Speculative Philosophy and Intellectual Intuition: An Introduction to Hegel's *Essays*.

I. SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY: A FIRST SKETCH

"Speculation" is a bad word nowadays. On the stock market speculators are people who, wanting to get rich fast and without work, invest their money in untested stocks or on the basis of information that gives the prediction of success only a hazardously low degree of probability. And so, when we believe that a scientific hypothesis or a presumed psychological insight or indeed even a statement claiming to be "factual" has no evidence or hardly any evidence that could serve as foundation of its truth claims, we say: "This is mere speculation."

Yet when the congressional committee investigating the wild gyrations of the stock market asked Bernard Baruch what he did for a living he is supposed to have answered proudly, "I am a speculator." Rather surprisingly, old Bernard Baruch and the young Hegel of these *Essays* have one thing in common: they were proud of being engaged in speculation. Of course they meant two different things by "speculation"—even though the latter-day use of the word is connected in some bizarre way with the earlier meaning.

The term "speculation" comes from "speculare," which is taken to be synonymous with "intuire" (from which comes "intuition"). In a very preliminary way we can describe what the author of the *Essays* meant by speculation as the intuition or vision of the true nature of the relations among God, nature, and self-consciousness or reason. "Self-consciousness" and "reason" are interchangeable on the basis of the Kantian "I think"—"I think the categories"—rather than on the basis of the Cartesian "cogito," which comprises acts other than those of thinking, let alone "pure" thinking. It was Schelling who tried to articulate this vision of the true nature of the relation of God, nature and self-consciousness in his Philosophy of Identity—so called because the relation was to be one of identity, a basically simple design trying to hold together a complex composition. The vision was of course not a sensuous intuition, but an intellectual intui-
When Hegel speaks of speculative philosophy he has the Philosophy of Identity in mind and its intellectual intuition of the all-comprising and ultimate whole of God, nature, and self-consciousness.

The Philosophy of Identity had to have the form of a system whose organic wholeness, reflecting the wholeness of the vision, was to be the test of the truth of the vision. The system consisted of two parts: the Philosophy of Nature and the Transcendental Philosophy, a division obviously at odds with the Kantian as well as the pre-Kantian divisions of philosophy. At the time when Hegel wrote the Essays Schelling had published several drafts of the Philosophy of Nature and one of the Transcendental Philosophy. Although Schelling was forever revising his system, the holistic vision behind it is clear. It was a singularly beautiful vision. If ever the time should come when philosophy is judged in terms of aesthetic criteria, the general scheme of the Philosophy of Identity (rather than the detailed execution) would surely be among the crowned victors. Its vision of the whole is the vision of an unconscious God (Spinoza’s natura naturans) revealing Himself in the ever ascending levels of nature (natura naturata) until self-consciousness emerges in rational man. This is the story the Philosophy of Nature tells. The Transcendental Philosophy, on the other hand, claims to trace God’s coming to know Himself in a sequence of stages that culminate in art, according to Schelling; in religion or rather, a re-union of art and religion, according to the young Hegel; and in philosophy, according to the mature Hegel. For although Hegel’s mature thought and system became more complex and subtle, they never completely lost their connection with the basic vision and division of the Philosophy of Identity. His Philosophy of Nature, like Schelling’s though critical of it, was still meant, if not to replace the natural sciences altogether, at least to provide them with the basic framework without which they lose themselves in the infinite chaos of experience and remain atomistic and mechanistic instead of becoming holistic and dynamic. And Hegel’s Logic, his Philosophy of History, and perhaps even his Phenomenology, may be said to explicate themes that Schelling’s Transcendental Philosophy was unable to shelter and develop in its relatively simplistic frame. Further, Hegel could integrate these themes into the total vision.

In any case, the Hegel of the Essays, following Schelling though not without reservations, is convinced that philosophy has finally come into its own as speculative philosophy envisioning the inner unity of God, nature, and self-consciousness, and it has gained its systematic presentation in the Philosophy of Identity with its two...
organic parts, the Philosophy of Nature tracing the emergence of self-consciousness, and the Transcendental Philosophy tracing the emergence of God’s knowledge of Himself.

None of this is likely to sound convincing to a reader with an analytically trained intellect. I shall try in Section III of this Introduction to make the conception of speculative philosophy appear less strange by pointing out how speculative philosophy takes care of objections which non-speculative philosophy raises against it. Nor will speculative philosophy make sense to any historian of philosophy who knows that “speculation” is just another term for “intellectual intuition” and is aware of what Kant did to that concept. In Section IV I hope to show where in Kant’s work the speculative philosophers believed to find justification for reintroducing intellectual intuition into the cognitive enterprise of philosophy. In Section II, however, I shall try my hand at an entirely different approach to the Philosophy of Identity, an approach by way of the human or, to use a fashionable term, existential motivations that drove Hegel into the arms of Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity.

But first we must return for a moment to the term “speculation.” It was of course precisely its Philosophy of Nature that brought speculative philosophy into disrepute. The triumphant march of the natural sciences throughout the nineteenth century turned speculation qua intellectual intuition into speculation qua unwarranted by any acceptable evidences. In their Philosophy of Nature Schelling and Hegel were like two brave medieval knights fighting a division of tanks. The battle was lost before it began. Yet the thought is perhaps not without some twilight charm that someday the sciences themselves will feel a hankering after a unity that could not be satisfied by the logical reconstruction of the language of science and to which the holistic passion that shaped these now forgotten Philosophies of Nature may be congenial. To be sure, the fuzzy-heads that make up the small but noisy army of today’s anti-science and anti-technology prophets may joyfully return to the speculative Philosophy of Nature and claim it as an ally. But its sound re-appropriation, if there is to be another one after the débacle of Bergson’s élan vital, will have to arise from a need within the sciences themselves.

II. HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF IDENTITY

In his introduction to the Difference essay Hegel writes that philoso-
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Phy becomes a need in times when the simple and beautiful harmony of existence is sundered by the awareness of basic dichotomies and antinomies, when the believers become alienated from the gods, man from nature, the individual from his community. In historical situations of this sort philosophy is born and re-born in order to prepare through its systematic thought the revolution through which civilization's many-dimensional alienation will be overcome in a higher cultural synthesis.

