

Introduction

Events every day remind us that ours is a global world. The crumbling of the Berlin Wall, student uprisings in China, the war in the Persian Gulf—all are happenings that seem perilously close no matter where we live. As the world has grown smaller, relations among nation-states have become much more complex. Drugs on the streets of Boston, Seattle, or Des Moines are embedded in a massive web of international relations extending across two continents. The opening of McDonald's in Moscow signals changing Soviet-American relations as well as the far reaches of multinational corporate structures across national and ideological boundaries. Increasingly terms such as *globalization* and *internationalization* are a part of our vocabulary, crucial to our thinking about what it means to live in a world that is shrinking into a single place.

In religious matters as well, we are forced to think more globally. Not only are we more and more aware of the millions of people around the world who believe differently than we do, but the reality of global politics and conflicting ideologies is impressed upon us in ways that easily provoke our fears. We see, hear, and read about how religion and politics are entangled in one tense spot after another, such as in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the Middle East. Religion has become “politicized” and politics “religionized” in many quarters—what happens in any one of them bears directly upon us and the rest of the world in an age of potential nuclear destruction.

We cannot, in fact, adequately understand what is going on in the United States without placing events and trends in a broader context. Consider the nation's rapidly growing Muslim, Asian, and Hispanic populations. These new populations did not just come onto the scene but are themselves a reflection of the nation's shifting pattern of economic and political ties with other countries in the period since World War II. Political and ideological ties with the Middle East opened up possibilities for Muslim immigrants, many of whom have chosen to remain and settle in this country, thus making Islam one of the rapidly growing faiths in the United States. Large numbers of Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Chicanos have entered the country during these years—an influx of people gradually reshaping American Catholicism as Hispanic culture and traditions

are integrated into church life. Broadened ties with Asia, and especially with Japan, combined with American intervention in Vietnam, have resulted in a stream of "new immigrants" from many Asian countries. The United States' deep involvement in a global network of political alliances and trade relations over the past fifty years has created a new-style religious pluralism within its own borders — the global context of religions and peoples "writ small" on the nation.

A global network of political alliances and trade relations also creates its own vulnerabilities — potential shifts in a nation's power within the larger order. When the nation's niche in the larger system changes, cultural and institutional ramifications follow. The United States' standing as a world power, for example, has long sustained a sense of national purpose and patriotic pride, which, in turn, has helped to shape normative faith and the outlook of the American people. In times of national prosperity and of economic and technological advance, the American Way of Life as an ideology thrives; the mood of the nation is upbeat. In times of uncertainty and mounting threats to world dominance, however, the normative matrix of politics and faith — often referred to as "civil religion" — is easily transformed. Fears that the United States might be losing its hegemony in the world economy and a generalized loss of confidence in the nation's values and institutions as, for example, in the post-Vietnam years, parallel, not surprisingly, a loss of vitality and influence for the mainline Judeo-Christian traditions.

A World-Order Perspective

As these examples suggest, a more global perspective sheds insights on cultural and religious change. The advantages of such a perspective are more and more recognized in the social sciences. Theories of social and political change once cast primarily in terms of the internal dynamics of individual societies (e.g., structural differentiation, industrialization, modernization) are now increasingly challenged by more global perspectives. It is recognized that individual societies often are not the best context in which to examine change and that it is possible to identify transnational systems that better locate what is happening. Older notions of linear, evolutionary change over time within societies have given way to concerns with global systems, the relations among societies, and changing configurations of world order. Rather than theories of history of the sort advanced in years past by Spencer, Toynbee, and others, the newer paradigms posit systems of nation-states as power players and give attention to changes in the balance of power among them, as, for example, in historian Paul Kennedy's recent, best-selling *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987).

