CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This is a book about global environmental politics and global environ-
mental governance. It is not, however, about "global" as the term is often
used. I deliberately use the term "global" in place of "international" to make
the point that the politics of the global environment encompass much
more than the interactions of states.[1] Instead, I write here about an emerg-
ing form of "global" politics and governance that is rooted in the civil
societies of many different countries but is also, to a growing degree,
transnational in its reach, articulated via a complex set of knowledge-based
linkages and, at the same time, sensitive to differences among local places.
The emergence of this global environmental "regime" is a response to what
is often called an "environmental crisis," but which is more properly under-
stood as a reaction to certain processes of social transformation at work
upon human civilization and its constituent societies. It is for this reason
that, as will be seen in chapter 2, I argue that "global environmental change"
is best conceived of as a *social* rather than a *physical* phenomenon.

The arguments developed in this book therefore revolve around two
somewhat different (and sometimes clashing) themata. There is, first of all,
a framing theme rooted in the sociology of knowledge, which focuses on
the ways in which the worldviews underlying broad social practices change,
and how these changes play themselves out over the longer term (see
chapter 3, below, and Lipschutz & Mayer 1993). What I analyze here, in this
respect, is what is often called the "environmental movement," but is better
understood as a transnational system of rules, principles, norms, and prac-
tices, oriented around a very large number of often dissimilar actors, fo-
cused on environmental protection, sustainability, and governance.[2] While
this transnational "regime" is much too broad and diverse to characterize
in a few words, I have chosen to use the term *global civil society*, in
preference to other possibilities, for three reasons. First, the term provides
a convenient sort of shorthand. Second, it underlines the grounding of this
sector in societal processes as opposed to state-centered, institutionalized
political ones. And, third, it suggests a form of social action somewhat
parallel to the holism that one finds in some ecological models, without

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suggesting the indivisibility of the planet so characteristic of much environmental analysis.

The argument, as developed here, is that the environmentally-oriented sector of global civil society is, whether consciously or not, engaged in a longer-term project to modify what can be regarded as the underlying constitutive rule basis of modern civilization and to develop new modes of local as well as transnational governance.[3] In doing so, global civil society is laying the basis for broad institutional, social and political change, although I should add that success in this endeavor is by no means assured.

The notion of "civil society" is one with a long history, but it generally refers to those forms of association among individuals that are explicitly not part of the public, state apparatus, the private, household realm or the atomistic market (Cohen & Arato 1992; Walzer 1992, 1995; Larkins & Fawn 1996). Civil society is important in global politics in that it is a sector of the state-society complex where social change often begins; for a number of reasons, which I address in this book, actors in civil society are a force for social and political change, in both the domestic and global arenas (see chapter 3; Lipschutz 1992/96). This does not mean that global civil society is a unity; it is riven by many divisions, more than one finds in even the international state system. Nonetheless, there are segments of this global civil society that are oriented in ways that specifically promote social and political change.

The second theme of this book is a policy-oriented one.[4] This focus concerns the formulation and implementation of environmental policy and, in particular, the possibilities of carrying out commitments implied or required by the terms of international environmental agreements. I take it as a given that environmental protection and sustainable development are "public goods" to be provided through various mechanisms of national and global governance. While this point might be disputed by some (e.g., Rubin 1994), it is not a terribly controversial statement. Given that the state and its agencies, as well as markets, are primarily engaged in the maintenance and reproduction of social structure, under conditions of great stress and dynamic change, what is the likelihood of developing and implementing successful policies to protect the environment?[5] For that matter, how is a state, such as one typically found in the developing world, to make decisions about the allocation of resources (Ascher & Healy 1990)? How are markets, operating primarily to satisfy short-term individual interests, to take account of environmental externalities and future generations (Ekins & Max-Neef 1992)? This is especially problematic when administrative structures dedicated to exploitation are strong while those intended to protect or conserve Nature are weak. The dilemma is further complicated by the difficult, short-term tradeoffs to be made between high rates of economic

growth, that often benefit only elites, and strategies of environmental con-
servation, restoration and sustainability, that promise greater justice for all
but fewer resources to the well-off. These are obviously questions of great
concern to those who would protect or sustain the environment.