We can see by inference from his early theological writings and by what we know of the circumstances of his first thirty years that these views reflect Hegel's own existential situation. On the level of values he was torn apart by clashing loyalties, loyalties to Greek Apollo, Christian Jesus, and Judeo-Prussian Kant. Liberated in mind by the French Revolution like every young German worth his salt, he yet remained in political bondage to the absolutist Duke of Württemberg. He was tied down to the study of dogmatic theology, although there was probably little that interested him less at the time. He who later drew the wide panorama of human history and civilizations into his philosophy lived as a young man in exceedingly narrow conditions of financial, social, and sexual deprivation as stipendiate in Tübingen and as tutor in private homes of the moderately wealthy in Bern and Frankfurt. Only an iron self-discipline can have kept him from exploding and going mad as his friend Hölderlin did. His was a thoroughly alienated existence in which the clash between the life he led and his aspirations, between what was the case and what should and could be the case drove him, as it drove so many of his generation, to dream the idealizing dream of the Hellenic age and of the Christian Middle Ages and to trust in philosophy to prepare the revolution of the German situation. It is important to be aware of the personal urgency in Hegel's commitment to philosophy. What motivated and energized his philosophical beginnings were not at all intellectual puzzles, but the deeply felt disturbances of the situation in which he found himself and his generation, with the clash between Apollo, Jesus, and Kant the most articulate of these personal aspects of the general malaise. At least that much the young Hegel and our own existentialists have in common: matters of personal urgency rather than an interest in intellectual puzzles motivated their philosophizing. And when Kierkegaard compared the later Hegel's Logic with a dance of skeletons he was not aware—and in fact could not have been aware—of how similar the personal problems behind his Either-Or were with the clash of value constellations that split the
young Hegel. Although their motivational situation was similar they
took off in very different directions indeed, doing so on the basis of
the sort of decision which is not exactly made by men, but which
rather makes men: Kierkegaard to explore, and lead his public into
what, in this time and place of his, it should mean to be a Christian
in Christianity, and Hegel to explore and finally present what, in this
time and place of his, the system of philosophia perennis is.

How did the existential situation of the young Hegel lead him in
the Essays to embrace Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity?

To be sure, Hegel might never have become a Schellingian if the
accidents of life had not brought him together with Schelling in
Tübingen and made them good enough friends to remain in contact
even after they went their different ways from Tübingen, Schelling
to fame and professorship in Jena, Hegel to the obscurity of a private
tutorship in Bern and Frankfurt. Nor must it be forgotten that Schell-
ing, in making Hegel his neighbor and his colleague at the University
of Jena, freed Hegel from the social and financial—if not sexual—
frustrations of the preceding decades. It is not cynical to ascribe
importance to biographical data of this sort. On the other hand, there
must have been something in Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity that
made it look attractive to Hegel as philosophy from the perspective
of his own existential travail.

Kant’s Critical Idealism lay before the public in its whole extension
and depth. There was Fichte’s philosophy as Wissenschaftslehre. He-
gel was familiar with both. In the rich firmament of Goethe’s Ger-
many there was a multitude of other philosophers, now known only
to specialist scholars but then quite visible stars, a few of them
generally believed at the time to be stars of the first magnitude. What
Hegel could see in Schelling’s philosophy and in none of the others
was the construction—or at least the sketch for it—of a harmonious
whole in which Hegel’s own basic conflicts, though expressed in the
most abstract terms, found their solution. He was able to project the
longing after harmony that was energized by his personal turmoil
into Schelling’s philosophy, a philosophy which aimed at overcoming
and bringing into systematic unity the basic conceptual dichotomies
and antinomies that had evolved in modern metaphysics from Descartes
to Kant around the relation between the infinite and the finite
(God and His creation) and between the subject and object (man and
nature, the knower and the known). It was not at all impossible to
project one’s own alienations into these and connected dichotomies
and to consider the Philosophy of Identity, with the interdependence
of its two parts and their intrinsic relation to the Absolute, as the
vehicle of one’s own reconciliation with God, nature, and society.
Thus Hegel, quite unlike Kierkegaard, took the first and decisive
step away from his existential motivations and moved toward the
grand tradition of modern philosophy—whose Plotinus he was des-
tined to become. His Essays are the documents marking the begin-
ning of his career. Without this first step Hegel rather than Kierke-
gaard might have become the father of existentialism. His gifts—
among which ordinary logical thinking was conspicuously absent
—might have well prepared him for this; and the influence which
parts of the Phenomenology had, for example on Sartre, corroborate
it.

III. SPECULATIVE versus REFLECTIVE PHILOSOPHY

Our excursion in the preceding section was intended to aid in an
understanding of how the general scheme of Schelling’s system—
with its view of the Absolute revealing itself in nature and rational
self-consciousness and revealing itself to itself in the two parts of the
Philosophy of Identity—found a ready response in Hegel. The
schisms characteristic of his situation and that of his generation,
when expressed in philosophical dichotomies such as those of the in-
finite and finite and of subject and object, could find their harmonious
solution in the Philosophy of Identity, which seemed to offer on the
academic level a view of the whole uniting in harmony all sorts of
opposites. As such, it could serve as a philosophical basis for the
revolution that would turn modern civilization, sick from and of its
schisms, into a truly integrated culture to be described in metaphors
taken from the romantic conception of nature: a living whole of
which the individuals were organs rather than atoms. As each part
was sustained and enriched by the whole, so each part functioned to
sustain the whole.

But here a problem arises. If speculative philosophy, having its
sight on that final whole of God, nature, and self-consciousness, is
philosophy as it has finally come into its own truth, then what about
all those philosophical efforts that cannot be said even by the most
tolerant historian to anticipate speculative philosophy at least germi-
nally? That is, what about all non-speculative philosophy? And what
about the interrelations, if any, between speculative and non-
speculative philosophy? These questions are among the questions which Hegel himself takes up in his Introduction to the Essays.

The Essays have a name for non-speculative philosophy: reflective philosophy. The term has here only an indirect connection with the various uses Kant assigned to 'reflection' and 'reflective' in The Critique of Pure Reason and The Critique of Judgment. Basically, Hegel uses it as Schelling had done in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), where reflection was what the second of the three "epochs" in the "history of self-consciousness" led to, reflection going hand in hand with analysis, both being opposed to the "productive intuition" and "synthesis" that characterize the first epoch. And Kant’s philosophy was taken to be the typical culmination of the epoch of reflection. (The third epoch was that of "the absolute act of will.") But as no concept remained quite the same when Hegel took it up in his own thought, we can understand what Hegel meant by 'reflective philosophy' without discussing Schelling's view.