The newer paradigm goes by various names: world order, world systems, and international relations. "World order" and "world systems" are closely associated, but both are different from international relations as usually understood. Immanuel Wallerstein's work (1974, 1979), more than anyone else's, has shaped world-systems theory. As distinct from international-relations theory, which has looked upon the global system as a set of relationships among relatively separate entities, world-systems theory for Wallerstein posits the existence of a much more integrated entity with a logic and structure of its own. As a theory it stresses, first and foremost, a whole-to-parts mode of thinking that assumes *a priori* world social relations, and not simply among component parts, and it is in this sense a model of social order at the most generalizable level.

For Wallerstein, the focus of analysis is the modern capitalist world system emerging in the West in the sixteenth century. The term *world* does not refer to the globe but rather to boundaries of the capitalist division of labor. These boundaries are defined in terms of a hierarchical and territorial division of labor based on an exchange of commodities: high-wage goods are produced in the core of the system, and low-wage goods are produced on its periphery. The dominant core seeks to maintain its position of power and control over the periphery by means of effective legitimation and political and economic integration. The attainment and loss of hegemonic power is seen as resulting primarily from the operation of economic forces, and more specifically technological and organizational innovations that significantly alter the competitive advantages among nation-states. As such, the theoretical approach contains a distinct Marxist bias, thus tending to favor economic and material explanations while largely ignoring cultural and religious considerations.

Increasingly, though, scholars are recognizing that cultural factors need not be ignored and that including such factors might indeed enhance a world-systems perspective. Wallerstein himself seems to have moved in this direction, giving more attention in recent writings to "metaphysical presuppositions" and "organizing myths" that help in shaping the modern world system (see Robertson and Lechner, 1985). Roland Robertson suggests that the time has come to "go beyond" relatively simple models of world polity or world economy and to explore the "dynamics of global culture." His point is that globalization has a cultural dimension as well as economic and political ones, all three closely interwoven with one another. Whatever else it may be, the world system is, as Robertson says (1985), a "sociocultural system," the elements of which may be separated *analytically* but not in their actual dynamics. This is not to advance a cultural, or idealist, interpretation in place of others but to encourage a balanced perspective between determinism and voluntarism, and between materialist and nonmaterialist explanations. Thus, Robertson's

plea is for a broadened approach to thinking about world order, and without resorting to reductionism of any kind, either materialist or idealist.

Relevance to the Study of Religion

Is a world-order perspective useful for religious studies? What are its intellectual advantages over other, more customary approaches for studying religion? These are pertinent and timely questions.

Surprisingly little attention has been given to global approaches in the study of religion. In the sociology and anthropology of religion, conceptual models remain limited largely to groups and structures *within* societies, such as Pentecostal migrants, Southern Baptists, middle-class churchgoers, New Agers, religious bureaucracies, and so forth; societies are viewed as systems made up of social classes, institutions, racial and ethnic groups, religious groups, etc. The religious life of whole societies is studied but typically as autonomous units, such as Japanese religion, American Catholicism, and British folk beliefs. Theories of secularization are cast largely in terms of macrosocietal trends, often laden with assumptions about unilinear and irreversible patterns of change, and almost always without concern for the wider relationships among societies. In religious studies more generally, historical and comparative methods of studying religion are the predominant approaches. Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Christianity, and the other great world religions are treated as traditions or subtraditions encompassing beliefs, practices, values, and symbols extending over time and lands. Religions are compared, one with another, usually on the basis of their historical origins and development. Global considerations of power and exchange relations as a general underlying framework tend not, however, to be treated in any systematic manner.

A wider, global perspective would appear to offer many advantages for the study of religion:

One, by focusing upon the larger, transsocietal context, we are sensitized to the dominant patterns of change, which cut *across* societies and religious traditions. Much attention is given already in religious studies to the idiographic, or particular, characteristics of religions and cultures, but this approach overlooks the more generalizable features of continuity and change discernible today. Sorting out these features is essential to understanding the modern world and the relations of religion to modernity, and by establishing what is generalizable we can have a better appreciation of that which is truly particularistic. Religious responses to the common global influences vary enormously—from accommodation to protest—but to understand how and why responses vary, we need to know more about the larger contexts out of which they arise.

