibility for solving political problems to representatives and administrators (who, in a democracy, are checked by an active public).

Individuals can overcome political apathy by becoming engaged in political debate or activity, thereby learning to conduct themselves in the public sphere. At the same time, they can generate interest in politics by being educated to think critically about politics—by analyzing political and social problems, and how those problems are resolved most profitably. Hence, political interest may not be generated by the process of socialization as I have defined it. For socialization trains people to behave toward certain norms, and if one of those norms is apathy, then the problem I have just described perpetuates itself. Rather, in a polity that reproduces an apathetic citizenry, some form of counter-socialization may be necessary, one where individuals are educated and activated in order to transform the social conditions which breed political apathy. I would argue, then, that political interest can be taught, and not merely transmitted between generations.34

Finally, civic or political education can also be ennobling in ways that political socialization cannot. Education and political activism can teach citizens the nobility of that office. Through learning about politics, either by discussion or activity, individuals experience the political ideas that have significance for the national community. Political socialization merely provides the behavioral context in which individuals are taught to act in particular ways, without necessarily engaging them in political issues. Thus, by being socialized to particular norms, the individual is not compelled to understand why those norms are worthy ones, or why the community in which he or she lives is worth defending.
NATIONAL SERVICE AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

A number of authors contend that national service ought to be one means which teaches individuals citizenship. Morris Janowitz, Donald Eberly and Michael Sherraden, Charles Moskos, and Ami- tai Etzioni argue most systematically for the plan. They believe that national service must first socialize individuals toward cer- tain norms, and that this socialization constitutes citizenship. Even their occasional comments about “civic education” concern socialization rather than education.

Morris Janowitz maintains that national service helps individ- uals achieve “civic consciousness”—“the process by which national attachments and obligations are molded into the search for supra- national citizenship.”36 Janowitz argues that we must move beyond narrow self-interest, and promote voluntarism as a way of solving collective problems effectively. Yet he seems to hedge on this point a bit when he declares that “no matter how one defines citizenship, to be a citizen implies that one is an effective consumer, anchored in the economic system.”36

Janowitz declares that states persist because of the “powerful ideas of mutual obligation,” rather than self-interest.37 And he wishes to harness this sense of obligation in order to promote a more stable polity and a deeper sense of civic pride. He contends that citizens of liberal democracies must be obligated in ways that express their loyalty to the state: taxes, education of the family, military service, electoral participation, jury duty, membership in voluntary associations, and “promoting the welfare of the commu- nity.” The idea of national service comes under this last category, and Janowitz suggests that it supplement the more traditional institutions of civic education—the schools and the military—in order to create a loyal citizenry.

What is civic education, though? It is an education that involves

a) exposing students to central and enduring political trad- itions of the nation, b) teaching essential knowledge about the organization and operation of contemporary gov- ernmental institutions, and c) fashioning essential identifi- cation and moral sentiments required for performance as effective citizens.38

Yet this definition conforms more to what I have been calling social- ization. Students are “exposed” to certain traditions—that is, these
traditions are transmitted to them, they do not play a part in the learning process. An important goal is “identification” with the state and teaching “moral sentiments” to individuals—not pressing them to think critically about their country. Finally, “teaching essential knowledge” of American government does not advance the students beyond elementary civics; it confirms what they have learned in school without challenging them to think critically about the national political community. In short, “civic education” here signifies little more than socializing Americans toward particular norms.

Janowitz bases this argument on the failures of the post-War era. He discovers two causes of the decline of “civic consciousness” in America since 1945, and especially since the 1960s: “new communalism” and the influence of social science on mass education. Combined, both have engineered a decline in the civic pride of the citizens of the United States. From the time of the first wave of Eastern European immigrants in the late nineteenth century until World War II, civic education was concerned with assimilating immigrants. This was important for a growing nation because it ensured a stable and loyal citizenry, and created the political conditions necessary for a successful economy and foreign policy. However, at the same time ominous forces were at work: the school was becoming more professionalized, “civics” were being transformed into “social problems,” Deweyite teaching methods were coming into vogue, and citizenship was being taught as a set of rights, not obligations or duties. According to Janowitz, these forces would explode into what he calls the crisis of the post-War years.