The distinction between reflective and speculative philosophy is not meant to be a distinction between different schools of philosophy. To Hegel, English empiricism from Locke on as well as continental rationalism (with the exception of Spinoza) were reflective philosophies. The whole philosophy of the Enlightenment was reflective. And so was most of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Reflective philosophy is philosophy that has not come to the true conception of philosophy, philosophy that is not really philosophy—inauthentic philosophy over against authentic philosophy which is, and cannot but be speculative. In terms of the Kantian faculties, reflective philosophy is philosophy of the intellect (der Verstand), speculative philosophy is philosophy of Reason (die Vernunft), but of a Reason which has been allowed to trespass on territory Kant believed to be inaccessi-ble to finite man. It is typical of reflective philosophy, though it does not exhaust its nature, that it relies on arguments, proofs, and the whole apparatus of logic, that it insists on clear-cut dichotomies in terms of abstract universals, dichotomies such as those of the infinite and the finite, subject and object, universal and particular, freedom and necessity, causality and teleology, etc., etc.; that it tries to solve intellectual puzzles rather than give the true conceptual vision of the whole; that it sticks to the natural sciences as the source of the only reliable knowledge of nature, thus committing itself, in the first place, to a concept of experience reduced to sense perception and to a con-cept of sense perception reduced to some causal chain, and in the second place, to a pervasive atomism that reduces the whole to the
sum of its parts, and to a mechanism that excludes teleology from a positive role in cognition. No reflective philosophy need have all of these characteristics although any one of them would be the indication of a philosophy that has not reached the one authentic conception of philosophy.

Hence, any assault that reflective philosophy directs against speculative philosophy can be taken care of simply by pointing out that it is a reflective assault. Answering it by counterarguments would turn the speculative philosopher into a reflective one. What is wrong with the attack is that it is reflective; it is made in a style of doing philosophy that is not truly philosophical. Whatever the argument may be which a reflective philosopher uses against speculative philosophy, his very arguing shows that he is not really a philosopher. Contempt is the only answer to all reflective assaults. No dialogue is possible.

We shall soon observe that this is only one side of Hegel’s attitude toward reflective philosophy. But before we come to the other side we may want to illustrate this conception of the relation between reflective and speculative philosophy by way of a contemporary parallel. I mean the relation between existentialism and analytic philosophy.

There can be no doubt at all that our own contemporary analytic philosophy, in its narrowest as well as in its widest meaning (which excludes only the existentialists, the Whiteheadians, and the Thomists), would be judged by Hegel to be a very typical reflective philosophy. There must be considerable doubt, however, whether or not Hegel would acknowledge existentialism to be speculative philosophy. From the viewpoint of the Philosophy of Identity, existentialism spoiled its chance of being authentic philosophy by concentrating not just on man but on man as condemned to finitude. And from the viewpoint of existentialism Hegel spoiled his chance of being the first modern existentialist when he permitted the urge that drove him into philosophy to find satisfaction in the more or less traditional apparatus of the Philosophy of Identity. Yet there are several aspects of existentialism in which the Hegel of the Essays could recognize himself: Besides the already mentioned motivational factor (one does not do philosophy to solve intellectual puzzles, though a positive version would have to have recourse to some colorless formula such as searching for meaning in a world become meaningless, which fits neither Hegel nor existentialism), Hegel would recognize his contempt for the philosophy of the intellect in existentialism’s contempt for a civilization in which the empirical sciences and technology have be-
come predominant and where philosophy has very largely become the handmaiden of science. He would recognize, as we already did, his distinction between reflective and speculative philosophy in the distinction so dear to existentialists, the distinction between what is authentic and what is inauthentic, between *eigentlich* and *uneigentlich*. And speculation itself, intellectual intuition as vision of the whole, has its analogue or rather, its subjective caricature in the cognitive function existentialists ascribe to moods, the mood of boredom, for example, being said to reveal the Whole of Being or Being as a Whole. In any case, whether or not existentialism is what speculative philosophy would have come to be in our own day, it is quite certain that the reaction existentialism has shown towards even the most devastating attacks launched against it by analytic philosophers is very much the same as the reaction of speculative philosophy towards reflective attacks. These attacks are attacks that need not be answered except by classifying them as analytic, that is, as basically unphilosophic, as philosophically inauthentic. From the side of existentialism no dialogue is possible between it and analytic philosophy, just as from the side of speculative philosophy no dialogue is possible between it and reflective philosophy. (From the side of analytic philosophy as from the side of reflective philosophy in general, the situation is of course quite different as they are committed to the idea of rational discourse. It seems to them incomprehensible that there are philosophies which in principle refuse to argue or, if they condescend to argue, know that they are lowering themselves to a pseudo-philosophical level.)

We had mentioned that the contempt for reflective philosophy will turn out to be only one side of Hegel’s attitude toward reflective philosophy. To the reader of the Essays it may appear to be the most prominent part, as they abound with ferocious sarcasms directed at reflective philosophy in general and at this or that reflective philosopher in particular. Yet there is something authentically inauthentic, so to speak, about the very dichotomy of reflective and speculative philosophy. For like all the other dichotomies mentioned before, the dichotomy of reflective and speculative philosophy is itself typical of the style of reflective philosophy, and not at all typical of speculative philosophy, in which the reflective dichotomies are overcome in a vision of the organic whole that builds up its richness of harmony out of the tensions between its constituents. To be sure, unlike the reflective dichotomies separating the infinite from the finite, subject from object, freedom from necessity, etc., the dichotomy separating
reflective from speculative philosophy is not a dichotomy in philosophy, but a dichotomy about philosophy, a second-level dichotomy. But this should make no difference at all; for meta-philosophy is itself an essential part of philosophy and the meta-philosophical dichotomy is philosophical—although Hegel should have called it a reflective philosophical dichotomy, a dichotomy which sets speculative philosophy the task of overcoming it as it is to overcome the first-level dichotomies that reflective philosophy prides itself of.

