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## Urban Arenas of Ethnic Conflict

A city is a product of both hegemonic and subordinate cultures, and, at the same time, the site for their production.

—J. Agnew, J. Mercer, and D. Sopher,  
*The City in Cultural Context* (1984)

A disturbing number of cities across the world are susceptible to intense intercommunal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist fractures. Cities such as Jerusalem, Belfast, Johannesburg, Nicosia, Montreal, Algiers, Sarajevo, New Delhi, Beirut, and Brussels are urban arenas penetrable by deep intergroup conflict associated with ethnic or political differences. In some cases, a city is the target or focal point for unresolved nationalistic ethnic conflict. Jerusalem is at the spatial epicenter of Israeli-Palestinian conflict which during the five years of the *intifada* cost more than 1,600 lives (Human Rights Watch 1993a). In other cases, a city is not a primary cause of intergroup conflict, but a platform for the expression of conflicting sovereignty claims or for tensions related to ethnic group relations. Belfast is the capital and the most important stage for conflict in contested Northern Ireland, a province that has borne witness to more than three thousand Protestant and Catholic deaths over the twenty-five years of civil war. New Delhi is the site of Hindu-Muslim tension and violence as separatist campaigns concerning Kashmir and Khalistan penetrate this center of Indian population and culture. And urban centers in Germany are platforms for right-wing groups in their

displays of hostility toward Mediterranean labor migrants and political refugees.<sup>1</sup>

In other cases, the management of war-torn cities holds the key to sustainable coexistence of warring ethnic groups subsequent to cessation of overt hostilities. In the former Yugoslavia, the cities of Sarajevo and Mostar are critical elements in whether enemies can spatially coexist in a workable reconstruction of a war-torn Bosnia that has suffered more than 200,000 dead and 1.7 million refugees.<sup>2</sup> Johannesburg is the economic powerhouse and largest urban region in the new democratic South Africa, a country where more than 15,000 people have been killed since the mid-1980s in political violence between the former white government and blacks, with thousands more dead from black-on-black hostilities (Human Rights Watch 1993a). The physically partitioned city of Nicosia is the focal point of the United Nations–managed settlement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots who engaged in a civil war that cost more than 10,000 lives in the 1960s and 1970s. The Lebanese political capital and cultural center of Beirut is undergoing physical and social reconstruction after a fifteen-year civil war that cost more than 15,000 Muslim, Christian, and Druze lives. And in the new Baltic countries of the former Soviet Union, native and Russian populations now coexist uneasily in the urban centers of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Yet, in other cities such as Brussels and Montreal, there have been effective efforts to defuse nationalistic conflict through cooperative communal governance and lawmaking.

Common to many of these cities is that ethnic identity<sup>3</sup> and nationalism<sup>4</sup> combine to create pressures for group rights, autonomy, or territorial separation. Such ethnic nationalism is often exclusive and fragmentary, and may constitute a threat to an existing state when an ethnic group aspires to create a nation-state different than currently exists.<sup>5</sup> In ethnically polarized cities, the machinery of government is often controlled by one ethnic group and used to discriminate against competing and threatening groups. In other cases, a third-party mediator may be brought in to govern the urban setting. In either case, the very legitimacy of a city's political structures and its rules of decisionmaking and governance are commonly challenged by ethnic groups who either seek an equal or proportionate share of power (such as blacks in South Africa) or demand group-based autonomy or independence (such as Palestinians in Jerusalem or the Quebecois in Montreal). In the most intense cases,

these cities are battlegrounds between "homeland" ethnic groups, each proclaiming the city as their own (Esman 1985).

As we witness changes since the 1960s in the scale of world conflict from international to intrastate, urban centers of ethnic proximity and diversity assume increased salience to those studying and seeking to resolve contemporary conflict. Sixty-nine of the ninety-four wars recorded between 1945 and 1988 (INCORE 1994) have been intrastate conflicts killing an estimated 17–30 million people and displacing millions from their home countries. Eighty percent of all war deaths since World War II have been internal to national states (Russett and Starr 1989; Brogan 1990). Of the thirty-seven major armed conflicts in the world in 1991, twenty-five of them were intrastate conflicts between ethnic groups or between an ethnic group and a government (Eriksen 1993). Gurr and Harff (1994, 6) document forty-nine "protracted communal conflicts" in the world today that are confrontations between "ethnic groups and governments over fundamental issues of group rights and identity" and "usually involved recurring episodes of intense violence."<sup>6</sup>