Two, a world-order approach offers a rich vantage point for examining trends in “establishment” religion. By virtue of their established status, such religions are closely aligned with political and economic institutions and ideologies. Historically, religious traditions have developed and expanded in ways closely related to trade patterns. The fate of all three institutions—political, economic, and religious—is linked to what happens in the larger global context. In nations experiencing ascendancy and dominance in the world system, establishment religion and ideology is more likely to flourish, while during periods of stagnation and decline, these suffer in popularity. Accentuated are the ebbs and flows, the dynamic rather than the static aspects of religious faiths and traditions.

Three, world order provides perspective on periods of religious unrest and dramatic religious change. Periods such as the 1960s in the United States, the early nineteenth and early seventeenth centuries in England, and the Reformation in the sixteenth century—all characterized by schism, sectarianism, and cult movements—can be viewed as transitional periods, as times of major realignment in the relations between domestic interest groups and world affairs. By exploring transitional periods, we gain insights not only on conditions underlying periods of intense religious activity but also on how to begin to compare watershed periods in religious history.

Four, a global framework forces upon us the concerns of people everywhere for survival and peace, for health and well-being, even for a sense of a common humanity. A nuclear age pulls the world together in a common fate. Indeed the possibility of a single world generates its own religious agenda: it poses new religious questions on the part of people bound together in new ways and encourages the rise of universal theodicies. What once seemed like insurmountable differences separating believers from one another and from nonbelievers, and which would have been in past eras, now diminish in the face of modern circumstances. We become, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith says, “heirs of the whole religious history of humankind.”

Outline of Chapters

The essays in this volume cover a wide range of topics and explore many issues. Contributors were given considerable freedom in developing perspectives, the only major constraint being that the focus was on the Western world, or the cultural and religious developments in relation to the West. Because of the role of the United States in the modern world order, considerable attention was also given to the implications of such a perspective for American religion.

The papers are organized into five sections.

General Considerations

Section I includes two general essays, one by Robert Wuthnow and a second by James Davison Hunter and James E. Hawdon. In what was intended as a broad overview, Wuthnow argues for a global approach because of three major types of contributions. One is that such an approach draws attention to the more general dynamics of modern life in various societies—to features of a world culture, ranging from child-rearing habits and legal patterns to trends toward religious individualism and secularization. Organizational structures as well as religious and cultural styles are all shaped by the emerging conditions of a global existence. To overlook these patterns and trends is to fail to see modern life in its broadest context.

A second contribution is that we gain insight into the deeper changes underlying what appears to be more proximate influences on religion. He cites sectarianism as an example. Ernst Troeltsch's formulation has long been accepted as the classic statement on sects from the time of the Reformation to the end of the nineteenth century. Wuthnow observes, however, that the Protestant countries in which Troeltsch's sects were mainly located lay at the core of an expanding world economy. Economic expansion and industrialization made possible growth in population and a widening territorial division of labor, all of which created social upheavals generating potential recruits for sectarian movements. Their inclusion into an expanding dominant economy increased the likelihood of these movements gradually becoming established churches. Other types of world-economy conditions and dynamics might have produced patterns of sectarianism that are quite different. Thus, what may appear to be a universal characteristic of sectarianism, as some have argued, may be contingent on a particular set of historical and economic circumstances.

A third contribution is that a global perspective helps us to look at phenomena in quite a different way. One example he points to is American Protestant missions to the Third World. Mainline Protestant missionary efforts have scaled back in this century in favor of assistance to indigenous ministries, supplying social services and lobbying for social justice by political means. In contrast, evangelical and fundamentalist missions have grown and have continued to concern themselves primarily with conversions. Merely citing numbers of foreign missionaries can be misleading and minimizes the impact of the missionary enterprise as a whole. "Viewed from the American context," he writes, "it appears that mainstream Protestantism has suffered a serious decline in its missionary efforts. Viewed from a world-order perspective, the decline may be less serious than it would otherwise appear."