Here we reach the positive side of Hegel’s attitude toward reflective philosophy. It is historical or at least, it is historical in a way. Only after reflective philosophy has gone through all its paces and realized its major possibilities can philosophy come into its own as speculative philosophy. The analytic gifts of the intellect must have bloomed and so made all the dichotomies of the time explicit before the bud (ever present?) of speculation can open up in its full glory. In particular, reflective philosophy must have reached the stage where it sees itself split into unsolvable antinomies and is forced into scepticism concerning the very problems that form its traditional core. It is at this historical point when philosophy despairs of metaphysics—as it does in Kant’s Dialectic of Pure Reason—and forbids pure Reason to have any but a methodological (“regulative”) role in cognition, that philosophy can and must come into its own as speculation. In Hegel’s style of speculative philosophy this necessity is at once historical and conceptual—without much awareness of this reflective distinction. Rather it is taken for granted that the logical dependence of the concept of speculative philosophy—the overcoming of the dichotomies—on the concept of reflective philosophy is eo ipso a temporal sequence or, to express it in a somewhat different way, as if the teleological unfolding of philosophy is identical with the causal chain of historical events. (It needs no stressing that this sort of identification as it occurs in the Essays, is at the very heart of the later Hegel’s elaborate and subtle historical dialectic.)

(In the Essays Hegel’s view of the history of philosophy is rather ambivalent. At times he does seem to view the history of philosophy as leading “necessarily” in its last stages from reflective philosophy to speculative philosophy. At other times he seems to think that any philosophy which deserves the name is germinally speculative, but kept from knowing itself as such by the cultural situation in which it makes its appearance. Yet there is Spinoza, the great inspirator of the Philosophy of Identity. It seems difficult for either of these views
to account for Spinoza’s system appearing at the time when it did appear.)

There are two images that the Essays occasionally use for the relation between reflective and speculative philosophy, and they show how ambiguous Hegel’s concept of this relation is. In one image, what philosophy is about is compared with a grove. To speculative philosophy the grove is where the god dwells. To reflective philosophy, the grove is a number of trees. In the other image, philosophy is compared with a temple. Speculative philosophy dwells in it, but reflective philosophy remains in the forecourt.

The first image appears to make the difference between reflective and speculative philosophy so radical as to exclude all relation, let alone dialogue, between them. Yet in his earlier theological writings Hegel also uses the image of the hallowed grove for the youthful organic and holistic culture of Hellas, in which nature and the divine were not yet split one from the other nor the individual from his community. If we remember this, then we may also interpret the hallowed grove image with respect to speculative philosophy in a dialectical way: reflective philosophy had to separate the sacred grove into its component trees so that in speculative philosophy the divine, the natural, and the rational could achieve consciousness of their unity.

Exactly the opposite holds for the other image, that of the temple and its forecourt. Obviously, if there is a forecourt one cannot enter the temple of speculative philosophy without passing through the forecourt of reflective philosophy. On the surface, then, the second image seems to be that of a necessary connection between reflective and speculative philosophy. But why does there have to be a forecourt at all? And in fact, Hegel stresses that there is no approach to speculative philosophy but a salto mortale, à corps perdu, by a jump that must be lethal to reflective philosophy if it is to be resurrected as speculation.

Besides the rather hedged-in admission that reflective philosophy had to run its full course before the true conception of authentic philosophy could arise, the Essays contain a second positive appraisal of reflective philosophy. For it would seem that Hegel concedes that the very language of speculative philosophy must for purposes of communication be to a large extent the language of reflective philosophy and even the language of ordinary discourse. There are certain indications that the writer of the Essays had already given considerable thought to the problem of how to communicate speculative philoso-
phy. He is convinced that it should not be done more geometrico, not even in the very attenuated form in which it occurs in Fichte’s Science of Knowledge and Schelling’s publications up to 1801. This logical apparatus is hopelessly reflective. Nor would Hegel’s own inclinations and logical gifts be appropriate to it. But then, how can speculation, extra-ordinary and extra-reflective as it is, be communicated at all? How can ordinary language and reflective philosophical discourse be made to do an extra-ordinary and non-reflective job? There is quite a similarity here between the speculative philosopher and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard focused in on this sort of problem very early and his whole literary style is a deliberate answer to it, an answer full of astonishing deviousness. Even the most prejudiced Hegelian will have to admit, I think, that in this respect Kierkegaard was much the greater craftsman of the two. Hegel found the full measure of his style only in the Phenomenology (1807) when he was 37 years old, and it consisted mainly in various singular ways of adapting the grammar and terms of ordinary and reflective discourses to the presentation of an ever ongoing movement of concepts fed by dialectical tensions. Kierkegaard was an artful spider weaving intricate nets to catch his readers, Hegel a busy bird bravely bending and stretching the available material to build a fine nest for his dialectical eggs, and the reader be damned. Some of this bending and stretching can already be observed in the Essays. Hegel’s style in the Essays was unlike that of anybody else then writing in German philosophy. This is not necessarily a praise, least of all in Hegel’s own judgment, which condemns the idiosyncratic in philosophy. I am somewhat inclined to agree with those critics who say that the main stylistic rule of the Essays is this: the more complex the grammatical construction of a sentence and the less clear its meaning, the more speculative it will be. In any case, the uniqueness of his style in the Essays seems due less to any clear insight into how speculative philosophy should and could be communicated than to a rather tentative groping in many divergent directions of adapting the linguistic medium to speculative purposes. The reflective dichotomy, for example, of subject and object is overcome linguistically with Schelling’s aid by way of the awkward formulas at the heart of the Philosophy of Identity: “the subjective Subject-Object” and “the objective Subject-Object.” The latter is dealt with in the Philosophy of Nature, the former in the Transcendental Philosophy. The same procedure might have been used for the reflective dichotomy of the Infinite and the Finite, but neither Schelling nor Hegel does so, though they use “the
FINALLY INFINITE” and “the infinitely Finite,” neither of which would indicate what it should: the overcoming of the dichotomy in the “identity” of the Infinite and the Finite. To speak of God in epistemological terms as Subject-Object must have seemed less iconoclastic and objectionable than to speak of Him as the Finite-Infinite. One shudders to think of Schelling and Hegel extending the symbolization of the identity of subject and object to other dichotomies such as those of freedom and necessity or causality and teleology.

Parenthetically we may note here that Hegel is rather flexible in relating these two basic dichotomies of subject and object and of the infinite and the finite to one another. Sometimes it is the subject that is infinite and the object finite, sometimes the other way around, a flexibility that only a philosophy contemptuous of reflective philosophy could allow itself.