The responsibility for this crisis rests first on the shoulders of the “new communalists”—minority communities who focus concern on their problems to the detriment of the larger whole. Blacks, Hispanics, and women’s groups thus contribute to the decline of citizenship in America. Janowitz blames the busing and black power movements of past years for fomenting black communalism, claiming that “frequently black nationalists turned into another youth gang.” He also charges Afro-American studies programs at universities with encouraging black separatism, and complains that university unrest had implications outside the academic setting. For some it “regularized middle-class college attendance” for blacks, but for others, “at the level of the underclass, the new communalism often became a rationalization for purposeless violence without a facade of educational aspiration.” Further spending for education has not assuaged this, thus Janowitz suggests a civilian and military service program to aid in the assimilation process. Janowitz
traces the history of blacks in the modern military in order to show that they can be socialized through service institutions.\textsuperscript{39}

Janowitz also analyzes the “communalism” of Mexican-Americans, and argues that Spanish-speakers, and Mexicans in particular, have not become assimilated into the American social fabric, rather they still keep to themselves. He contends that Chicano
colonizing vast segments of the southwest, that they are “transplanting a segment of [their] society to a new and expanded locale,” and even that they may be recolonizing land lost in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{40}

This is a problem because Mexican-American values are different from the traditional values of Americans. For one, Mexican-Americans “are more concerned with their rights than their obligations.” Also, Mexican “familism” resists acculturation, a phenomenon of which Janowitz approves because it provides them with “self-esteem,” and a belief that they are “special.” However, there is a subversive element simmering under all of this, for “the strong sense of group identity has not prevented considerable criminality and deviance among the young.” Thus Mexican familism leads to social pathology, or at least does nothing to prevent it. A further peril is the fact that Mexican-Americans are “easily the most fertile” ethnic group. These “social pathologies” imply that Mexican mothers have failed to assimilate their children to “American values.”\textsuperscript{41} In Pate-
man’s terms, Mexican women have not fulfilled their part of the sexual contract in America.

Finally, Mexican civic and educational standards are poor: “Mexican-Americans have not been preoccupied with educational achievement,” and their rates of political participation are very low (except of course over the issue of bilingualism). Janowitz concludes that all this bespeaks a Mexican “cultural and social irre-
denta” in the American southwest; the “irredenta” is inherently unstable not only for the reasons given above, but also because Mexico itself is an unstable country whose “agitations and demonstra-
tions...will no doubt influence the pattern of immigration to the United States in the years ahead.” In sum, the communalism arising out of black separatism and Mexican immigration has upset the “delicate balance of toleration.” For these “new immi-
grants” are “deeply involved in a communal lifestyle which blocks the development of a sense of citizenship.”\textsuperscript{42}

These arguments imply that service ought to be a mechanism of cultural assimilation, not merely acculturation or pluralism. Civic “education” ought first to provide all residents of the United
States with a common set of values and norms, and the program should try to assimilate those residents who might not normally adapt well to those norms. It also suggests that national service ought to help eliminate “new communalism.” Yet this implication could justify using national service participants to restrict the practices of these groups. Thus some proponents suggest that national service participants could become part of a border patrol corps, designed to supplement the professional border patrols.

Janowitz’s argument also implies that national service is to be developed in a national, not an international, context. For example, he does not ask why Mexicans are coming to the United States, or whether this migration may be tied to an international political-economic order on top of which rests the United States. The very way Janowitz establishes the problematic of new communalism, especially in relation to the “Chicano problem,” suggests that the United States lives in a geopolitical vacuum. This reflects the perspective with which he presents the notion of “civic consciousness”: it is a turn inward in order to reestablish some mythical normative ideal that Americans may have once had. It is, in short, a turn toward civic socialization. Yet this could reinforce the ignorance Americans have about the outside world, and it would make it easier for them to accept the potentially racist argument that, for instance, Mexican values violate the basic principles of the nation.

Janowitz argues that it is not only the “new communalism” which has created the sociological conditions for the decline of civic education, but also the “widespread demoralization of teachers.” This demoralization has a number of sources: the horrible conditions in inner city schools, the decline in the “mental caliber, prestige, and authority” of the American high school teacher, the practice of tenure and the power of the unions to prevent the removal of bad teachers, the “hidden curriculum” of dissatisfied teachers on the Left, and the dominance of images from the mass media.43 I would argue, though, that these are social, even sociological issues, not educational ones. Janowitz offers a plan for a new order in society, and does not suggest ways in which individuals can learn. Moreover, given the prominence of women in teaching positions, Janowitz indirectly blames the “ills” of modern American society on the failure of women to transmit the appropriate values to children.