Although these two themes are quite different in ontological *and* epis-
temological terms, they are not unrelated. The policy theme has to do with
material practices; the sociology of knowledge theme with the social beliefs
that underpin those practices. One has to do with changing material prac-
tices; the other with the fundamental changes in beliefs that would be
necessary to embed changed practices in social institutions. Or, to put it
another way, if policy is not accompanied by an explanatory framework that
somehow accounts for the need for a particular change, it is unlikely that
human behavior will change so as to make the policy an effective one.
These ideas will be further developed below, and in the chapters to follow.
The remainder of this chapter lays out the problem(s) addressed in this
book and summarizes how I approach them.

Learning

In an oft-quoted passage—almost a throwaway line—Max Weber once
wrote:

> Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct.
> Yet, very frequently the "world images" that have been created by "ideas"
> have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been
> pushed by the dynamic of interest (Gerth & Mills 1946:200; see also
> Lipschutz 1989; Robertson 1992).

While Weber was never very clear about what, exactly, he meant by this
formulation, it nonetheless captures one of the central puzzles of both the
policy and sociology of knowledge aspects of this volume and, in particular,
the first part of this book. Weber's statement also raises an ontological issue
related to the question of determinism: Does the material base determine
the ideological, as some historical materialists would have it, or do the
arrows point the other way? Indeed, if we are to think about practice aimed
at changing social structures—inasmuch as I will argue in chapter 2, it is
these social formations that bear major responsibility for environmental
degradation—where do we begin?

One place to begin is with policy, as it is being made. Much atten-
tion is being focused on negotiations and activities by states and inter-
national organizations at the international level where, it is hoped, the

infrastructure for global environmental sustainability might be established (Haas, Keohane & Levy 1993). I do not take it for granted that the mechanisms likely to be proposed and implemented by states at the international level to protect the environment and promote environmental sustainability will necessarily make it possible to achieve these goals. There are a number of reasons for making this assertion and they are addressed in detail in chapter 2; suffice it here to say that the obstacles to successful implementation are to be found in the relationships between the "local" and the "international."

A primary obstacle, however, involves how we conceptualize global environmental change. As often as not, damage to the environment is described in terms of its *physical* characteristics—the declining numbers of a particular species, the loss of so many inches of soil, the presence of so much pollution in air or water, the increase in average global temperature or the decrease in stratospheric ozone concentrations—with the implication that policy should focus on the things that can be counted instead of the things that count. Rather than seeing environmental change as solely a biogeophysical phenomenon, as argued in chapter 2, we should also think of it as a *social* phenomenon. After all, it is the particular structure and features of our political, social, and economic institutions that lead us to abuse our environment, and this argues for a reconfiguration of institutions rather than more conceptually-simple and simplistic notions such as changes in the "numbers." But such institutional reconfigurations are already underway. They include efforts to create new institutions of governance based on the "construction" of common property (or common-pool) resource systems that rely on self-enforcing solutions to the collective action problem (Ostrom 1990; Hechter 1990; Lipschutz 1991a). They also involve the construction of the global "regime," mentioned above, through the transmission, via global networks, of knowledge about these schemes that can be replicated in many places.

Chapter 3 returns to the questions posed above about the relationship between the material and ideal where human society and Nature are concerned. Answers can be formulated in a number of different ways, and there are any number of philosophers and ethicists grappling with them (Reagan 1984; Sagoff 1988; Stone 1993). In chapter 3, I am less interested in the relationship between social systems and Nature—that point is taken up in chapters 7 and 8—than in the ways new bodies of knowledge help, in effect, to restructure and reconstitute these systems. I prefer this approach for two reasons: First, it acknowledges that neither society nor Nature are static. Second, such bodies of knowledge help to establish the basis for changes in beliefs and practices.

In chapter 3, two complementary frameworks are offered for under-standing the process of change in social practices and systems. These can be seen as two parts of an "agency-structure" system (Wendt 1987). The structure part is based on the notion of "actor networks," a framework that has been developed by scholars of what are called "large technical systems." Such systems consist of both physical and non-physical components, hard-ware as well as rules, organizations as well as information (Bijker, Hughes & Pinch 1987; Hughes 1987).

The second framework is focused on the possibilities of agency. It has been formulated by Robert Cox (1987) and Stephen Gill (1993), and relates changes in modes and social relations of production to changes in what they call, borrowing from Fernand Braudel, "historical structures." These structures offer the materials with which agents can make choices, both individually and collectively, about their futures. Such structures are, as often as not, legitimated and maintained by both state and society; they are the mechanisms of social reproduction as well as social change.