In any event one has to keep in mind the whole glorious scheme of the Philosophy of Identity to give to the ‘objective and subjective Subject-Object’ the flesh and blood it seems to lack in the Essays. One must keep in mind, moreover, that these abstract identity formulas were alive with the existential agony felt by Hegel and his contemporaries and that the holistic passion at the living core of the Philosophy of Identity was fed by the alienation of the individual from nature, community (das Volk), and God.

Speculative philosophy, in sum, defends itself against the attacks of reflective philosophy by labelling the attacks reflective, and not by arguing with them—because it would then abandon itself as speculation and surrender to reflection. On the other hand, reflective philosophers, cupidì rerum novarum, see in the speculators an interesting new sort of monkey they would like to get better acquainted with. In fact, if the monkey could convince them that his system is not just another cage but what he claims it to be, the ultimate whole as known in the only sort of knowledge that deserves the name, the reflectors might in the end want to share the cage with him. But instead of trying to convince them in the style they expect from a philosopher, the monkey develops his salto mortale rhetoric which is as convincing as telling a healthy man that he must go through cancer of the brain in order to enjoy true health. So what can speculative philosophy actually do to convince reflective philosophy (as well as common sense and the general public) that it is what it claims to be?

Perhaps this is one of the problems, taken in its most catholic scope, that the Phenomenology, as the prolegomena to Hegel’s sys-
tem, was later intended to answer. In the Essays the answer is an inaudible sigh of regret joined with an affirmation of hope. The sigh of regret: if only THE speculative system existed, not in fragments and sketches as in Schelling, but as an organic whole detailed in its totality! The affirmation of hope: once this system exists, the spirit of the time will reach out toward it, its time will have come, es wird sein Glueck machen. For civilization is longing to be cured of the dichotomies that rend it and that reflective philosophy had the task of bringing into the open.

And the spirit did reach out toward it. However, it was not in the Philosophy of Identity that the spirit recognized itself, not in Schelling and not in the Hegel of the Essays. It recognized itself in the Hegel of the Phenomenology, the Logic and the Philosophy of History. In them, speculative philosophy, though greatly changed, fulfilled its promises, and died (except in England, where religion found a strong ally in it, and in Italy, where liberalism was the ally and where national pride could claim Vico to be St. John the Baptist to Hegel, the savior).

After all is said and done it must yet be admitted that the Essays, notwithstanding Hegel’s unwillingness to let speculative philosophy descend to the level of reflective philosophy, give not only a speculative judgment on reflective philosophy, but also a reflective approach of sorts to speculative philosophy. Contemptuous of the forecourt of the temple, the Essays manage just the same to spend much time and effort in it—just as Michelangelo did in la bella rusticana, the little Quattrocento church on the hills of Florence whose simple static harmonies he was in need of as a foil for the complex dynamic tensions of his own revolutionary style.

IV. INTELLECTUAL INTUITION

We might begin in a cavalier fashion by saying that intellectual intuition furnishes the evidences on which the Philosophy of Identity is built. In saying this we are, however, already victims of reflective philosophy. For the concept of "being based upon..." involves some logical relation pertaining to induction or deduction, as if intellectual intuition either furnished the evidences that could verify or falsify the truth claims of statements, or were some set of self-evident axioms at the basis of a body of theorems. In the former case the Phi-
losophy of Identity would be an empirical science with an exceedingly strange sort of evidence as its experiential ground. In the latter case it would be like geometry as traditionally conceived, and hence subject to the threat of the Kantian question whether the apriority of the axioms is analytic or synthetic; and if synthetic a priori, the possibility of their objective reference would have to be made intelligible. But this whole apparatus remains of course in the forecourt of the temple of philosophy and is, or should be, foreign to speculative philosophy—which dwells in the temple itself.

We have already suggested that intellectual intuition became, in Schelling and Hegel, the vision of the whole, a vision in which God, nature, and self-consciousness (or reason) come into their truth. Spinoza's scientia sub specie æternitatis becomes scientia sub specie totalitatis atque harmoniae. (In the following generations this vision of the whole will be degraded to Weltanschauung, leading to the relativization not only of moral and aesthetic standards but also of the basic theoretical categories, emerging as sociology of sorts in France, and in Germany as Dilthey's typology of Weltanschaungen.) Kant, however, had surely meant by intellectual intuition something quite different from this vision of the whole. And he had clearly and decisively disallowed intellectual intuition to have any positive role in human cognition. How was it then that intellectual intuition turned into this holistic vision and organized itself into something that claimed to be THE system of knowledge under the name of the Philosophy of Identity?

I shall let Schelling and Hegel speak for themselves, letting them talk univocce without drawing a line between what Schelling said and what Hegel said. Nor shall I draw a line between what they did say and what they might have said. It must of course not be assumed that the way they understand Kant is my own way.

What the speculators said and might have said to Kant is this:

"You admit that the concept of an intuitive intellect or intellectual intuition harbors no logical contradictions and that therefore there could be such a thing as intellectual intuition; but you also assert that as a matter of fact human beings do not possess it. For the basic way in which anything can be knowable to us as an object of experience is by its being given to us, and the only way in which it can be given to us is by its becoming a datum to our senses: it must cause a sensation in us. Having sensations, however, is very different from having knowledge. So you bridge the gap between having sensations and having knowledge by an impressive analysis of the ap-
paratus which our sensibility and the reason (der Verstand) contribute on their own account to the objectivity of possible objects of experience. We say 'our sensibility' and 'the reason' because you do play with the idea of non-human subjects whose sensibility might have forms different from those human sensibility has. And you do not play with the idea of rational beings whose forms of judgment and therewith categories might be different from those of man. This is part of your Stoic background, about which more later. Sensibility contributes (the forms of) space and time; reason contributes twelve basic concepts in accordance with the twelve forms of judgment and, dependent on the categories and their schematization, your twelve 'principles of the pure understanding.' In consequence, what you allow us to have knowledge of in our experience are not the things as they are in themselves but only as they affect us, that is, as they appear to us. You revel in the dichotomy of things in themselves—which are unknowable to us—and their appearances—which are all we are ever permitted to know. Even what you call our synthetic a priori knowledge such as mathematics does not reach beyond the possible objects of experience.