Within ethnically tense and fragmenting states, urban management of ethnic competition has profound consequences for the national, and ultimately, international level (Ashkenasi 1988a). Urban areas and their civilian populations are "soft, high-value" targets for broader conflict (Brown 1993). They can become important military and symbolic battlegrounds and flashpoints for violence between warring ethnic groups seeking sovereignty, autonomy, or independence. Cities are fragile and vulnerable organisms subject to economic stagnation, demographic disintegration, cultural suppression, and ideological and political excesses violent in nature. They are focal points of urban and regional economies dependent on multi-ethnic contacts, social and cultural centers and platforms for political expression, and potential centers of grievance and mobilization. They provide the locus of everyday interaction where ethnicity and identity can be created and re-created (Erikson 1993). They are suppliers of important religious and cultural symbols, zones of intergroup proximity and intimacy, and arenas where the size and concentration of a subordinate population can present the most direct threat to the state. Much more than at larger geographic scales where segregation of ethnic communities is possible, the proximity of urban living means that contested cities can be located on the fault line between cultures—between modernizing societies and

traditional cultures; between individual-based and community-based economies and societal ethics; between democracy and more authoritarian regimes; and/or between old colonial governments and native populations.

Polarized cities are characterized by “narrow ground” (Stewart 1977) where antagonistic parties encounter one another spatially and functionally.<sup>7</sup> In many cases, the proximate and contentious ethnic territoriality found in the residential fabric of a contested city constricts and dichotomizes urban living. A city is a site where belligerent peoples come together—if not due to intergroup competition over urban space, then to the economic interdependencies inherent to urban living. The narrow ground is also felt by city policymakers because ethnic polarization circumscribes policy options. Penetration of the city by extralocal conflict requires urban management not only of city services, but of ideological or religious expression and other correlates of intergroup tension and hostilities.

This study examines how nationalistic ethnic conflict penetrates the building of cities and explores whether urban policies and their effects may independently influence, for better or worse, the shape and magnitude of that conflict. In other words, it explores how urban policy is affected by the conditions imposed by deep-rooted nationalistic conflict, but also how local decisions may affect the dynamics of the conflict. It tests the proposition that cities are not simple mirrors of broader ethnic conflict, but instead capable of channeling, modifying, or disrupting broader imperatives and governing ideologies. Urban arenas of national conflict are not necessarily passive receptacles. Rather, as Friedland and Hecht (1996) suggest, national and religious conflict may be worked out, and modulated, in urban space. Through their shaping and control of ethnic territorial expression, city governing regimes may independently intensify or moderate the level of interethnic tension and the coherency of mobilization by a subordinated “out-group.” Urban policy and administrative strategies related to spatial organization, demographic allocation, service delivery and spending, and economic development may have direct links to ethnic groups’ feelings of psychological security and fairness in the urban milieu. Urban policies also may influence political organization on the part of an aggrieved group (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1994). If these expectations that cities matter amidst conflict are accurate, the urban region becomes an essential analytical scale for studying

the contemporary intrastate patterns and processes of ethnic conflict, violence, and their management.

It is not evident whether a major city in the midst of nationalistic ethnic conflict will constitute a flashpoint for intergroup tension or a buffer against it. A city presents a subordinate ethnic group with the "often-contradictory forces of state assimilation and discrimination" (A. Smith 1993). On the one hand, the economic centrality and/or religious symbolism of a city within a national hierarchy and the close juxtaposition of antagonistic neighborhoods would lead one to anticipate exacerbation of the general level of interethnic tension and the increasing frequency of violent actions. Intergroup proximity and interaction characteristic of urban areas might provide sparks to unresolved and long-simmering ethnic fires. To the extent that a city is a flashpoint, it can act as a major and independent obstruction to the success of larger regional and national peace processes.<sup>8</sup> Yet the same features of urban closeness and interdependency may lead local political leaders and elites to engage in workable ethnic compromises not politically possible at a larger geographic scale. Ashkenasi (1988a) suggests that the pragmatic needs of communal government will influence city leadership and intergroup relations in a more affirmative fashion than it does national-level ethnic relations. In addition, the realities of urban interdependence may make it more difficult for ethnic groups to live in their own "purified" communities insulated by myths of sameness and communal solidarity (Sennett 1970). Cities may then be buffers against the strong winds of sectarianism and ethnicity. In these cases, the possibility exists that urban-based ethnic compromises may, under certain conditions, radiate outward to help pacify conflict at national and international levels.