At first glance, the two frameworks might appear quite different. To the contrary, they are closely related. Let me clarify this point (and play off Weber) with an example based on trains and tracks. These, I claim, are not just "hardware" that people have used to get from here to there; they are also constitutive of a body of knowledge that, in its day, helped to recon-struct social practice and structure.[6] The first trains appeared in Britain during the second decade of the nineteenth century. By the 1830s, steam-powered trains were in common use and, within forty years, networks of rails could be found crossing all of the world's continents.[7] Trains had fundamental effects on markets, politics, and the conduct of war. Not only did they alter material practices in these three realms, they also changed fundamental understandings of those practices and their rules of operation, too. Thus, I use the term "body of knowledge" to indicate something that has major material and ideational impacts on societies and the ways in which they function and organize themselves.[8]

In 1820, a world webbed *with* rails was hardly imagined. By 1900, a world *without* rails was hardly imaginable, even though new modes of transportation—the automobile and airplane—were already beginning to appear and would, within a matter of decades, become dominant. In es-sence, trains were a material factor—a large technological system—that changed people's worldviews. But to argue that they were the next logical step in transportation is to be too clever by half (and note that, even as late as the 1870s, urban rail systems were often horse-powered). And surely they were not immediately and unequivocally accepted by society at large. What then was the dynamic? What was the relationship between the material and

ideational processes? Why did railroads penetrate so deeply while, more recently, nuclear power has met with such strong social resistance (Rochlin 1994)?

Robert Cox argues, in essence, that changes in the dominant mode of production in a society and, indeed, the world, bring with them changes in what he calls people's *intersubjective ethics* and *rationalities* (which I understand to correspond to my use of ideal, ideological, and ideational, even though these three are not identical). These types of changes do not coincide with political or even generational cycles; they are more closely linked to "historical structures" that change only very slowly. This does not mean that material change determines absolutely ideational change, although the causal arrows seem mostly to point that way in Cox's model. As presented in chapter 3, the arrows pointing the other way are important, too, and it behooves us to look more closely how the material and ideal are mutually constitutive.

However irrelevant it might seem to the environmental case, my invocation of trains is not. The difficult question is: what constitutes a contemporary parallel to the large technological system of the nineteenth century that was the railroad? "Environmental change" involves such a parallel. Let us regard industrial civilization's cumulative impacts on the environment not merely as a set of somewhat disjoint physical phenomena or even the aggregation of the outputs of a broad range of human practices. Consider them, instead, as the consequence of a globally-integrated material structure formed by the cumulation of ideas, practices and technologies. The emerging and corresponding "body of knowledge" then has to do with how this process is taking place and how it might be dealt with.

Such a body of knowledge is not only about describing, however; it is also forcing us to change our understanding of the world, where we belong in it, and how we act in it. In studying the ways in which this body of knowledge is being propagated through human societies, thereby changing not only their material features but their ideational ones, we may also come to better understand the dynamics of large-scale social change. In chapter 3, I draw upon the literature on the sociology of knowledge and the constructivist approaches to the problem of agency and action to suggest how this process is taking place before our very eyes, even though it is not immediately apparent from the parts.

In essence, chapter 3 shows that the activities of "environmentalists"— in both the scientific and political senses—within global civil society, are helping to change the ideational frameworks that support one set of constructions of social reality by replacing old intersubjective rationalities and ethics with new ones. Advocates of biodiversity do more than just bring animals, plants, and bugs into the charmed circle of human ethics and law;

they fundamentally change society's understanding of the relationship *between* humanity and Nature. Those who practice environmental preservation and/or restoration are motivated not only by utilitarian goals, they are also engaged in ethical activities. Those who organize in towns and cities to control industrial and automotive pollution are not only concerned for their collective health, they are also changing the connections between political economy and environment. They are all engaged in similar transformative activities. The result is that, slowly but surely, a "body of knowledge" is being adapted, adopted, and integrated into social practice and beliefs. This involves the negotiation of new meanings of Nature, in which process we are "reconstructing" Nature as well as ourselves (Evernden 1992).