"If we examine the nature of your prejudice against intellectual intuition more closely we find it to be rooted in dubious psychology, theological dogma, and the procedures of the natural sciences. To begin with the last, you state that the knowledge claims of the natural sciences are well founded to the extent that their judgments, from statements of observation to the most general theories, can be tested empirically, that is, by perception; and perception, according to the causal theory of perception which you unquestionably accept, has as its basic stratum visual, acoustic, and similar sensations. So the triumphant course of the natural sciences since Galileo and Newton over against the debacle of the metaphysical knowledge claims of the rationalists leads you to assert that we must claim no knowledge of any object, ourselves included, that cannot be related in certain prescribed ways to something that is given to us either in externally or in internally perceptual experience. (The prescribed ways in which any object we claim to know must be related to what is sensuously given to us are spatial, temporal and those formulated in your principles of the pure understanding.)

"The lesson which the natural sciences taught you goes beautifully hand in hand with your theological bias. This is your conviction of the inescapable finitude of rational man. You find the index of this finitude in the fact that objects can be known to us if and only if
they (a) affect our sensibility and (b) conform to the spontaneously imposed conditions of our intellect. Our sensibility is merely passive and our spontaneity is limited to the mere forms of objectivity. Over against this doubly finite relation of the human subject to the objects of his cognitive experiences you conceive of a kind of knowledge which is spontaneity all through. There would be no receptivity in it at all and spontaneity would not be limited to the mere forms. This is what you call intellectual intuition. It is divine creativity seen in the perspective of your epistemological and psychological presuppositions.

"Your psychological presuppositions have already come to the fore. Man has the capacity to receive sensations, and you call this receptivity sensibility. This is one psychological stem from which knowledge grows. The other is the faculty of freely forming concepts, combining them in judgments, and combining judgments in syllogisms. This is reason. What sort of psychology is this? If it were rational psychology à la Wolff and Baumgarten, you yourself would have destroyed it in the Paralogism section of your Dialectic of Pure Reason. If it were empirical psychology you would seem to have founded, at least in part, your explanation of the possibility of empirical knowledge on empirical knowledge and this is hardly a convincing foundation.

"Besides, there is the basic contradiction that you got yourself into. Jacobi summed it up when he said that without the thing-in-itself one cannot get into The Critique of Pure Reason and with the thing-in-itself one cannot stay in it. What is it that causes the sensations in us? This cause of our sensations cannot be found in the objects of our experiences, whether we mean by the objects of our experiences ordinary objects like trees and houses or scientific objects like gravity and atoms. The objects of our experiences cannot be the causes of our sensations, for according to your own theory the possibility of any object is rooted in the forms of our sensibility and the forms of the intellect having shaped the sensuous material. So the X that causes the sensation must be the thing-in-itself unknowably hidden behind the veil of appearances. But in making the thing-in-itself the cause of our sensations you have done what is verboten by your own Critique. You have applied one of the categories, the category of causality, to the thing-in-itself. It is inconceivable in terms of your theory that the thing-in-itself causes sensations. One could more easily receive a letter from outer space, even one written in English.
Walter Cerf

"Now what would you say if we show you that you yourself un-
knowingly make intellectual intuition the ultimate basis of all knowl-
dge claims that you consider soundly grounded? We are of course
referring to your transcendental apperception, the 'I think,' of which
you say that it is the highest point to which must be fastened the
applicability of the categories to time (and space), therewith the
possibility of experiencing objects and therewith the possibility of
objects of experience. For according to your first Critique the unity
of nature as the totality of all possible objects of experience depends
in the last analysis on the unity of the I in its synthesizing categorial
acts of thinking. But precisely in making the thinking I the highest
point you give it the characteristic that is definitory of intellectual
intuition. To think oneself as thinking—pure self-consciousness—is
to give oneself existence as pure I. Your transcendental appercep-
tion lives up to your own concept of intellectual intuition. You have
overcome your dichotomy of receptivity—in which objects are given
—and spontaneity—in which they are thought. The pure Ego gives
itself to itself in the pure act of thinking itself as thinking. This is
how it exists. Naturally, 'existence' does not have the meaning it
ordinarily has. It does not have anything to do with being localizable
in time and space, which is the reason why the I must not be said
to create itself. Fichte prefers to speak of the Ego 'positing' itself.
We use 'constructing,' others 'constituting.'

"Your transcendental apperception, however, does not only over-
come your dichotomy of receptivity and spontaneity. It also is the
beginning of a synthesis of your two most radical and basic oppo-
sites, that of the subject and object and that of the infinite and the
finite.

"As to the dichotomy of subject and object, it is seen at once that
the 'I think' of the pure apperception—the I that thinks itself as
thinking—is at the same time both subject and object, or as we pre-
fer to say, the identity of subject and object. Nous noei heauton. This,
though, is Aristotle. The Greek roots of your philosophy are Stoic
rather than Platonic or Aristotelian. So were those of Rousseau,
whom you so admired. The light that gave the Enlightenment its name
was the lumen naturale, the Stoic spark of reason, the representative
part of divine reason in all rational beings making them all free,
equal, and brothers, as the French Revolution concluded.

"The metaphysical rationalism of Stoicism also forms the hidden
background of your transcendental apperception. For the 'I' of your
'I think' is not at all that of any I-saying individual, who is no less
appearance than the objects he experiences. One might rather say that the I of the pure apperception is that of the Leibnizian monad which, as the I-in-itself, is hidden behind the subject as it appears to itself. This monadological background of the pure apperception would seem to be undeniable. Yet it must not ever be forgotten that the monadic subject-in-itself is given, in the spirit of the age, the features of the Stoic spark of reason, the same divine reason in each rational individual. So there is occasion for a secret tug-of-war between the Leibnizian and the Stoic background. In any event, at the bottom of your Critique there is the Stoic philosophy of identity. It is a very limited one in comparison with ours. It excludes all of nature. For though divine reason is said by Stoic metaphysic to rule over nature, the laws of nature being decrees issued by it, Stoicism does not allow divine reason to be present inside nature as the unconscious urge driving it toward the emergence of self-consciousness. Thus your Stoic identity is limited to the divine reason ruling the universe and its representative sparks residing in human individuals, and through that very residence standing in constant danger of being infringed and becoming polluted. To this extent, then, and only to this extent, your transcendent apperception is also the overcoming of the finite-infinite dichotomy. Without this Stoic identity between infinite and finite reason, each monadic subject would have its own world and you would have to appeal to the hypothesis of a pre-established harmony to explain the illusion of a world shared by all. You would not be able to explain that our experience, instead of being a flux of private sensations, gives us knowledge of a common world. On the other hand, your monadological background might have permitted you a more subtle way of accounting for the pre-personal individuation of the sparks of reason—of the indexing function of the I of the transcendental apperception—than Stoicism itself would have been able to do. In either case, though, for either monad or spark of reason the use of language, in any of the customary senses of 'language,' is a disquieting problem, though not within the Philosophy of Identity as it knows God's becoming man.