In a second general essay, Hunter and Hawdon are concerned with religious authority under conditions of advanced capitalism. With the expansion of the state and growth of the knowledge sector, religious authority has become marginalized from the structures of power in modern society. While religious leaders and influentials once played a dominant role in shaping public cultures, they do so no longer. This is not, as the authors suggest, because religious elites have withdrawn from the task but is, rather, a "consequence of their being structurally displaced." No longer enjoying a dominant cultural role, religious elites must now compete with secular elites to define the symbols of public life. They advance data showing that in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, Switzerland, and France, the number of religious elites has remained relatively constant vis-a-vis the total population, while religious elites as a percentage of other cultural elites has dropped consistently and dramatically over the past century. The expansion of cultural elites in the contemporary world order is truly phenomenal and is crucial to understanding the fate of religious elites in Western societies.

The loss of cultural influence on the part of religious elites, however, has not resulted in their political solidarity. Hunter and Hawdon caution against a "new class" interpretation on the grounds of the diversity of political opinions among elites, both religious and nonreligious. A generally better explanation of ideology is the relative proximity of cultural elites to the mechanisms of profit making—the further removed from the market for their livelihood, the more likely to be critical. Among religious elites (especially Protestants and Catholics) they find theological orientation on an orthodox-progressive continuum to be a strong predictor of political views. The politically meaningful divisions among religious leaders, they conclude, are no longer defined by religious heritage but by how orthodox or progressive they are in theological outlook. The tendency of religious elites toward political polarization amounts to differing forms of posturing in the knowledge sector and strategies for regaining influence: progressives seek to form alliances with those who currently occupy the centers of cultural power, whereas conservatives challenge the legitimacy of powerful elites and seek to transform the center of power. Neither strategy, according to the authors, will likely restore religious elites to authority, given the basic structural realities of advanced capitalism.

Core and Periphery

Section 2 takes up a fundamental issue in world-order thinking—relations of core and periphery. So phrased, concern is with power structures and inequalities embedded in intersocietal relations. Essays here explore developments in various parts of the world in relation to world capitalism, with its core lying in Europe and North America.

Ninian Smart examines the historical experience of China, Japan, India, and Islamic states, and their differing trajectories of development and responses to the impact of colonialism and modern world capitalism. China has sought in various periods to combine Western science and Confucian values, and modern science and Marxism, with ideologies requiring that it abolish much of its past in the interest of either nationalism or socialist collectivism. By contrast, Japan has been successful in creating a vital synthesis between Western and nationalist values by importing Western models of education and by recasting its primeval Shinto tradition. In yet another pattern, India has been successful in its "grafting on" of Western values and modernization while at the same time retaining virtually all of its past, partly, as Smart explains, because of the "new" Hindu ideology, which was able to deal constructively with influences of Christianity, science, democracy, and nationalism. Islam has not fully worked out its independence of the West, and it has yet to produce, in the postcolonial period, a genuine new vision of itself as a faith and ideology. In each instance, the author interweaves political and economic factors with the religious and cultural, showing the impact of modern capitalism.

Smart's essay underscores that what we think of as religious traditions today are truly "inventions of the modern world." This is the case not just for the faiths of colonized lands but for the faiths of the colonizers as well. Christianity in Western countries, and especially liberal Protestantism in the United States, has successfully assimilated modern values such as liberalism, science, and democracy. However, as the author observes, because we are evolving towards a looser conception of core and periphery, the bonds between global capitalism and the United States will likely diminish. The new world order is seen as one in which both economic competition and individual human rights will be important, or as he says, an "order (that) will be 'liberal' in a classical way." His essay concludes with speculation about future trends: greater freedom of religion and corrosion of authorities, internationalism and diminished appeal of patriotism, pluralism of religious worldviews, and religions as transnational spiritual corporations.

Latin America and its relations with the United States is the topic of two papers. In his essay "'God Damn Yanquis' — American Hegemony and Contemporary Latin America," Graham Howes examines the role of religious institutions in legitimating, mediating, and maintaining United States hegemony in contemporary Latin America. Three spheres of religio-political involvement are identified: radical subcultures within Roman Catholicism (Liberation Theology), conservative responses to

this (Opus Dei), and the proliferation of fast-growing evangelical and fundamentalist Protestant sects. Linkages between the United States government and nation-states, and between the religious culture of the United States and its institutional counterparts in Latin America are closely examined.