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This research project investigates city and regional conflicts that reflect deep ethno-ideological divisions, focusing on the relationship in ethnically polarized cities between urban policy strategies and the magnitude and manifestations of local and regional ethnic conflict. Specifically, it asks whether cities matter amidst conflict—is urban planning and policy capable of independently affecting relations between ethnic groups or are local actions derivative of fundamental governing ideologies and thus irrelevant? The study explores two case studies—Jerusalem (Israel and West Bank) and

Belfast (Northern Ireland)—through the analysis of published and unpublished academic articles and government reports, evaluation of quantitative urban data, and the undertaking of numerous interviews. Field research involved three months in each location during the October 1994 to March 1995 period. During this time, I undertook seventy-four face-to-face interviews with a diverse collection of persons involved in, or affected by, the city policymaking process. Throughout all research tasks, I examine whether there exists a semiautonomous, meaningful role for urban policymaking amidst conflict, and whether the effects of local decisions on ethnic relations facilitate or obstruct the goals of the governing regime.

If cities matter amidst conflict, urban management of ethnic strife may possibly provide lessons—either positive or adverse—for ethnic governance at national and cross-national scales. One of the greatest challenges facing many world cities today is to facilitate the expression of ethnic and cultural diversity that enriches city life while at the same time working against the physical and psychological barriers, hostility, and violence that can paralyze and impoverish it. Applied research in this area will provide to practitioners and officials a better understanding of the complexities of urban policymaking amidst uncertainty and strife.<sup>9</sup> Government practices and public policy are viewed here not as inconsequential to ethnic conflict. This is consistent with cross-national analyses of ethnic conflict which reveal that today's ethnic violence stems as much from actions by political elites and ethnic entrepreneurs as from traditional community antagonisms (Pesic 1996; Esman and Telhami 1995; Snyder 1993). Ethnic tension and violence at the urban level provides an important microcosm of intergroup dynamics at more encompassing geographic scales. Thus, applied urban research may provide to policy officials at local, national, and cross-national scales a keener awareness of how government authority and its expression affects the dynamics of ethnic nationalism.

This work is organized in the following fashion. The remainder of chapter 1 describes the extraordinary nature of societal division that exists within contested cities and asserts that diverse perspectives on the management of ethnic conflict must be utilized to effectively study the complexities of cities amidst conflict. Chapter 2 constructs a conceptual framework that connects the governing ideology of the urban state, urban policy strategies, ethnic conditions in the city (both objective and perceptual), and urban intergroup

stability or volatility. Chapter 3 explains the selection of Jerusalem and Belfast for study and locates the field research within the larger and evolving peacemaking processes enveloping Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland. The next three chapters comprise a case study of Jerusalem, exploring the key aspects of Israeli urban policy in chapter 4, the internal dynamics of partisan policymaking and its effect on Palestinians in chapter 5, and the effect of urban policy on intergroup ethnic relations in the city, metropolitan region, and West Bank in chapter 6. A case study of Belfast comprises the next three chapters. In chapter 7, the neutral intentions of British urban policy are described; in chapter 8, the effects of this approach on government action and on Belfast's residents and neighborhoods are analyzed; in chapter 9, the rudiments of an alternative urban policy approach more consistent with the advancement of peace are portrayed. Finally, in chapter 10, I explore the connecting and distinguishing themes culled from the two case studies, draw conclusions regarding the effects of urban policy on conflict, and suggest that cities (and urban policies) have an indispensable role to play in fostering and deepening national peace and reconciliation.

### Divided and Polarized Cities

Ethnically polarized cities host a deeper, more intransigent type of urban conflict than is found in most cities. Cities are frequently divided geographically by ethnicity, race, income, and age (Massey and Denton 1993; Goldsmith and Blakely 1992). In most cities, conflicts focus on issues of service delivery (such as housing), land use compatibility, and facility siting. Yet conflicts in these *divided* cities are addressed within accepted political frameworks. Questions of what constitutes the public good are debated but largely within a sanctioned framework. For example, African Americans in the 1960s protested for a greater share of economic benefits, but did so within a political framework they largely accepted.<sup>10</sup> After the 1992 Los Angeles riots, issues of service distribution dominated those of territoriality and sovereignty. Gurr (1993) labels these as "ethno-class" conflicts involving quests for political and economic equality and for cultural rights. In such divided cities, coalition building remains possible across ethnic groups and cross-cutting cleavages defuse and moderate intergroup conflict (Nordlinger 1972). One of

the major roles of urban planning in such circumstances is to ameliorate urban conflict through an acceptable allocation of urban services and benefits across ethnic groups and their neighborhoods.