"Here we must return for a moment to what we have said about your overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy. For the 'I think' of your transcendental apperception is not just the Ego's thinking itself as thinking—and thus in this very narrow sense the identity of subject and object. Your 'I think' is an incomplete expression. You yourself stress that what the I thinks are the categories and through them the twelve principles of the pure understanding to which the
objectivity of the objects of our experience is due. 'I think the categories' is, in terms of our Philosophy of Identity, a formula for the identity of that part of the subject which you call *Verstand* and the form of objectivity. In claiming that the twelve principles are the conditions furnished by reason which allow our experience to be of objects you may also claim, as we would express it, the identity of the rational self with the form of objectivity.

"In sum, then, your transcendental apperception is indeed intellectual intuition unilaterally defined from the perspective of the dichotomy of receptivity and spontaneity as the overcoming of this dichotomy. At the same time, however, and again without your recognizing the fact, the transcendental apperception is the very limited overcoming of the dichotomies of the subject and object and of the infinite and the finite that your philosophy allows. And intellectual intuition does all this right at the most crucial point of your philosophy, where you deny the possibility of intellectual intuition to the finite beings men are. From all this we conclude that your concept of intellectual intuition is much too narrow. Intellectual intuition must be conceived as the construction of the identity underlying all the dichotomies you reflectors have been proud of establishing, and particularly the subject-object and infinite-finite dichotomies. It is this enlarged concept of intellectual intuition which we call speculation and which thus becomes the holistic vision of the complex identity of subject and object and of the infinite and the finite or—in terms that join these basic dichotomies—of God, nature and self-consciousness.

"Transcendental apperception as intellectual intuition, however, is not the only motive in your Critical Idealism that leads directly into the speculation of our Philosophy of Identity. We have always been fascinated by an aside of yours that you let slip in an unguarded moment. This is your remark that perhaps the two stems of our cognitive faculties, sensibility and reason, have the same root. You must have had in mind something like an unconscious intellectual intuition, an identity of receptivity and spontaneity prior to their reflective separation. We think we are justified in seeing this as an anticipation of the unconscious God revealing Himself in nature. For one inspired moment you came close to our philosophy of nature.

"We also like to connect this aside of yours with your equally inspired conception of the role of productive imagination in your Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. The role productive imagination is given in your Deduction is that of synthetizing the
pure manifold of time in accordance with the rules as which the categories function in the objectification of experience. Pure imagination, as the great synthetizer, is the mediator between time and the categories. It does not seem to us far-fetched to see in the role you ascribe to imagination an anticipation of the speculative construction of the identity of these opposites. Productive imagination, instead of merely putting two different pieces in an external unity, is their inner unity, their 'common root' raised from its unconscious pre-reflective status to post-reflective awareness.

"The role you ascribe to productive imagination in your Deduction anticipates our speculative philosophy, or is at least a step in the right direction, also with respect to the finite-infinite dichotomy. For in overcoming through productive imagination your own rigorous confrontation of receptivity and spontaneity, you are also undoing, however cautiously and limitedly, your stubborn insistence on the finitude of man. And at the same time you are advancing beyond the Stoic philosophy of identity with its restriction to the sparks of reason as the only divine element in man. To be sure, you still exclude the sense data from the Ego's productivity. It was Fichte to whom we owe this giant step. But in making productive imagination the great synthetizer you have given to the pure Ego, at least within the cognitive sphere, a spontaneity that goes far beyond the mere thinking of the categories. The Ego is now coming close to being a 'finitely infinite.' By the same token you have transcended the limitations of your Stoic background. To the Stoic reason which is pure thought you have added productive imagination to do the work which reason cannot do, the work of synthetizing the pure manifold of time. Though there is no labor involved in this sort of work, it is at least doing something while the pure manifold of time, on the left of productive imagination, and the pure thinking of the categories, on its right, are in one sense and another not doing anything at all. You have gone beyond the contemplative god of Stoicism; yet you have not come closer to the active God of Christianity.

"In your theoretical philosophy God functions as a merely methodological rule in the ongoing business of exploring the world: do not ever stop exploring. In your practical philosophy God is a postulate, though a necessary one, to guarantee justice in distributing blessings according to deserts. Your Stoicism turns Judaic in the moral sphere. You totally separate reason and the universal moral law grounded in it from the beautiful sphere of human passions. Moreover you are unable to explain how the universal moral law can
actually function as such in human life and you admit that even if it does no one can ever be sure that it is doing so. This is what the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit have come to in your philosophy. Your hidden metaphysical Stoicism is Hellas’ revenge on Christianity. “We regret to have to say this. Our Philosophy of Identity has as much of the Christian God as any metaphysic can possibly have that claims to be knowledge. You must not suspect us of being frivolous when we see the total relationship of God, nature and self-consciousness in analogy with the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.8

“But quite apart from this somewhat esoteric analogy taken from the tradition of Christian theology—not for nothing did we spend years in the Stift in Tübingen—speculation achieves its overcoming of all the basic reflective dichotomies in the organistically conceived vista of THE WHOLE as presented in the Philosophy of Identity. Its Philosophy of Nature deals with the objective Subject-Object, whose unconscious self-revelatory dynamics replaces your dichotomy of the thing-in-itself and its appearances. The Transcendental Philosophy deals with the subjective Subject-Object and solves the problems, unsolvable within your Critical Idealism, of the relation of the pure apperception to God on the one hand, and to the (logico-historical) development of rationality in man on the other. The God who reveals Himself in nature is not, as such, the God who comes to know Himself as having revealed himself in nature. That God He becomes only in the evolution of human rationality. Man’s re-construction of God’s creativity in nature is thus itself a chapter—the last one?—of God’s creation of Himself.

“It surely cannot be said against our system with its superb balance of idealism and realism that there is still a vestige of an idealistic imbalance in it because the Philosophy of Nature was not written by nature itself but had to wait for the birth and development of rationality in man. One could just as well talk about an imbalance in favor of realism in that the whole ascending chain of God’s unconscious revelations in nature was needed to bring forth that rationality in man which becomes the instrument of God’s knowledge of Himself.