At this point, the reader might rightfully ask: "What does this have to do with global politics, whether environmental or not?" My argument here has as much to do with the distinction *between* as the linkages *among* the local and the global. Rather than repeating clichés, or invoking Tip O'Neill (the U.S. Congressman and Speaker of the House from Boston who argued that "All politics is local"; see Salisbury 1993), I would only make two points. First, everyone's experience of the world is centered where they are: The "global" has no material existence except insofar as it impacts on the individual, who is ineluctably restricted to a single place at any one time (CNN, economic integration and global air travel notwithstanding). Second, however, everyone is aware that the world is much more than the place in which they find themselves: Each "local" is part of a number of globe-girdling systems through which actions in one place can be transmitted and made known to other places (Robertson 1992). More to the point, the activities we ordinarily describe as "international" have no effect except as they motivate changes in the behavior and practices of individuals, or groups, acting locally. And this is the crux of my claim that this book addresses *global* environmental politics.

The Green World

How significant are these processes of social change? How can they be studied and measured? How can we "know" without experiencing such change? Can we be sure that change will be for the better? Major shifts in social beliefs and practices almost always occur at imperceptible rates and require long periods of time to become visible. Only when war or some other catastrophe substantially destroys the material base of society do we see rapid, radical changes in the belief structures of societies.[9] Even then, the "ruins" of earlier periods may remain discernible, even if only faintly so. As Georgi Derlugian puts it, "History is an enormously inertial process"

(1994). Otherwise, such changes take generations, if not longer, and occur in and through historical structures.

In the final part of this book, I will return to these questions and the policy and framework issues raised above. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 represent the empirical core of this book, presenting studies of global civil society and its environmental practices in three different parts of the world: California, Hungary, and Indonesia. The framework developed in the first part of the book influences, but does not determine, the stories told in these three chapters. I eschew the more traditional inductive or positivist approaches of social science in describing and understanding the types of phenomena discussed here. Instead, I operated along inductive-deductive-inductive lines in thinking, researching, and writing; hence the shift, at this point in the book, to place-specific "data."

The logic of the three research sites is, perhaps, not immediately apparent. They have as much to do with expediency—particular funding opportunities, the availability of graduate students with appropriate interests, language, and expertise—as a critical comparative element. The first research site is an industrialized society in the "West"; the second, an industrialized society in the old Soviet Bloc (or "East," as we used to call it); the third, a developing society in the "South." At the same time, all three cases are representative of "developmental" states, in the sense that the exploitation of the resource base of each has been and is legitimated by the state and has been and is central to social reproduction. But each state as a whole is not really at issue here; the specific focus of these chapters is much more the local than state or "nation," and what emerges is a fairly high degree of diversity even within each country. Hence, I maintain something of a fiction in calling each of these studies characteristic of the country within which they are found, but it is a fiction that is necessary, if not entirely precise.

Beyond this, however, there are a set of common characteristics that serve to unite the three cases, and that provide the basis for the fieldwork behind the chapters. First, although I had originally conceptualized "global civil society," in its local and national manifestations, as independent of or in opposition to the state, it became increasingly clear during my research that this was not the case. In contrast with some romantic views of the "new" social movements, and the academic literature focusing on and describing them, environmentalism and the environmental movement cannot be seen as, somehow, being fully autonomous from the state. Indeed, as John Walton (1992) makes clear in his study of water politics in the Owens Valley of California, states and social movements are part of a mutually-constitutive relationship *between* state and civil society. This remains the case even when they seem set on opposing tracks.[10]

Ultimately, these cases focus on the role of place—of specific places or regions—centered in larger, historically-contingent, state-driven political economies, as well as the actions of individuals and groups in those places, and the linkages between groups in those places and agents in other places. This is not to say only that people in Indonesia, California, and Hungary are in contact with one another; it is to say that, through the networks of global civil society, they are all participants in a shared episteme (Ruggie 1975), exposed to similar material factors, ethics, and intersubjective rationalities. "Tree-huggers" and "water-lovers" in Indonesia, California, and Hungary (there are very few of the former in Hungary) are all linked by a globally-shared system of symbols, knowledge creation and transmission, even though their practices are driven by the histories, politics, and ecologies of the places in which they act.