The Catholic church up until the 1960s, he observes, legitimated the prevailing model of economic development—*desarollo*—which assigned a leading role to foreign capital, trusted in the military as a modernizing agent, and held out hope of sustained economic growth. In the period since, the church has been viewed as a less reliable ally of the United States, thus resulting in more covert involvement by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other United States government agencies in Latin American affairs. Aside from direct political intrusion, religious and ideological involvement ranges from efforts at turning public opinion against the “progressive” church to attempts at cultivating among intellectuals a right-wing, “revisionist” counterculture. It is among three Protestant constituencies—the Pentecostals, the fundamentalist sects, and the burgeoning middle-class evangelicals—that, as Howes says, “American missions and America’s Mission are most clearly coincident.” Utilizing the mass media and funded through bureaucracies based in the United States, growing numbers of Protestants are drawn to a faith possessing a mixture of theological conservatism and traditional anti-communism consonant with the interests of United States foreign policy. Paradoxically, as the Latin American case illustrates, a result of the efforts at using religion itself to try to induce approved political and ideological homogeneity has been the generation of greater religious pluralism.

Juan Carlos Navarro looks more specifically at liberation theology—its teachings and practice, and its implications both for Latin American politics and for Catholicism in the United States. He emphasizes that liberation theology is a dynamic religious force that will continue to evolve as a result of both internal developments and contextual modifications. He points to changes in the past twenty-five years, from the time of the Cuban Revolution to the Nicaraguan conflict: most notably the increased role of Catholic bishops, priests, and lay people in the revolutionary movements. He sees the recent process of democratization in many Latin American countries as in part a development to which liberation theology has made a contribution but also as perhaps “the most important challenge ahead.” With repressive regimes being replaced by relatively open, democratic, but yet still capitalist, governments, have come shifts in thinking (revisions of “dependency theory,” as he describes it) empha-

sizing internal, unexplored opportunities for economic development and general disillusionment with orthodox socialist solutions to social and economic problems.

Navarro views liberation theology as having a significant impact on Catholicism in the United States. He cites the concerns of the American bishops for the welfare of the poor and for distributive justice, and their emphasis upon the moral responsibility of rich nations for underdeveloped countries, as liberationist themes. While not expecting rank-and-file Catholics in the United States to fully endorse these themes, a more likely prospect, as he sees it, is "an increased awareness of Latin American problems in the United States coupled with a process of mutual enrichment of diverse Catholic traditions."

James H. Cone's "Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Third World" shows the reciprocal influence of the Third World on King, and of King on Third World people. He shows that especially in the latter period of his life, Martin Luther King, Jr. began to analyze more deeply the relationships of racism, poverty, and militarism in the policies of the United States government and in the international economic order. His focus on the global implications of racism in relation to poverty and war led him to the conclusion that the slums in American cities are a "system of internal colonialism" not unlike the exploitation in the Third World. King's global vision also helped him to see that the sociopolitical freedom of blacks was closely tied to the liberation of their sisters and brothers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Unless all were free, none were truly free.

King's impact upon the Third World was both symbolic and substantive. His symbolic influence was fourfold: (1) as a symbol of the black struggle for justice in the United States; (2) as a symbol of Third World peoples' struggles against colonialism; (3) as a symbol of the best in the American democratic and Judeo-Christian tradition; and (4) as a symbol of the struggle for world peace through nonviolence. Substantively, King's ideas and philosophy of nonviolence have prompted much debate among Third World leaders and inspired hope to millions throughout the world.