In contrast, urban *polarization* occurs in cases where ethnic and nationalist claims combine and impinge significantly and consistently on distributional questions at the municipal level (Boal and Douglas 1982; Benvenisti 1986a). Polarized cities host "alternative and directly opposing cultures that are 'contestable'" (Agnew, Mercer, and Sopher 1984). Such conflicts are "ethnonational" wherein one group seeks autonomy or separation (Gurr 1993). In such a circumstance, a strong minority of the urban population may reject urban and societal institutions, making consensus regarding political power sharing impossible (Douglas and Boal 1982; Romann and Weingrod 1991). The severity and intractability of intergroup conflict in polarized cities can overwhelm the adversary politics between government and opposition common in modern democratic states. Political means are seen as incapable of effectively resolving urban ethnic differences. While doctrines of collective rights, pluralism, or autonomy are invoked by those on the outside, the politically dominant *in-group* views resistance by a historically subordinated *out-group* as an obstacle to "natural" processes of city building and assimilation (Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985).

Whereas in most cities there is a belief maintained by all groups that the existing system of governance is properly configured and capable of producing fair outcomes, assuming adequate political participation and representation of minority interests,<sup>11</sup> governance in "polarized" cities is often viewed by a not insubstantial segment of the ethnic minority population as artificial, imposed, or illegitimate. In those cases where an ethnic minority acknowledges the authority of city governance, it deeply mistrusts its intrinsic capability to respond to calls for equal, or group-based, treatment. A "combustible mixture" of distributive and political grievances can then combine to turn the attention of subordinated ethnic leaders from urban reform of the existing system to, next, radical restructuring or to, finally, separation and autonomy.<sup>12</sup>

The occurrence of intergroup tension and violence in polarized cities can be qualitatively different than in divided cities. Many polarized cities are the sites of enduring and consistent interethnic violence laden with political meaning, capable of destabilizing both city life and larger peace processes. The potential for explosiveness



in many polarized cities is more catastrophic and politically salient than the individual criminally based actions of divided cities.<sup>13</sup> In settings where antagonistic sides view each other as threats to physical, cultural, or social survival, violence can be “rational” in that it is viewed as the only way for an aggrieved ethnic group to change intractable institutions and circumstances (Sisk 1995). Such circumstances, however, can produce “hurting stalemates” where the status quo is mutually damaging and neither side can impose its solution upon the other (Touval and Zartman 1985).

### Urban Policy amidst Polarization

This study of the relationship between urban policy and broader ideological conflict seeks to integrate political science, urban planning, geographic, and social-psychological perspectives on the management of ethnic conflict. Models and theories from multiple disciplines are utilized because no single perspective is likely to capture fully the complex social and ecological aspects of urban ethnic conflict. I now discuss each disciplinary strand and its contributions and limitations to the study of city-based nationalistic conflict.

*Political science* models of conflict management focus on political and legal arrangements and mechanisms at the level of the nation-state that might diffuse or moderate conflict. By de-emphasizing applications to city governance and management, these models limit their utility regarding how city officials are to operate in ethnically polarized cities. Micropolitical, or smaller scale, forms of conflict management in urban areas—such as discrimination and segregation, demographic policies, or community relations—are seen simply as tools of larger macropolitical objectives operating at national and international levels (O’Leary and McGarry 1995). The city is assumed to reflect at a concrete level the playing out of broader imbalances of power. Or, as Rothman (1992) points out, the “low politics” of groups and how they pursue the fulfillment of human needs for their constituents is dismissed as unimportant compared to the “high politics” of states and their promotion and protection of national interests.