The research design utilized in the construction of these chapters draws on work in rural sociology elaborated by Norman Long and Ann Long (1992), and their collaborators, and described in detail by Andrew Long (1992): discourse and situational analysis.[11] As he puts it:

> [D]iscursive forms are the socio-historical product of actors' practical engagements with their world that combine many factors. . . . The definition of a particular discursive form, whose parameters are diffuse, can only come from an understanding of a particular field context and those actors involved in that arena. The situational method concerned with norms or rules of conduct is in effect another way of talking about and identifying discursive forms. . . . [S]uch norms (discursive forms) are translated (by actors) into practices that are ultimately manipulated in particular situations to serve particular ends (A. Long 1992:165).

In the three regions, therefore, the application of this approach has involved beginning at a distance, interviewing individuals involved in environmental organizations and activities, reading and analyzing printed materials and, eventually, focusing on action in one or two localities. While each of the specific stories told here are still "in progress" and, hence, incomplete, they nonetheless illustrate the relationships between global and local, and the central importance of the local in the reconstruction of the global.

As might be expected, the three cases are, in many ways, very different, even though for the purposes of this book, similarities are central. These differences are a function of the individual histories and political economies of both locale and country. Through these differences, however, it is possible to see that the emergence of discourses centered on Nature and resource exploitation are a response to the specific crises facing each "developmental" state. In each instance, the state has been and is instru-

mental in allocating property rights over resources and providing a stable political context within which exploitation and development can take place (Mulgan & Wilkinson 1992:341–42). Consequently, as the material conditions of local life are threatened or undermined, there emerges the possibility of different developmental discourses coming into play. These threaten the legitimacy and relationship of state to society and, in turn, can undermine the political stability so essential to the development process.[12] The state, therefore, finds itself in the curious position of having to legitimize behavior that forces changes in developmental strategies.

The history of "environmentalism" in California illustrates this process. The phenomenon can be traced back at least as far as John Muir and Gilbert Pinchot, in the late nineteenth century, and the Progressive/Conservationist movements of the early twentieth century, that eventually led to the creation of National Parks and National Forests (Hays 1980; Yaffee 1994). The Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Earth Island Institute[13] and other well-known environmental organizations were launched in California, and many other groups have since established offices there. The state is home to thousands of small, local operations, whose interests extend from conventional, "Not in my Back Yard" (NIMBY)-type issues all the way to those of global extent and implication. Environmentalist ideology is well-represented not only in the state legislature but also in the state's bureaucracies in Sacramento. Indeed, it was the infamous Santa Barbara channel oil spill of 1967 that is often considered the first "shot" fired in the rise of environmentalism over the past three or so decades.

California is not, however, unique in the United States in terms of the profusion of organizations and activists. Indeed, in some ways it is paradigmatic for a pattern that could be traced in most, if not all, of the states and provinces of North America. Where California is, perhaps, unusual is in the efforts undertaken by the *state* to problematize the society-Nature relationship through bioregionalism, a process described in chapter 4.

"Bioregionalism" is a term without a very precise definition; Humpty-Dumpty would have liked it (see Andruss, et al. 1990). I use the term here in a broad sense, to describe conscious and concrete efforts to reconcile human social institutions and practices with what we think of as (but which are really not) systems of "Nature,"[14] and to do so in an integrated sense, that˜is, one that considers the relationships and interactions of resources and human institutions in a comprehensive manner. While there is an extensive historical record of resource management districts—water, air, soil, etc.—and even considerable experience with ecosystem-based coordinated resource management planning (or "CR[I]MP," as it is called in California), efforts to institutionalize a bioregional approach through localized

politics are quite new.[15] If these efforts succeed in California, it is quite probable that they will be picked up and replicated elsewhere.[16]

Hungary presents a different story. Although the country possesses a history of nature conservation, oriented largely around water projects and agricultural development launched in the early- to mid-nineteenth century, the modern environmental movement is only about fifteen or twenty years old. The regimes of the old Soviet Bloc paid lip service to the observance of environmental standards and laws. They also found it expedient to profess a commitment to environmental regulation as a means of generating "credit," both economic and political, with Western countries. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, however, the material reality was quite different from the regulatory ideal (DeBardeleben 1991; Pryde 1991; Feshbach & Friendly 1992; DeBardeleben & Hannigan 1995). The price of such policy is now apparent, for example, in the declining life expectancies of Russian men (Specter 1995).