Mission and Ideology

A third set of papers focuses on Western Christian mission and related ideologies. The lead essay by A. F. Walls examines the spread of Christianity over the centuries, and particularly the shift during the twentieth century in the Christian center of gravity from the West toward the southern continents. In 1900 83 percent of Christians lived in Europe and North America; figures available for the late 1980s suggest that some 56 percent of the world's Christians now live in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific. The "Christian heartlands are changing," as Walls

says, and the concerns and priorities of people in these areas will likely shape the next phase of Christianity.

Walls sees this most recent shift in Christianity as related to the general impact of Western culture and hegemony on the southern world but notes that the relationship is not a straightforward one. Simple extension of territorial Christendom during the period of colonialism proved unworkable. The most important factor, he argues, was the simultaneous shift in the center of gravity within the West itself, that is, the Christianization of the United States and rise of the American missionary movement in the nineteenth century. Unlike in Europe where industrialization coincided with Christian decline, in the United States industrial transformation was accompanied by Christian growth. Energetic expansionism, resourcefulness, the application of business methods, the uninhibited use of money, the separation of church and state, and the creative use of voluntary religious societies all combined to give American missions a distinctive quality and momentum. These features have remained a mark of the American missionary movement even to the present, most notably among evangelical Christians.

Lamin Sanneh in "The Yogi and the Commissar: Christian Missions and New World Order in Africa" describes the impact of Christian missions in the indigenous African setting. Contrary to the view that missionaries were overseas agents of their imperial countries and the mission movement itself a source of major social and cultural disruption, Sanneh argues that missionary activity was neither terribly disruptive nor did it suppress indigenous creativity. He looks carefully at the accounts of missionaries themselves, noting that many were inclined to self-scrutiny about what they were doing and recognized the extreme ambiguity of European designs on Africa. Judged on the basis of actual missionary practices and effects in the field rather than on the motives of mission agencies or the intentions of some missionaries, he is inclined toward a generally benign view of the missionary's role in Africa. Thus, he would have us put to rest the political view of missionaries as the "religious surrogates of colonialism," so deeply built into the self-image of the West.

Sanneh proposes instead that the mission movement had a profound impact on the emergence of the new Africa. "If, in the light of the colonial takeover, we can speak justifiably of African capitulation, and, in that setting, of missionary assault on the old order," Sanneh writes, "we can, in the light of vernacular agency of missions, speak equally plausibly of African resistance to the forces of subjection, aided and abetted by missionary sponsorship of projects of cultural and social renewal." Of considerable importance in Sanneh's view was the development of vernacular resources and the promotion of African languages as complete and autonomous vehicles for conveying the Gospel to the people. Western mission-

ary activity had the effect of promoting a sense of awakening and unity in many places. Also, he argues, such activity facilitated African exposure to the world and thus had positive long-run effects on indigenous development.

Michael A. Burdick and Phillip E. Hammond, in "World Order and Mainline Religions: The Case of Protestant Foreign Missions," explore the fit of a world-order perspective using religious data for Great Britain and the United States. They examine empirically the theory that periods of national dominance have been periods of religious florescence for the established churches catering to the middle and upper classes, and its corollary, that with a loss of dominance comes a decline in socially established religiosity. Although intuitively appealing as a theory, it should be revised, they suggest. First, they show that contrary to theoretical prediction, "establishment" church membership peaked in the United States before the United States *began* its world system ascendancy. Several major established denominations peaked in membership either in the nineteenth century or in the early decades of this century, suggesting, as they say, that "what was reached in the mid-1960s was not just the apex in sheer numbers of membership figures in churches serving 'middle and upper classes' but also the saturation of the religion market."

Data on missionary activity, however, provide the most severe challenge to the simple rise-and-fall thesis of national power within the world system. Foreign missions in the United States, more so than for Great Britain, fail to fit the model. Burdick and Hammond show that the rise and fall of mainline Protestant missionary activity occurs well before the ascendancy and then challenge to America's hegemonic position in the world economy. A change of missionary ideology, seemingly independent of political and economic forces, occurred among the more liberal, mainline Protestants: from conversion in the nineteenth century to compassion in the 1920s, and finally, by 1970, to companionship with those to whom they ministered. Evangelical missionaries, in contrast, adhering to more traditional theological views, have grown enormously both in absolute numbers and in relative proportion of all missionary personnel. Evangelical missionary growth was most pronounced between World War II and 1968 — consistent with the world-order model — but the growth has continued to the present, contrary to what might have been expected. They suggest that if we look upon evangelicalism as becoming the "established" religion, then something of a world-order perspective on religious institutions would seem to be upheld.