Notwithstanding their dismissal of city-based dynamics, political science models of conflict management have important implications for urban management. O’Leary and McGarry (1995) outline two

types of methods—those that would eliminate ethnic differences and those that would manage such differences.<sup>14</sup> Methods that seek to eliminate differences include forced mass population transfers, partition or secession, and integration or assimilation. Ethnic cleansing in Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and apartheid in Johannesburg (South Africa) illustrate the application at the urban and regional scale of forced population transfers. More commonly, city administrations manipulate demographic proportions and spatially fragment an antagonistic ethnic group in order to achieve the same political objectives as forced relocations. Political partitioning of urban space (as in Nicosia, Cold War Berlin, and Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967) can be an important feature of national-level agreements regarding territorial separation. At the same time, urban partitioning introduces practical problems not found at a national scale. Finally, integration or assimilation strategies in many ways have greater salience at the smaller-scale urban level than they do at more dispersed national scales. Cities can seek integration through the attempted creation of a civic identity that would transcend ethnic identity. Assimilation takes this one step farther in attempting to create a common cultural identity derived through a melting pot process.

Methods for managing, rather than eliminating, ethnic differences include hegemonic control, third-party intervention, cantonization or federalization, and consociation or power sharing. Political stability is achieved by hegemonic control at the cost of democracy. One side dominates the state apparatus and channels in a partisan way decisionmaking outcomes toward the favored ethnic group (Lustick 1979; Smooha 1980). However, the proximity and interdependence of urban ethnic populations may necessitate in hegemonically controlled cities greater cooperation or co-optation between political leaders than would be found at national levels. Third-party intervention relies on there being an arbiter whose claim of neutrality must be broadly accepted by contending ethnic groups. At the urban scale, this perceived joint neutrality can be difficult because historic imbalances and inequalities are highlighted by a relative deprivation effect induced by physical proximity. Even well-intended policies by a third party can be seen as reinforcing these inequalities if root causes of urban disparities are not addressed.

Cantonization and federalization involve, in the first case, devolution of some government authority to homogeneous ethnonational

territories; and, in the second, separate domains of formal authority between levels of government. Urban applications of these concepts include, in the first case, the creation of community or neighborhood-based groups that would advise or decide on local issues. In the second case, there would be the creation of a metropolitan government and subordinate municipal governments. The last model of ethnic management is consociation or power sharing. At the national level, this has been the most closely scrutinized option for deeply divided societies. Lijphart's (1968, 1977) "consociational" democracy and Nordlinger's (1972) "conflict-regulating practices" focus on the role of cooperative efforts by political leaders in creating government structures and rules (such as proportional representation and minority veto power) that can overcome and diffuse societal fragmentation. Horowitz (1985) recommends the creation of incentives that would encourage politicians and voters to consider interests beyond their communal segments.<sup>15</sup> Although power sharing is usually studied exclusively at the national governmental level, it has relevance to the governance of cities split by ethnic nationalism (O'Leary and McGarry 1995).

Another line of political investigation—exemplified by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996), Gurr and Harff (1994), Tarrow (1994), Gurr (1993), and Weitzer (1990)—explores the cause and dynamics of communal conflict and ethnic group mobilization. Although applied to national settings, its focus on whether relative conditions of deprivation or aspects of an ethnic group's political organization and leadership primarily cause community protest and rebellion has direct salience to urban settings. In the first case, the origins of protest and resistance are found in a sense of injustice and grievance widely shared across out-group members. In the second case, resistance is a function of the actions and skills of ethnic group leaders, organizations, and networks. Targeting relative deprivation as the culprit, city governments could potentially try to ameliorate nationalistic claims and protests by an antagonistic ethnic group through betterment of objective urban conditions. Because cities may be either platform or palliative for community protest, the intensity of urban opposition may be different than, and be able to affect, the quality of national-level opposition.

Models and theories of *urban planning* have more directly addressed local policymaking and administration. However, a major limitation of this literature is that much of planning prescription

and theory has been dependent upon there being legitimate sources of power and control (Friedmann 1987). Traditional planning practice is rooted in assumptions of the maintenance of a stable state (Morley and Shachar 1986). In contrast, urban planning in ethnically polarized cities must act within conditions of instability and uncertainty that call into question the very basis of its traditional practice. Traditional planning is linked to societal guidance, urban reform, and the pursuit of a general "public interest" within the largely consensual policymaking environments characteristic of Western democracies. In contrast, the "public interest" in polarized cities is either fragile or impossible under contested conditions.