“To use an analogy which is not at all congenial to us but may become fashionable someday, your Critique sets new rules for the game of metaphysics. Yours is a game somewhat like tennis. The ball must always pass above the net of empirical statements. The game begins with a rally in which the ball must hit the ground in the nar-
row part of the area that you call the synthetic a priori, namely, that part of the synthetic a priori that gives 'the conditions of the possibility of objects of experience.' This is the rally of meta-metaphysics. Once this rally is over and the properly metaphysical part of the game begins, the ball must hit the ground in the area of analytic judgments and logical inferences and, strangely enough, also in an area adjacent to the synthetic a priori but having certain empirical ingredients—as in your Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786) and Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). We say, strangely enough, for after you had drawn a line of absolute opposition between the empirical and the a priori you yet proceed as if there were a gradual transition from one to the other. This may very well serve as another example of your overcoming your own dichotomies; but it is not of the same interest to us as the examples of the transcendental apperception and productive imagination.

"Our game is quite different: it is rather like doing a jigsaw puzzle. Directed perhaps by what we retain from the picture when we first saw it before it was taken apart, we reconstruct it by finding the proper place for each part within the whole, the only rule being that we have to follow faithfully the outline of each part so that they fit together as their maker meant them to. There is only one solution to the jigsaw puzzle, and it is ours.

"From the viewpoint of our system as a whole your Critique of Judgment with its discussion of the role of teleology in cognition is almost as important to us as your first Critique. For the process as which we see the whole cannot but be teleological, and so we had to undo your typically reflective position with respect to teleology in your Critique of Judgment. However, as we aim in this speech of ours to show the germs of true speculation in your philosophy, we have no reason to go into your treatment of teleology where you stubbornly insist on the finitude of human cognition. (Just the same, we wish to advise anyone who wants to understand our Philosophy of Identity from the inside out to study carefully the Critique of the Teleological Judgment—Part II of the Critique of Judgment—and particularly §§ 74–78.)

"However, there is one famous remark of yours that we wish to comment on. You are convinced that there never will be a Newton able to explain as little as the origin of a blade of grass according to laws of nature that were not arranged by design (Absicht)⁰. In other words, you believe the biological realm to be ultimately impervious to that atomistic-mechanistic approach that is celebrating triumph
after triumph in physics and chemistry. And yet at the same time you seem to resign yourself to the fact that biology as science has no choice but to use the methods of physics and chemistry as far as they can go, and beyond that point there is no knowledge that is scientific. This is absurd. To us biology in its largest sense is truly theogony and instead of reducing it as much as possible to physics and chemistry we extend to the subjects of physics and chemistry the holistic and dynamic vision of theogonic biology.

"May we now talk to you about Fichte, your erstwhile disciple and our erstwhile mentor and friend. Knowing how he annoyed you with his interpretation of your first Critique, we shall talk about him only for a moment, though we have much to say about him in the Essays.

"We have already mentioned the importance of his translating your 'I think' into 'The Ego posits himself.' This translation made it clear to us that your transcendental apperception is intellectual intuition. Prompted by us, Fichte accepted this. The ultimate basis of your Critique and his Science of Knowledge is intellectual intuition. His second important merit was his radical elimination of the thing-in-itself, although others had seen its paradoxical role in your idealism before him. He eliminated it, in the first place, through the Ego's second Tathandlung: the Ego posits the non-Ego. However, this would not take him any further than your own grounding of the form of objectivity in the subject. The step that leads him radically beyond your 'formal' idealism is his showing that the sensations themselves, far from being caused by the thing-in-itself, as well as their spatial and temporal relations, are doings, though unconscious ones, of the Ego. The historical merit of this doctrine is that it is so paradoxical. Thinking our way through the paradox greatly assisted us in bringing to birth the true system of philosophy. The paradox as presented from the side of the object of knowledge, that is, from the side of nature, consists in the fact that Fichte's doctrine totally de-naturalizes nature so that nature becomes even less than it is in your philosophy. In the Critique nature is mere appearance, but it is the appearance of something that is, the thing-in-itself, even though it is unknowable to us and not even definable as to the sense in which it can be said to be. The paradox from the side of the subject is that the Ego has lost your index of its finitude, for it is all spontaneity. Yet it is not allowed to be God nor is The Science of Knowledge allowed to be a text about God's acquiring knowledge of Himself. Fichte's third Tathandlung posits the definite finalization of the Ego: the Ego's aspirations to become one with God will be fulfilled only
in the infinitely distant future, that is to say, they will never be fulfilled.

"Over and against the Fichtean idealism, completely one-sided and perhaps rightly denounced as atheistic, we plead with you to see the profound balance and harmony, based on the speculative viewing of the relations among God, nature and self-consciousness, of our Philosophy of Identity, in which nature is as truly existent in God as God is subsistent in self-consciousness."

Kant had received his guests in his bedroom, seated in a chair by a closed window. When Schelling and Hegel finished with their plea Kant appeared to be asleep. The year is 1803 and he is sick and a little senile. He will die the following year, two years after the publication of the second of Hegel's *Essays*. (Post hoc, but not propter hoc—although if Kant had read the *Essays*, they might have shortened his life.) The silence continues. Hegel turns rather brusquely toward the door. He finds the stale air in the room oppressive. (Kant did not allow windows to be opened as he believed that bed bugs, which had been torturing him for years, fly in through the window.) Schelling bows elegantly in the direction of Kant. It is then that Kant gets up from his chair with great effort, holding himself by the table next to his chair and, slowly returning the bow, mutters, "I honor humanity in you."11 Schelling, quite touched, answers with a charming smile, "Sir, we honor divinity in you." He rushes to help the faltering Kant into his chair. But the old man does not want help. And Schelling, bowing once more, follows Hegel into the hall, leaving the great reflector to his bugs.

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4. First published by H. Nohl in 1907 and in large part translated by T. M. Knox and R. Kroner in 1948 (see Bibliographical Index).
5. See below, p. 82. Also *F & K*, p. 55.
6. These two sorts of objects, the ordinary and the scientific, were at that time not yet so different from one another as to cause much of a problem concerning their relation.
xxxvi
Walter Cerf

8. See H. S. Harris' Introduction, p. 22.
11. Ibid., p. 378. In the spirit of this imaginary scene I have taken some liberties with the passages in Prof. Schwarz’ book.