American Religion and Civic Culture

Section 4 organizes themes pertinent to American religion and civic culture. In the first paper, George M. Thomas offers a "world polity in-

terpretation of United States religious trends since World War II." Major trends identified include an increase in individualism, a growing liberal-conservative cleavage, and the politicization of religion. His approach to explaining these trends is to invoke the notion of "global density" (i.e., incorporation into global economic structures and nation-state involvement in the world polity) and to suggest that greater nation-state authority and status are the context of contemporary religion. A long-term increase in global density results in increased sociocultural heterogeneity and heightened competition and conflict over the nature of symbolic boundaries and the moral constitution of nation and citizen. He sees a concomitant intensification (resurgence, revival) of religious discourse and activity as an integral part of that reconstitution, conflict, and debate.

Because of the intensification of symbolic boundaries in the recent period, religious discourse took the form of social movements reworking those definitions. Thomas interprets the flurry of religious movements as liberal and conservative groups elaborating very different versions of individualism. Liberals stress personal choice, and conservatives stress personal conversion, yet both build on a subjective faith and value human happiness, self-esteem, and fulfillment. Generally, as Thomas says, the culture "defines the individual as a central unit of the nation-state, collective goals in terms of the well-being, happiness and autonomy of the individual, and rational moral action as the guarantor of progress. In short, both sets of movements are constructing the modern citizen and nation, albeit in significantly different ways." Different types of individualism are politicized largely around moral issues — concern about the breakdown of the family, abortion, prayer in schools, growing secularism. In the contemporary American context, conservatives are colorful and forthright, liberals are bland, but Thomas hints at the possibility that this difference might be short-lived.

Max L. Stackhouse, in his essay "Globalization and Theology in America Today," identifies three dimensions of globalization: deprovincialization, internationalization, and universality. Deprovincialization refers to a greater awareness of the larger world, internationalization to a growing interdependency and new levels of commonality, and universality to a basic "metaphysical-moral" vision of life. A theologian and broadly engaging theorist, Stackhouse seeks to weave into a single whole the social-structural aspects of globalization, a normative vision of universal truth and justice, and existential religious concerns of contemporary life. All are crucial, he believes, for creative theological reflection in America today.

His view of world systems reflects his broad orientation: "a modern rediscovery on this side of historical consciousness of what Troeltsch called 'relative natural law,' and what the theologians of old called 'orders

of creation,' now modulated by the results of both the contemporary sense of change and new capacities to cross-culturally tabulate social-scientific information." He is critical of American theology as narrow vision and provincial reflection and calls for a global theology based on moral realities beyond private interest and beyond the privileged insights of our unique historical experience. He draws parallels between global order and what amounts to the ultimate theological affirmation: "the only God worth worshiping liberates, but on the other side of liberation, calls to order—to a universalistic order."

In her essay on "Realism, Just War, and the Witness of Peace," Jean Bethke Elshtain addresses what "just war" might mean in our time. She explores the alternatives—pure war, or holy war if buttressed by ideology and doctrine, based on the rule of force and which sees the foreigner always as an enemy; and also, pure peace, or the Kingdom of God, which holds out hope for a world of ongoing equilibrium, harmony, and perfect order. Neither is satisfactory for one who "struggles to fashion a world of relative order and stability that makes room for and accepts the possibility of conflict." Ironically, as she notes, visions of pure peace often require their dialectical opposite, pure war, to sustain themselves.