Urban planning has tended to focus on technical aspects of land use and development and avoided discussions concerning values and social justice (Thomas 1994; Thomas and Krishnarayan 1994). Equity-based approaches to planning exist that are based on notions of social justice (Davidoff 1967; Krumholtz and Clavel 1994). Yet their emphasis on increasing the representation of disadvantaged groups' interests during decisionmaking does not appear to be generalizable to situations where politics is segmented and antagonistic. The role of urban planning amidst ethnic polarization is problematic. Benvenisti (1986a) states that planning's use of pragmatic, process-oriented approaches aimed at urban symptoms, not root causes, legitimizes the status quo and institutionalizes the dual, unequal conditions common to urban polarization. Planners' definition of urban problems in universal, civil-libertarian terms can reach a "manageable" solution by a convenient perception of the problem, yet a solution that has little importance when sovereignty and autonomy are the leading issues. The compatibility between dominant forms of power and the exercise of urban planning bears a resemblance to structuralist and neo-Marxist critiques of urban planning policy. These have castigated the profession for its subservience to the economic powers of advanced urban capitalism (Dear and Scott 1981). In its extreme, urban planning can be instrumental in the exercise of state repression and coercion (Yiftachel 1995). In contrast, two models of planning policy described by Friedmann (1987) have potentially more productive roles in the management and reconstruction of polarized cities. A "social learning" model of urban planning allows for the profession to learn from action and practice in ethnically polarized environments, and could be at the forefront in grassroots efforts to accommodate antagonistic

ethnicities within the urban milieu. A "social mobilization" or "empowerment" model of urban planning is more radical and seeks emancipation of working people, women, and oppressed ethnic groups (Friedmann 1987, 1992).

*Geographic* analyses of ethnically polarized environments provide insight into the spatial and territorial aspects and dynamics of such contest. Sack's (1981, 55) definition of territoriality is illuminating:

[T]he attempt to affect, influence, or control actions and interactions (of people, things, and relationships) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographical area.

A dominant ethnic government in a contested city can seek to contain an antagonistic group's territorial expression (Yiftachel 1995). This can be done through the intentional expansion of the dominant group's urban space or the restriction of subordinate group space. There is the effort to prevent the emergence of a powerful, regionally-based, counterculture which may challenge the ethnic state (Yiftachel 1995.) Territorial policies can displace attention away from the root causes of social conflict to conflicts among territorial spaces themselves (Sack 1986). In the urban setting, this means that international issues of sovereignty and autonomy become reducible to issues over neighborhoods and suburban growth. Urban territoriality can also become worthy of endless defense, no matter its realistic functionality in meeting the defending ethnic group's objective needs. In such a setting, even a well-intentioned urban government's sensitivity toward ethnic territoriality can help sustain and promote ethnic social cleavages (Murphy 1989).

The proximity of urban living introduces problematic effects of territoriality that must be faced by a dominant ethnic group. To control an antagonistic ethnic population, a dominant ethnic group in many cases will try to penetrate it geographically in order to establish a physical presence and to fragment the opposing group's sense of community. Yet such penetration forces the protagonist to give up some of the security provided by ethnic separation (Rommann 1995).<sup>16</sup> Thus, efforts at territorial control can paradoxically reduce group security. Spatial competition brings antagonistic groups closer together, establishing conditions for further conflict. In other cases, achievement of territorial control at one geographic

scale (for instance, that of the city) may expose the dominating group to demographic and physical threats at the next broader geographic scale (for instance, the urban or metropolitan region). Thus, territoriality may engender further efforts at territorial control in a self-fulfilling cycle (Sack 1986). Yet it has been suggested that in contested areas the greater the land area under territorial control, the less the control over the subordinated population (Akenson 1992, Williams 1994). Administrative control over land and political control over people are not necessarily the same.

Other urban geographic treatises have examined the relationship between urban space and social justice. Harvey's (1973) territorial distributive justice implies a spatial form that fulfills basic needs, contributes to the common good as well as private needs, and allocates extra resources to areas of extreme environmental or social difficulty. To D. Smith (1994), a socially just geography is one that reduces inequality. And Barry (1989, 146) connects the concept of spatial distributive justice to its institutional basis, highlighting the "institutions that together determine the access (or chances of access) of the members of a society to resources that are the means to the satisfaction of a wide variety of desires." This last comment highlights the need in ethnically polarized cities to connect geographic strategies and outcomes to the motivating ideologies and institutional rationales underlying them. How political goals are connected to specific territorial policies, and the effect these territorial outcomes have in turn on these goals, is a topic that geographic analyses have de-emphasized. We need to connect the spatial to the political.