Janowitz maintains that to achieve this reordering, individuals ought to engage in national community work, to “affiliate the individual into the larger social structure.”44 He presents the Civilian Conservation Corps as an example of such work, and suggests
that contemporary programs ought to model themselves after the CCC. This sort of program would, like the CCC, reinforce "the social and moral meaning of work." Indeed Janowitz argues that similar programs of the 1960s, like the Job Corps, were inadequate to the task, because they were not residential outdoor programs. Such programs are necessary in order to control the antisocial behavior of "frustrated youth" who are "largely black, but include other dispossessed minorities."

Yet Janowitz suggests that "affiliation" is necessary not only for desocialized youth, but for all youth. He argues, for example, that college students could be relieved of their "bored, restless, and unclear" goals through a program of civic service. However, Janowitz realizes that many of these young people will be against the program, and marshals some very questionable arguments against those young people who oppose national service on principle. Some young people fear national youth service because, on the surface, they wish to retain their personal freedom and power of economic self-determination. But, he assures the reader, "if we probe more deeply," we find that this is merely a cover for the real reason underlying the fear: national service would "interfere with the personal search for pleasure" and the spread of sexual freedom. Resocialization, then, is also necessary to restrain the hedonistic and individualistic desires of American youth.

Despite the number of young people who might favor national service, or who are indifferent to it, Janowitz fears that there are some who will still refuse to join. For this reason, he supports a voluntary service at least in the immediate future.

Obligatory national service would mobilize a very small minority who are in blind opposition based on personal deviance or criminal-like personality. I would estimate that at least five percent of youth would fall into this category. Neither the armed forces nor the civilian component would want to act as a reformatory for delinquents. It does not take many deviants to wreck or severely strain a program. Administrative leaders would have to maintain a system of rules which would allow for easy withdrawal of those who had an oppositionist mentality.

This argument implies that national service will not, for some, be the way they can realize the American dream or learn citizenship values, because their "oppositionist mentality" will preclude them
from even being enrolled. It also suggests that national service might be an instrument by which officials can locate those with "personal deviance or a criminal-like personality"; thus national service serves as a means of making visible to the public eye those who refuse to accept the principle of national service (through "easy withdrawal"). It may also intimate that opposition to national service on principle is difficult, if not impossible, without being labeled deviant or criminal. All these criticisms suggest, most importantly, that Janowitz's plan is designed primarily to socialize youth.

Michael Sherraden and Donald Eberly take a slightly different approach in defending national service, though they share many of the same goals for the program. In one article they examine the rights and responsibilities of citizens in America. The authors suggest that, contrary to the dominant trends in Western culture, one ought not to think of rights and responsibilities as opposites, but rather as complementary to each other. After centering themselves between "libertarians of the Right and Left," Milton Friedman and Erwin Knoll, the authors offer a panoply of new "rights" which imply responsibility, and which national service can offer: the right to employment, the right to "seek out a new and enriching experience," and the right/rite to a "promising future."

They maintain that a philosophy of rights and responsibilities should undergird a "new social institution [that] can in fact restore and augment individual opportunities." Sherraden and Eberly situate individual opportunity within a socioeconomic vacuum and address the issue of "rights and responsibilities" to an audience of libertarians: "In short, there has been a diminution of the role of the individual in meeting the needs of the society, and an accompanying alienation of individuals from government and from each other." Yet by focusing the problem on the "role of the individual" Sherraden and Eberly also imply that socialization can cure the problems afflicting America. Moreover, they ignore the intermediary institutions and organizations that prevent alienation from that society, and pose the problem as one of the individual versus society at large. We would expect their solution to be one that actually creates state institutions to enable individuals to meet "the needs of the society." And their proposal in the article confirms this, for they recommend a national service program that "would be a de facto civilian service created by the expansion of the conscientious objector provision in the draft law." Thus they suggest that national service become a "new social institution" (and not, for example, a new educational institution).