Human welfare and Nature played second and third fiddles to industrialism, resulting in concomitant pollution on a massive scale without, in the final analysis, very much in the way of economic success to show for the effort. Somewhat paradoxically, the environmental movements in many of these formerly-Socialist countries, Hungary included, arose not so much in response to such pollution—since data were closely held by the state—but as protests against the totalitarian, society-colonizing practices of the Party state. In Hungary, such protest developed in reaction to a foreign-financed, state-planned project to dam the Danube River—a pre-eminent symbol of Hungary and its history—for a product as mundane as electricity. The protest movement became a political "Trojan Horse"—oppositional politics by other means, so to speak—and played an important role in the gradual discrediting of the old regime.

After 1989, the force of this movement was largely spent, as participants flocked to join the many parties springing up to contest seats in the new Parliament. Those left behind found it necessary to rebuild the movement, and to make the case that the concerns motivating the *Duna Kör* (Danube Circle/Blue Danube) protests had not withered away. For reasons to be explored in chapter 5, however, these efforts have not, and are not, taking place in a vacuum. Budapest is to European environmentalists today as Lisbon was to European spies during World War II: a hotbed of activity. Why this is so is something of a puzzle, but the result is that many of the several hundred environmental and conservationist groups and organizations scattered about the country are connected not only to the goings-on in the country's capital, but also to organizations in Eastern and Western Europe and the United States.

Hungary is not a "green" country, but environmental awareness is, perhaps, as high as, if not higher than, any other of the post-bloc states. Of particular importance to the arguments presented in this book are the "on-the-ground" activities of many of these groups, organized around the preservation or restoration of various aspects of the environment, especially rivers and streams. This is, I argue in chapter 5, partly a cultural artifact of the country's environmental history, although it also grows out of the material role of rivers and streams in the everyday life of industrial societies. These projects act as a potential core of both environmental protection and awareness. The hope is that a gradual improvement in the former will lead to growth in the latter, which will provide broader support for the former, and so on. In a country under economic stress, as Hungary is at present, such dialectical processes are likely to be more effective than abstract appeals to ethics and humanity.

Indonesia presents still another model of the ways in which environmental beliefs and practices are adopted, adapted, and integrated into the political and social life of a country. Indonesia falls, of course, into the category we often characterize as "developing" or "Southern." Such a categorization tends to obscure vast economic, social, and cultural differences within the country. In many respects, the differences between cities in Indonesia and those in industrialized countries are smaller than the contrasts between Jakarta and parts of the archipelago such as Kalimantan; indeed, it is sometimes easier to get to the peripheral islands from the "outside world" than it is from the capital.[17] And, the political system of the country is such as to discourage the growth and freedom of organizations that dissent from official policies and postures, which include lip service to environmental quality and protection of indigenous resources, such as tropical forests. In practice, however, resource degradation and destruction are pervasive, abetted by patterns of ownership and contracting that are very attractive to international capital and often have as much to do with family ties as economic efficiency and profitability.

Yet, even here one finds an active and growing part of global civil society. As discussed in chapter 6, written by Judith Mayer, many of the groups in this network are as advanced in their sophistication and skills as any group in Washington, D.C., and they have extensive connections to organizations in other parts of the world.[18] And, as is the case in Hungary, such connections sometimes bypass the capital entirely. On the one hand, researchers and representatives from universities and organizations in the industrialized world travel to the provinces and trek into the jungles to make common cause with those peoples whose resource management strategies are threatened by Indonesia's integration into global markets. On the other hand, Indonesian activists often take short-term political and intel-

lectual refuge from domestic pressures by spending time at foreign universities and in the foreign offices of international environmental organizations. It is in and through their activities in these regions that one begins to understand how global environmental networks have begun to make connections with sophisticated local activists struggling against the processes of underdevelopment and environmental destruction, even in very remote parts of the world.

Indonesia's official environmental policies and politics are, thus, under pressure from within and without. In a state where control of the periphery by the center is often tenuous, at best, the potential for relatively independent, localized strategies is great. Moreover, as was the case in Hungary prior to 1989, environmentalism in Indonesia offers a space in which political organizing and struggle can be undertaken. Increasingly, environmentalists are making common cause with human rights activists to pressure governments for greater political freedom. As a result, environmentalists in countries like Indonesia must walk a fairly narrow line, if they are not to be accused by the government of illegal or unpatriotic activities.[19]

In many ways, these three cases are typical of specific categories of states and the environmental groups and activities that develop in them and, therefore, they differ from one another. But the similarities between the three should not be overlooked. Both California and Indonesia are highly urbanized but also depend on the exploitation and marketing of rural resources in world markets. The Suharto regime bears important resemblances to the pre-1989 government in Hungary. And Hungarian and Indonesian environmentalists are every bit as well-educated and skilled as their counterparts in California. I would not want to exaggerate the similarities, but an important concern here is the way in which similar beliefs and practices have appeared in three very different settings. In the final section of this book, I turn to an exploration of why this is so, and the implications for policymaking with respect to global environmental issues.