The *social psychology* of urban intergroup conflict is a final important consideration when studying urban ethnic conflict. Social-psychological studies of intergroup conflict and urban aggression indicate the immediate sources of ethnic conflict that must be addressed in efforts at accommodation. Ethnic conflicts of the type found in polarized cities are only marginally over material interests, but rather touch deeply on human needs for security, identity, and recognition, fair access to political institutions, and economic participation (R. Cohen 1978; Burton 1990; Kelman 1990; Azar 1991). The proximity of urban living can exacerbate these felt needs through the effect of relative deprivation and the psychology of imbalance. The threatened loss of group identity and security amidst conditions of urban conflict—due in particular to urban territorial

changes—can be a prime motivator of antagonism and unrest. To a threatened subgroup, psychological needs pertaining to community and cultural viability (measured through the survival, for instance, of ethnic schools or religious institutions in a neighborhood) can be as important as objective needs pertaining to land for housing and economic activities. Recognition and maintenance of group identity would seem to be an essential building block for peacemaking efforts at urban and national levels.<sup>17</sup>

Psychologists trained in intergroup conflict resolution emphasize not the promotion and preservation of political interests, but the non-negotiable values of each side associated with human needs and identity needs. As Burton (1991, 81) states, “there can be no resolution of a conflict unless it takes into account as political reality the perceptions and values of those who are represented in facilitated discussions.” Without addressing core human needs such as identity, security, and economic access, conflicts may be managed for awhile by political leaders but seldom resolved, since core human needs are often bypassed by political negotiations. Social-psychological, needs-based approaches to conflict resolution focus on locally based intergroup conflict and thus have salience to urban conflict. However, these techniques are usually not directly linked to formal policy processes. Indeed, such intergroup deliberations, to be effective, need to be free of the power relations and vested interests of formal politics and policymaking (Kelman and Cohen 1976; Burton 1990; Fisher 1990; Rothman 1992). The current study attempts to highlight the social-psychological effects of urban policy on both subordinate and dominant ethnic groups. It seeks to explain the debilitating effects of urban strategies on group perceptions of security, identity, and cohesiveness, and to hopefully indicate directions whereby future urban actions can accommodate and respect human needs as part of a larger peace.

Psychologists have also examined the physical ecology (environmental factors) and social ecology (personal characteristics) of aggression. Absent resolution of root causes underlying urban violence, policymakers can seek attenuation of overt hostile acts by either designing physical environments to dissuade aggression or providing opportunities for conflict-reducing intergroup conflict (Goldstein 1994). The former category of environmental design interventions includes access control, formal surveillance by security personnel, and the creation of environments that facilitate natural

surveillance by residents engaged in day-to-day activities (Wood 1991; Clarke 1992). “Defensible space,” for example, is designed so that multiple “eyes on the street” dissuade criminal behavior (Newman 1975). A more hardened approach to environmental crime prevention is described by M. Davis (1990) in his account of a “militarization of urban space” aimed at protecting against urban aggressors or unwanted. Social ecological interventions, in contrast, seek to facilitate intergroup contact that will overcome stereotyping and hatred. This assumes that group insularity and prejudice are at the roots of intergroup conflict. Yet intergroup encounters may actually increase conflict if the groups are not of equal status or do not share some common goals (Allport 1954; Goldstein 1991). This is problematic because in ethnically polarized cities, status—actual or perceived—is commonly not equivalent between groups, but is usually of a dominant-subordinate nature. Identity-enhancing and confidence-building community development initiatives on both sides of the urban divide may be necessary for intergroup contact to have any measurable positive effect.

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Each analytical perspective on the management of ethnic conflict—political science, urban planning, geographic, and social-psychological—offers penetrating insights into the dynamics, management, and possible resolution of urban-based ethnic conflict. Yet, because each tends to have a different target of analysis—national political, urban strategic, territorial/spatial, and individual or group-based, respectively—it becomes necessary to integrate their perspectives to more fruitfully learn about the multifaceted interplay of urban management and ethnic nationalism. A synthesis of several perspectives provides the opportunity to connect broader political ideologies to urban strategies and their specific territorial outcomes. These, in turn, have significant effects on group identity and deprivation, and thus ultimately on the extent and manifestations of urban unrest and violence.