Just-war thinking as a possibility, Elshtain insists, requires much of us. It requires serious reflection about what our governments are doing, but more than this it demands a sense of responsibility and accountability, or, as she says, a "morally formed civic character." Just war is not *just* about war: it is an account of politics that seeks to be non-utopian yet to place the political within a larger set of moral concerns and civic duties. Thus, just-war thinking pictures the individual embedded within a framework of overlapping communities and loyalties: families, civil society, state, and international order. The author welcomes a politics that offers values for which one might die but not easy justifications for the need to kill—a set of civic values embodied in a character she describes as the "chastened patriot." The chastened patriot is committed yet detached, compassionate yet critical, someone who recognizes that we have multiple ties and loyalties extending beyond our own nation. She calls for a reconstructed just-war tradition that "makes room for patriotism even as it offers a critique of aggressive nationalism and imperialism, which makes room for internationalism even as it offers a principled rejection of an ideal of one world or one state."

Concluding Reflection

The final two essays were written in response to the other papers as a general critique of world-order thinking in relation to religion. Both authors were asked to reflect broadly about the issues and approaches of this perspective.

W. Barnett Pearce, a communications theorist, ponders whether the dynamics and trends within the world order can be satisfactorily understood using a vocabulary that names objective variables (e.g., economics, social structure) and excludes hermeneutics. His argument is that the act of representing world order as systemic is itself a crucial bit of data about the system. Representing the system in this way is a reflexive act and involves interpretive vocabularies and "stories" of the various component parts. In a complex cybernetic system such as a world-order system, Pearce argues that there must be not only narratives of the various parts but "narratives which describe the relation among other narratives." He proposes the term "eloquence" to direct attention to this more coherent, transcendent form of narrative.

His critique calls for a more rigorous pursuit of what kind of system is comprised by the world order. This will involve considerations of boundaries and structures using multiple vocabularies, of analyst and of analyzed, of the insider and of the outsider, of the core and of the periphery. Pearce argues that as human beings we live *in* discourse, that there are simultaneously multiple, incommensurate discourses, and that the way these discourses intermesh is crucial to understanding the lived experience of persons in the world system.

Rhys H. Williams examines world order as a paradigm for cultural and religious analysis. He dissects the various terms and meanings associated with the phrase *world order*: international, globalization, world system, and world order. His conclusion is that world order is the most appropriate construction because of its relative openness to interpretation and lack of association with a particular theoretical school. In a similar vein with Pearce, he observes that studies of economic, political, or social "order" typically portray that order as an end state rather than as a process, or collection of processes, and that they fail to give attention to the texture and multivocal nature of multiple discourses. Williams notes that a world-systems perspective, while obviously global, also emphasizes attention to local diversity, indigenous traditions, and cultural pluralism. There seems to be, as he says, "the simultaneous assumption that *both processes of core domination and peripheral resistance, are the primary locus of social vitality.*"

The analysis of religion and culture, Williams emphasizes, cannot be divorced from questions of social power. He focuses attention, in the American case, on the debate surrounding the notion of the "public sphere." The issue is not simply who defines the public sphere at present, but also the changes that are developing in the way it is defined. He points to the role of global media and argues that it is essential to understand the differences between the "politics of imagery" and a public forum of viable motives and cultural resources in America today. Religious organi-

zations have played, and continue to play, a crucial part in the formation of and commentary upon public issues, but there is a broadening cultural vocabulary on which to draw, a mixing of religious and nonreligious languages, and a need for greater clarity of how issues get defined and interpreted. An empirical task, he suggests, is to "understand how processes and events around the globe affect these resources for shaping our public sphere."

As is apparent in all five sections, many issues remain to be resolved before there can be any coherent world-order perspective on religion. No real consensus has yet emerged on how to approach the globalization phenomenon, on how to conceptualize what globalization is, or on what it might mean for religion. There is little agreement on basic terms, much less a full-blown vocabulary for intellectual exchange. Given that world order is still evolving as a conceptual approach and that it has received very little attention in the study of religion, this could hardly be otherwise. This volume is an attempt to contribute to this further development and to bring about more debate.

— Wade Clark Roof

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