What can be thy Place?

Many observers and scholars have made note of the growing prominence of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in international as well as local politics (Princen & Finger 1994; Wapner 1995a, 1995b, 1996). But one question remains: Does this movement differ from other transnational social movements, especially those of decades past, such as the labor movement? The question is an important one for the following alternative reasons: If the environmental movement is similar to those social and political movements of the past, it is essentially engaged in a

project of reform and it can be described with much the same models applied to those earlier movements (Stevis 1995). If the environmental movement is similar to other social movements in existence today, it arises in response to the same fragmenting processes that are breaking down the social structures of industrial society and replacing them with new, atom-ized identities (Offe 1990; Hall 1991). But perhaps neither of these two is entirely accurate. Perhaps the environmental movement (and other ele-ments of global civil society) incorporates some of the features of both but is also different in key respects. This would be especially true with respect to its generation by considerations of *place*.

I subscribe to the third alternative. As suggested in chapter 7, place is of growing importance to the actions of the environmental element in global civil society, for reasons having as much to do with practicality as with individual and collective identities. Places (or habitats or landscapes) are not abstractions, as are globalized concepts such as climate change or biodiversity. Environmental damage, whether triggered by biogeophysical changes or development, occur in specific places, in people's "backyards." Often, these also form the bases of their livelihoods and histories. It is for this reason that place is important.

More to the point, the meanings that people, acting collectively, give to Nature around them are critical to their sense of identity and location in the world, even as they are often central to their local modes of produc-tion and social reproduction. We all live and work in concrete places, not in some sort of abstract global space. This is a sentiment that does not seem terribly relevant in a time of increasingly globalized markets and culture, yet it is, I believe, a very specific reaction to the process of globalization. For better or worse, this sense of identity with place is not so very different from the recent rise of ethnic identities in many parts of the world, a point also explored in chapter 7 (see also Robertson 1992).

The identification with place has implications, moreover, beyond sim-ply acting locally. To return to my earlier arguments about the developmen-tal state, the control over processes of extraction and production, *in specific places*, is one element that legitimizes the state in the eyes of society. A state that loses such control is not only weak, it is also unable to "deliver the goods" that generate societal support. In other words, it begins to lose the capacity to govern (Lipschutz 1991b). Insofar as local action is also about local control over the development process, the state may find itself weakened or confronted by local political opposition. Hence, the process of attempting to return or regain some degree of control becomes one of finding ways to legitimize state involvement in local activities. Not all states manage to do this and some, confronted by decentralization and fragmen-tation, simply fall apart. Others find ways to compromise. In all instances,

the central question becomes: Who decides? And this leads to the final chapter of the book, in which the issue of governance is addressed.

Surely, the reader may argue at this point, environmental organizations and lobbyists are powerful in the capitals of many countries and have had significant influence on law and policy but, in aggregate, the activist core constitutes only a small fraction of each country's citizens, does it not? And the activities of local groups, however many there are, cannot possibly influence global politics. Chapter 8 returns to the notion of global civil society in its environmental manifestation and the role of global civil society in environmental governance. There, I further develop the argument that global civil society represents the emergence of a form of global governance that is, in some ways, complementary to the state and state system and, in other ways, in opposition to them.

Inasmuch as national governments are either unable or unwilling to engage in the policies required to set right a broad variety of environmental problems, strategies for dealing with them must emerge elsewhere. The creation of common-pool property resource systems through, for example, restoration projects or bioregionalism, involves the construction of new institutions for governance. These institutions may or may not have the blessings of government, but they do regulate the use of the place or ecosystem with which they are concerned. Are such institutions mechanisms simply for reform, or do they represent agents of real social change? It depends. We cannot generalize across all societies nor make confident predictions about the future. Still, I believe that such arrangements will be essential if we, as a civilization, are to "make peace with the planet" (Commoner 1990), and find ways to live with each other, too.